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# WHAT IS EDUCATION?

EDUCATION, at the present hour, is exciting the profoundest interest amongst all classes of the people of England. It is felt to be one of the most important duties imposed on the social life of the whole nation. Great institutions for educating have been organized and are at work all over the country. A vast new province has been added to the public service. Boards for inspecting and examining have been established. The law commands all children to be educated. They must spend their early years at school; and the efficiency of those schools and the effects produced on the pupils are tested and recorded by public inspectors, who send in reports to the chiefs of their departments. Members of the government, of great official position, make speeches in London and the counties, proclaiming the importance of education for developing the civilization of the country. Schools and colleges are being rapidly multiplied all over the land, so warm is the flame with which patriotism burns in this most interesting region. Ardent efforts are made on every side to develop in the young an ever-increasing amount of mental and, along with it, moral culture. That civilization means education; that it has education for its foundation; that success in the arts, in trade, in manufacturing, with better and happier homes for the laboring as for the richer classes, necessarily implies education, are truths to which the eyes of all England are more and more directed.

Under circumstances and feelings such as these, the mighty question comes forward with irresistible force, What is education? What is it that education is called upon to do for the young? To bestow knowledge stored up in the brain, is the almost universal answer. Teachers pour out long lectures of

19090
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highly elaborated knowledge. It is gathered up by memory, and is reproduced with accuracy to the questioning of masters and inspectors. Pupils of the higher order are trained to write out with correctness the beautiful sentences which have fallen from the master's lips, and he proudly points out their excellence to the examiners sent to inquire into his success. This system has spread widely in every direction; even universities have been captivated by the fine compositions and brilliant statements elicited by their examinations. They point to the splendid compositions sent in by candidates for honors, to the multitudes of elaborate statements in reply to historical inquiries, and they ask, What results can be finer or more powerfully testify to a grand education? But is this the true, the one all-important answer to the critical question, What is education? Is memory, however wide its range and accurate its responses, the very essence of a human being, the root of his civilization? Will the repetition of a whole book, however excellent the book, by itself alone prove that the power of thinking has received its highest development, that the mind has reached the greatest strength of which nature has made it susceptible? All knowledge is valuable; yet is the possession of the largest possible stock of knowledge, resting on memory alone, the greatest intellectual force which the human mind can acquire? Would the ability to repeat correctly every page of an encyclopædia make the man who possessed this treasure the most commanding thinker, the most powerful discoverer of truth, the most vigorous reasoner, the dominant genius in poetry, statesmanship, or philosophy? Would he be the honored judge to whom all his countrymen would appeal with submission for all moral or social difficulties?

It is almost idle to ask such questions; so glaring is the absurdity with which they deal, and so steadily is the nation opening its eyes to the certain truth that it will never learn from this quarter what education really is. Memory will never generate the ablest man, great tho the services are which a strong memory will yield to its possessor. And then there is another consideration of the gravest moment. At what cost are the powers of the memory developed? Vast is its cost of production, any intelligent economist would say. The treasure piled up in the store-house may be enormous; but how was the accu-

mulation accomplished? Those who adopt the memory as their educational tool are ever exerting greater pressure on their pupils. The acquisition of knowledge is held to be true education; and the more earnest and noble-minded is the feeling to rescue the young from ignorance, the stronger will be the effort to pile up knowledge on the memory, and the more fatal will be the consequences to the unhappy victims of such a theory of education. Additional hours are incessantly demanded for school, longer and more frequent lectures to be remembered are given, severer codes of attendance enforced, and thus a mass of over-education is required under which the brains of countless youthful sufferers sink into pain and often into lunacy.

Public complaints are breaking out on every side. We are told of "a widowed mother, praying that her child should not be forced, for night after night his mind wandered, calling out fragments of his instruction." Children are unable to sleep through school-work. They are forced up to a certain pitch to pass the inspector, and then the knowledge they have acquired rolls away like water. Boys and girls are found in hospitals, suffering under nervous diseases which physicians declare to have proceeded from overtaxed brains.

But there are more fearful events yet to tell, which have happened amongst the higher classes of society. The *Times* of December 11, 1882, records the physical and mental deterioration which has fallen on the civil servants of India, described by an Indian correspondent. It has already awakened official alarm. "Since the institution of competitive examinations, out of a hundred odd civilians nine have died and two forced to retire on account of physical debility. Ten more were considered quite unfit for their work on account of bodily weakness, and eight have positively become insane. It is this system which is creating almost a panic here, especially as these cases of insanity are nearly all crowded up the last few years, during which the standard of examination has been raised to the highest pitch. The most anxious scrutiny is now made of each new batch of young civilians, as landed, and their physical and mental condition is at once reported to the government." Is it not humiliating to be told that the consequences are such as to have established the conviction that the seeds of insanity are largely

sown in their brains, and that a very serious proportion of those who have come out at the head of the examinations are unquestionably laboring under mental disease which will drive them away from their work? They will be unable to bear the strain of the work of those offices which they have been selected to fill, and for which their studies are designed specially to prepare them.

And now from what cause does this most sad amount of disaster proceed? The correspondent of the *Times* has rightly stated it: "The fad of cramming" was the source of all the mischief. To cram is not to teach, neither for the teacher nor the taught. It has been well said that teaching is a pleasure, but assuredly cramming is not, and the difference to the pupil is immense. There is no sympathy, no joint action of thought and feeling between pupil and teacher in cramming. They do not live together in the same thoughts nor hunt together in the same field. To cram is simply to load, to pile up as on a cart; to summon the memory to gather up certain things and to store them away till they are called for. It learns knowledge by heart, it gathers formulas and correct sentences, but it does not discover knowledge by means of the thinking intelligence of the pupil's mind; and if only memory repeats correctly the words required, the examiner generally does not care to inquire whether they have been understood. The right words are on the paper, and that is enough. Meanwhile it is forgotten that memory is far severer for the brain than the exercise of intelligence, and thus the thinking power is struck with paralysis. Here we find the explanation of the great change for the worse which has come over education in England. The mode of conducting examinations is the cause of all the mischief. *Viva voce* has been flung aside and paper work substituted in its place. Good *viva voce* examiners are hard to find, and much work is required of them. But a still stronger force has made its appearance and has been energetically at work. Answers on paper produce such beautiful compositions. Long arrays of knowledge are brought up by the pupil, repeating often with marvellous accuracy what great writers have said on the subjects treated. Pupils and tutors alike feel themselves honored by the brilliant exhibitions created by this process. They point to papers and exclaim, "What can be

finer or better?" The masters attach the rewards of the school to these elaborate manuscripts, the prizes and the scholarships which cover the young with glory. Parents are charmed with the excellent results, and spare no efforts to stimulate their children to get up treasures of information which generate such brilliant performances on paper and lead up to such rewards. But how are all these great achievements effected? By memory, not by intellectual mastering of the subjects handled. Repetition by heart is the instrument employed, cramming performs the work, and the physical and intellectual consequences of cramming are piled up on the youthful victims. We thus see that cramming does not supply the answer to the great question, What is education?

That answer will be found, not in what the mind contains, so much as in the state of the mind itself. All education, of course, involves some amount of knowledge acquired; the thinking faculty cannot be trained except by its action in acquiring knowledge: but knowledge—that is, words accurately repeated—by itself alone is not education. True education is the development of the thinking power of the human mind, and its mighty instrument is *viva voce*, employed partly in examinations, but with incomparably more power and effect in actual teaching itself. The aim and task of education—independently of the value of the knowledge obtained for moral or any other purposes—is to cultivate the powers of the understanding, to strengthen and enlarge them, to show how they are to be used in mastering any subject. It seeks to train the young pupil how to use his brain, how to determine and examine for himself the questions put before him, how to handle his mind as a tool, and thus to realize the very purposes for which that mind was given him. In a word, to teach him how to think.

Now what is the educational process to be adopted for accomplishing this great object of teaching a boy how to think? Not, certainly, to set him to read well-written and learned books, to store up their contents in his memory, and then to pour them out at examinations. Nor will this great end be reached by learned addresses from tutors, carefully gathered up in notes by the pupils and then followed up by examinations which simply test the attention and the accuracy of the students. This

is cram—nothing better. Such lectures, indeed, may prove most valuable, if embodied in an education which is steadily developing the thinking power and ever imparting to the pupil a constantly increasing faculty of mastering and making his own learning set before him by able instructors. The thinking powers, however, must be awakened before such lectures can pass out of cramming. We are still summoned to inquire, How is a boy to be taught how to think?

The answer is not difficult; indeed it may be called obvious: yet how little is it perceived or valued at the present hour, even in our most distinguished institutions of education! Its secret lies in skilful questioning by the teacher, in power to make the pupil discover for himself the facts and truths to be gathered up at each place. The mighty tool of education is that the teacher and the taught, by the help of *viva voce*, should be engaged in a common search; that they should be living in the same thoughts, be ever consulting together how to make the discovery they seek to win. The work of the teacher is to direct the attention of the student to the facts lying before him, to stimulate his inquiry into the relations which they bear towards each other, what difficulties they present, how they are to be cleared away by thought, what new truths they reveal. To make the pupil find out for himself the answer to be given to each question, as it arises, is the very essence of real education. The questions put by the tutor place the student on the right ground. They show what he is to try to understand and explain. The several elements of the subject investigated are placed, one after another, before the pupil's mind. He is invited to put them together, and so to discover the lesson, the new knowledge they convey. Every insight into the subject which he gains as he moves along is made by the teacher to suggest something still farther on: the depths of the study are gradually and intelligently reached. The pupil's mind is ever kept thinking, putting together, and discovering. The knowledge won is in no small degree his own acquisition, the product of his own intelligence, his own brain. He is incessantly learning how to use the faculties with which his mind is endowed, and with their help, *guided but not told by the teacher*, to gather up the understanding of the subject to be explored.

The difference between the method of questioning and cramming is vast indeed. The knowledge ultimately reached may be the same. The crammer's book may, nay, generally does, give the goal to be reached. It is the right knowledge, but it is simply heaped up on the memory without being mastered and won by the thought of the learner. It is not his own, and it is left to disappear. Under the guidance of a questioning and challenging tutor, each stone of the knowledge sought has been discovered and handled, and put into the right place of the intellectual structure by the pupil. The subject is understood, because it has been looked into by an inquiring mind. To remember what has been grasped and understood is something utterly different from summoning the memory to reproduce a load of knowledge. What we have gathered from our own observation and comprehend we remember easily. It has become familiar, and familiarity wonderfully lightens the task of memory. If by any chance the exact statement is missing, a mind which is at home in the subject and knows how to search for it recovers it easily. No painful strain, no unhealthy effort, is needed.

Further, another advantage of immense value must be recorded of teaching by *viva voce*, by questioning. The pupil is at once placed in the very heart of his subject. The questions are put by a mind which is master of the subject to be explored. It leads at once the young intellect, step by step, to the very core of the subject examined; side issues, subordinate points, are passed by for the moment. The inquiry is pursued along the main road which leads directly to the point where everything is explained. The matter to be understood is thus firmly grasped.

Great is the power of *viva voce* in teaching; greater yet is it in examinations. It at once compels the pupil to feel that his only chance of facing his examiner lies in his understanding the subject. Knowledge will be demanded, of course, and it must be produced; but the pupil will know that the value put upon the knowledge, the marks given for it, will be reckoned on the basis of the answerer being at home in dealing with the knowledge he is asked for. No *viva voce* examiner worthy of the name will be contented with words repeated out of a book. He will imperatively seek to learn whether the knowledge contained in

it will repay the labor spent in acquiring it. The end of all teaching will be ever kept in view, the insight into the matter learnt. On the other hand, the feeling of the pupil who has to encounter an examiner who will take his answer to pieces will be radically different from that of a student who writes down unchallenged answers on paper. He knows that he will have to make his examiner see that he understands. Poor memory will retire into the second place; to master the subject will be the king of his studies.

Even with an examiner who has been also the teacher, the *viva voce* method will still be powerful. The student will not know what turn the examination will take, to what part of it the examiner will attach most importance, what assumed combination of facts he will have to explain or clear away. Nothing but a thorough mastery of the subject will give him safety, and that mastery is true education. The institution of *viva voce* examinations would at once crush the cramming which is paralyzing so fast the educational machinery of England.

The Oxford of old days brilliantly exhibited the power and the transcendent excellence of *viva voce* examinations. The *viva voce* mainly decided the fortunes of the candidates for honors. They were examined for half a day by men of the greatest ability in the university. What their views were on the subjects to be handled was seldom known accurately beforehand; what turn the examination would take was hard to foresee, until the examiner himself had revealed the state of his own mind and the character of his own knowledge. Crowds of undergraduates, whose day of fate was approaching, thronged the schools to learn what the examiners were, what they thought on divinity, ethics, history, and other topics, how they handled the candidates for honors, what they liked and disliked in their answers. Then—and this was an element of great significance—the examiners felt that they were themselves being examined. Tutors and private tutors were eager to learn what they held, what they laid stress on, by what processes they reached the conclusions they expected from the examined. The intellectual movement hence resulting in the university was vast, and, to its glory be it said, the system gave immense impulse to progress. The examiners were almost as

eager to acquire a distinguished reputation for progressive learning as the undergraduates were to win brilliant honors. The whole university was in a state of progress, and that progress could be measured by the advancing character of the examinations. As for cram, it was nowhere; organized, advancing thinking was met with on every side.

We have now reached the second stage in the process of education. We have seen that its first and great object is to teach the young mind how to think, how to make itself master of any subject which has to be learnt. The question comes to the front, What are the fields of study which commend themselves as the most suitable for making the young pupil an educated man?

Besides developing power of thought, all education seeks to acquire knowledge. In the lower classes of life, useful knowledge, knowledge that fits the learner to carry on some special business from which a livelihood is to be obtained, is the object most desired. The law here steps in and commands attendance at school for a period more or less long, and prescribes studies which transcend, more or less widely, what is specifically required for procuring a livelihood. The conception of a culture which aims at a development of human character which transcends mere utility is proclaimed by the programme of studies. A master endowed with the genius of teaching may here awaken visions which cause rays of bright illumination to shine. There are few things more common than the confusion of thought, the ignorance of first principles, the want of all real understanding of the business they carry on, to be found in men of great positions. Good *viva voce*, in their earlier years, might have done wonders for them. Then let us look lower down to the children of the lower classes: take for instance the sons of agricultural laborers. None more urgently need to earn their living by work. They are soon called away from school, yet in the short period of schooling they may be taught to perceive many truths, simple in appearance, but great forces in fact, which may prove of high value to them in agriculture. A little boy may easily be made to understand how a plant grows, how it picks up new substances from the sun and air or under or from the ground, how it decomposes those substances and ex-

tracts from them the parts which they can apply to their own growth. A simple but very instructive peep may be given him in chemistry. The perceptions thus gained may easily expand, as years advance, into real agricultural ability.

A like course with like results may be adopted in other callings, and there can be no doubt that, with a teacher who is master of *viva voce*, fundamental principles, full of light for the future, may be planted as germs in the youthful brain, to grow and bear fruit as the powers of the mind develop.

We come now to the class of young boys whose education has not for its aim the imparting of such knowledge as would fit them for pursuing a particular profession in life. Such education is given to youths who intend to become clergymen or lawyers or to occupy high posts in society. In such education, as in every other, knowledge must be imparted, but it need not necessarily be professional knowledge. The making of the man, the strengthening of his powers, the development of his mind and character, are the great ends sought in training him to fill an important station in the world. For the upper classes of English boys the chief instrument employed for education is the classics, the Greek and Latin languages in combination with mathematics and history. Science has lately made its appearance in these regions and is steadily advancing in request. These are excellent things for the young to learn, but, alas! they are peculiarly susceptible of cram. A vast amount of arithmetic may be learnt by rote with little insight into the real nature of its processes. Indeed it may be hoped that it will not be thought disrespectful to say of a department of knowledge so great and so powerful as mathematics that it is singularly exposed to the danger of being taught by mere mechanical practice. Lord Derby in a speech made at Derby records of his studies at Cambridge that "he had been subjected to the weary and unprofitable drudgery of cramming up a certain quantity of mathematics, anyhow, for the final examination without which competition for classical honors was not allowed. He had a lively recollection of the process; the only distinct impression which it had left upon his mind being this, that without that personal experience he should not have known with what marvellous rapidity knowledge crammed

up for a special purpose and never assimilated is apt to disappear."

History in our day has a fatal tendency to degenerate into cram. It is got up by repetition: the limbs of the body lie about; the living connection is absent. Dates, lines of kings, names of battle-fields, are placed heavily on the memory: the characters of the people, their manner of living, the details of their civilization, their political constitutions, the quality of their lives, the tone of their civilization, are little understood. As to science, we hear of chemistry asserting its right to be taught: the conception of the forces it deals with, their modes of action, we are often told, are wholly missing from the brains of the young. It is not to be denied that these branches of scientific knowledge may be taught on a different system, and that the thinking power of the pupils may be successfully summoned to enter into their essence, what they are and how they work; but that such teaching is flourishing in England evidence, we are told, fails to show. They are peculiarly susceptible of being crammed, and thus labor and thought are sadly wasted in the operation. A man may be able to count accurately every yard of distance to the stars, or to reckon up all the kings, and yet be none the wiser or more efficient for valuable working thereby. His mind, so far, may be nothing more than a dictionary.

If such are the dangers which beset the ordinary forms of education, the question comes home heavily upon us, Which is the best, the most productive instrument for effecting that confessedly most important function, education? For value and power, it may safely be asserted, the study of the Greek and Latin languages stands pre-eminently the first. Greek, above all, has no equal in educating force: it is the greatest, the most productive tool for developing the minds of the young known to man. The proclamation of this great truth was never more needed than at the present hour. What is the use, cries many a parent, of making a boy waste so many years on Greek and Latin? Is scholarship, the ability to translate well into English Greek and Latin authors, the best, the most efficient instrument for making a youth of marked talent a powerful statesman, an eminent divine, a distinguished writer, or a great merchant?

"More can be learnt," exclaimed Mr. Cobden, "from a single number of the *Times* than from all the works of Thucydides"—of which he had not read a single line.

In reply to such assaults on the teaching of the classics, let us note in the first place that these educational instruments are languages, or rather literatures. They place the boy in the closest contact with countless thoughts of the highest value. Let him be trained to read Plato and Aristotle with full appreciation of their thoughts, or Virgil and Æschylus in lively sympathy with their emotions: how many ideas he will have acquired, how many regions of human life, how many portions of his own mind he will have gained insight into! Think of what is implied in thoroughly mastering Thucydides and Demosthenes: how much light will have been shed on human nature, on the laws of human existence, on the relations of man to man, on the essence of human life. Down to this very hour the great writers of Greece are living powers in the world. Plato's genius is a force felt by well-nigh every explorer of moral philosophy. There are few speculations now written on philosophy in which Plato or his thoughts do not appear.

Then look at Aristotle, one of the most living names known to the thinking world. Think of his wonderful range of observation, the multitude of subjects on which he has thrown out invaluable suggestions, his profound insight into metaphysics and poetry, the marvellous accuracy with which he has explained the elements and the principles of the political life in which mankind must live. There is not a statesman in the world who, unless he has mastered what Aristotle has said, might not learn from him precious lessons as to how to govern nations. Then think of his researches into political economy: how many bankers and merchants might not, with great benefit to themselves, ask him to tell them what money is, and how it does its work.

Pass on next to Thucydides. Read the funeral oration spoken by Pericles in the second year of the Peloponnesian war. Were the souls, the deep emotions of a great people under the most trying circumstances which life could well offer, the nobleness of their patriotism, their lofty conceptions of duty, their resolute determination to give their lives to a great future for

their country, ever pictured with so much power, with so strong a force of reality? I have known statesmen of both Houses of Parliament, distinguished orators themselves, declare that to be told that their speeches recalled to mind that speech of Pericles, to have their names mentioned in combination with his, to be the greatest honor they had ever received.

Is it necessary to speak of the poets of Greece, her tragedians and her comic writers, their brilliancy, their breadth of feeling, the beauty of their words, their pathos and power of touching human souls? Above all, is not Homer a poet for all time, a bard whose power to stir, to touch, the spirits of mankind is appreciated by English lovers of poetry as truly as it was by the Greeks when its beautiful sounds first reached their ears?

But yet more can be said of Greek. A distinguished statesman, Mr. Goschen, declared in a speech, at the opening of Bristol College, that he had learnt to think in the study of the Epistle to the Romans. What higher tribute can be given to any instrument of education—what so high? Can a stronger proof be cited, furnished by actual experience, of the matchless superiority of Greek for the accomplishment of the all-important work of education?

Thus, we see, Greek educates by means of the most powerful force which can be made to bear upon the young, the greatness of the mind with which they are brought in contact, the power of the writers and their works. A mind of this order awakens in those who come under its influence many more ideas than one of lower degree, expresses them with greater truth, flashes them into lower depths of the spirit of the recipient, kindles a more fervent enthusiasm, and calls forth a more ardent imitation. The society of the best and ablest men is a most powerful education down to the end of life. It never ceases to train and influence: and if it moulds elderly men, how much more will it shape youth? Where can a boy be initiated in so many things, catch so many vistas, acquire so valuable and so fruitful a familiarity with many provinces of manly thought, as in the study of Homer and Sophocles, Aristotle and Plato, Demosthenes and Thucydides, and, above all, St. Paul? These men have been the founders of civilization; they have hewn out the road on which nations and individuals are travelling

still. The Greek type, in the main, is the form of the thought of modern Europe. Be it repeated, of all instruments of education, the best, the most powerful, the most developing is Greek.

It may be said in reply that science would accomplish most of the objects here described, whilst, on the other hand, it would enrich the youth with knowledge highly useful, capable of bringing large reward to the pupil himself and to society. Let it be freely confessed, scientific knowledge is endowed with great excellence; the valuable results which flow from it cannot be contested. But as *the* instrument of education, it falls into a lower rank; if employed alone it would leave portions, and those the most important, of the youth's nature absolutely undeveloped. There would be, against a good teacher of Greek, no gain of expansion of intellect, whilst the youth would be turned out empty of countless perceptions, destitute of a multitude of insight into things moral, social, and political, bearing on the most important elements of human life and of his own being. He might become what was once thought to be not uncommon, but now happily, it is believed, unknown, a Senior Wrangler in the calculus, and a child amongst men.

But there is far more to be said yet of the classics as an instrument of education. They are dead languages: they cannot be learnt by speaking. They demand long toil and severe study: years are consumed in the mastering of them. What! exclaim many ardent friends of education at the present day, are young minds, which are in such sore need of instruction, to be sentenced to spend years on languages which no one speaks, which are not wanted for the very purpose for which languages exist? There might be some sense in toiling to acquire French and German: they express the thoughts and feelings of civilized nations. Familiarity with them may be rapidly acquired, and equally rapid returns for the time and labor expended in their acquisition. Of what use is the knowledge of Greek and Latin? If it is urged that they contain writings of incalculable value, why not have them translated into modern languages by expert scholars, and their contents read and studied at once without the loss of such long portions of human life? Translations will at once place the thoughts of a Homer and an Aristotle before students: why adopt a method which consumes

such large quantities of time without any call whatever for the use of the languages as languages?

The answer to this indignant reproach is easy and decisive. It is precisely in the labor demanded, the time consumed, the difficulty encountered, that the supreme value of dead languages lies. The thoughts of great men, discovered by painful labor and attention in languages to which sound and ear give no help, are the fiercest enemies of cram and the most powerful developers of the faculties of the human brain. Lessons given in living languages need call for little thought, still less for translations. There is little labor spent in mastering their meaning: a shallow perception of the meaning generally suffices for the learner. The faculties of the mind are feebly summoned to awake and encounter the struggle of understanding. With an intelligent teacher and a living language much superficial work may be done, but it gives no guarantee for bringing out thought in the pupil. He is but feebly summoned to think.

Wholly otherwise is it with education conducted in a dead language. The difficulty of reaching the sense of the passages, the obstacles encountered in the process, the efforts of thought, of perception, of putting the whole sense together, are the supreme merits of this unrivalled educational tool. In the first place the meaning of the unknown word has to be ascertained. The dictionary will not often yield its treasure without a resistance which sometimes is quite formidable. It presents several meanings to the searcher: which shall he select as being the right one? Much more, how is he to come to the conclusion that it is the right one? He is thus driven to seek the thought which the great writer intended to express. He must enter into the mind that framed the sentence; he must endeavor from the context to catch the sense intended: and such a search places him in intimate communion with the great man whose work he is studying. He must examine minutely every expression, and explore its relation to its companions in the sentence. Thus in order to discover, out of several senses given in the dictionary, that which is the correct one, the very essence of the intended thought must be found and grasped. Pass on from a single sentence to many, and then it will be seen how intimate is the companionship between the writer and the

pupil. In a living language the meaning of the single passage is quickly but cursorily perceived, the mind of the student passes on without reflection; there is no labor, no powerful exertion of thought, but also little development of the pupil's intellect. Small has been the education achieved.

Let us now look at the educating power of this process when it is carried on upon the words of writers of the highest ability. And it must not be forgotten that one mighty force must always be supposed to be present—responsibility to a true teacher, to a mind ever keenly on the watch to make sure that the meaning, the full meaning, has been apprehended. We must not think here of written translations sent up to a tutor or an examiner, unless they are closely looked into with the pupil at his side. We must place ourselves in the presence of a *viva voce* lesson conducted by a teacher who is master of his profession. The construing youth has failed to catch the right meaning of the word, or, worse yet, the sense of the whole passage. The error is pointed out, the badness of the logic imputed to the great Greek exhibited. The pupil's eyes are opened to the fatal fact that he has not mastered the thought written, that he and his Thucydides are not at one. The teacher will then put into action that practice which is the mightiest force of the art of education. He will tell the baffled pupil nothing of what the right sense is: he will summon him to correct his own mistakes himself. He will point out the error involved in his own translation, he will flash before him the absurd meaning which he inflicts on the great Greek whom he holds in his hand. He will stimulate the intellect of the youth to correct his blunder, to make his author speak sense. This is true education. The pupil will know that he will have to reproduce in English, faithfully and accurately, what the deep-thinking author has written, and that if he fail to grasp it he will have to work out the full meaning under the acute questioning of his tutor and in the presence of his school-fellows. It is not easy to conceive a stronger stimulus for effort than such a consciousness; it is far more impelling than a mere dread of punishment. The final result will be that the young student will place himself, by his own mental effort, in full communion with the great epic. And what is the meaning of this great fact? It is to live in the

closest intimacy with a literature of the very highest order in the world. That literature touches life on all its sides. Its thoughts, its culture, its power of language, its range, its depth and intellectual force are of the grandest, the most mind-stirring that ever were produced. And then, let it not ever be forgotten, if the epistles of Paul, such as that to the Romans, are brought into action, religion, too, in its inmost essence will be brought home to the student's heart and conscience, whilst his intellect will be called upon for reasoning of the highest order. This is emphatically to be taught to think, to be developed as a human being: this is education.

It may be permitted here, it is hoped, to illustrate the nature and the power of this grand instrument of education, dead languages, by the practice of one of the greatest teachers of our age, Dr. Arnold, as illustrated by his pupil and biographer, Dean Stanley. At its foundation lay the grand principle that "it was not knowledge but the means of getting knowledge which he had to teach." His whole method was founded on the principle of awakening the intellect of every individual boy. "As a general rule," continues the Dean, "he never gave information except as a kind of reward for an answer. His explanations were as short as possible, as much as would dispose of the difficulty and no more. His questions were of a kind to call the attention of the boys to the real point of every subject, to disclose to them the exact boundaries of their knowledge and their ignorance, to train them to understand the principles on which these facts rested. 'You come here,' he was wont to say, 'not to read but to learn how to read, how to think for yourselves:' and thus the greater part of his instructions were interwoven with the process of their own minds. There was a constant reference to their thoughts, an acknowledgment that, as far as their information and their power of reasoning could take them, they ought to have an opinion of their own; a working, not for but with the class as if they were equally interested with himself in making out the meaning of the passage before them; a constant endeavor to set them right, either by gradually helping them on to a true answer, or by making the answers of the more advanced part of the class serve as a medium through which his instructions might be communicated to the less

advanced. And then the very scantiness with which he occasionally dealt out his knowledge, whilst it often created an angry feeling of disappointment, left at the same time an impression that the source from which they drew was unexhausted and unfathomed, and to all that he did say gave twice its original value. Intellectually and morally he felt that the teacher himself ought to be perpetually learning, aye, as every lesson went on, and by information extracted from his pupils, to be constantly above the level of his scholars." What grander conception of what teaching is was ever formed?

Most powerful was this method when applied to the writings of such a man as St. Paul. Here the interest in the meaning to be carried away was intense, both in the teacher and the taught. Every word was felt to be supremely important; the meaning of the sentence was often so hard to find, the jealousy of the one adopted so intense, the temper to challenge and then to justify so keen. Where will a force be found equal to this in power of developing thought in the learners, in opening their eyes to what seeking for truth means, in training them to handle every tool for discovering it, in elevating them, when it is found and proved, to a consciousness that they had won a treasure of incomparable value?

In such a method *viva voce* reigned supreme. Teacher, pupil, and the great Greek lived together in one common act of thinking. Cram was impossible; it dared not enter. A few questions to the point would have covered the unhappy utterer of it with confusion and shame.

BONAMY PRICE.

# RECONSTRUCTION IN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

IT is becoming matter of common remark that a revolution is sweeping over the religious thought of Christendom, and to careful observers the phrase does not appear overstrong. We find convictions long rooted in the general mind unsettled and wavering, old doctrines once received without a dream of asking proof called to the bar of free inquiry, and old questions reopened which were thought to be closed forever by the creeds. To many it seems that the fountain-light of all their seeing is going out in darkness; a sudden storm has torn them from the moorings of the past, and they feel themselves helplessly adrift on the flux and reflux of uncertainty. And yet if we comprehend the present situation, there is nothing in it to give us great alarm. It is plain enough that the prevalent confusion of religious opinion is owing to the changed conditions wrought by the rapid intellectual advance of the age. Generation by generation we have been moving on into a new intellectual world, a world of wider horizons and profounder harmonies, where the old systems of theology look strangely out of place. It is not so much that they are directly attacked by modern thought, but they are being undermined or overpassed by its movement. Such a state of things, however, is far from being unexampled. If to-day Christian belief is passing through a certain crisis in which it seems likely to undergo a sensible modification; and if this is owing to the fact that its present doctrinal formulations have become obsolete, or out of harmony with the spirit of the age, such has been the experience of Christianity in more than one period of its history. It is true that in history cataclysm is rare, but progress is constant, and revolution is not so different from evolution as may be supposed; for it is but a sudden quicken-

ing of the ordinary pace of Time, which always "innovateth greatly, tho quietly and by degrees scarce to be perceived." When the progress of the human mind makes some old opinion obsolete, it may simply die out, and then we speak of the change as a silent revolution. When the old opinion is identified with some existing interest, or associated with some cherished truth, and therefore clung to and defended, the revolution in which it is repudiated will be more or less violent. But the violence is something comparatively unimportant; the essential thing in any revolution of opinion is the extent of the change it effects. Revolution with bayonets and bloodshed may be not so effectively revolutionary as the peaceful and gradual change wrought, as we say, by lapse of time. Thus while to a superficial view revolution appears only as a destructive movement, whose sole aim is the overthrow of an existing order, its truer character is seen in its constructive tendency; destruction being but an incident or a condition of its reconstructive work.

The character and course of what we call modern thought is only appreciated in its relation to the past which gave it birth. The great intellectual reaction which set in with the close of the Crusades grew in the sixteenth century to a declared refusal of unquestioning acceptance of authoritative teaching and a demand for the certitude of personal insight. Yet the result of the Reformation was not emancipation from authority, but only the transfer of the old principle to a new throne. The spirit of intellectual freedom turned, therefore, to the social and political fields, to scientific research, and in all departments of secular life it gradually attained ascendency. Hence the Church of Christ, whose place is in the van of human progress, began to fall behind and parted company with the world. In the common opinion reason became opposed to faith, and freethinker synonymous with unbeliever. The growing influence of scientific training and the extended application of critical methods have widened the breach between dogmatic orthodoxy and secular thought, and fanned the mutual antagonism which has ranged their respective partisans in hostile camps. On the one hand are the so-called freethinkers, or rationalists, who look upon the Christianity of the churches at best with contemptuous indifference; who regard all religion as the product of an igno-

rant and superstitious past, and all its teaching with regard to supramundane concerns as built on assumptions which can never be scientifically verified. In their efforts and aspirations toward a better social state they are pure secularists, and in their attitude toward all that lies beyond the grasp of logic pronounced agnostics. On the other hand are the zealous upholders of traditional belief, who deem any modification of received doctrine a base betrayal of the faith entrusted to their defence. Their method of meeting established conclusions of science or criticism is to "cling tenaciously to the ancient creeds," and denounce four fifths of modern learning as infidelity. They attack "rationalism" with ardor, seeming to find irrationalism a satisfactory alternative, and in their bigoted intolerance would gladly silence by persecution teachings which they cannot overthrow by argument.

The blind strife of faith and reason can issue in no victory of any real worth, and the plain needs of this time are calling to the front a class of religious teachers who feel that they have a message to deliver other than any rallying-cry of traditionalists or infidels, and a reconstructive work to do which those self-confident disputants neither care to attempt nor would be competent to achieve. It is not to be expected that either of the opposing parties should do justice to the other. Both are under the ascendency of antecedent prepossessions, and find no cogency in any argument but such as supports their foregone conclusions. Such eager advocates cannot realize the point of view from which an opponent's position appears strong, nor fairly appreciate the habit of thought which naturally gives rise to the opinions and sentiments they condemn. But those who stand between the party that would destroy everything and the party that would retain everything unchanged find that the principles each contends for are really not antagonistic, but complementary; and while agreeing with neither they can sympathize with both. The zeal of the traditionalist may be scarcely according to knowledge, but of its sincerity and earnestness there can be no question. He cannot but be deeply stirred, for to him the paramount interests of human life, all that give it worth or meaning, are at stake. The revelation of divine truth, he holds, is made to faith, and not to reason uninspired and uninstructed from on

high. And the rationalist claims respect at least for his spirit of intellectual honesty. He is a seeker of truth, and in that quest reason is his only guide and stay. He cannot accept anything for true which he holds to be unreasonable, or which offers itself on condition of first laying fetters on the freedom of thought. The party of religious progress, seeking to maintain its continuity and the development of truth for the present out of the truth of the past, make it their endeavor to bring religious belief into harmony with the requirements of the scientific mind; and they are convinced that it is this ministry of reconciliation which alone can bring peace in our time. Taking this position, they are the true radicals, for they would effect such a reformation of religion as shall adapt it to the wider thought and learning of the age. And they are the true conservatives, for it is not they but this revolutionary time that demands a reconstruction of religious thought, and to meet such demand is the only possible conservatism.

The advocates of a rational faith have always kept two aims in view: first, to seek a profounder philosophy of religion in which all the great spiritual truths which belief only asserts and which "reason" declares beyond the reach of scientific certitude shall be established on a self-sustaining ground; so that the content of faith shall be restored to personal consciousness, not through any submission to authority, but as the result of a rigorous intellectual process, and the ground-ideas of theology shall no longer be doctrines believed or disbelieved, but truths that are known. And the second aim is to simplify the necessary creed, or rather to return to its original simplicity, by distinguishing between what is essential to Christian faith and what is inessential and to be left open to individual opinion. It is with this latter point this paper is concerned. We are told by both the extreme parties I have spoken of that what is in question between them is Christianity and its continuance as the religion of the civilized world. If we ask, What is Christianity? theologians answer that it is a body of authoritative dogma, derived from Scripture or tradition and developed by decrees of councils, confessions of assemblies, and the writings of eminent divines. The agnostics reply to a similar effect. "For my part," writes Mr. Frederic Harrison, "I hold Christianity to be what

is taught in average churches and chapels to the millions of professing Christians." And he adds: "I say it is a very serious fact when philosophical defenders of religion begin by repudiating what is taught in average pulpits."[1] It may be a serious fact, —for the average pulpit,—but all religious reform and progress is attended with such repudiation. But the average pulpit-teaching of the nineteenth century differs from that of the eighteenth, and both from that of the seventeenth. In every Christian age the average pulpit reflects the current phases of religious thought, and therefore cannot furnish a complete or stable canon of essential Christianity. Indeed Mr. Harrison might almost as well say that he takes his political economy from the average newspaper, for political economy has a certain affinity to Christianity in that it is a body of principles, more or less settled, whose apprehension is in the growth of social experience. However, our point is that both sides agree in identifying Christianity with a current orthodoxy. The traditionalists suppose that in maintaining certain received doctrines with regard to miracles, inspiration of Scripture, divine grace, the future state, etc., they are defending Christianity; and their opponents will have it that if they upset these doctrines they abolish Christianity. To believers in a living and progressive Christianity it means something very different from this. "As many as receive Him, to them he gives power to become sons of God." That is Christianity: that power which eighteen centuries ago quickened a knot of Galilean fishermen into the Church of Christ, and has ever since been leavening the life of man and leading the civilization of the world; a power whose earliest mission was not to the intellect, but to the heart and conscience of mankind; working in after-times now through priesthoods, institutions, and theologies, and again working in spite of these things—in spite of sacerdotalism and doctrinal perversions: and whether working by these instruments or against these hindrances, always a spiritual power, distinct from systems, dogmas, codes, and creeds. With infinite flexibility it adapts itself in every land to the most diverse forms of thought, the most opposite ways of life, and changes

[1] *The Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1877.

its form in every age to meet the changing phases of social progress and the new conditions of a new environment. With equal firmness it refuses to be restricted to any rigid definitions of theology, or any fixed order of ecclesiastical prescription, and casts off one after another the unyielding systems of belief or practice which have outlived their usefulness and become fetters on its advancing feet. This working of a vital force is what we read in Christian history, and so we learn a true estimate of the old beliefs which have come down to us. They were the native growth of their time. They sprang from a soil adapted to produce them, and were shaped and trained by the pressure of manifold contemporary influences. They were vigorous and helpful to men as long as the mental climate in which they took rise continued unchanged. But now a change has come over the growing mind of man, and the old formulas are ceasing to be natural or adequate expressions of our enlarged, enlightened thought. Stretch them as we may by new interpretations, they will not cover the needs of the present. They have had their day. The Gospel did enter in and dwell there, but as in a tabernacle, not a fixed abiding-place. The system is for an age; the Gospel too is for that age, but also for all time. Thus the Gospel is tolerant of all human forms and indifferent to them all. It makes use of forms, but it transcends formalism. It has been the life of one system after another; it cannot be made into a system itself. Under every human mechanism it is felt to be a living power, inspiring equally Augustin and Eckhart and Pascal and Bunyan and Fox. It is a spirit of light and life in the mind and heart of humanity, quickening every germ of good and fostering a continual growth in wisdom and righteousness. Like the sunshine it is endlessly diffusive, and ready to take any color if it may work the better with any human movement or minister more helpfully to any human need. It breeds in us ever new aspiration and perpetual effort toward improvement. It frees us from servile dependence on tradition and blind idolatry of the past, for it tells us that the Spirit of Christ is with us now and always to teach us what is best.

I know that the orthodox theologian will be apt to tell me that all this is sadly loose and vague, a kind of "rationalizing" that is most "unsound;" while for his part, Mr. Frederic Harrison,

who holds Christianity to be what is taught in average churches, might say in his clever way that he has no concern with "Neo-Christianity" and takes no interest in "a fantasia with variations on the orthodox creed." Yet evidently if one would know what Christianity really is, the four gospels are a source of surer information than the Westminster Confession or the teachings of the average pulpit. For what is Christianity but the religion which Jesus himself believed and lived by, and what is orthodoxy but conformity to the principles he taught by word and deed? The Christian churches have given painful thought to the theories elaborated by doctors and divines; it seems almost terrible to find how completely they have ignored the teachings of that Life which is the Light of men. One church adores the Infant in his mother's arms, nestling to her bosom in smiling ignorance of all human wants and woes. Another kneels before the Divine Victim, thorn-crowned, pierced and bleeding, murmuring from white lips, "It is finished." But the Christ of Gospel history, the Christ between the cradle and the cross, this preaching, teaching, absolving, and denouncing Christ, witnessing to the grand simplicities of a spiritual religion and martyred by the bigotry of orthodox formalists—it seems but yesterday that we began to see in him a Man as real and living as ourselves, began to ponder those sayings of his which are the rock-foundation of all human life, and which, tho the heavens vanish as a vesture that is folded up, can never lose their power or pass away.

And when we turn to his teaching we find that none is so utterly informal and unsystematic; none so abounds in metaphor, hyperbole, and paradox. It glows with a passionate intensity not to be translated into plain prosaic statement.[1] It is not to be formulated in dogmatic propositions, and they who take it literally—as the Roman takes "This is my Body"—miss the inwardness which is the key to its constant meaning. "The

[1] "And some of you shall they cause to be put to death, but not a hair of your head shall be injured. . . ." "If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother and wife and children, he cannot be my disciple. . . ." "There is no man that hath left house or father or mother or children for my sake and the gospel's, but he shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses and brethren and sisters and mothers and children and lands."

words that I speak unto you," he tells us, "they are spirit and they are life. . . ." "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." All his sayings are left open, free, and fluent for the living heart of man to grasp and to interpret. Their unity is no after-result of our system-making; it is the organic unity of life. All grows out of one root-truth, the fatherhood of God. That is the fundamental fact on which the spiritual world is built. Into this one word, Father, the whole Gospel contracts and coils itself up; from this it expands and issues forth. Man is not God's creature merely, but his child; his nature is one in kind with the nature of his Father; he is not a finite but an infinite being. To tell us this the Word was made flesh. Scotus had the deeper insight when he made the end of the Incarnation to be revelation, and not merely redemption as Aquinas taught. "I am the Truth," Christ said. The God who is Man, the Man who is God by his single personality reveals humanity as divine and divinity as human. The historic coming of the Son of God in the Son of Mary reveals his eternal coming in the primal constitution of humanity, and the eternal sonship of mankind to God. For in him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and he is the one true and perfect man. In so far as Christ is human, man is divine. In so far as Christ has being, the unity of God and man is a reality. This is the ground of the Incarnation, and only thus is the Incarnation possible. Only through the essential homogeneity of all spiritual being can the Son of God be also Son of Man. Remaining at the ante-Christian point of view, where always between God and man there is a great gulf fixed, we may indeed accept the Incarnation as a dogma, but always it must appear a mystery which we cannot hope to understand. For our obstinate preconception makes it a mystery. If to our thought divinity contradicts humanity, what can we make of the person of Christ? To con some blind and barren phrases about hypostatic union does not lighten our darkness. The effort to conceive a being half human, half divine ends in hopeless perplexity. We go from one nature to the other, as if they lay side by side, loosely tied together. Now in some word or action Jesus seems all human; now in some other all divine. Sometimes he seems too unearthly for our affections; sometimes too mortal for our worship. He appears too divine to be

purely human, and yet too human to be quite divine. We say we believe in a Saviour Christ both God and Man; but really he rather seems to be neither God nor man. This mysterious, elusive personality escapes our mental grasp. We cannot realize what we think we believe about him, simply because this Christ of our dualistic fancy is an unreality and never did exist. What we have to do is to take our stand upon the Incarnation and look at God and man from thence. Then this baffling mystery becomes a living truth for us. Then the words of Christ begin to have for us reality and power: his words to men, "Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect;" his words to God, "The glory which thou gavest me I have given them." It was their grasp of the Incarnation as the ground-fact of their own being that transformed the hearts and minds of the disciples, and made them speak of their Lord as the "First born of many brethren," and address their converts as "partakers of the divine nature," and exclaim, "Beloved, now are we the sons of God. . . " "Because we are sons, God sends the spirit of his Son into our hearts."

This revelation of fatherhood and sonship is the light and the interpreter of every spiritual truth. It asserts the principle which at once underlies and transcends all ethics. Righteousness is the law of human action; but once the truth of the divinity of human nature is recognized, righteousness changes from an outward, regulative law to an inward, constitutive law. It is the law for will because the law of will, the organic law of the will's own nature. To act righteously is not to obey a "stern lawgiver;" it is to act according to our will, to follow our strongest inclination. Since the spirit which we are is one in nature with the Spirit whose we are, the service of God is freedom. In its obedience to God the spirit is the law unto itself; and autonomy, not anarchy, is freedom. Righteousness then goes deeper than conduct; it attaches not to doing, but to being; it is not the quality of a man's action, but of the man. And He who came to reveal ideal manhood is with us always to make it a reality. He gives us power to become in fact what we are in truth, sons of God. Other religions begin with sin and sacrifice for sin; the Gospel begins with our inborn capacity of likeness to God, of being perfect as he is perfect; "for he that sanctifieth and they

that are sanctified are all of one." It works not through a law of restraint on human nature, but through a law of development in human nature, and calls out its latent energies. Christ changes all compulsion into spontaneity, for he is come not to give us a new law, but that we might have life and have it more abundantly. It is this purpose to realize man's ideal divinity—as Christ puts it, "That ye may be the children of your Father in heaven"—that leads to the profound teaching of Love as the motive and principle of action. Selfishness may have become a second nature with us, but he who is born again of the spirit learns that the true nature of man is to love. In altruism is the fulfilment of individuality, and he who will lose his life shall find it. It is at once the principle of personal and of social life. The world that lives by self-interest may take it that to love one's neighbor as one's self is only a high-wrought fancy, but nothing is more certain than that love is the one binding force of human society. In so far as society does not disintegrate into atomism, and civilization does not relapse into barbarism, so far it is actually held together by the power of love. It is the test of our discipleship to Christ that we love one another; and the kingdom of God, the true order of social life on earth, is the fellowship of his disciples,—of those who learn in their sonship to one heavenly Father their brotherhood as men.

It is impossible to bring out here the depth and fulness of these Gospel principles I touch upon; but let us dwell for a moment on one other by way of illustration, the truth concerning sin and forgiveness. If true manhood is revealed in the Sinless Man, it follows that humanity is by nature righteous. To admit any doctrine of human depravity is to throw away all hope of human reformation. The water cannot rise higher than its source. Moreover there can be no talk of redemption, for there has been no fall. If it is his nature to sin, the sinner is but fulfilling the law of his being, and from that law he cannot escape. But then he is no longer a sinner. We cannot blame him for being what he was made to be: the worm will do his kind. Thus it is the fact that we are by nature righteous that makes the guilt of sin, and brands the sinner as false to the humanity he bears. Here too is the only ground of his restoration. Assuming righteousness to be our normal state, or health, Christ

speaks of sinners as "the sick," and always he is hopeful of their recovery, since the natural forces of the soul work to a cure. As a sick man the sinner needs, not judge and jury, but wise treatment and fostering care. And so the Friend of Sinners is the physician of the soul. His panacea was sympathy. While by his stainless purity he was lifted up, by his sympathy he drew all men unto him, inspiring the penitence which alone makes it possible for one to be forgiven. This was the quickening power that restored the vision of divine truth to the spiritually blind, strengthened the lame to walk in the paths of righteousness, brought the deaf to hear the voice of God and the dumb to speak his praise. And everywhere he went the self-condemned and outcast followed him, taking heart anew. Tho it might seem he sometimes came too late, yet the trusting could believe that none was lost beyond his power to save who was not only the Healer of the sick but the Resurrection and the Life to those who were dead in trespasses and sins.

In all this Jesus was but "working the works of the Father." As the Apostle writes: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." The Gospel bears this simple message to the personal soul: God is your Father; and whenever you do wrong and tell him so, he will always forgive you, as any father forgives his child. And that forgiveness is not remission of penalty, but remission of sin, a cleansing from unrighteousness. It lifts from us the burden that weighs upon the heart, and breaks down the barrier of self-reproach and fear between us and the Father, and brings us back to the accord and union with him which is the peace that passeth understanding. For his fatherhood goes deeper than our sin. We may wound him, but we cannot change him. We may shut our hearts from him; we cannot shut his heart from us. What a man thinks or what he does cannot annul the relation in which he has his being. He can make himself a bad son; he cannot unmake his sonship. The guiltiest soul is still the soul of the Father's child. And tho we may lose our hold upon this truth, God never does. Always, if we will, our way is open to return to him. If we confess our sin, we may trust his eternal faithfulness and justice to forgive and cleanse. There is nowhere any sinful soul, fancying it has learned too late to long for purity

and looking on itself as lost, but may hear if it will listen the Father's voice, saying, "Son, be of good cheer; thy sins are forgiven thee."

And Christ who tells his followers, "I do nothing of myself; the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works," tells them besides, "The works that I do ye shall do also." When he said, "The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins," he claimed that power on behalf of all his brethren, and declared it a prerogative of the human nature we derive from our Father in heaven. The remission of sin was the key of the heavenly kingdom which was founded on the rock of the divine humanity revealed in Christ. And that key was given into the hands of each and all; that power is ours to cultivate and exercise. We read in the New Testament of men confessing their sins one to another, and forgiving one another as God had forgiven them; but such a practice has long been one of the world's lost arts. In later times when the faith of many had waxed cold, the fancy arose among the Christians that Jesus had bestowed this power of absolution on none but a chosen few and their ordained successors, and its exercise degenerated into a sacerdotal rite. But the teaching of the Master is plain: all his disciples were to forgive. The uplifting of the sinful was no mere function of an official class, but the work of a spiritual faculty revealed in the human sons of God. For the washing away a brother's evil past every one is a priest; in this we all are "workers together with God," and in so far as we are one with the spirit of the Son of Man we have a real power to absolve and to redeem from sin.

I must leave these suggestions to indicate a distinction of the utmost importance to bear in mind,—the distinction, namely, between the Gospel, as a revelation of spiritual truth, and the Christian religion, as the embodiment of men's efforts to apprehend that truth. Those efforts, it cannot be denied, have been far from entirely successful; indeed it almost seems as tho the history of dogmatic and institutional Christianity were little else than a record of aberrations from the profound and simple truths revealed by Christ. The first century had hardly passed away before the deep thought of God as Father, the conception of Christ as the Divine Man in whom the mutual relations of

Father and children are revealed, began to grow dim before men's minds. The heart of the Gospel, the eternal unity of human spirit with the divine, was lost to the faith; the Christian consciousness returned to the old falsity of the finitude of man, and the gulf opened again between humanity and God. With the rapid decadence of the early Greek theology the development of Christian thought and life passed to the Latin Church, and for a thousand years there was taught in the name of Christ a religion which at every point was the distortion or contradiction of his Gospel.[1] Under the shadow of Roman imperialism God the Father became the absolute and arbitrary Sovereign of the world, communicating with it from a distance and indirectly, and fixing the spiritual state of men, apart from all reference to personal character, according to immutable decrees. Again, since man was in no sense divine, Christ could be in no sense human. A purely superhuman being who had suddenly come to earth in the likeness of men had left it as abruptly without effecting any spiritual result. As Mediator he disappeared, melting into the general conception of the divine; and losing the character of Saviour, assumed more definitely that of Judge, the *Rex tremendi majestatis*, until the Virgin Mother had to be specially invoked to appease the wrath of her Son.

I need not recapitulate the mediæval errors, which in gross are familiar to us all, but I would call attention to these two points: first, this Christian paganism was no mere corruption of a religion once true to the Gospel revelation. It was a corrupt tree which brought forth that evil fruit: corrupt in root as in branch. Latin Christianity was the natural ripening of false principles, and no decay of an original excellence: not only it perverted, it never apprehended the religion of Christ. And secondly, while the Reformation effected the emancipation of the personal soul from ecclesiastical tyranny, it did not touch the foundations of Latin theology. However divergent in their application—as where the Bible rather than the Church was held to be the medium of divine communications—the principles of Protestant and Catholic theologies remained the same. The ground-ideas of Augustin were retained by Calvin, and Augustin's

[1] Compare Prof. Allen's admirable paper, "The Theological Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century;" PRINCETON REVIEW, Nov. 1882.

God, the foreign despot, reappears under another aspect in Paley's retired mechanician. The doctrines of this old theology are at once unchristian in their genesis and antichristian in their spirit, if we mean by Christianity the teaching of Christ. Consider for instance the doctrine of original sin, which assumes that Adam's fall destroyed the essential relation to God in which humanity was constituted and placed it forever under a ban; the doctrine of the Atonement, in which the suffering of an innocent victim is supposed to placate the offended Majesty of heaven; the doctrine of eternal life as an endless future of sensuous bliss, rather than a spiritual union with God which may be ours here: of eternal death as an endless future of sensuous pain, and not rather the state of unrepented sin; the doctrine of revelation, not as a living process adapted to the growing mind of man under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth—a process constantly going on, as real to-day and more clear and full than ever since the day of Christ—but rather as a deposit of definite instructions once for all delivered—so that revelation changes its meaning from "a making known" to "that which has been made known"—and embodied in a rule of faith, to be guarded against all innovation.

It would indeed be idle to inveigh against the past. The belief of Christendom was shaped amid dark days of violence and barbarism, and the Church could not but share in the ignorance and superstition of its time. It is well to note with Hallam that "had religion been more pure, it would have been less permanent, and Christianity has been preserved by means of its corruptions." It is wonderful to see how the spirit of the Gospel always takes the world as it finds it and contrives to make it better, bringing out of evils and errors some soul of goodness and truth. Even Mariolatry and Transubstantiation, the pet abominations of good Protestants, did service in their day to the cause of Christ; for they were the best the time allowed. When the cloud had received Jesus out of men's sight, and their crude materialism, which knew no man save after the flesh, had lost even the memory of his loving manly heart, it was much to find in the womanly tenderness of Mary some echo of the lost truth that God is Love. And it was a true instinct that found expression in the sensuous ritual of the Mass, for it led men to feel after the absent, silent God if haply they might find him and

bring him down from above by the hand of the priest, in visible presence on the altar; and so, amid all that was material and gross, there was kept alive some sense of possible communion through the living Bread with the Sustainer and Nourisher of their souls.

As in the natural world some hard integument of husk or shell conceals and protects a growing germ of life until maturity, so in the divine training of mankind dogmatic errors may encase a spiritual truth too pure and lofty for an earthly-minded generation to receive. But when the time comes, the husk breaks open and the kernel falls. And the time has come for us to think ourselves loose from the dry abstractions of traditional doctrine, and take the living truths of the Gospel into the depth of our intelligence. We must teach a religion not merely certified as orthodox by due authority, but one which commends itself as true and carries with it its own authentication. We must show it to be the one faith for all time, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, not because cast in the mould of any one epoch, or narrowed to the notions of any one sect, but because it meets the special needs of every age, and in its infinite variety makes itself all things to all men. "New occasions teach new duties:" they who are for "standing on the old ways"—forgetting that Time, the great innovator, never stands still—are likely to be left standing there alone. We cannot shut our eyes to the great defection from the orthodox churches which is going on. Traditional dogma has lost its hold upon this generation, and day by day the young and active-minded are leaving the home of their early faith. Between the camp of Reason and that of a Faith which seems no longer reasonable they are halting irresolute. Whither shall they go? Many, attracted by the clear-cut, positive tenets of the "advanced thinkers," and the definite limitations they assign to human knowledge, will join the ranks of the Materialists who deny every spiritual verity, or of the Agnostics who tell us that whether there be any such thing as spirit we cannot know and need not care. Others will find such bald negations dreary and repellent, and their hearts will turn to the great historic Church, which, "e'en with something of a mother's mind," would narcotize the intellect in order to give rest to weary doubters.

The mute cry of this growing multitude, scattered abroad

as sheep having no shepherd, goes up to accuse them of unfaithfulness who are accounted stewards of the mysteries of God. It is because men are taught to identify the Gospel of Christ with a theological caricature that they are rejecting the one with the other; and our wish to help them must be keener if we feel that it is by us this offence cometh, and that we owe them reparation. If a thinking man in these days tells me, whether scornfully or sadly, that he cannot accept the Christian religion, I take him for one to whom Christianity has been misrepresented, and I say to him: That which any rational instinct within you bids you reject is not the Christianity of Christ. You turn impatiently from the flimsy "schemes of salvation" spun out of the theological cobwebs of the past, and you want to hear no more of Christianity. But you are overhasty in accepting these doctrinal futilities at their own valuation, and giving credit to their claims. Go to the fountain-head; study Christianity in the life and words of Christ; measure the teaching of the past or present by the great spiritual principles he taught, and you will no longer confound his Gospel with the misapprehensions and perversions of it that have obtained among men. More than that, you will find that as long as man is man the Gospel must remain the complete and final truth for human thought and life. The truth that Christ revealed of man's sonship to God is still the highest inspiration to human righteousness; his truth of human brotherhood is still the highest hope of social progress. It is not possible to leave these truths behind as the race advances. The religion which has divine manhood for its principle has always a true ideal to hold up before men, and an endless power to fascinate and attract. If here and there that religion seem to have failed, in every case you will find the failure traceable to some deviation from Christ's principles, or some loss of his spirit. Yet while we have his Gospel for our light and guide, the path of a true development is always open to recall our straying feet. And if with an imperfect or distorted Christianity the world has made such progress, what may not be expected when we return to the pure teaching of the Spirit of Christ himself?

For what we have to do to-day is to bring men back to the faith of the earliest Church, in which Christ was everything and Christianity as yet nothing. It was not "Christianity" that ori-

ginated the great revolution which is destined to regenerate the world; it was Christ. He was a living, loving man before he was the centre of any doctrinal system. At the outset the Christian religion was a binding of men's hearts to Christ. His entire following was due to the attraction of his person, drawing to him the men and women whom he made his own forever. And ever since the sense of personal union with him has been the source of all that is purest and strongest in human character. It is this that made men triumph over martyrdom, and made the mystery of death bright with a satisfying hope: "We know not what we shall be, but we know that we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." Christianity is Christ himself. Its power in the world has been the power of a perfect human character to mould the sons of men into the image of the Son of God. That power then is with us now. What he was, he is. As he loved and helped men once, he loves and helps them still. He is still the Revealer of the Father, the Redeemer of the sinful, the Giver of eternal life. He has not faded into a reminiscence; he is not lost to us in the dim perspective of history; for we know him no more after the flesh. Let our Christianity be faith in Christ, and love of Christ, and allegiance to Christ, and he will lead us out of the darkness that shadows our time into the marvellous light of his kingdom—the household and Family of God which knows no sovereign but the Father, no citizenship but brotherhood, no law but love.

FRANCIS A. HENRY.

# NATIONAL LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL CHARACTER.

IN one of the suggestive and curiously learned notes with which Gibbon relieves and lights up the stately and somewhat sombre pages of his great work, he justly observes, "There is room for a very interesting work which should lay open the connection between the languages and manners of nations." It is, I think, strange that the interesting work which the great historian thus foreshadowed should be to-day a literary *desideratum:* especially strange when we recollect that within the last quarter of a century the press has teemed with many a volume on kindred subjects in connection with the philosophy and science of language: when Grimm, Max Müller, Trench, Farrar, and others have shown how fascinating philological studies can be made when treated in a large and philosophic spirit. True, the task would require for its adequate treatment no ordinary intellectual equipment. The writer should be at once historian, philologist, and philosopher; one not only "in voices well divulged," but who, like Ulysses of old, had studied the manners and the customs of many nations. Indeed the work would not have been unworthy of the unique powers of the great historian who suggested it. It would have afforded ample play for his vast and varied historical lore, his large philological learning (so much in advance of his time), and his keen philosophic insight. The writer of the present paper is well aware that such a work is quite beyond his limited powers. His be the humble office of putting up, as it were, a finger-post to indicate the direction of the attractive path of research on which he cannot hope to travel very far himself.

It were easy to cite innumerable passages from ancient and modern writers, from the Roman Seneca to the American Mathews, pointing to the intimate connection between the speech and manners of a people. "There is indeed," as the latter writer truly says, "a physiognomy in speech as well as in the face. . . . . As with individuals, so with nations; every race has its own organic growth, its own characteristic ideas and opinions, its legislation, its manners, its customs, its modes of religious worship: and *the expression of all these is found in its speech.*"

But seeing that our field of inquiry is so vast,—the spoken and written language of a people,—the pertinent question at once presents itself, In what part of this wide field of language shall we look for these characteristic words? From what lips are we most likely to hear the peculiar phrases which best mirror the mind and manners of a people, and bear most clearly the impress of its habits of thought, its mental and moral idiosyncrasies—of those qualities, in fact, which differentiate the nation? Not in state papers; not in studied orations; not in the works of learned authors. No; the typical words and phrases with which we are concerned are those which are heard in the street, the market or the shop: in the places where the people "most do congregate." It is the familiar household words of a people, their natural utterances in their unrestrained social intercourse—it is, in short, *the common language of the common people*—which furnishes the key to unlock the secrets of the national character.

These characteristic or typical words may conveniently be grouped under different heads.

The first group I would style, for lack of a better term, the *dominant* or salient words of the national vocabulary. These dominant words are the words on everybody's lips: words which are ever rising to the surface of the stream of common conversation mark the course of the general current of the nation's thoughts.

Let us take our first illustration from our cousins across the line. Brother Jonathan is nothing if he is not "go-ahead." It is his favorite phrase; the epithet by which foreign nations most

frequently express their admiration for the energetic qualities of the American people.

Landed for the first time at New York or Boston, when John Bull hears the words "Go ahead" as he enters the omnibus which takes him to his hotel, he may probably contrast the phrase with the familiar "All right" which on such an occasion he would have heard at home. But he hardly realizes at once the fact that these two common expressions, "go ahead" and "all right," embody, as Dickens observes, the leading characteristics of the two closely connected yet distinct branches of the Anglo-Saxon family.

The charming American writer Mathews thinks that Dickens has somewhat exaggerated in dealing with these two expressions as typical of the two peoples. But what does he himself say? "The phrases are, on the whole, vivid miniatures of John Bull and his restless brother—the latter of whom sits on the safety-valve that he may travel faster, pours oil and resin into the steam-furnaces, leaps from the cars before they have entered the depot, and who would hardly object to being fired off from a cannon or in a bombshell, provided there were one chance in twenty of getting safe to the end of his journey." We could hardly have a stronger picture of the reckless impetuosity of the true American than that contained in the preceding extract from one of their ablest writers. As this reckless impetuosity is embodied in the phrase "go ahead," so the English "all right" embodies admirably the slow, cautious, it may be stolid, conservatism of John Bull. Speed is the paramount idea with the Yankee; safety, with the Englishman.

The history of the phrase is instructive. As first propounded by the immortal Crockett, "Be sure you are right; then go ahead," the maxim was admirable. The sternest moralist could take no exception to it. But in this shape it was too long and too circumspect for common use, and it soon was lopped of its troublesome morality and "whittled down" (to use an Americanism) to its present compendious and handy proportions.

The phrase "go ahead" is, as we have said, essentially American both in its origin and use; but the English have a very

common phrase expressing a very similar mental condition—"getting on." "Getting on" is for the Englishman what "go ahead" is for the American. The frequent use of "getting on" in ordinary English conversation is an evidence of the earnest desire of the ordinary Englishman to outstrip his neighbor in the race and struggle for place, power, and pelf. He is never satisfied with the position he occupies, but, like the unhappy youth in Longfellow's poem, he must ever mount higher and higher. Other European nations are not so much plagued with this restless fever as the English; while to the Asiatic the mental condition is utterly strange, if not unintelligible. "Why," asks the Hindoo, "should a man strive to 'get on'?" He is what he is by the divine arrangement, and why wish it otherwise? The self-satisfied Englishman may look with contempt upon the Hindoo for his indolent acquiescence with his lot; but John Bull's happiness would probably not be decreased if he were content to learn from the despised Hindoo the lesson of contentment with his lot. The United States has been with some justice styled the land of the "almighty dollar." And assuredly the way in which the sound of the words "dollars," "dollars" is ceaselessly dinned into one's ears plainly shows the important part which the "dollar" plays in the life of the American people. In the United States generally, our English word "servant" is entirely discarded; instead of it the word "help" is used. The change is significant: the former implies, while the latter ignores, a difference of social rank between employer and employed. The former breathes the spirit of the old feudal days; the latter, the spirit of modern democratic liberty and equality. Again, the words "gentleman" and "lady" have both of them, as we might *a priori* anticipate, a much greater latitude of meaning in the United States than in England. In the latter country these words are in ordinary parlance restricted to the so-called upper classes of society and always imply a certain amount of culture and refinement, or, as we should now say, of "sweetness and light;" in the former, the words as used by the masses are emptied of any such impertinent class distinctions, and one may hear the negro who blackens boots at your hotel spoken of as "the gentleman who does

the boots," while his wife the laundress would be hurt if she were not referred to as "the lady who does the washing."

A correspondent of a Western paper describes New York as being better characterized by intenseness than by any other word. "You see it," he writes, "in everything: in business, in social life, in pastimes, at the stock board, in the streets—everywhere. The effect of this is seen in the language of the people. If a man speaks, he must express what he has to say in the fewest possible words. Hence the curt phrases, the short-cuts in trains of thought which this pressure on one's time has brought into use. All is *spoken for short*." How many words would an Englishman take to describe what the American calls simply the "telescoping" of a train?

The words "reckon," "calculate," "guess," "put up," "balance," are among the salient or dominant words which every Englishman must at once remark from their constant use in the most unexpected and amusing ways in the United States. They all indicate very unequivocally the commercial and business character of the nation.

A single word, it has been said, will often reveal more of the character of a people than the history of a campaign. Such a word is the Russian word *pikas*. This word travellers tell us is constantly on the lips of the Russian peasant. It means *it is ordered*, and the constant and universal use of the word by the Russian peasant argues his blind and slavish submission to authority. It may indeed be that in these latter days, when nihilism is rampant in Russia, and when there would seem to be a universal uprising of the masses against all constituted authority, the word *pikas* may not be so frequently on the lips of the Russian as it used to be. Nihilism is the natural reaction from a state of "pikasism."

I may here call attention to the very significant fact that the Russian language is said to have no words to express the ideas of "justice," "liberty," or "honor." Does not the absence of these three words, taken in connection with the constant presence of the word *pikas*, throw a flood of light upon the moral, social, and political condition of the Russian people?

In modern Greece the word *skopos* plays the same part

that *pikas* does in Russia. It is the dominant word in the language. "There is everywhere and in all things," writes "The Roving Englishman," "the same want of private honesty and of public faith. The best men are liars and robbers. They rob as a provision for their families; they rob as a duty and a right and perquisite of office." "There is everywhere that infernal word *skopos*[1] (meaning want of faith). No man has the smallest belief in himself or in any one else; words cease altogether to be symbols of things."

There is perhaps no single word which we could find more characteristic of the English nation than the simple and untranslatable Saxon word "home." It gives us the key-note of the English mind and tells of a people who prize, above and beyond all other blessings, the domestic virtues, family ties, and fireside enjoyments. In youth and age alike the word "home" brings with it to the Englishman the most delightful and hallowed associations. To him it is as one of our most English poets sings:

> "The resort of love and joy,
> Of peace and plenty, when supporting and supported,
> Polished friends and dear relations, mingle into bliss."

The domestic side of the English character is shown again in the Saxon words "husband" and "wife"—words which serve also, as Trench observes, to remind us of domestic duties. "What is *husband* (house-band) but the band or bond of the house, who binds and keeps the family together? And what is *wife* but the title of her who is engaged in the web and the woof, the most ordinary branch of wifely employment when the language was forming?"

"Gentleman" is a typical English word. Long may it be so! Thackeray truly says: "Wherever the English language is spoken, there is no man who does not feel and understand and use the noble word 'gentleman.'" And he adds that there is no one who better teaches what a gentleman should be than our English Addison. The French have long borrowed the word from us, and of late years the Germans are endeavoring to naturalize it in their language.

[1] It is not easy to connect the signification of the modern Greek word *skopos* with the classical *skopos*, which means a watchman—a *scout;* a mask.

"Duty" is a word which the English are fond of using, and one which they may be proud to claim as a characteristic one. Duty is the pole-star by which the Englishman from his youth is instructed to direct his conduct: the motive which is most constantly urged to animate his courage and inspire his efforts. The most stirring appeal probably ever addressed to English hearts was the famous watchword which Nelson passed like an electric shock through the fleet before the battle of Aboukir: "England expects that every man this day will do his duty." And one of the most touching, simple, and English epitaphs ever graven on the tombstone of a hero was that penned for himself by one of England's noblest sons: "Here lies Sir Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty."

"Fair play" and "pluck" are homely Saxon words, racy of the soil, and eminently characteristic of some of the most sterling qualities of the Englishman. A French military writer says: "The Saxon word 'pluck' expresses admirably the peculiar characteristic of the indomitable courage of the British soldier. It means courage, but it means courage united to firmness, to *sang-froid*, to a steady resolution which never falters. It is in fact courage guided by duty and controlled by reason." What "pluck" is for the English, *élan* is for the French. And the difference between the two words symbolizes the character of the two nations. Pluck implies "steady endurance;" *élan*, brilliant dash. *Élan* is usually limited to displays of courage on the field of battle; whereas pluck may be exhibited in innumerable and diverse fields—by the prize-fighter Tom Sayers, as with one arm broken he fights on against his giant adversary, as well as by our gallant countrymen during the Indian Mutiny, of whom Montalembert wrote that, tho alone in many cases and surrounded by fiends thirsting for their lives, "not one of them turned pale in presence of his butchers." *Gloire* is the parent of *élan;* while stern "duty" is the father of "pluck."

The common English saying, "Fair play is a jewel," embodies a national sentiment—a sentiment acted upon generally, whether in international affairs or in the ring. So far as the prize-ring tends to foster a love of "fair play," so far we must admit

there is a redeeming feature in a practice otherwise altogether brutal and degrading.

While the Saxon words which I have enumerated, "home," "duty," "gentleman," "fair play," and "pluck," continue to hold the place which they now hold in general estimation in England, while they are the *verba et voces*, the spells by which to quicken the hearts and stir the pulses of his fellow-countrymen, so long no Englishman need despair of the future of his country.

The genial and whole-souled hospitality of Ireland, which is said to make a friend of every visitor, finds fitting expression in the intensity of the Irish welcome, "Cead mille a failthe." Speaking of the Irish twenty-two years ago, Emerson Tennent, himself an Irishman, wrote: "A great man, now no more,—the late Sir Robert Peel,—once said to me that in Ireland, instead of aiming at what was best and most excellent, everything in the eyes of the people was 'good enough,' 'well enough,' or 'time enough.'" "In these expressions," he adds, "we have an evidence of that lazy contentment, that listless indifference to their lot, which characterizes the lower classes of Irish *in their own country*." The last four words are a very necessary qualification to the above statement, for it is matter of daily experience both in this country and in the United States that Irishmen transplanted to America cast off the indolence which marked them at home, and often by their industry and intelligence win honorable positions in the foremost ranks of their adopted country. They practically contradict the hackneyed school-boy quotation, "Cœlum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt;" a fact which ought to encourage British statesmen in promoting schemes for Irish emigration. During the last few years several new words have found their way into the Irish national vocabulary. "No rent," "Land League," "home rule," have taken the place of "good enough" and "well enough," and indicate a terrible awakening from their former state of lethargy; a change which finds practical expression in the terrible catalogue of murders, assassinations, and agrarian outrages with which for many months we have been so painfully familiar. Just now there would seem to be a faint gleam of light on Ireland's dark

and stormy horizon. Let us hope that there is still enough of patience and sound sense in Ireland, enough of justice and statesmanship in England, to find a remedy for a condition of things which no true Englishman or Irishman can contemplate without grief and shame. Those who know the Irish best must admit that they are eminently a devout and religious people. The phrase "God be praised," or "God's will be done," with which the Irish peasant usually winds up his tale of misery, is in itself proof of this deep-seated religious instinct of the people.

"It is said," writes Mathews, "the word oftenest on a Frenchman's lips is *la gloire*, and next to that perhaps *brillant, brillant*. The utility of a feat or achievement in literature or science, in war or politics, surgery or mechanics, is of little moment in his eyes unless it also dazzles and excites surprise. Sir Astley Cooper, the great British surgeon, when visiting the French capital, was asked by the surgeon *en chef* of the Empire how often he had performed some surgical operation requiring a rare union of dexterity and nerve. He replied that he had performed thirteen times. "Ah! but, monsieur, I have performed him one hundred and sixty times! How many times do you save life?" continued the curious Frenchman. "I," said the Englishman, "saved eleven out of thirteen. How many did you save out of one hundred and sixty?" "Ah, monsieur, I lose dem all; but the operation was very *brillant*."

The French have been for centuries the masters of the science of gastronomy, and the proof of this is seen in the fact that the English and most other modern nations have borrowed from them the names of all save the most ordinary dishes which they put upon their tables, and in polite society the present word *menu* has nearly superseded our vulgar Saxon "bill of fare."

A clever French-Canadian *littérateur* has pointed out some of the peculiar phrases in common use among his countrymen which bespeak their Norman and maritime origin. They embark and disembark from their wagons; veer about on all occasions, even in church. Instead of going to dress, "Ils vont se gréer," or to *rig themselves* out. They wash their *butin*, not their *linge*. The last word, *butin*, he tells us, is still in vogue in

Normandy (the *cunabula* of the French-Canadian), and recalls the freebooting tastes, as the other terms do the sea-going habits, of the handsomer Norman piratical ancestors of our peaceful, unmaritime French-Canadians.

Again, our fellow-subjects in the Province of Quebec are eminently religious. Indeed it may well be questioned if the Pope has in any part of the globe more faithful and devout followers than the descendants of the French on the banks of the St. Lawrence. The proof of this is their passion for giving the names of saints not only to their children but to their towns and villages. Some of the saints who have thus been made to stand sponsors for places in Lower Canada have not, I fear, been quite regularly canonized. For example, we find among the French *habitants* the English name "Somerset" is changed into Saint Morriset, and "Stanfold" into "Saint *Fol*"—*Saint Fool!*

The next group or class of words which I shall cite as characteristic of a nation are those which are conspicuous by their absence from the language. In every language there will be found a greater or lesser number of *imported* or foreign words for which the importing language has no equivalent. The exact ideas which these foreign words embody are not in fact natural or indigenous to the nation importing them; and when they do introduce the ideas, they generally at the same time introduce the symbols of these ideas. Sometimes these foreign words become after a time naturalized, and pass muster as natives "to the manner born." Sometimes, however, they refuse to change their character and preserve to the last their alien aspect. These words are doubly significant; they point out ideas which are either wanting altogether, or only imperfectly conceived in one country and which in the other are clearly recognized and sharply defined.

The English language, which is essentially composite in its character, borrows freely from almost every other. Like Augustus of old, she orders up all the world to be taxed. "There is scarce a tongue on the globe," says a writer from whom I have already freely quoted, "which the absorbing genius of the Anglo-Saxon has not laid under contribution to enrich the exchequer

of her all-conquering speech." "To say nothing of the Greek, Latin, and French, which enter so largely into the woof of our tongue, we are indebted to the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Welsh, Arabic, Hebrew, Hindoo, and even the North American Indian dialects for many words which we cannot do without."

Ever since the days of Louis Quatorze, France has been to a large extent the *arbiter elegantiarum*, "the master of ceremonies," for the rest of Europe. England, in common with the rest of Christendom, has copied her fashions and adopted her language, so far as it relates to the usages and customs of refined and fashionable society. *Bal, etiquette, mode, convenance, bon-ton, haut-ton, savoir faire, prestige, blasé, esprit, jeu d'esprit, bêtise, sottise, naïveté, bouderies, espièglerie, sentiment, galanterie,*[1] are all terms more or less incorporated into our language, and many of which indicate peculiarities of manner and temper which the French alone recognize and define. It will be noticed that a large proportion of the words enumerated have special reference to conversation; a fact which indicates, as Madame de Staël has observed, that "we are compelled to borrow from these 'past masters in the art of conversation' the terms they employ in reference to that art."

In addition to these terms, we have also borrowed from the French the names of many of the games of cards or dice in which gamblers delight, altho it must be admitted that this department of our vocabulary has of late been largely enriched by our cousins across the lines.

There is another imported French word which we may feel thankful to say expresses an idea not indigenous to English soil: the word *espionage*—a word invented, as Dr. Channing tells us, to designate the infernal machine which Napoleon the First established under his unprincipled chief of police for the purpose of consolidating his despotism.

This would seem a natural place to refer to the first intrusion of French or Norman words into our English language, during the two centuries which immediately followed the Conquest.

[1] M. Suard, in his essay on epistolary style prefixed to the letters of Mme. de Sévigné, says that the words *sentiment* and *galanterie*, which express very distinct ideas to a Frenchman, cannot be translated into Latin, Italian, or English.

The readers of "Ivanhoe" will remember the dialogue between the swine-herd Gurth and Wamba the jester, in which the motley fool moralizes sadly on the fact that the ox and the swine and other animals retain their old Saxon names while in the field and in care of the Saxon bondsman, but become beef, pork, veal —Norman words—when they are placed on the tables of their Norman masters. Again, all titles of rank, as prince, duke, marquis, are Norman, while hind, churl, and boor are Saxon. The palaces and castles are Norman, but house, home, hearth, are Saxon. Plain evidence here that the Normans were the conquerors and the Saxons the conquered. I must not, however, dwell on this subject, deeply interesting as it is, inasmuch as it relates rather to the connection between language and history than between language and manners. For it is emphatically true that the history of a people, as well as its manners, is written in its language.

As we have borrowed thus freely from the French, they in turn have imported many representative Saxon words for which their language has no equivalents. Home, comfort, gentleman, club, partner, sport, jockey, steeple-chase, punch, and beefsteak, may be mentioned as among the most noticeable of these Saxon interlopers. *Un vrai gentleman* is now a colloquial expression in France, and *un punch, le sport le box*, have recently been introduced simultaneously with the things they represent. *Un meeting* and *il self-government* are expressions not uncommon in French newspapers. "Nursery," says a writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, "is a word which has no French equivalent, because the thing has no existence there. A Frenchman, translating an English work of travels, was obliged to paraphrase nursery as "a room specially appropriated to the children under the charge of *head-nurses*." The English words imported into the French language seem somehow strange and awkward in their French companionship, and for the most part they sullenly refuse to be naturalized.

It is mentioned by Mathews as highly significant of the French character that they have no word equivalent to "listener." *Celui qui écoute* can only be regarded, he says, as an awkward paraphrase. The inference is irresistible: they are a nation

of talkers. They rarely indulge in what Sydney Smith once styled "flashes of eloquent silence," and thus "the Frenchman, careless whether he is listened to or not, has never recognized the fact that his language has no name for the person to whom he chatters."

Again, it has often been quoted as an instance of the poverty of the French language that the French had but one word for love and apply it indifferently to *sweethearts* and sweetmeats. In England we carefully distinguish between loving and liking, and the French word *amour* is always taken *in malam partem*.

The unartistic English have been content to borrow from the æsthetic and artistic Italians many of the Italian words which are elsewhere cited as characteristics of their natural tastes: such as *gusto*, *chiara-oscuro*, *cicerone*, *virtuoso*, *dilettante*. A change, however, in the artistic feelings and tastes of the English people is marked by the recent introduction into, and frequent use in, England of the word "æsthetic."

"One of the most formidable obstacles," says Mathews, "which Christian missionaries have encountered in teaching the doctrines and precepts of the gospel to the heathen has been the absence from their language of a spiritual and ethical nomenclature." For the absence of the nomenclature argues the absence of any just or adequate ideas on matters spiritual or moral. The Zulus, according to Bishop Colenso, have an extraordinary *penchant* for carrion in a certain stage of decomposition, "when it has worms in it, but not too many." Carrion in this delectable state is called *ubomi*. No other word in the Zulu language excites such strong emotions, and the phrase "to eat *ubomi*" has become with them the synonym for the highest conceivable felicity, and the unhappy missionary, with no doubt a terrible feeling of the bathos he was guilty of, could bethink him of no other word than *ubomi* to picture to the Zulu mind the infinite beatitudes of heaven.

The poverty of the languages of savage nations in relation to spiritual and abstract subjects has been noted. Sometimes their verbal poverty is of a kind of which they need not feel ashamed. For example, it is said that the language of the American Indians (the same is said of the Gaelic) has no words for swear-

ing. Our red man has borrowed his oaths as well as many of his other vices from his civilized and Christian white brother. In connection with this fact, the author of "Ocean to Ocean" remarks that "reverence is a strong trait in the Indian character in his uncivilized state;" and he pertinently asks, "Is not his dignity of speech and manner connected with this veneration of the Deity?"

The next group or class of character-words are those which express the national ideal of happiness; the moral qualities which a nation likes or dislikes; the actions which they praise or blame. Take the words *nirvana* and *ubomi:* what an amazing contrast, wide as the poles asunder, between the ideas signified! The one the *summum bonum* of the Buddhist; the other the *summum bonum* of the Zulu. What a moral and intellectual gulf between the subtle, metaphysical Hindoo and the Zulu epicure in carrion! How perfectly is this difference brought out in the two expressions *nirvana* and *ubomi!*

A ray of light from a distant star put to the question by the spectroscope tells us the physical constituents of the heavenly body from which it parted possibly centuries ago. So a single word rightly analyzed may spread out before our eyes, as in a spectrum, the inner moral constituents of the people who used it possibly ages before.

The words which embody the common national ideal of happiness or enjoyment are, I have stated, specially typical of their inner life. Contrast, for example, the household Saxon words "fun" and "sport" with the *dolce far niente* of the Italian and the *kief* of the Turk. How vast the interval between the Englishman's ideal of enjoyment and the Turk's! The English words "fun" and "sport" both imply physical activity; in the former there is a strong element of boisterous, heart-easing mirth, and in the latter a possibility of physical danger: while the Italian and Turkish words indicate a perfectly passive physical condition, accompanied possibly in the former with a contemplative enjoyment of the beauties of nature or art, and in the latter with mere dreamy, animal, sensuous bliss. The word *kief*, according to the Christian Hadji, Major Burton, an excellent authority on such a point, "is the very basis of the Turk-

ish language;" and one must reside many years among the Turks before being able to understand its full significance. "The Turks say 'Comment va le kief?' as the French, 'Comment va la santé?' 'Êtes-vous en kief?' as we say 'Are you in good humor?' To smoke his hookah, to contemplate a lovely landscape, to recline upon a sofa while his eyes follow the movements of a graceful dancing-girl: all this constitutes the *kief* of the Turk." Have we not in this one word an epitome of Eastern life?

Contrast again the English word "comfort" with the French *plaisir*. The former is a true Saxon word which defies translation, and which both the Germans and the French have borrowed from us. Pleasure (*plaisir*) is fleeting, while comfort is lasting. Pain follows pleasure, and pleasure is mixed with alloy. But comfort is that modest form of pleasure which seems to be exempt from these drawbacks, being at once desirable and without alloy—pleasure, in fact, without the *amari aliquid* which generally attends it. Comfort is the aim of the Englishman, while pleasure is the idol of the French. Lastly, comfort is usually found at home; pleasure is sought abroad. Does not the difference in these two words point to an essential distinction between the sober, domestic, home-loving Englishman and the gay Frenchman who lives in and for society?

A Parisian being asked why he did not marry a lady at whose house he spent most of his time and in whose society he seemed to take great pleasure, answered that if he married her he should not know where to pass his evenings.

When an Englishman wishes to commend a friend, he probably says "He is a *good* man" or a "worthy fellow." In similar circumstances a Frenchman would say "C'est un *brave* homme;" a Yankee, "He is a *smart* man;" and an Italian, "Un buon diavolo." Each mentions the quality he most esteems. Is it not plain that moral worth stands highest with the English, courage with the French, and "smartness," a quality closely akin to dishonesty, with the Yankee? Among the all-conquering Romans of the Republic, *virtus*, manliness or courage, was the quality most prized, as *arete*, meaning the same thing, was among the Greeks. In both nations, in their heroic days, courage

was the virtue *par excellence*, including as it were all others. Gibbon tells us how this quality of courage declined among the Romans under the emperors; and we have already seen how among their later descendants the modern derivation of *virtus*—*virtuoso*—is utterly emptied of any element of manliness.

In this connection I may quote the remark of Gibbon in his sketch of the military establishment of the Roman emperors. After describing the steps taken to secure the valor (*virtus*) of the troops, he adds: "And yet so sensible were the Romans of the imperfections of valor without skill and practice, that in their language the name of an army, *exercitus*, was borrowed from the word which signified *exercise*." It is in connection with this word that Gibbon makes the note that I have elsewhere cited as the text for the present paper.

There is no more infallible index of the morals of a people than the terms they usually employ in speaking of good and bad actions or good and bad men. When bad names are always given to bad things, and good names to good things; when language is not used to gloss over vice but to condemn it, we may feel assured that the morals of the people are generally sound. But if, on the contrary, shameful and dishonorable things are called by honorable names; if in the common conversation of the people bad men and bad actions are spoken of, not in terms of strong and earnest disapprobation, but in delicate and dainty terms of allowance or approval; if men systematically "put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter," it requires no prophet to tell us that that nation has lost its moral sense and is already far gone in corruption and depravity.

When in France, for example, we find a blackleg called a *chevalier d'industrie;* the most degraded woman, a *fille de joie;* a libertine, *homme de bonnes fortunes;* a breach of the marriage-vow, an *inconséquence;* an adulterous intrigue, a *liaison* or *galanterie:* when the word *roué* has ceased to be a term of disgrace and is transformed into a term of friendship, can we doubt that the moral sense of the nation which has learned so to pervert language has been seared, and that they have practically ceased to regard the distinction between right and wrong? When this is the common language of

society we cannot be surprised to find that men become hypocrites of vice rather than of virtue, and that it was actually said of one of the chartered libertines of the age of Louis Quatorze, "Il est fanfaron de vices qu'il n'a pas" (He affects vices which he has not).

The moral and social condition of the Hungarians is indicated in the word by which they describe robbers—"the poor people;" and the standard of morality among the Italians in the time of the Borgias, by their speaking of the most deadly poison as the "powder of succession"—significant of its use in hastening the exit of those who stood in the path of the impatient heir.

Montaigne says, with truth, that this abuse of language is one of the most powerful instruments of vice. He adds that as society advances this engine of evil does not lose its power. "On the prevention of this abuse or the sustaining of a high tone of moral feeling by giving harsh names to harsh deeds, the preservation of the boundaries between virtue and vice mainly depends."

Well might the eloquent South in one of his famous sermons descant upon "The Fatal Imposture and Force of Words." "Men conceit," to quote Bacon's apothegm, "that their reason hath the mastery over their words, but it happens too that words react and influence the understanding. Words as a Tartar bow do shoot back upon the intellect of the wisest and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment."

Trench quotes a passage from Coleridge in which he illustrates by a noble simile the tremendous power of words over the intellect of man. "They are," he says, "the wheels of the intellect, but they are such wheels as Ezekiel saw in the vision of God as he sat among the captives by the river of Cheba. Whithersoever the spirit was to go the wheels went, and thither was their spirit to go, for the spirit of the living creatures was in the wheels also." It is not, then, too much to say that national language is not merely the mirror which reflects, but in some sort the mould which forms, the national character. The language of a people has been called "a moral barometer that indicates and marks the rise and fall of a nation's life." It is

indeed a very sensitive barometer, and generally gives the first external indication of the declining morality of a people. But it is not merely a passive index of corruption; it becomes in time an active agent in the work. For as the corrupt manners corrupt the language, so the corrupt language still further corrupts the manners: and thus the manners and the language mutually act and react upon each other.

The English people have reason to congratulate themselves that this moral abuse of words is not general with them. The blunt and honest Anglo-Saxon is accustomed to call a spade a spade. Some exceptions to this rule there may be. But they are exceptions. The name given to a duel, an "affair of honor," may be mentioned as one. There cannot, I think, be a question that this high-sounding title contributed to make fashionable in England a custom now happily exploded as being as barbarous and irrational as the mediæval ordeal by fire.

The national forms of salutation are the next group of words or phrases to which I shall refer as indicating the distinctive genius of a people. This is indeed a particularly striking class, and more than the others which I have mentioned has attracted the notice of writers. *A priori* we should expect to find a deep significance in these common salutations. What are these daily salutations but the expression of the feeling with which the people of this or that country habitually regard one another, the normal moral attitude in which they stand towards each other? This common feeling, this normal mental condition, is crystallized, as it were, in the ordinary forms of salutation. These salutations are in truth apt illustrations of what has been happily designated as "the unconscious metaphysics of language."

This branch of my subject has been so admirably treated by the writer to whom I have so frequently referred in this article, Mr. Mathews, that I shall content myself with asking my readers to turn to the pleasant pages of that delightful author if they wish to understand the full significance of the salutations of the principal ancient and modern nations.[1] When they have done

[1] "The Use and Abuse of Words," chap. ii.

so I have no doubt they will think that he is justified in saying that "the forms of salutation used by different nations are saturated with their idiosyncrasies and of themselves alone reveal their respective characters."

The proverbs of a people are another very important and attractive group of characteristic national phrases, and would of themselves furnish material not merely for one but many goodly volumes. Indeed the proverbs of many nations have already employed the pens of learned writers. I must content myself in this paper with merely glancing at this branch of my subject and mentioning it for the purpose of showing that I have not altogether overlooked it.

The last group of characteristic words which I shall notice are the names given to persons and places by different nations. The names which different nations give to individuals or localities have not, so far as I know, been studied at all, until very recently, as a key to the character of the nation; and yet I think such an inquiry will be found to throw no little light upon the feelings and habits and thoughts of the nation amongst whom they arise. A recent writer has pointed out that the great majority of Greek names are derived from (1) the worship of the gods; (2) politics; (3) warfare; (4) wealth or social distinction. "The fondness for those of the last class reveals," he says, "the fact that the love of praise was a ruling passion among the Greeks." Again, "Names expressive of beauty, strength, joy, and favor are extremely common among the Greeks, and record the loving wish of parents for the welfare (and comeliness) of their children."

I must somewhat abruptly close this very imperfect sketch. It may serve as an introduction to the subject—a subject vast and boundless as language itself. The various words and phrases which I have cited, taken from many different languages, ancient and modern, are at least enough to establish, and that was my object, the intimate connection between the most ordinary and simple utterances of a people and their innermost life and habits of thought and feeling. I should fain hope also that the characteristic or typical English words which I have cited, contrasted with the typical words of other languages, may have

a tendency to raise rather than to lower our estimate of our Saxon tongue. Sure am I of this, that the more we study our mother-tongue, the tongue which Milton and Shakespeare spoke and wrote, the more shall we learn to regard it as not the least precious part of our priceless heritage as Englishmen ; not merely because it is the most perfect instrument for the expression of human thought which has ever yet been elaborated, but, more than this, because of the spirit of manliness, honesty, and truthfulness which animates and pervades it.

E. A. MEREDITH.

## MYTHS OF THE ORIGIN OF DEATH.

THE problems of the mythologist are to account, if he can, first for the origin and next for the distribution of Myths. Plainly the myths of men must have their source in certain conditions of the human intellect. That these conditions do not exist in full force among civilized men is obvious enough, because men of all civilizations, Egyptian, Hindoo, and Greek, have been as much puzzled as we modern peoples are to account for the origin of myths. The mental conditions, therefore, which naturally and necessarily produce myths must be strange, on the whole, to civilized men. We are therefore led to ask whether this mental stage has not existed, and whether it does not still exist, among the more backward races, savages as we rather indiscriminately call them. If we do find widely prevalent among the lower races a condition of thought which would necessarily beget the myths of the lower races, and if among the upper races myths similar in character be traced, the problem of the mythologist will be partially solved. Myths, or certain myths, will be the productions of the human mind in the savage state; and when these legends occur among civilized races, they will either be survivals from savagery or narratives borrowed from savages.

Let us apply this system to a single case; namely, to the myths concerning the Origin of Death.

Now, it is plain enough that civilized men, in a scientific age, would never dream of inventing a story to account for so necessary and inevitable an incident as Death. "All men are mortal" is the very type among us of a universal affirmative statement, and how men come to be mortal needs no explanation. So the case seems to civilized and scientific man. But his own

children have not attained to his belief in Death. The certainty and universality of Death do not enter into the thoughts of our little ones.

> "For in the thought of immortality
> Do children play about the flowery meads."

Now, there are still many tribes of men who practically disbelieve in Death. To them Death is always a surprise and an accident, an unnecessary, irrelevant intrusion on the living world. "Natural deaths are, by many tribes, regarded as supernatural," says Mr. Tylor. These tribes have no conception of Death as the inevitable, eventual obstruction and cessation of the powers of the bodily machine; the stopping of the pulses and processes of life by violence or decay or disease. To persons who regard Death thus, *his* intrusion into the world (for Death, of course, is thought to be a person) stands in great need of explanation. That explanation, as usual, is given in myths. But before studying these widely different myths, let us first establish the fact that Death really is regarded as something non-natural and intrusive. The modern savage readily believes in and accounts, in a scientific way, for *violent* deaths. The spear or club breaks or crushes a hole in a man, and his soul flies out. But the deaths he disbelieves in are *natural* deaths. These he is obliged to explain as produced by some supernatural cause, generally the action of malevolent spirits impelled by witches. Thus the savage holds that, violence apart and the action of witches apart, man would even now be immortal. "There are rude races of Australia and South America," writes Mr. Tylor, "whose intense belief in witchcraft has led them to declare that if men were never bewitched, and never killed by violence, *they would never die at all.* Like the Australians, the Africans will inquire of their dead 'what sorcerer slew them by his wicked arts.'" "The natives," says Sir George Grey, speaking of the Australians, "do not believe that there is such a thing as death from natural causes." On the death of an Australian native from disease, a kind of magical coroner's inquest is held by the conjurers of the tribe, and the direction in which the wizard lives who slew the dead man is ascertained by the movements of worms and insects. The process is described at full length by

Mr. Brough Smyth in his "Aborigines of Victoria." Turning from Australia to Hindostan, we find that the Puwarrees (according to Heber's narrative) attribute all natural deaths to a supernatural cause; namely, witchcraft. That is, the Puwarrees do not yet believe in the universality and necessity of Death. He is an intruder brought by magic arts into our living world. Again, in his "Ethnology of Bengal," Dalton tells us that the Hos (an aboriginal non-Aryan race) are of the same opinion as the Puwarrees. "They hold that all disease in men or animals is attributable to one of two causes: the wrath of some evil spirit or the spell of some witch or sorcerer. These superstitions are common to all classes of the population of this province." In the New Hebrides disease and death are caused, as Mr. Codrington found, by *tamates*, or ghosts. In New Caledonia, according to Erskine, death is the result of witchcraft practised by members of a hostile tribe, for who would be so wicked as to bewitch his fellow-tribesman? The Andaman Islanders attribute all natural deaths to the supernatural influence of *e reu chaugala*, or to *jura-win*, two spirits of the jungle and the sea. The death is avenged by the nearest relation of the deceased, who shoots arrows at the invisible enemy. The negroes of Central Africa entertain precisely similar ideas about the non-naturalness of Death. Mr. Duff Macdonald, in his recent book, "Africana," writes: "Every man who dies what we call a natural death is really killed by witches." It is a far cry from the Blantyre Mission in Africa to the Eskimo of the frozen north. But so uniform is human nature in the lower races that the Eskimo precisely agree, as far as theories of Death go, with the Africans, the aborigines of India, the Andaman Islanders, the Australians, and the rest. Dr. Rink found that "sickness or death coming about in an accidental manner was always attributed to witchcraft, and it remains a question whether death on the whole was not originally accounted for as resulting from magic." It is needless to show how these ideas survived into civilization. Bishop Jewell, denouncing witches before Queen Elizabeth, was, so far, mentally on a level with the Eskimo and the Australian. The familiar and voluminous records of trials for witchcraft, whether at Salem or at Edinburgh, prove that all abnormal and unwonted deaths and diseases, in animals or in

men, were explained by our ancestors as the results of supernatural mischief.

It has been made plain (and the proof might be enlarged to any extent) that the savage does not regard Death as "God's great ordinance," universal and inevitable and natural. But, being curious and inquisitive, he cannot help asking himself, "How did this terrible invader first enter a world where he now appears so often?" This is, properly speaking, a scientific question; but the savage answers it, not by collecting facts and generalizing from them, but by inventing a myth. This is his invariable habit. Does he want to know why this tree has red berries, why that animal has brown stripes, why this bird utters its peculiar cry, where fire came from, why a constellation is grouped in one way or another, why his race of men differs from the whites, —in all these, and in all other intellectual perplexities, the savage invents a story to solve the problem. Stories about the Origin of Death are, therefore, among the commonest fruits of the savage imagination. As those legends have been produced to meet the same want by persons in a very similar mental condition, it inevitably follows that they all resemble each other with considerable closeness. We need not conclude that all the myths we are about to examine came from a single original source, or were handed about, with flint arrow-heads, seeds, shells, beads, and weapons, in the course of savage commerce. Borrowing of this sort may, or rather must, explain many difficulties as to the diffusion of some myths. But the myths with which we are concerned now, the myths of the Origin of Death, might conceivably have been separately developed by simple and ignorant men seeking to discover an answer to the same problem.

The Myths of the Origin of Death fall into a few categories. In many legends of the lower races men are said to have become subject to mortality because they infringed some mystic prohibition or *taboo* of the sort which is common among untutored peoples. The apparently untrammelled Polynesian, or Australian, or African is really the slave of countless traditions which forbid him to eat this object or to touch that, or to speak to such and such a person, or to utter this or that word. Races in this curious state of ceremonial subjection often account for

Death as the punishment imposed for breaking some *taboo*. In other cases, Death is said to have been caused by a sin of omission, not of commission. People who have a complicated and minute ritual (like so many of the lower races) persuade themselves that Death burst on the world when some passage of the ritual was first omitted, or when some custom was first infringed. Yet again, Death is fabled to have first claimed us for his victims in consequence of the erroneous delivery of a favorable message from some powerful supernatural being, or because of the failure of some enterprise which would have resulted in the overthrow of Death, or by virtue of a pact or covenant between Death and the gods. Thus it will be seen that Death is often (tho by no means invariably) the penalty of infringing a command, or of indulging in a culpable curiosity. But there are cases, as we shall see, in which Death, as a tolerably general law, follows on a mere accident. Some one is accidentally killed, and this "gives Death a lead" (as they say in the hunting-field) over the fence which had hitherto severed him from the world of living men. It is to be observed, in this connection, that the first of men who died is usually regarded as the discoverer of a hitherto "unknown country," the land beyond the grave, to which all future men must follow him. Bin dir Woor, among the Australians, was the first man who suffered death, and he (like Yama in the Vedic myth) became the Columbus of the new world of the dead.

Let us now examine in detail a few of the savage stories of the Origin of Death. That told by the Australians may be regarded with suspicion, as a refraction from a careless hearing of the narrative in Genesis. The legend printed by Mr. Brough Smyth was told to Mr. Bulwer by "a black fellow far from sharp," and this black fellow may conceivably have distorted what his tribe had heard from a missionary. This sort of refraction is not uncommon, and we must always guard ourselves against being deceived by a savage corruption of a Biblical narrative. Here is the myth, such as it is. "The first created man and woman were told" (by whom we do not learn) "not to go near a certain tree in which a bat lived. The bat was not to be disturbed. One day, however, the woman was gathering firewood, and she went near the tree. The bat flew away, and

after that came Death." More evidently genuine is the following legend of how Death "got a lead" into the Australian world. "The child of the first man was wounded. If his parents could heal him, Death would never enter the world. They failed. Death came." The wound, in this legend, was inflicted by a supernatural being. Here Death acts on the principle *ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*, and the *premier pas* was made easy for him. We may continue to examine the stories which account for Death as the result of breaking a *taboo*. The Ningphos of Bengal say they were originally immortal. They were forbidden to bathe in a certain pool of water. Some one, greatly daring, bathed, and, ever since, Ningphos have been subject to Death. The infringement, not of a *taboo*, but of a custom, caused death in one of the many Melanesian myths on this subject. Men and women had been practically deathless because they cast their old skins at certain intervals. But a grandmother had a favorite grandchild who failed to recognize her when she appeared as a young woman in her new skin. With fatal good-nature the grandmother put on her old skin again, and instantly men lost the art of skin-shifting, and Death finally seized them.

The Greek myth of the Origin of Death is the most important of those which turn on the breaking of a prohibition. The story has unfortunately become greatly confused in the various poetical forms which have reached us. As far as can be ascertained, death was regarded in one early Greek myth as the punishment of indulgence in forbidden curiosity. Men appear to have been free from Death before the quarrel between Zeus and Prometheus. In consequence of this quarrel Hephæstus fashioned a woman out of earth and water, and gave her to Epimetheus, the brother of the Titan. Prometheus had forbidden his brother to accept any gift from the gods, but the bride was welcomed nevertheless. She brought her magical coffer: this was opened; and men who, according to Hesiod, had hitherto lived exempt from "maladies that bring down Fate" were overwhelmed with the "diseases that stalk abroad by night and day." Now, in Hesiod (Works and Days, 70–100) there is nothing said about unholy curiosity. Pandora simply opened her casket and scattered its fatal contents. But Philodemus assures

us that, according to a variant of the myth, it was Epimetheus who opened the forbidden coffer, whence came Death.

Leaving the myths which turn on the breaking of a *taboo*, and reserving for consideration the New Zealand story, in which the Origin of Death is the neglect of a ritual process, let us look at some African myths of the Origin of Death. It is to be observed that in these (as in all the myths of the most backward races) many of the characters are, not gods, but animals.

The Bushman story lacks the beginning. The mother of the little Hare was lying dead, but we do not know how she came to die. The Moon then struck the little Hare on the lip, cutting it open, and saying, "Cry loudly, for your mother will not return, as *I* do, but is quite dead." In another version the Moon promises that the old Hare *will* return to life, but the little Hare is sceptical, and is hit in the mouth as before. The Hottentot myth makes the Moon send the Hare to men with the message that they will revive as he (the Moon) does. But the Hare "loses his memory as he runs" (to quote the French proverb which may be based on a form of this very tale), and the messenger brings the tidings that men shall surely die and never revive. The angry Moon then burns a hole in the Hare's mouth. In yet another Hottentot version the Hare's failure to deliver the message correctly caused the death of the Moon's mother (Bleek, "Bushman Folklore").[1] In this last variant we have death as the result of a failure or transgression. Among the more backward natives of South India (Lewin's "Wild Races of South India") the serpent is concerned, in a suspicious way, with the Origin of Death. The following legend might so easily arise from a confused understanding of the Mohammedan or Biblical narrative that it is of little value for our purpose. At the same time, even if it is only an adaptation, it shows the characteristics of the adapting mind. God had made the world, trees, and reptiles, and then set to work to make man out of clay. A serpent came and devoured the still inanimate

[1] The connection between the Moon and the Hare is also found in Sanskrit, in Mexican, in some of the South-Sea Islands, and in German and Buddhist folklore. Probably what we call "the Man in the Moon" seemed very like a hare to various races, roused their curiosity, and provoked explanations in the shape of myths.

clay images while God slept. The serpent still comes and bites us all, and the end is death. If God never slept, there would be no death. The snake carries us off while God is asleep. But the oddest part of this myth remains. Not being able always to keep awake, God made a dog to drive away the snake by barking. And that is why dogs always howl when men are at the point of death. Here we have our own rural superstition about howling dogs twisted into a South Indian myth of the Origin of Death. The introduction of Death by a pure accident recurs in a myth of Central Africa reported by Mr. Duff Macdonald. There was a time when the man blessed by Sancho Panza had not yet "invented sleep." A woman it was who came and offered to instruct two men in the still novel art of sleeping. "She held the nostrils of one, and he never awoke at all," and since then the art of dying has been facile.

A not unnatural theory of the Origin of Death is illustrated by a myth from Pentecost Island and a Red Indian myth. In the legends of very many races we find the attempt to account for the Origin of Evil by a simple dualistic myth. There were two brothers who made things; one made things well, the other made them ill. In Pentecost Island it was Tagar who made things well, and he appointed that men should die for five days only, and live again. But the malevolent Suque caused men "to die right out." The Red Indian legend of the same character is printed in the "Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology" (1879–80), p. 45. The younger of the Cin-au-av brothers said, "When a man dies, send him back in the morning and let all his friends rejoice." "Not so," said the elder; "the dead shall return no more." So the younger brother slew the child of the elder, and this was the beginning of Death.

There is another and a very quaint myth of the Origin of Death in Banks Island. At first, in Banks Island, as elsewhere, men were immortal. The economical results were just what might have been expected. Property became concentrated in the hands of the few,—that is, of the first generations,—while all the younger people were practically paupers. To heal the disastrous social malady, Qat (the maker of things, who was more or less a spider) sent for Mate—that is, Death. Death lived near a volcanic crater of a mountain, where there is now

a by-way into Hades, or Panoi as the Melanesians call it. Death came, and went through the empty forms of a funeral feast for himself. Tangaro the Fool was sent to watch Mate, and to see by what way he returned to Hades, that men might avoid that path in future. Now when Mate fled to his own place, this great fool Tangaro noticed the path, but forgot which it was and pointed it out to men under the impression that it was the road to the *upper*, not the *under* world. Ever since that day men have been constrained to follow Mate's path to Panoi and the dead. Another myth is somewhat different, but, like this one, attributes death to the imbecility of Tangaro the Fool. The New Zealand myth of the Origin of Death is pretty well known, as Mr. Tylor has seen in it the remnants of a solar myth, and has given it a "solar" explanation. It is an audacious thing to differ from so cautious and learned an anthropologist as Mr. Tylor, but the writer ventures to give his reasons for dissenting, in this case, from the view of the author of "Primitive Culture." Maui is the great hero of Maori mythology. He was not precisely a god, still less was he one of the early elemental gods, yet we can scarcely regard him as a man. He rather answers to one of the race of Titans, and especially to Prometheus, the son of a Titan. Maui was prematurely born, and his mother thought the child would be no credit to her already numerous and promising family. She therefore (as native women too often did in the South-Sea Islands) tied him up in her long tresses and tossed him out to sea. The gales brought him back to shore: one of his grandparents carried him home, and he became much the most illustrious and successful of his household. So far Maui had the luck which so commonly attends the youngest and least considered child in folklore and mythology. This feature in his myth may be a result of the very wide-spread custom of *jüngsten Recht* (Borough English) by which the youngest child is heir, at least, of the family hearth. Now, unluckily, at the baptism of Maui (for a pagan form of baptism is a Maori ceremony) his father omitted some of the Karakias, or ritual utterances proper to be used on such occasions. This was the fatal original mistake whence came man's liability to Death, for hitherto men had been immortal. So far, what is there "solar" about Maui?

Who are the Sun's brethren,—and Maui had many? How could the Sun catch the Sun in a snare, and beat him so as to make him lame? This was one of Maui's feats, for he meant to prevent the Sun from running too fast through the sky. Maui brought fire, indeed, from the under-world, as Prometheus stole it from the upper world, but many men and many beasts do as much as the myths of the world, and it is hard to see how the exploit gives Maui "a solar character." Maui invented barbs for hooks, and other appurtenances of early civilization, with which the sun has no more to do than with patent safety-matches. His last feat was to attempt to secure human immortality for ever. There are various legends on this subject. Some say Maui noticed that the sun and moon rose again from their daily death, by virtue of a fountain in Hades (Hine-nui-te-po) where they bathed. Others say he wished to kill Hine-nui-te-po (conceived of as a woman) and to carry off her heart. Whatever the reason, Maui was to be swallowed up in the giant frame of Hades, or Night, and, if he escaped alive, Death would never have power over men. He made the desperate adventure, and would have succeeded but for the folly of one of the birds which accompanied him. This little bird, which sings at sunset, burst out laughing inopportunely, wakened Hine-nui-te-po, and she crushed to death Maui and all hopes of earthly immortality. Had he only come forth alive, men would have been deathless. Now, except that the bird which laughed sings at sunset, what is there "solar" in all this? The sun does daily what Maui failed to do, passes through darkness and death back into light and life. Not only does the sun daily succeed where Maui failed, but (Taylor's "New Zealand,") it was his observation of this fact which encouraged Maui to risk the adventure. If Maui were the sun, we should all be immortal, for Maui's ordeal is daily achieved by the sun. But Mr. Tylor says ("Primitive Culture," i. 336), "It is seldom that solar characteristics are more distinctly marked in the several details of a myth than they are here." To us the characteristics seem to be precisely the reverse of solar. Throughout the cycle of Maui he is constantly set in direct opposition to the sun, and the very point of the final legend is that what the sun could do Maui could not. Literally the one common point between Maui and the sun is that the

little bird, the *tiwakawaka*, which sings at the daily death of day, sang at the eternal death of Maui. It will very frequently be found that the "solar hero" of mythologists is no more solar than Maui was a photographer!

Without pausing to consider the Tongan myth of the Origin of Death, we may go on to investigate the legends of the Aryan races. According to the Satapatha Brahmana, Death was made, like the gods and other creatures, by a being named Prajapati. Now of Prajapati, half was mortal, half was immortal. With his mortal half he feared Death, and concealed himself from Death in earth and water. Death said to the gods, "What hath become of him who created us?" They answered, "Fearing thee hath he entered the earth." The gods and Prajapati now freed themselves from the dominion of Death by celebrating an enormous number of sacrifices. Death was chagrined by their escape from the "nets and clubs" which he carries in the Aitareya Brahmana. "As you have escaped me, so will men also escape," he grumbled. The gods appeased him by the promise that, *in the body*, no man henceforth for ever should evade Death. "Every one who is to become immortal shall do so by first parting with his body." Among the Aryans of India, as we have already seen, Death has a protomartyr, Yama, "the first of men who reached the River, spying out a path for many" (Atharva Veda, vi. 283). Here Yama corresponds to Tangaro the Fool, in the myth of the Solomon Islands. But Yama is not regarded as a maleficent being like Tangaro. The Rig Veda (x. 14) speaks of him as "King Yama, who departed to the mighty streams and sought out a road for many;" and again, the Atharva Veda names him "the first of men who died, and the first who departed to the celestial world." With him the Blessed Fathers dwell for ever in happiness. Mr. Max Müller, however, takes Yama to be "a character suggested by the setting sun,"—a claim which is also put forward, as we have seen, for the Maori hero Maui. It is Yama, according to the Rig Veda, who sends the birds (a pigeon is one of his messengers) as warnings of approaching death. Among the Iranian race, Yima appears to have been the counterpart of the Vedic Yama. He is now King of the Blessed; originally he was the first of men over whom Death won his earliest victory.

With this victory are vaguely connected legends of a serpent who killed King Yima, in punishment, apparently, of a sin. But it is hard to trace this myth in any coherent shape among the sacred books of the Iranian religion.

We have now hastily examined some typical instances of myths of the Origin of Death. Our point is proved if it be admitted that such myths would naturally arise only among races which have not the scientific conception of the nature and universality of Death. It has been shown that the Death-myths of savages do correspond with their prevalent conceptions of the nature of death, and it is inferred that the similar myths of Greeks, Hindoos, and Persians are either survivals from the time when these races were uncivilized, or are examples of borrowing from uncivilized peoples. This theory of myths has no real novelty, being precisely that by which Eusebius, in his "Præparatio Evangelica," replied to the various philosophical and moral theories of the contemporary pagan Greeks. "Your myths began," Eusebius argues, "when your ancestors knew neither law nor civilization. You have never ventured to lay aside these ancient stories, of which you are now ashamed, as you show by your various apologetic explanations, none of which have the advantage of agreeing with each other." Thus the ancient Father actually anticipated the latest results of modern comparative science.

ANDREW LANG.

## HENRY JAMES'S NOVELS.

IT is nearly ten years since Mr. James gave his first novel to the world, tho for a considerable period before the publication of "Roderick Hudson" he had secured a distinct if limited constituency. His briefer tales had won for him the praise of those who do not fling their praise broadcast. While still barely past his twenties he had gained approval of the sort which many men of genius in literature have died without receiving; his work had struck a new if not a loud note, and those few trained ears which wait for any fine and pure sounds to pierce the coarser clamors, were not slow in their pleased recognition. An American novelist was, just then, very much needed. The great Hawthorne was no more; Dr. Holmes had abandoned his witty and unique romances to resume his dulcet and copious song; Mr. George William Curtis had wholly failed to redeem the promise of earlier years, and, instead of either equalling or excelling his "Trumps," had mortgaged all the grace and humor within his command to the pages of a popular magazine; Bayard Taylor, still living, had once again deserted fiction for poetry; Mr. De Forest yet wrote, but with a success which was for some capricious reason below the gauge of his marked ability; Mr. Howells had done no more than lay the corner-stone of his now assured reputation. And as for Mr. Bishop, Mr. Julian Hawthorne, Mr. Lathrop, Miss Woolson, and a few others at present winning laurels of green and seemingly durable leaf, they had thus far accomplished at best but a tithe of their existent work. The field was clear for some fresh, decisive effort, and the new struggler had every reason to count upon appreciative welcome, provided he should show the right aim and the truly artistic impulse.

In reviewing the more youthful essays of Mr. James's talent,

we are struck with one noteworthy and even singular fact. Altho a beginner, he had nothing of a beginner's rawness. *The Galaxy* (an excellent and representative magazine, while it lived and throve) printed two stories of his which he has never cared to preserve in any future volume, but which, both of them, show the mature reflection of the man rather than the boy's unstudied fervor. Fervor has, indeed, never characterized the pages of Mr. James's writing; an extraordinary personal sobriety was one of their chief qualities, then as now. But in "A Day of Days" and "A Light Man" (two stories taken somewhat at random from others which he has preferred to forget and to have forgotten) was evident the same grave care for detail, the same calm-poised regard of style, the same attention to those subtle and wholesome resources of refined pleasure on the part of his reader, which he has since shown us with so much wider and stronger effect. If the present article were more within the province of the biographer, it might be possible to trace hereditary causes for this remarkable firmness of touch at a time when the most brilliant strokes of a writer are expected to carry prompt subsequent proofs of their wayward and erratic origin. But even then the fact of Mr. James having enjoyed the valuable company of a father famed for high scholarship and sound literary equipment could scarcely explain his placid freedom from the faults, the excesses, the vanities, the extravagances, which are usually so certain an accompaniment of adolescent striving. And Mr. James had none of these; he may at times have sinned on the side of dulness, but it was a sort of majestic dulness, like the traditional laxity of an author who has conquered his public and can dignifiedly trifle with them. We recall another story, entitled "A Very Extraordinary Case," in which (tho it must have appeared in *The Atlantic Monthly* more than twelve years ago) there was not a hint of abandon, of vagary, of feeble treatment. It was a tale of a young man who fell in love with a very beautiful and charming woman, while suffering from a wound received in the late civil war. The hero, through the kindness of a lady who had formerly been his friend, was transported from irksome surroundings in New York to commodious and elegant quarters in a mansion which adjoined the Hudson. Here he met his fate, and his

fate pierced him with her lovely glances, thrilled him with her evasive, baffling, and coy personality. A younger lady had fascinated, bewildered him, and led her invalid swain to ponder whether her heart were of wax or adamant. While he was in this pathetic condition of doubt, he one day put on her cloak, to attire her for a walk, or a visit, or perhaps a suspected meeting with some unknown rival, and soon afterward died. This tale was printed long ago, and Mr. James was a very obscure writer when he printed it; and yet in it may be found the same individuality and novelty of treatment which have been his passwords to distinction.

"The Passionate Pilgrim"—a brief bit of work, embodying in exquisite diction the delight and enthusiasm inspired by an American who sees England for the first time in all her pastoral yet historic loveliness—has the fault of exaggeration, here and there; the dreamy and romantic character of Searle is charged with too electric and explosive a force of sentiment; he now and then passes the sane bound, and resembles one of those curious cases preserved in the annals of the neurologist: nor does his tragic end fail to remove from him this morbid element. But the whole story has an air, a delicacy, a finish quite its own, and every page is stamped with some telling and memorable felicity. "The Last of the Valerii"—which records how a young Roman noble conceived an hereditary pagan passion for a marble Juno excavated from the soil of his own garden—distinctly shows the influence of Hawthorne. Mr. James had not yet escaped "influences"; he was still under the spell of imitation. But the narrative is managed with a masterly vigor; we see the disciple only in the subject, and not in its treatment. The young Conte Valerio is presented and described to us with an actual wizardry of portrayal, and his singular love is so overfilmed by a tender poetic haze that it wears no trait of repulsion. Clumsy handling would have made his figure a merely grotesque one; but it is handled with the adroit reverse of clumsiness, and before the curtain is let to fall upon it we feel our sympathies wakened where to rouse our ridicule would have been by no means difficult. Another purely imaginative story, and one bathed in that heavy sinister shadow beloved of him who gave us "The Twice-Told Tales," is "The Romance of Certain Old

Clothes." Its very *locale* instantly suggests Hawthorne. It is supposed to happen "toward the middle of the eighteenth century," and "in the Province of Massachusetts." Its atmosphere is finely Colonial; it is pervaded with a gently murmurous rhythm, like the hum of an antique spinning-wheel. It tells of two sisters who both loved the same man. One wins him as a husband, and afterward dies. She leaves, however, in sacred charge to her lord, a chest of laces and silk apparel, the most costly and beautiful in the Province, which he is to faithfully guard until their infant daughter shall come of age. He swears to his dying wife that the chest shall remain undisturbed. But subsequently he weds the second sister, whose vanity hungers for the concealed treasure. She torments her husband with entreaties regarding them, and at length, in a fit of distracted irresolution, he flings her the key of the chest. That evening, on his return home after several hours of absence, he misses his wife, and searches for her everywhere throughout the stately old homestead. He at length finds her upstairs in the dim and dusky attic, crouched beside the huge chest, whose lid is open. She has "fallen backward from a kneeling posture, with one hand supporting her on the floor and the other pressed to her heart." On her limbs he perceives the stiffness of death, and on her face, where the fading light of the sun strikes it through a near window, is "the terror of something more than death." The *finale* of this weird tale runs as follows: "Her lips were parted in entreaty, in dismay, in agony; and on her bloodless brow and cheeks there glowed the marks of ten hideous wounds from two vengeful ghostly hands."

In such fanciful and lurid work as this it is hard to recognize the future author of "Daisy Miller" and "An International Episode." And yet the breadth between the two classes of accomplishment measures, in a certain way, the scope and range of Mr. James's capabilities. No author can escape the requirements and demands of his time, and that increased age should make him more sensible and observant of them is usually a proof of his creative excellence. We speak of a painter's first, second, or third "manner," and with the novelist it would often be fair to chronicle similar grades of development. But the charge so often preferred with heat and even ire against Mr.

James, to the effect that he wholly lacks poetic imagination and is a coldly studious realist, would seem to suggest that some of his critics have by no means made themselves familiar with all his published writings.

In the same volume as that which we are now considering may be found three other tales that imply a decidedly French source of inspiration. "The Madonna of the Future" commemorates the pathetic incident of a poor little crazed American artist in Florence, who believes himself to be gradually perfecting a marvellous picture of the Virgin, and who has in reality, after years of feverish toil, done no more than add many weak brush-strokes to a mournful and worthless daub. The *donnée* of this tale is not new. Mr. James treats it with fascinating skill, and the quiet splendor of his style was never more potent than when it is brought to bear upon the "transcendent illusions and deplorable failure" of his piteous, dream-haunted, maniacal Theobald. It is all a true, glowing jewel of thought, of feeling, and of literary execution; its like exists nowhere among the masterpieces of our language, and we doubt if any language contains a prose-poem at once so chaste and so rich-tinted, so imbued with the best energy and yet so mellowed by the softer and deeper shadings. At the same time, we cannot but recall that its motive, its *idée mère*, came originally from Balzac, whose well-known story contains something more than the germ of Mr. James's perfect achievement. In the same way "Eugene Pickering" and "Madame de Mauves" are French of origin; their tone, their color, reminds us respectively of Turgénieff and Cherbuliez. In "Eugene Pickering" we have one of those icy-hearted women whose merciless coquetries the great dead Russian has repeatedly chosen to dissect. Madame Blumenthal loves to bind her victims in the chains of her own witchery and then watch them struggle. She overflows with a certain sort of sentiment; she is fond of talking about soul and passion in others, but she has neither soul nor passion herself. To slightly alter Mr. James's own words concerning this fair and dangerous temptress, she reads his hero's little story to the end, closes the book very tenderly, smoothing down the cover, and then, when Pickering is least prepared for so cruel an act, she tosses it into the dusty limbo of all her old romances. Madame Blumenthal her-

self is drawn with a bold, firm hand. She seems to have been prompted by Turgénieff, but only because he has given us similar glacial feminine types. She is quite different from Madame de Mauves, who is treated with an equally pitiless exposure. The latter, married to a man whom she has learned merely to tolerate, and whom she has ample reason to think unfaithful, receives from him an encouragement to imitate his own inconstancy. Her placid rebellion takes a most startling shape; it recalls Cherbuliez, and for the reason that this keen-sighted Frenchman is so fond of like surprises in the juxtaposition of his personages. The story ends with a most bitter surprise. The wife remains frigidly virtuous, and the husband, thrilled by her rectitude into a new appreciation, regards her with new eyes. To put it considerably more coarsely than Mr. James does, M. de Mauves falls violently in love with his shocked and proper spouse. But she has nothing except severe scorn to give him in return. He blows out his brains, one day, in consequence of her unaltered disdain. The end of it all is hopeless, unsatisfactory, but it is thoroughly consistent with Mr. James's contempt for the conventional *ficelles* of fiction.

This book, "A Passionate Pilgrim and Other Tales," has received a more detailed notice than the ordinary reviewer of Mr. James's work would be willing to accord it. The volume has hitherto been praised in journals and magazines, but the attention there permitted to it has been hasty and inexact. The book, as it now stands, is remarkable and episodical. There are few things that approach its collection of brief, pungent *nouvelles*. Soberly judged, it is very important; it is not only destined to live, but it is destined to keep a proud place by reason of its vital novelty. That it has come to us through foreign channels is of no consequence; it is fine, poetic, careful, accurate; it resembles nothing in our own letters, as regards actual form. Hawthorne, Turgénieff, Balzac and Cherbuliez may have helped to make it, but nothing has been stolen from these high-priests of fiction except a stray odor of their blazing tripods. Even in his early efforts Mr. James was no copyist; he may have borrowed, but he has always done so at a high rate of interest, promptly and thoroughly paid.

"Roderick Hudson" was the first of his works entitled by its

size to be considered a novel. It is the history of a young American sculptor, whose extraordinary feats in simple clay-modelling win him the admiration and protection of a rich *connoisseur*. Roderick Hudson is sent by Rowland Mallet from an obscure Massachusetts town to the glow and grandeur of Rome itself. He possesses the artistic temperament, with all its virtues, charms, inconsistencies and weaknesses. He has an almost supreme talent, tho one whose exercise and results are dependent upon all sorts of variable caprice. He is noble as a sculptor; he makes one or two great statues, which amaze Rome. But his inspiration leaves him under the stress of a futile love for a very beautiful and bewildering woman, and he sinks from glorious ardor into supine cynicism. His history is that of a wrecked life, a ruined soul, and it has been the history of more than a single man dowered with grand natural gifts. His genius becomes his bane and curse rather than his refuge and solace. Self-control is a sealed book to him. He is very handsome and proud as a prince. He regards life with a picturesque, unconscious arrogance. He wants to wear experience as tho it were a purple robe, with a very soft lining, to be draped about his graceful form in whatever folds are most becoming. It turns out for him, as it turns out for most of us, a crown of thorns, a spear of anguish. But he will not accept his hurts resignedly; he has not the patience to let them heal; he is forever tearing off their bandages and making his exasperated moans while they bleed. He revolts against those iron formulas of acceptance and toleration, to disobey which is to feed the flame of one's own misery with new fagots, day after day. He cries out against men, women, the world, and he imperiously forgets that he has expected much from them and is willing to give them little. He has opportunities for sacrifice, for unselfishness, for that benignant comfort which springs from resolutely fixing our eyes upon the needs and torments of others and so gradually feeling the sting of individual sorrow grow less and less. But he avails himself of no such wise lenitive. He is wholly destitute of wisdom; he is all impulse, and it is incessantly the impulse of egotism. He wounds those who love him, and as if by a divine right, from which commoner mortals are exempted. His rank in art is among the pure-visioned idealists; he wants

to bathe his work in dawn, and make it kindred with the large, tameless, masterful moods of Nature—with the sea, the stars, the winds, the mountains. But his moral life is a satire upon his artistic life. He is like a gallery whose walls are of coarse stucco but wear the best paintings of Raphael or Velasquez. His dreams are angelic in their spiritual height and expansion, but his actualities are earthy and even mean. He is drawn with consummate subtlety and pathos, and we feel, as we watch his image rise and round itself before our sight, that the hand which gave it us has gone to work without a tremor. It is a conception steeped in irony, but it is branded with a sad, inexorable truth. Such men as Roderick Hudson have lived their lamentable, incomplete lives before now. His woful end is like the dying radiance of a meteor across a heaven set with calm and steadfast stars. We realize how others loved him; we ourselves love him in spite of all his glaring faults. We deplore his untimely death as we deplore his wasted career. He might have been so much, if only the elements were kindlier mixed! He embodies a stern and obdurate fact—that those whose brains receive at birth the divine dowry of peculiar and special favors too often are predestined, as if by some tyrannic fatality, to pay a dark forfeit for the precious boon. So much power is given to the head, so much weakness to the heart. And both together, conflicting within one human organization, create a perpetual surprise, a perpetual puzzle, to him who must bear about, through his daily dealings with society, this sorry junction of unreconciled antagonisms.

The other characters in the novel are all striking creations. They bite into the memory and will not be forgotten. They are generously described, but they are nevertheless permitted to speak for themselves after we have been introduced to them, and in a way that dramatically coincides with their previous literary portraiture. The placid, worldly-wise, and somewhat obtuse Rowland Mallet is inimitably conceived; the home-spun, maternal, timorous Mrs. Hudson, with her worship for her gifted son and her limited, rural views of all things, could not easily be excelled; the repressed, sedate, almost ascetic Mary Garland, with her sweet maidenly heart in continual secret pulsation of love for Roderick, who so undervalues its devotion, is securely

and ably treated; the wilful, intoxicating Christina Light, with her almost unparalleled beauty, with so much about her that is genuine and that all the vicious falsity of her home-surroundings cannot quite tarnish and spoil, with her nimble, arch wit, her disguises, her flashes of daring candor, and her fitful, recurrent disgust for the fools, bores and rascals whom she is compelled to meet, merits a prominent place among the author's foremost creations. And as for his minor people, Émile Augier and the younger Dumas, in their brightest comedies, have not given us better.

Admirable as we find this novel of "Roderick Hudson" in almost every particular, it did not bring its author anything like the solid celebrity which soon afterward resulted to him from "The American." That struck a far more popular note, and indeed a more authentic one. "Roderick Hudson" had charmed a necessarily more limited public, since its truly magnificent maturity of style coexisted with an undoubted subtlety. Its creative stimulus may be traced rather to Mr. James's reading than his observation of life and men. It is a book of great beauty, great worth, but it is more the book of the poetic-minded scholar than of the artist who studies nature from sentient and breathing models. "The American," on the other hand, was full of vital experience; its sentences were all chiselled into the old perfection and its literary portion was faultlessly careful, but it gave us a wholly new view of Mr. James's capacities. Perhaps the surprise shocked us a little, but the shock, after all, was one of pleasure. Still, it made us feel that the world had claimed Mr. James for its own, and that he was writing to suit the demands of his time. He had previously seemed to write from no such motive, tho when we recall the tales in the "Passionate Pilgrim" volume we are disposed toward the belief that they could, on the whole, be better spared than their author's later work. That is less supple, less tender, less imaginative, but it is, at the same time, more original and characteristically determinate. "The American" made its author famous, and justly. The American himself, Christopher Newman, is a most happy and strong conception. For a man who has gained his fortune early in life by the manufacture of wash-tubs, he is perhaps refined beyond probability. It is highly doubtful

whether his matrimonial advances toward the haughty and impoverished family of the Bellegardes would in actual life have received any toleration whatever. He would have proved coarse, vulgar, perhaps even gross. But Mr. James makes his hero something very different from that. He has never been less realistic in the painting of a character, and rarely more successful. Newman, as we find him, is a most healthful, sunny, winsome fellow. His self-esteem is prodigious, but never repulsive. His Americanism is the most salient thing conceivable, and Mr. James has managed to render it so by incessantly contrasting him with people in every way his opposites. There are scenes in this book which hold the very soul of the true modern comedy; nothing could be more dramatic than the attitude in which Mr. James's young American millionaire stands toward the half-ruined race of the Bellegardes, with their historic ancestry, their overpowering pride, and their keen greed for his republican dollars. More than once the charge of foreign sympathy has been brought against Mr. James; he has been called "the man without a country;" he has been blamed and even sneered at for all sorts of unpatriotic sentiments. But surely in the wholesome democracy which breathes from Newman we have no evidence that these accusations are well based. Aristocracy was never made to wear a shabbier front than it wears in the pages of "The American." Old Madame de Bellegarde, stained with a hideous crime, an unnatural mother and a murderous wife, who might have been created by Balzac himself, is certainly no shining credit to patrician theories. Her son, Urbain, the overbearing, bloodless young Marquis, is only a skin-deep gentleman, and scarcely even that, while his hare-brained, flighty, and often amusing little wife would make a very dangerous custodian of any superior family traditions. Beyond doubt Mr. James has dealt unsparingly enough with these three European persons to acquit himself of unloyal regard for the habitants of his native shores. But on the other hand he has shaped the poor, timid, suffering Madame de Cintré with an excessive charity. He makes her weakness charming, and clothes her in a wistful serenity that is like the faint odor of some very fragile tho perfect flower. She could only have existed in Europe—perhaps, for that matter, only in France itself. The tragedy of her

lot has a kind of gilt-edged gloom; it reminds us of the misfortune endured by certain young queens and princesses. It is astonishing how well she is described, since she is described so little. And yet we feel the flowing lines of her robe, the undulating elegance of her walk, the gracious urbanity of her smile. She has been made intentionally shadowy; her coloring is that of the pastel or the aquarelle; and for this reason she is a trifle unsatisfactory. But we know her to be good and flawlessly pure, a *dévote* of the church in whose tenets she has been reared, and a gentle zealot in her strict observance of maternal and fraternal commands.

There is one character in "The American" which must not be forgotten; he is too full of grace, courage and natural gayety for that; we mean young Valentin de Bellegarde, junior brother of the imperious and frigid Urbain. He is a modern D'Artagnan; if Dumas the Elder had drawn him we are sure that Valentin would have been a soldier of fortune and rescued captive damsels, riding spurred, booted and plumed to their relief. As it is, we see him fall rashly in a foolish duel, and for this reason he suggests even more keenly the gay chevalier of the French romancist. But he is, after all, considerably subtler than a D'Artagnan. He knows his Paris well, and it is a much wickeder and more corrupt Paris, one might venture to state, than that of Louis Treize. Valentin is thoroughly modern; he is taken directly from the French life of the present.

"The American" was somewhat speedily followed by "The Europeans," a novel for which many new-gained readers waited with glad expectancy. But "The Europeans," while proving itself anything but a *pendant* to the author's previous work whose name its own so resembled, gave signs of something like fatigue, and of over-rapid construction as well. It contains some passages of capable writing, and it is all good literature. But it is not such good literature as "The American," and it will inevitably, we think, take a second rank among its author's works. It is a story that deals with American soil, and it transports two of its chief characters from Europe to this country. Mr. James himself calls it "A Sketch," and he has been no less wise than modest in doing so. His success on American soil, so to speak, has never been his finest success. Not that he is not, in the

very deepest meaning of the word, an American novelist, but he necessarily, from continued residence abroad, knows his own countrypeople the best where he is most in the habit of finding them; and it is when he gives their portraits a foreign frame that we recognize them as most apt and secure of handling. But the Baroness is undeniably a well-wrought personage. She is "*une femme qui possède cent-trente-sept-mille manières de dire Non, et d'incommensurables variations pour dire Oui*," as one of Mr. James's most admired authors has long ago put it.

"Daisy Miller" was a far more vivid piece of work, tho considerably briefer. Its success was immediate and phenomenal, and we suspect that in making us acquainted with this innocent, unconventional, closely studied type of an American girl abroad Mr. James did more to familiarize himself with the large reading public than by anything else he has ever written. The little tale was discussed in hundreds of households, condemned, praised, argued over, fervently and often unjustly criticised. It belongs among its author's simply clever work; it shows us his tact and his talent at their fullest, but it shows us none of his larger and radiant qualities. It is an acute and exact study, perfectly free from the satire with which some of its detractors have declared it to be malevolently brimming. It puts a poor silly little American girl in a very sorry light, and makes those of us who are willing to accept unpartisan views of national faults regret that certain distinctive features of our special civilization should cause our women to be so misunderstood in other lands. Poor Daisy means no harm; it is evident to any attentive and unbiassed eye that Mr. James knows she means no harm. He has copied rather than created her; she has been ridiculously educated here, and makes a sad little goose of herself there. She is a reproach, an advice, an admonition to us, as he presents her. But the American sensitiveness largely flew to arms because of her presentation. It called the author of her literary being a good many hard names. There is no doubt, however, that he was merely availing himself of a fresh and effective subject for strongly naturalistic treatment. But angered America refused to see this, and for successive months Mr. James, never so widely known till now, was never so widely rebuked. In "An International Episode" he made us a kind

of *amende*, tho probably an unintended one. He drew for us a young American girl of praiseworthy deportment and stout independence, who refused to marry an English nobleman. This story mollified some of his irate critics. Like "Daisy Miller," it belonged among his slighter works, and the comment should here be made that scarcely any novelist of our time has approached Mr. James in his power to write a magazine-tale which could attract hosts of readers and columns of discussion. "An International Episode" is the finest thing he has done without placing his characters in a foreign *entourage*, altho this story ends in England. It is, however, not so good as "The Pension Beaurepas," which has a superb humor and a startling actuality. In that delightful bit of grouping we believe that Mr. James once more offended. The remorseless economies and the laughable crudities of certain Americans, met in a Swiss *pension*, were esteemed material unfit for manipulation by a leal United States citizen. But the probable truth is that Mr. James regards his own country as a much greater affair than some of his aggrieved critics do. He thinks her quite able to stand a little honest fault-finding. Thackeray thought the same thing of his English brothers, about thirty years ago, and awoke even worse resentment for having cherished such opinions. It is a weak commonwealth which cannot afford to receive a good many stout raps of merited censure. The really good Americans are very possibly those who pay a candid smile to their own faults and foibles.

Two other shorter works of Mr. James should here be noticed, because they both deal with the same international questions of difference in breeding, culture, manners, education. These are "A Bundle of Letters" and "The Point of View." Each is in fact a bundle of letters, and two or three of the writers are the same in either *brochure*. "The Point of View" was published but a few months ago, and during a time when nearly every daily newspaper was having its fling of condemnation at Mr. James's mighty "un-Americanism." But the author made it singularly plain, in transcribing the supposed correspondence of these foreigners who have come to visit us and of these fellow-countrypeople who have returned to us after absence, that he desired to extenuate nothing nor set down aught in malice—that he described the impressions of others rather than stood

sponsor for their convictions. As well blame a dramatist as a novelist for the vices and peccadilloes of his men and women. But even here, where Mr. James had embodied a separate mass of antipathy or of predilection in each one of his personages, making this the *litera scripta* not of himself but of themselves (individually and successively, one after one), he has been accused of assailing with wanton slurs his own fair and free land! The present writer remembers to have seen in a New York newspaper of good position, not long ago, an almost vituperative letter in which Mr. James was held up to scorn for having permitted his "Point of View" to slander this country at the expense of Europe. Large quotations were made, as if in a perfectly honest spirit of corroboration, from one special epistolary chapter of this same work. It chanced to be a chapter in which a particularly provincial Frenchman was imagined as scathing us—as regarding us from his exclusively Gallic *point de vue*. But the words, with an amazing lack either of honesty or common-sense, were quoted *as Mr. James's own!* The very next letter represented a totally opposite sort of writer: he extolled our institutions of every sort with unstinted enthusiasm; he was "spread-eagle" enough, as we put it here, for a Fourth-of-July oration; he scoffed at Europe as a contemptible little section of the map in comparison with our glorious and thrice-blessed expanse of it. And he was just as serious, just as impartially permitted by his author to have his own say and to say it all out, as the feudal-minded enemy of the Stars and Stripes had been but a page or two before! Yet the person who made his quarrel with Mr. James entirely omitted this assertive eulogist from mention! It was taken grandly for a matter of course that he had written sacred truths, while the sound abuse of us, clearly indicated as emanating from a wholly different pen, was coolly copied out as if it had been signed with neither reservation nor explanation by Mr. James!

"Confidence" is a novel which contains some good writing, but it is chiefly of a descriptive, landscape sort. Mr. James takes us about Europe in company with his various characters, who are the most nomadic Americans in the world; we are even led to think, at times, that he has made them so for the purpose of telling us where they rest and muse and converse, rather than

of telling us just what and who they are. "Confidence" is like one of his fine "Transatlantic Sketches" amplified, with a thread of story to gleam here and there amid its mellifluous and rhythmic prose. The story is by no means notable. The characters are all enigmas for which we find no ultimate key. They do not seem to live, but rather to talk of living, and almost merely to play at it. Tho it appeared but recently, it gives the idea of having been written long ago—before "The Passionate Pilgrim" and "Madame de Mauves"—and of having afterward been re-touched, re-polished. It is by no means so good as "Gabrielle de Bergerac," which was printed fully fifteen years ago, and which better deserves resurrection than the novelette "Watch and Ward," now given us in book-form. "Gabrielle de Bergerac" was a lovely picture of French château-life. But "Confidence" is not a lovely picture of any sort of life. The more closely we examine it at this later date, the more assured we feel of its youthful origin. Its psychology is unfathomable, but not with the profundity of deep insight. We are prepared to expect certain inevitable things of its men and women, and they do the precise opposites of these things. They amaze us, they even irritate us, but they never interest us. The whole book is curious for its blending of good technical elaboration with insufficient human exposition.

Chronologically speaking, we should not have left until the last a novel of Mr. James's which we have reserved for final treatment. He has published no small amount of fiction since he wrote "The Portrait of a Lady," and yet this deserves a last place on the list of his novels. Into this work, as it seems to us, Mr. James has poured his soul, and given the world something that it will not soon let die. Four magnificent volumes now stand recorded to his credit as an author. These are: "The Passionate Pilgrim and Other Tales," "Roderick Hudson," "The American," and "The Portrait of a Lady." Much of his intermediate writing is fine and admirable. But it would have given him a secondary place in letters, while these four books just mentioned lift him to a primary, we were about to add a supreme, place in letters. If he should never put pen to paper again, his fame is secure and permanent through those four books alone. And after the most careful consideration of each,

it appears to us that "The Portrait of a Lady" is paramount over the rest. It is the longest thing that he has written, but it is also the most majestic and unassailable. Its heroine is a character whose misfortunes are the imperative catastrophes resultant from her own ideal strivings. Unlike Roderick Hudson, Isabel Archer does not recklessly sow the seed of her own future torments. She makes a pitiable error, but she makes it in all womanly faith and sincerity. She is a beautiful, talented, exceptionally lovable girl, and suddenly, at a period when she desires more than ever before to wrest a fecund and splendid victory from the usual aridity of life—to ennoble herself by subjugating herself—to live a power for good and to die somehow perpetuating such a power—at this very period, we say, she is lifted from the inertia of longing to the possibility of achievement. A fortune is left her, in a most unexpected manner; vistas of new purpose are opened to her; the prospect is dazzling at first; she hardly knows what she shall do with these charming, golden opportunities. She does what nearly every woman of her personal graces would do under the same conditions. Out of four suitors (if poor, consumptive Ralph Touchett may be called a suitor) she selects a man whom she marries, believing him a paragon of wisdom, virtue, taste, refinement, notability. He is poor, and it is a comfort for her to feel him so. For this reason he and she shall be yoked, all the more, in exercise of noble end. Her love, which is a reverence, becomes a horror of disappointed discovery. The whole novel is a sort of monumental comment upon the dread uncertainties of matrimony. Isabel's husband, whom she believed of a spirit equally lofty and amiable, turns out a frigid self-worshipper, a creature whose blood is ichor, whose creed is an adoration of *les usages*, whose honor is a brittle veneer of decorum, beneath which beats a heart as formally regular as the strokes of a well-regulated clock. He has married her with very much the same motive as that which might prompt him to buy a new bit of antique *bric-à-brac* at slight cost from a shrewd dealer. He is a virtuoso, a collector, a person who puts immense value upon all exterior things, and he considers life, happiness, matrimony, womanhood, principle, even divinity itself as an exceedingly

exterior thing. Isabel's amazement, her grief, her dismay, her passionate mutiny, and her final bitter resignation, constitute the chief substance of this remarkable book. But much more than this goes to make the book, as a thousand turrets, traceries, illuminations and sculptures go to make a great result in architecture. It is a book with a very solid earth beneath it and a very luminous and profound sky above it. It is rich in passages of quotable description, and no less rich in characters of piercing vividness. It contains more than one "portrait of a lady," as it contains more than one portrait of a man. Madame Merle, the perfectly equipped woman of the world, the charmer, the *intrigante*, the soft-voiced, soft-moving diplomatist, and yet (as we feel more than we are really told) the force for ill, the adulteress, and the arch-hypocrite—Madame Merle, we say, is incomparably depicted. Again, the dying Ralph Touchett, with his mixture of the cynic and the humanitarian, with his love for Isabel alike so exquisitely concealed and revealed, with his patience, his outbursts of regret, his poetry of feeling, his inalienable dignity and manhood, is an astonishingly striking conception. He exists, to our knowledge, nowhere else in any pages of fiction. He is the high-tide mark of what Mr. James can do with a human individuality, and he represents what Mr. James likes most to do with one. We all must recognize him if we have lived and thought. As the author first presents him to us, we involuntarily recall having seen some one who looked just like him. This may not be true, but the sensation of having met Ralph Touchett before is none the less insistent, and proves how marvellous is Mr. James's faculty for hitting off with a few airy or rough touches the physical "points" of his fellow-creatures. "Tall, lean, loosely and feebly put together," runs the description of Ralph Touchett, "he had an ugly, sickly, witty and charming face, furnished, but by no means decorated, with a straggling mustache and whisker. He looked clever and ill—a combination by no means felicitous; and he wore a brown velvet jacket. He carried his hands in his pockets, and there was something in the way he did it that showed the habit was inveterate. His gait had a shambling, wandering quality; he was not very firm on his

legs." We get to love this poor dying consumptive very dearly before he dies. He has a great warm heart behind those wasting lungs. He is a philosopher, but he is also through and through a man.

But, after all, tho he and Isabel are the two triumphs of the book, they are merely the crown of a perfect edifice; all the rest of the structure is of a correspondent excellence. The demure little Pansy, with her unswerving propriety, her devout, filial faith, her enormous sense of rule and law and obedience, is a picture of puritanic simplicity whose tints should last for other generations than ours. So, too, Lord Warburton, as regards crisp and potent yet harmonious and secure character-painting. He is the Liberal English peer to a fault,—with mind enough to understand that his position is absurd, yet with inherited pride enough to preserve an unblemished caste. Quotation, in "The Portrait of a Lady," is a dangerous temptation. Every page offers abundant chance for it, filled as every page is with epigram, thought, knowledge of the world, glancing play of humor, and sportive resilience of fancy.

Mr. James, as we understand, is still in middle life. His career has thus far been enviably brilliant. He has secured heed, place and note in England; he is honorably known throughout Germany and France. In his own country he has stimulated eager debate, caused sides to be formed for and against him, won his lovers and his haters after the manner of all literary men who have ever risen high above mediocrity. He has attained much—how much this article has been of meagre worth if it has not already somewhat plainly shown. He has put his stamp upon the literature of his age; he has employed a bewitching, resonant, cultivated style in which to express, not merely himself, but the best of himself—not merely his ideas, but his most careful, solid and durable ideas. That he will give us, in the future years which supposably still await him, work of even a stouter fibre against oblivion than any which he has yet produced, is far from improbable. Toward that result his admirers—and we venture to assert that they are a more numerous tho more modest *clientèle* than some current newspapers would rather maliciously have us believe—entertain

strong and obvious reasons for hope. Fame has rarely crowned so young a writer with bays of so fine a verdure. But he has won them, when all is said, very honestly. He bears the palm because he merits it. Let him merit new honors and these are sure to reward him. As it is, there is little doubt that he deserves to-day to be called the first of English-writing novelists.

EDGAR FAWCETT.

# OUR EXPERIENCE IN TAXING DISTILLED SPIRITS.

## SECOND ARTICLE.

WITH a view of making as complete as possible the curious record of the experience of the United States in taxing distilled spirits, especially in that department of the subject which relates to the influence of this tax on other industries, it is proposed to here turn back and ask attention to an example of no little economic interest and importance which inadvertently was not noticed in its proper connection in the preceding article, and which illustrates in a remarkable manner the subtle, diffusive, and often remote and unexpected influence of a tax, especially when the same is imposed on the processes rather than the final results of industry.

Before the tax was levied upon distilled spirits in 1862, a large (and probably the largest) proportion of the vinegar used in the United States was made from this product, rather than, as was popularly supposed, from the juice of apples and grapes; the process of manufacture being substantially to add yeast to alcohol (low proof-spirits) largely diluted with water, and allow the mixture to trickle slowly through a cask filled with shavings of beech-wood. In this way the alcoholic liquor is caused to present an immensely extended surface to the action of the air, when oxidation takes place so rapidly that very frequently by the time the liquor has reached the bottom of the cask it no longer contains any alcohol, but is entirely converted into vinegar. Experience has also shown that vinegar thus manufactured and with care is always purer and a better preservative of animal and vegetable food than vinegar manufactured from the juices of fruits, inasmuch as the latter always contain putresci-

ble constituents which are rarely fully eliminated by the process of fermentation; and further, that when the use of distilled spirits at their first cost of production is permissible for the preparation of vinegar, the product can be sold at a much cheaper rate than any other competing article: and the desirability of cheapness and purity in the supply of this commodity at once becomes evident, when it is remembered that the largest consumption of vinegar in every community is for the pickling (preservation) of meats, fish, and vegetables. All this business the war-taxation at once and almost completely broke up. On the other hand, the manufacture of cider—which was not specially taxed—received a great stimulus. New orchards were set out, new nurseries were called into existence, additional cider-mills were demanded in every apple-section of the country, and thousands of dollars were invested in this industry where but a small sum had formerly sufficed. The old-fashioned press also gave place to improved and expensive machinery, and expensive buildings were erected for conducting the business on a most extensive scale. According to a statement submitted to Congress in 1882 by the "Cider-Vinegar Makers' Association," the number of persons engaged in cider and cider-vinegar making in the United States at that time was between ten and twelve thousand, and the amount of capital invested as aggregating into millions. As the amount of available cider and wine produced in the most favorable fruit-years is, however, never sufficient to supply the demand of the country for vinegar, other and cheaper materials for its manufacture were sought for and found, but always at the sacrifice of the purity and healthfulness of the resulting product. Great hopes were for a time entertained that a fermented syrup made from glucose, or starch-sugar, would answer, and this material soon came into extensive use; but the vinegar made from it was found to soon putrefy, and its use, after occasioning great losses to picklers and the community, was abandoned. Unscrupulous manufacturers also made use of mineral acids for the manufacture of factitious vinegar; and as some evidence of the extent to which such fabrications came into general use, it may be stated that in 1877 the Board of Health of the District of Columbia condemned five car-loads of so-called vinegar sent to Washington

from Chicago, analysis showing that the same was little other than dilute sulphuric acid; the board further reporting that the sample analyzed formed part of an invoice of a thousand barrels which had been brought to that city for sale and consumption as vinegar.

Under such circumstances, Congress in 1879 made it lawful for manufacturers of vinegar to separate by a so-called vaporizing process the alcoholic element of an ordinary distiller's "mash," and condense the same in water in such a way as to form a weak mixture, suitable for making vinegar, and yet not salable as spirits. But the moment this was done, fresh industrial antagonisms arose. Vinegar manufactured from distilled spirits again made its appearance on the market, and in such quantities and at such prices that the cider-vinegar makers claimed it would be no longer possible for them to continue their business. The latter accordingly, as was to have been expected, speedily organized themselves into a National Protective Cider-Makers' Association, and demanded of Congress, through petitions and deputations, that the permission granted to vaporize alcohol and use it in the manner described for the manufacture of vinegar should be at once repealed, alleging that the consequence of refusal would be to destroy many millions of dollars of capital which the original tax-law had caused to be invested, and (with less of truth) that the fruit-production of the country would be checked, and the manufacture and sale of deleterious compounds to serve as vinegar be encouraged. Very curiously, also, the distillers actively co-operated as allies of the cider-vinegar makers in asking for a repeal of the new law, alleging a fear that it would encourage illicit distillation and consequent frauds on the revenue. That there were some reasons for such apprehensions could not well be doubted; but the real motive influencing the distillers undoubtedly was, the fear of losing a limited market for their products which had come to them through a revival to some extent of the manufacture of spirit-vinegar, in consequence of the reduction of the tax on proof-spirits in 1868 from $2 per proof-gallon to 50 cents, with subsequent changes to 70 and 90 cents in 1872 and 1875 respectively. And the antagonisms thus inaugurated still exist, and continue to occupy the attention

of the committees of Congress in a greater or less degree at almost every session; the whole history affording a most striking illustration of the unnatural, unpatriotic, and false view that has come to be almost universally taken under the leading free representative government of the earth of the great function of taxation. The distiller, for example, in the case in question, asking to have returned to him what he regards as an alienated right, namely, to levy contribution on every one who desires to use alcohol in any shape; the cider-maker, that the tax may be so fixed as will prevent competition and thereby enable him to exact a larger profit on the sale of his product; and, finally, the spirit-vinegar maker claiming that as he alone occupies a humanitarian standpoint, because his product alone is cheap and always healthful, therefore that the law should be especially framed to promote and encourage his business;—each and all speaking, as is proper, for their own interests; each and all, as is not proper, ever ready to promote their interests by fictitious pleas and averments; while no one (or but rarely) appears on behalf of the consumers, who are the great mass of the people, in whose interests, it is popularly claimed, all laws are enacted. Furthermore, none of the disastrous consequences which it was confidently predicted would ensue if Congress failed to withdraw from the spirit-vinegar makers the permission to use vaporized spirits have apparently occurred as the result of such failure. The regular business of producing distilled spirits goes on as usual. Farmers have not ceased to plant and care for their orchards; cider continues to be manufactured in increasing quantities when the seasons are propitious; while the general public have abundant opportunities to supply themselves with whatever vinegar they may desire at lower prices than have prevailed since the breaking out of the war in 1860. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue alone seems warranted in complaining that through the use of the vaporizing process the facilities for illicit distillation are increased, and probably taken advantage of, to a considerable extent. Finally, if to any it may seem that this history has been stated in greater detail than is expedient, it may be replied that no more important contributions can, in the opinion of the writer, be made to economic science than just such records of practical experience; for it is mainly

through the force and teaching of such examples that the masses can be induced to acknowledge the truth and make the application of abstract principles.

One of the topics to which the attention of the Revenue Commission of 1865 was given, was the influence of the greatly increased cost of distilled spirits in the United States, through the war-taxation, on their demand for drinking purposes; and the testimony of a large number of persons from all sections of the loyal States—manufacturers and dealers in liquors, United States revenue officials and others—was taken in reference to this matter. The opinions expressed were almost unanimously to the effect that no change in consumption was noted by retailers until after the tax was raised above 60 cents per gallon; but that when the tax was increased to $2 the reduction for a time in consumption, especially in the thinly settled sections of the country, was very noticeable. With the increase of taxes on whiskey there was also an immediate and very marked increase in the consumption of beer, the price of which was not enhanced by taxation to a corresponding extent with that of spirits. Thus in 1864, with an internal-revenue tax of $1 per barrel, the assessment was paid on an equivalent of 2,223,000 barrels; in 1865 on 3,657,000; in 1866 on 5,115,000; in 1867 on 3,819,000; while in 1883 the number, as before stated, was 17,757,892 barrels.

On the other hand, the testimony of leading retail and package dealers in liquors in many of the *large* towns and cities was generally to the effect that their business *in the aggregate* was not diminished by the high rates of taxes imposed on spirits; but at the same time all admitted that the demand for the so-called "foreign" or "imported" liquors (upon which the tariff rates had been raised to a greater extent than the taxes on domestic spirits) largely diminished; and also that this loss was fully made good by an increased sale of American whiskey. In fact, the great increase at this time in the price of foreign liquors greatly promoted the sale and use of whiskey in the northern and eastern sections of the country, and seems to have nationalized this liquor as a beverage, and also the term "Bourbon," which then for the first time was, in common parlance (as it ever since has been), generally given to every variety of American

whiskey. One prominent retail liquor-dealer of New York testified before the Commission in 1865 that where during the preceding two years he had lost a sale of *four* gallons of "foreign" (?) brandy, he had in the same time gained a sale of twelve gallons of American whiskey. There was also a general agreement among the witnesses that one noticeable effect of the greatly increased cost of spirits through taxation was an increase of adulteration of the cheap liquors that were retailed, thus debasing the quality of the article that was consumed by the habitually intemperate or the physically exhausted among the poor. One practical illustration in proof of this (contained in a memorial presented to Congress by the American Wine and Spirit Society) was, that in 1860, when gin was selling, duty paid, in New York, at 65 cents per gallon, the retailer charged 6 cents a glass; and that the retail price continued the same when the wholesale price had subsequently advanced to $3.25 per gallon.

Previous to the war and the taxes, the cheap liquors bought by the masses in the United States for stimulant or intoxication were not much adulterated, because there was nothing much cheaper than the crude proof-spirit itself (costing from 14 to 23 cents per gallon wholesale) which could be used as a material for adulteration. At the same time, nothing could be much more deleterious than the American raw spirits (whiskeys) from which the so-called fusel-oil (amylic alcohol), which is the invariable accompaniment of its distillation, has not been removed by redistillation or by oxidation through standing and atmospheric exposure.[1]

Some reliable testimony was also taken illustrative of the specific consumption of distilled spirits in the United States before the war. Thus, according to the opinion of those best conversant with the trade, the quantity of proof spirits required to meet the demands of New York City and its immedi-

[1] While fusel-oil, in itself, is so deleterious that the inhalation of its vapor, even in minute quantity, is very dangerous, there can be no doubt that it is almost completely removed from spirits through what is technically called "ageing," or atmospheric oxidation and moderately high temperatures. Under such circumstances the fusel-oil appears to be naturally converted into innoxious ethers, which give to wines and liquors their delicate "bouquet," or flavor, which is so much prized and is so agreeable.

ate vicinity in 1862 was from 800 to 1000 barrels daily, or from twelve to fifteen millions of gallons per annum. Of this amount one half was set down as directly consumed for drink; while the balance, having been converted into alcohol, pure spirits, imitation liquors, medicinal preparations and the like, found a market elsewhere. According to the testimony of the then Superintendent of Police, the number of places where spirituous liquors were sold at retail in New York City in 1862 was upwards of 8000; and that the quantity sold over the bars of some of the largest hotels, restaurants, and drinking-saloons was equivalent in each case to a barrel of fifty gallons daily.

The results of investigations made some years ago in England, and communicated in a paper read before the Statistical Society by the Rev. Dawson Burns in 1875,[1] were to the effect, that increased taxation upon spirits in Great Britain, and a consequent increase in their price, had always resulted in restricted consumption; that the lowering of the rate had, on the other hand, stimulated consumption; and that seasons of manufacturing and commercial prosperity and development virtually operated as a reduction of the rate and of the price. Mr. Burns, in the paper referred to, also brings out this further interesting fact; namely, that in 1861 Mr. Gladstone, with a view of inducing a popular consumption of light wines, and in accordance with the popular theory that light wines, if cheap, would readily enter into consumption, and by helping to drive out the stronger liquors would assist in the work of promoting popular sobriety, largely reduced the duties on imported wines, i.e., from 5s. $9\frac{3}{10}$d. to 1s. per gallon on wines containing less than 26 per cent of proof-spirits, and 50 per cent on wines more highly alcoholic but not exceeding 42 per cent of proof-spirits. The result was a refutation, in a degree, of the popular theory. The importation and use of imported wines, as was expected, largely increased; and altho a taste for the French clarets was partially excited among the British public, the consumption of the stronger wines of Spain and Portugal—the sherries and the

1 "The Consumption of Intoxicating Liquors at various periods as affected by the rates of duty imposed upon them," by the Rev. Dawson Burns, M.A., Metropolitan Superintendent of the United Kingdom Alliance. (*Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, vol. xxxviii. 1875.)

ports—was stimulated in a much greater degree. In the debate, however, which followed the reading of this paper, the drift of opinion expressed was, that the conclusion of Mr. Burns, that high duties as a rule reduced the consumption of spirits in England, was not sustained; and it was pointed out by Dr. Farr and others that the consumption of intoxicating liquors in Great Britain was affected far more by the prosperity of the country and the rates of wages than by the duties which had at different times been imposed upon them. And the late Mr. Dudley Baxter, especially, whose knowledge and judgment of economic matters are entitled to great respect, maintained that, as regards the upper and middle classes of Great Britain, Mr. Gladstone's legislation in respect to wines had been of most decided advantage to the cause of temperance; and that this, together with the spread and cheapening, by his measures, of tea and coffee, had been one of the most effectual agencies that had been adopted in the country for many years for the furtherance of the object which the advocates of temperance had at heart. But be this as it may, the whole evidence from the experience of the United States is, that if the great and rapid increase in the price of distilled spirits, after the year 1863, through Federal taxation, did for a time and to some extent operate to diminish their popular consumption, the effect was but temporary. And such a result, when the habits and character of the people of the United States are taken into consideration, ought not to have been unexpected; and it is to be observed, furthermore, that it accords entirely with the experience of Great Britain, as accepted by her leading economists and expressed in the debate above noticed. For such is the degree of material abundance in the United States, and so easy has it been for the masses of its people to obtain what they want in the nature of food-supplies, that they are notoriously extravagant and not given to economy in the use of all such materials;[1]

[1] The following example in the way of confirmatory evidence on this point, which has come to the knowledge of the writer while the present article was in the course of preparation, is so interesting that he cannot forbear submitting it to the reader.

During the past year, the price of sugars, all over the world, owing to an increase of production has been lower than at any previous time in the history of commerce; and, in accordance with a well-recognized economic law or axiom,

and a rise of price operates less in restricting consumption than in almost any other country. And as illustrative of this matter, it is interesting to note the difference in the methods by which liquors are retailed in the United States and England respectively. Thus in the former, when a drink of distilled spirits is called for at a public bar, the bottle or decanter is set before the customer and he helps himself; in the latter, on the contrary, every quantity of spirits retailed is measured by the seller. and accurately proportioned to the price to be received by him. This custom prevails universally in Great Britain—in the leading hotels and club-houses as well as with the smallest and lowest retailers; and hence the original signification of the term "dram-shop," i.e., a place where liquor is sold by the fluid drachm or other measure, but which in the United States has become so perverted in meaning as to now signify a place where one can drink without any exact measure, or have as much strong liquor for a common price as the average consumer would ordinarily desire for one act of drinking. Besides, as remarked by Mr. Burns in his paper above referred to, industrial prosperity and full employment of the masses virtually operate as a reduction of the tax and the price of spirits; and such employment and industrial activity existed in the United States in a high degree from the latter years of the war down to the era of business and financial dis-

consumption has also noticeably increased. In the United States this increase is estimated as high as from 10 to 15 per cent; and, very curiously, has manifested itself in a greater proportionate demand for the lower grades of refined white sugars, rather than, as might naturally have been expected, for the best qualities of refined yellow sugars, which are cheaper. This circumstance attracting the attention of one of the great refiners in the United States, he sought an explanation of it from one of his most intelligent workmen, and in answer received the following reply: "There is no difficulty, sir, in explaining it. I give my wife, for instance, every Monday morning fifty cents to buy sugar for the family for a week, as I have always done; and she buys the same quantity as before: but the same money now gives us the same quantity of white sugar that it once did of the yellow." Or in other words, the wife, being the judge of the interests and desires of the family, preferred to take her share of the advantage resulting from the fall in the price of this essential article of household consumption in an increase in quality (which, by the way, was more apparent to the eye than the taste), rather than in the form of a larger quantity, for the same price, of the grade which had before been satisfactory; or than the same quantity and quality as before, and applied the resulting saving to the purchase of something additional or to an increase of the family reserve in the savings-bank.

turbance and paralysis in 1873. During all this period, accordingly, the aggregate drinking consumption of distilled and fermented liquors in the United States went on steadily increasing, or at least keeping pace with the increase of population. With the advent of bad times in this latter year, some diminution in the popular use of these commodities might naturally have been expected; and during the years 1873 and '74 there seems to have been some decrease, or at least no increase; the decrease manifesting itself rather in the consumption of fermented liquors than of distilled spirits: the receipts of internal revenue from the former, from the tax of $1 per barrel, declining from $8,910,823 in 1873 to $8,880,829 in 1874, and $8,743,744 in 1876; while the population continued to increase. But subsequent to 1875–6, and especially on the recurrence of national prosperity in 1878–9, the aggregate consumption of spirits and beer in the United States rapidly increased; the internal-revenue receipts from distilled spirits—tax remaining the same—increasing from $56,426,000 in 1875–6 to $69,893,000 in 1882–3; and of fermented liquors from $9,571,000 in 1875–6 to $16,153,920 in 1882–3: which increments, it will be noted, are in much greater ratio than any concurrent increase in population.

It is interesting to here also note the changes which have taken place during the period under consideration in the importation of champagne, a form of spirituous liquor almost exclusively consumed by the more wealthy portion of our population. In 1870 the importation was returned at 2,106,000 quarts and 906,788 pints. In 1874, the year following the commencement of the long commercial and industrial depression, the importation was 1,615,000 quarts, a decrease of 491,000; and 1,688,000 pints, an increase of 782,000. In 1878 the importation was 837,000 quarts, a decrease, as compared with 1874, of 778,000; and 1,185,000 pints, a decrease of 500,000. In 1880, national prosperity having returned, the importation was 1,351,000 quarts, an increase, as compared with 1878, of 514,000; and 1,784,000 pints, an increase of 599,000. For the fiscal year 1883 the importations of champagnes were returned at 2,506,092 quarts and 3,927,372 pints or less; a very large increase over the importations of any former years.

Finally, considering all the evidence available on this matter

of the production and consumption of distilled and fermented liquors in the United States and other countries, one cannot resist the impression of the small apparent effect which specific agencies—legislative, societary, and personal—produce in restricting their consumption as stimulants or for intoxicating purposes. Excepting, possibly, the recent experience of Great Britain and certain exceptional periods, the aggregate everywhere goes on increasing: no matter whether the prices be high or low, in bad times as well as in good: in the *latter* because the masses have the means to indulge their appetites, and in the *former* because they think there is a need of stimulants to counteract the tendency of the times to mental depression. The most remarkable illustration to the contrary is probably to be found in the results of the labors of Father Mathew in behalf of temperance in Ireland in the years 1838–40. Under his influence, the consumption of distilled spirits in Ireland, as indicated by the revenue returns, fell off more than 40 per cent, and did not materially increase for many years thereafter. Now, however, the *per capita* consumption of Ireland, with a greatly reduced population, is about the same as it was prior to the temperance agitation in 1838; thus indicating that the influence of Father Mathew, tho resulting in great immediate good, has not been permanent. It is also to be noted that the reduction in the consumption of distilled spirits in Ireland which followed Father Mathew's work was accompanied by a notably increased consumption of tea and malt liquors. On the other hand, and as matter of encouragement to any friends of temperance who may feel a sense of discouragement at the results of these investigations, the fact before noticed should be recalled, that while the production and consumption of *distilled spirits* in the United States continually increase and appear very large in the aggregate, the *comparative* consumption is undoubtedly much less than it was forty years ago,—unquestionably very much less than it was at the commencement of the present century,—and does not at present tend to increase, but rather to decrease; and that what is true of the United States appears to be also true of Great Britain. All available evidence, furthermore, is to the effect that with the increase of civilization, of facilities for intercommunication, and general consuming power,

the increased consumption of distilled spirits—taking a term of years for comparison—has not been by any means as great as has happened in respect to other commodities of common consumption. Thus, while, according to Mr. Leone Levi, the British economist, the consumption per head of the British people from 1866 to 1877 of bacon and hams increased 277 per cent, of wheat 94 per cent, of sugar 57 per cent, and of tea 32 per cent, the consumption of spirits increased only 21 per cent. A similar conclusion is reached by comparing the estimated *per capita* consumption of certain articles of daily consumption by the population of the city of London in 1843 and 1865. Thus, in respect to sugar, the increase during this period was from 16.5 lbs. to 41.1 lbs.; of tea, from 1.4 lbs. to 3.2 lbs.; of cocoa, from 0.09 lb. to 1.1 lbs.; and of spirits, from 0.87 gallon to only 0.89 gallon. Evidence to the same effect, even more striking and confirmatory, was also presented by Robert Giffen, Esq., President of the Statistical Society of London, in his inaugural address delivered in November, 1883; from which appeared that the proportion of various imported and excisable commodities retained for home consumption had increased per head of the total population of Great Britain during the period from 1840 to 1881 as follows: bacon and hams, from 0.01 lb. to 13.93 lbs.; butter, 1.05 to 6.36; raw sugar, 15.20 to 58.92; rice, 0.90 to 16.32; tobacco, 0.86 to 1.41: while the *per capita* increase in the consumption of spirits had been from 0.97 gallon to only 1.08 gallons.

The statistics of German consumption are also reported to lead to similar conclusions.

It has been a somewhat popular opinion that the great increase in the price of alcoholic liquors, through taxation, since 1863 has induced and increased the consumption of opium and other drugs in the United States, as substitutes for spirits. Of this there is no positive proof. There has been a marked increase in the importations of *crude* opium into the United States, and in the importation and domestic manufacture of morphia, the principal derivative of opium, since 1860, but not greater than what would seem to be warranted by the increase of population. In 1860 the importations of crude opium were returned at 119,525 lbs., and in 1866 at 180,852 lbs.; and these

facts would indicate some basis for the belief of an abnormal use of this drug during the years of the war. In 1869 the importation fell off to 90,997 lbs., but increased in 1875 to 188,238 lbs., in 1880 to 243,211 lbs., and fell off in 1883 to 229,012 lbs. Supposing the entire opium importation into the United States for the past year (1883) to be exclusively used for domestic consumption, certainly this amount is not large for 53,000,000 people. But all of this import was not so used; inasmuch as there is some export of opium and its derivatives from the United States to the West Indies and Central and South America; in all which countries the comparative consumption of opium is much greater, and the comparative consumption of spirits much less, than in the United States: an illustration of what is now accepted as a cosmic law, that the use of intoxicating liquors is to a certain extent dependent on climate. Medical experts have very generally come to regard the danger in respect to opium consumption in the United States to be at present almost wholly confined to the use of morphia; there being an undoubted tendency among persons affected with nervous ailments,—more especially women,—when they feel depressed from various causes, and in need of some stimulant, to resort to this drug, which, altho most costly, does not affect the breath like alcohol and can be easily carried and concealed about the person.

On the other hand, the importation of opium specially prepared for smoking purposes, which did not exist in 1865, has in latter years increased enormously; rising from 12,554 lbs. in 1871 to 77,196 lbs. in 1880, and 298,153 lbs. in 1883; paying in the latter year a customs revenue of nearly two millions of dollars. The preparation of opium for smoking finds its way into the country mainly through the port of San Francisco, and its consumption has hitherto been supposed to be almost wholly restricted to Chinese residents; but the circumstance that the increase of import has been of late in a ratio so far in excess of any ratio of increase in Chinese immigration suggests a probability that the vice of opium-smoking is finding favor and adoption with the native American.

Attempts have been made from time to time to estimate the annual cost to consumers in the United States and other coun-

tries of distilled and fermented liquors used for the purpose of drink. At the best, these estimates, no matter how carefully prepared, can but be regarded as approximately accurate, as the necessary data for forming an opinion cannot be obtained with exactness. The following statements and inferences respecting the cost of such consumption in the United States may, however, be of some value and interest.

Assuming the present (1883) consumption of distilled spirits for drinking purposes at about 60,000,000 proof-gallons per annum,[1] the original or *first* cost of this quantity at 25 cents per gallon would be only $15,000,000. (The average price of proof-spirits in Cincinnati, exclusive of the tax, for the year 1882 was 24.9 cents; for 1883, 23.8 cents.) Adding the internal-revenue tax of 90 cents per gallon ($54,000,000) and all the additional taxes which the Federal Government imposes on the whole business of producing and vending distilled spirits, i.e. licenses, etc. ($6,410,764), and the first cost would become further augmented to $75,410,764. (The census return of the value of the entire product of distilled liquors in the country for 1880 was $41,063,000.) The returned value of the imports of spirits, of imitations thereof, and of champagne for 1883 was $6,906,900, on which the duties collected were $5,593,869; making the aggregate first cost of such importations $12,500,769, and the total first cost of the entire distilled spirit and imported champagne consumption of the United States for the fiscal year of 1883 $87,911,533: of which large sum, $66,004,633 accrues to the internal revenue. It will thus be seen that the Government is the largest partner, and has by far the largest interest, in this business.

The next question of interest and importance is, To what extent is this aggregate of first market-price or cost, and of the accompanying taxation, increased in the process of distribution?

[1] The number of gallons of proof-spirits on which the internal-revenue tax was paid for the year 1883 was 76,762,063, of which 75,508,785 gallons were distilled from grain, molasses, etc., and 1,253,278 gallons from fruit. Of this aggregate, 7,561,171 gallons were withdrawn from warehouse under the form of alcohol; which would represent in turn about 14,400,000 gallons of proof-spirits, and indicate a larger consumption of spirits for industrial and pharmaceutical purposes than was assumed on page 205 of the first article of this series.

The drift of opinion on the part of those who have discussed this subject in Great Britain appears to be that it is about doubled. If we assume this to be the case in the United States, then the ultimate cost to the consumer of the distilled-spirit and champagne consumption in this country from the year 1883 would be $175,823,066.

It may here also be mentioned that the value of the still wines imported into the United States during the fiscal year 1883 (duties included) was returned at $8,827,000.

The present (1884) domestic production and consumption of fermented liquors—ale, lager-beer, etc.—is probably about 18,500,000 barrels, of an average capacity of 31 gallons each; or an aggregate of 573,500,000 gallons. At an assumed valuation in the hands of the manufacturer at $6 per barrel, the resulting aggregate would be $111,000,000. (The returned census valuation of the malt-liquor product of the United States for 1880 was $101,088,000.) The internal-revenue tax of $1 per barrel ($18,500,000), and an allowance of an equal sum to cover expenses and profits of distribution to the retailers, would further increase this original cost as above assumed to $148,000,000. If sold (retailed) to the consumer at double this sum, the final aggregate figures would be $296,000,000. For the year 1883 the value of the importations of ale, beer, and porter—duties included—was returned at $1,657,178, which to the ultimate consumer may be assumed to represent an expenditure of at least $3,000,000.

We have then, on the basis of the above figures and estimates, a present direct annual expenditure on the part of consumers in the United States of $175,823,000 for distilled spirits (domestic and imported) and of champagne, but exclusive of all still wines; and of $299,000,000 for fermented liquors of domestic and foreign production; or a total annual aggregate of $474,823,000. This result is much less than the estimates that have been heretofore made, and which have obtained much credence on the part of the public; and they are also less in comparison, as will be directly shown, than the estimates of the cost of similar consumption generally accepted as correct for Great Britain. The main element of uncertainty pertaining to all these calculations is in respect to the extent to which the original or first cost of the various liquors is enhanced in price on their way to

the ultimate consumers; and here, in the absence of much definite evidence, there is an opportunity for great latitude of opinion. It is obvious that the price paid for drink varies greatly according to the circumstances under which it is obtained; the man buying each glass from a public retailer necessarily paying much more per gallon than the one who takes it from a cask or bottle at home;[1] and to accurately ascertain how final consumption is apportioned in these respects in a nation of 55,000,000 is clearly an impossibility. It will also be noted that the above aggregate does not include any estimate of the cost of the annual consumption of domestic or foreign wines other than champagne.

But assuming $474,000,000 as the minimum annual cost to the consumers of distilled and fermented liquors in the United States at the present time, it will be interesting to compare this amount with the returned value, according to the census of 1880, of the annual product of certain other leading commodities. Thus, the returned valuation of cotton manufacturers for 1880 was $210,000,000; of woollen goods, $160,000,000; of boots and shoes, $196,000,000; of agricultural implements, $68,000,000; of men and women's clothing, $241,000,000; of iron and steel, $296,000,000; and of lumber planed and sawed, $270,000,000. The amount of expenditures for public schools in the whole country, including building and all other expenditures, for 1880, was also returned at $79,339,814.

This same subject has also attracted much attention of late years in Great Britain; and the results of its investigation have been presented in several elaborate papers to the Statistical and other economic and scientific societies. The general conclu-

[1] Popular estimates of the cost of distilled and fermented liquors to consumers which have obtained extensive circulation and acceptance fix the retail price of the former at from $3.78 to $6 per gallon, and of the latter at from $16 to $20 per barrel, or from 50 to 67 cents per gallon.

One ingenious writer has given the following estimate of the number of drinks represented by the present annual consumption of distilled spirits in the United States: "Each gallon contains fifty average drinks; which multiplied by the total number of gallons consumed for drinking purposes (assumed at 60,000,000 for 1883) would give 3,000,000,000 drinks; which would be at the rate of over 54 drinks per annum for each man, woman, and child of the present population, estimated at 55,000,000."

sions which seem to be accepted as approximately accurate are: that the amount paid for the production and distribution of alcohol in its several forms of spirits, beer, and wines in Great Britain for the year 1880 was from £120,000,000 ($600,000,000) to £130,000,000 ($650,000,000), or a sum nearly double the whole land-rental of the United Kingdom. The actual cost of the production of the raw materials used in the aggregate manufacture of these several products has been estimated at about £25,000,000, or $125,000,000, and the original cost of the home products and imports (including the expense of manufacturing, but not that of retailing and distribution) at about £42,000,000 ($210,000,000). According to an estimate presented to the Statistical Society of London, April, 1882, by Mr. Stephen Bourne, the number of persons employed in producing the raw materials out of which the alcoholic products annually consumed in Great Britain are in turn manufactured must approximate 300,000 in number; and that nearly 600,000 people (workers) additional are employed in the subsequent and contingent manufacturing and dispensing processes; or a total of near 900,000 persons "whose occupation it is to provide the liquor consumed in the land." Mr. William Hoyle, an English investigator, who for many years has made this subject a specialty for discussion and investigation, and who publishes an annual report and estimates, in a recent communication to the London *Times* fixes the expenditure of the British people for the year 1883 on intoxicating liquors at $627,386,505, a decrease of $3,870,420 as compared with 1882. Accepting these conclusions respecting the annual direct expenditure of the British people for alcoholic liquors, the estimates above given of the present annual expenditure of the United States for like purposes would seem by comparison, as before stated, to be too small. But, on the other hand, it should be borne in mind that the present wholesale market-price of crude spirits in the United States, inclusive of the tax, is less than half that charged in Great Britain; and that the estimates of expenditure for the United States as above given do not include the cost of the consumption of domestic wines: so that, if allowance is made for these differences, the estimates for the two countries, as above given, will very closely approximate. But again, it is to be re-

membered that the population of the United States is at present almost one third larger than that of Great Britain. In the face of such antagonism of results, there would seem therefore but one thing that could be said in explanation; and that is, that the latitude of opinion existing, and which, in the absence of authentic data, is fully permissible, of the extent to which the wholesale cost of distilled and fermented liquors is increased in the process of retail distribution, warrants, without any imputation of inaccuracy, a very great discrepancy of conclusion as to the aggregate final cost of spirit consumption.

In the next and concluding article of this series it is proposed to discuss the financial results and moral influences which have followed the attempt of the United States to obtain a large revenue through the imposition of high taxes on distilled spirits.

DAVID A. WELLS.

# WOMEN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A PROPHECY FROM HISTORY.[1]

## FIRST ARTICLE.

"I conclude then, my friend, that none of the occupations which comprehend the ordering of the state belong to woman as woman, nor yet to man as man; but natural gifts are to be found here and there in both sexes alike; and, so far as nature is concerned, the woman is admissible to all pursuits as well as the man; tho in all of them the woman is weaker than the man."—PLATO, *The Republic.*

"DON'T prophesy unless you know," is the sound advice which Mark Twain gives to the aspiring prophets of the nineteenth century; and the words are characteristic of the day in which they were written.

Modern civilization, altho it be a despiser of prophets and of soothsayers, and of all who claim to see with distinctness through non-transparent bodies, nevertheless belongs to a prophetic age. But I urge no paradox. Its prophets need not be blessed with any special revelation. They do not require to be old men who have seen visions, nor young men who have

[1] While I have submitted to the custom which prohibits the elaborate citation of authorities in connection with magazine articles, I think it proper to refer to Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Sociological Charts," which, with his vast collection of ethnological data, have been the chief source of my tribal notes. In my brief sketch of the Common Law, I have taken the unusual liberty of quoting freely, without reference, from my article on "The Rights of Married Women" (*Appletons' Journal*, November, 1880); and in preparing the statistical tables, illustrating the industrial and educational progress of women in the United States, which will accompany my second paper, I have profited by the courtesy of the National Bureau of Education and the personal assistance of Commissioner John Eaton, and have also drawn largely upon the tables constructed by the Census Bureau of the Tenth Census.—F. K. C.

dreamed dreams. They are not always the happy discoverers of sacred and mystical writings. They are not necessarily the fourth sons of fourth sons, born in some lucky quarter of the heavens, and midnight gazers at the Lion, the Bears, the Scorpion, the Water-carrier, and the like; nor yet gray-bearded hermits—murmurers of wild incantations over unsavory chemicals.

On the contrary, let even "one of the prophets" walk the earth to-morrow, proclaiming the approach of some supernatural or even unexpected event, and measure if you can the supreme contempt and indifference with which he would be received. Let a man but venture an unfounded word about so popular a subject as the weather, which shall presume to go beyond the Delphian twenty-four-hour oracles of the War Department, and he will at once be written down as a fool or a knave. Each new announcement of the Last Day of all is received with diminishing alarm and concern by the most credulous as the century draws to a close, and fewer and fewer white robes are stitched at each new foretelling of the event. The unsupported foreknowledge of the wisest brings a low price to-day in the market of the most faithful.

And yet we daily listen to prophecies in which we place the most implicit confidence, and no man is thought to possess the ordinary dictates of prudence who undertakes any great or important step throughout the course of his life without first inquiring of one or more of the prophets of the nineteenth century. The explanation is simple. We worship to-day at the shrine of facts. Facts are the foundations and corner-stones of the highest philosophies of the age. They are the beginning of every investigation and the light which guides every sound theory of life and morals of a bitterly practical world. *They are also our prophets.* Unmistakable, untinselled, unbiassed, unavoidable facts have assumed the offices of the horoscope, the dipping new moon, the blazing comet. The astronomer has supplanted the astrologer, the chemist and physician the alchemist, and the Signal Service the shadow of the hedgehog. Academic learning has called the facts of the past by the name of history, and to this great prophet we shall address ourselves. The argument from history is a simple one. The facts of yesterday

are history. The facts of to-day will be history to-morrow. The facts of to-morrow—are they not largely within the grasp of the acute student of the yesterday and to-day? The same is true of centuries. We observe a certain tendency to-day under given conditions. History reveals to us the same tendency at work half a dozen centuries ago under different conditions, and acquaints us with the final result. The problem set us then is: Given the result of the tendency in the earlier period, what will be the probable result of the modern tendency in the future?

Most important preliminary of all, let us first state our subject of investigation with distinctness.

The numberless problems connected with the woman question are approached from the most practical possible standpoint and with the best prospects of reaching sound conclusions by seeking to come to some actual measurement of the present market value of woman's work. Let it be remembered as an excuse for so rude a proposition that women have actually entered the commercial world, and are staking their social position to a large extent upon their right and ability to hold in it places of importance and remuneration. It is too late by some years to ventilate opinions as to the mistake women will make in competing with men in the industrial field. The competition is actually in progress, and each year, as we shall presently see, is adding to the number of women who have thus voluntarily or from necessity braved an apparently unequal contest. Women must now be weighed in the common scales and balances in which all human labor is ruthlessly weighed and valued. The result of this measurement is granting them one position and denying them another. It is settling certain important questions beyond dispute which must guide the pathway to the future happiness and welfare of women. It is giving unmistakable *tendencies*. Is it too much to say that the boundary-lines of what is familiarly known as "woman's sphere" are for the present at least quite effaced? Perhaps they will hereafter be drawn again with greater wisdom and distinctness, but are not the questions which women now propose to us rather those of the workshop than of the household? The world asks to-day, and women encourage the inquiry: What will the woman sell for in the open market? What is her lifting power

—that is to say, what is the strength of her arm and the power of her endurance, expressed in pounds and feet? What is the selling price of the greatest deftness and most exquisite cunning of her hand? For what may be bought the keenest of her judgments, the brightest of her wits, the strongest natural force of her character?

But of equal significance is the inquiry in regard to her *relative* value, for to this we are compelled to address ourselves. The powers and abilities of *man* measure the wages and demand for labor. How then can women work at the side of men? In the long-run, is the result of the work of men of more intrinsic value to the industrial world? Will it always be? Need we illustrate the importance this inquiry has assumed in reaching final conclusions? We may dogmatize. We may confess the issue here and avoid it there. At last we must be brought to the most relentless of all the factors in human existence—the fact that the moral, material, and intellectual independence and success of the individual depends on its power to measure itself with the *best*. In every branch of human activity, as well as in the simplest forms of physical and political development, to the fittest belongs the crown. Relative forces never fail to seek and find their relative positions; any prejudices or desires we may have to the contrary notwithstanding.

Notice here the danger we are approaching. You must not measure the value of an ounce of gold by putting it into the opposite scale to a ton of coal. You must find the *element* of value in an article before you presume to measure its value in exchange. We shall be able to draw a moral from this fact hereafter. My title suggests that we take for our objective point "the woman of the twentieth century." What is the future of the present tendencies bearing upon the industrial, educational, and social status of women? Is the existence of the present relations of women to society due to a natural law, and is it founded on healthful and necessary development, or is it not? Is the New Philosophy destined to win in the end, or is it based on false and hurtful hypotheses, and will it probably fail?

We shall begin our examination by bringing ourselves directly in front of the three great classes of opinions which are enter-

tained by the thoughtful people in the community. We can then look the whole problem squarely in the face.

First consider those who hold to the extreme conservative view. They claim that women are by nature and construction the physical and intellectual inferiors of men, altho they possess certain peculiar powers which fit them especially for the peculiar duties of womanhood which they are called upon to perform. They assert that marriage and the bearing and rearing of children consumes the major part of the woman's energies, and is and should be the most important, and for the best part of her life the single, interest of her being. That she is not fitted for general work, and her engagement in any business competition is bound to prove a failure and invariably to put in peril the happiness of the home, and the health of herself and her children. That since marriage is the supposable and proper future of all young women, it is wrong for their lives to be built or their characters to be shaped in any way which will unfit them in any degree for leading happy and healthy married lives, bearing strong children, and educating them to the age of man- or woman-hood. They assert that it is foolish to be led astray in this matter by dwelling on the comparatively small contingent of women who do not marry, or to amend great natural laws for them which will injuriously affect the mass of mankind. That the real strength of women lies in the personal influence which a simple and innocent life possesses over rude and wicked men, and that their development should proceed in this direction. That there is no more beautiful ambition for a woman, after that of bringing up useful and moral citizens, than the especial privilege she has of brightening the home and alleviating the cares and sorrows of life for her husband, brother, father, or as the case may be. That the sum of the New Philosophy is to displace women from the pedestal on which a long chain of civilizing influences has placed them, and to expose them again to the rude struggle with the hardships of the world for which they are unfitted, and from which they will issue as before, haggard and worn in health, and little and despised and dishonored before men. The general conclusion is that all the modern tendencies toward granting women the best advantages of education, admitting them to industrial pur-

suits, and encouraging them to the pursuit of aims and personal ambitions collateral to marriage is falsely, fatally, and wickedly against nature, and, while pretending to seek their material elevation, will certainly result in their personal degradation; and that it is opposed to the welfare of women and the society whose health and happiness is so largely dependent on the health and happiness of its wives and mothers.

The extreme wing of the New Philosophy hold to exactly opposite propositions. They contend that the apparent inequality between men and women results entirely from education and inheritance. That their intellectual and physical possibilities are in every respect equal, and that time will soon demonstrate this truth, after a few decades of natural life and sound mental training. That the apparent physical limitations on woman's life are the result of a long neglect of the simple laws of health, and that the bearing of children and other natural processes need not in a healthy state of the constitution cause either danger or inconvenience. That women will probably lose some share of their physical beauty from a contact with the things of the world, and perhaps most of their pretty and childish ways, but that the loss will be more than made up to them in the sound sense and general information which they will be forced to acquire. That material independence is essential to the full development of character, and that personal responsibility in the matter of time and talents is impossible with most people without steady occupation. That marriage is after all only a happy accident, as the preponderance of women over men tends to prove, and that marriage should be treated as a collateral and not a first aim with women. That women at present utterly neglect the development of personal character in their chase of husbands, and that it is a shameful state of affairs which so often requires women to marry as a means of support, which is now their necessity in the majority of cases. That unless women engage in lucrative occupations they must either starve, depend upon charity, or marry. They prefer marriage. That the present employments of women are unfitted for them and are highly unremunerative, and that they should be granted access to the best opportunities for self-support. The general conclusion is that the present tendency is a thor-

oughly healthy one, and that the end of the development will be erasure of all social distinctions between the sexes.

The third class of opinion takes a middle ground. It includes men and women who are too fair-minded to be blind to the great encumbrances which are now placed upon the development of the female character, and who admit that it is lowering to women to be forced to depend entirely on men for their pecuniary support, and that it gives men a power over them which is hurtful to all the best interests of society. They frankly admit that women would gain wisdom, practical habits of work, and conscience in the matter of time and talents by engaging in steady pursuits. They admit that the capacity of the minds of women to receive the highest form of intellectual training is no longer open to discussion, and that in all possible cases women should be granted the best opportunities of education. They say that the fact that their lives will be happier for it, and the smallest duties of their homes better performed for it, is sufficient warrant for this opinion. They are by no means persuaded that a very high degree of mental training is beyond her physical powers of endurance. They cheerfully recognize the fact that women are often called upon to earn their own living by force of circumstances, some being without opportunity for marriage, and that it is a cruel hardship that so many hindrances should be placed in their way.

But, on the other hand, they urge that it is quite absurd to say that the difference between the sexes will ever be obliterated, or that it is only the result of an unhealthy development, or that such distinctions as do now exist will ever be explained away as the result of artificial conditions of society, or that they are any more contrary to nature than the relative positions of the sexes among the lower animals. That it is impossible to avoid the real issue that the vast majority of women do marry at about twenty years of age, and that by marriage they are to a certain extent reduced to a dependent state and unfitted for industrial occupations. That this fact of itself will always be enough to diminish their average industrial value, and there is no possible hope of its ever being otherwise; leaving out of account the very serious consideration as to whether their constitutional structure even before marriage does not impose certain

restrictions and limitations on competition with men. That the health of women is of more vital importance than that of men, and that it is a crime for them to imperil it for the sake of pecuniary independence. That the price of successful competition is often the loss of health, and that therefore it is proper that the mother should be spared as far as possible the labor and excitement of industrial competition. In general the important rules of society concerning women should conform to the established fact that the office of bearing and rearing children is the fair share of women in the distribution of the world's economy.

And now let us not be too hasty in accepting this tentative position as the correct one. It is the natural shelter of weak-minded persons to be content with unsettled and vacillating opinions about great social problems, the issue of which is uncertain. An opinion is not necessarily correct because it is moderate and non-committal. Moderate views in some cases are a species of moral cowardice, which from personal vanity or some equally low motive seeks to avoid the mortification of ever retracing a mistaken step before men. Hedging is the sporting word for this plan. Here is the common illustration. A and B are to run a race. C ventures fifty dollars that A will win and fifty dollars that B will win. Whatever is the result of the race he will keep his money, but his friends are not slow to call him a fool and a coward!

We proceed now to our inquiries. Where will another hundred years find our best women—(1) As concerns industrial pursuits? (2) In the matter of educational advantages? (3) In reference to political and legal rights?

We have already intimated what is thought to be the proper method for seeking the closest and truest answers to these inquiries. It is only from an historical treatment that any clear understanding can be arrived at. The involved questions of the legal, moral, and social status of women are curiously entangled with that sure indicium of false conservatism—the symbolic character. And by the symbolic character is meant that legal or social condition of a theory or a social fact which causes it to fit unevenly into the place which society is disposed to accord it. It is the old story of the square block in the round hole;

the new wine in the old bottles; the patches of fresh cloth on the ragged garment. The appearance of this symbolic character at once indicates the true field for the study of the subject. It must be examined in its simplest and if possible in its original forms. It must be separated from the new set of circumstances with which it appears inconsistent, and which have served to complicate it and expose it to false and misleading lights. Symbols are always the evidence of uneven development, and uneven development is in nine cases out of ten the result of some special conservatism which society has from time to time discovered some cause for evincing. It is astonishing to what extremes this fact often carries what may have begun in a mere popular whim. A good reason for a special rule arises in the tenth century, which may be founded on some temporary political dogma or popular superstition. The nineteenth century rolls around, and no trace of the dogma or the superstition can be found, but the rule is as intact as the latest utterance of the best scientist, and is the key to a serious modern problem.

In all matters connected with domestic economy the community has always evinced a most unyielding conservatism, and we may discover more than one phase of the modern "woman question," which has left far back in the remote ages the peculiar circumstances which gave it birth, and which, if we could only see with our eyes, would appear quite out of harmony with its environment. On this argument we shall base our proposition that women are far behind their age.

It will be understood, therefore, why we have chosen to arrange our discussion under the following heads:

I. A brief historical sketch of the early forms of the division of labor among the savage and aboriginal tribes, and a brief review of the rise and progress of the question among the Anglo-Saxon races.

II. A statement of the present status of the problem, as regards woman's industrial and educational opportunities, and her legal and political rights.

III. An analysis of the present tendencies, with a view to distinguish between those which are permanent and those which are temporary, and thereby to predict the future.

We shall first make a hasty examination of the division of labor among men and women in savage and aboriginal conditions of life.

We discover the Tasmanians leaving all the work of any importance, such as is termed industrial in modern parlance, to the women. The men hunt, fish, and fight, and make canoes and weapons. In addition to the necessary duty of looking after the children, the Tasmanian women have to provide all the food for the household. They climb up trees for the oppossums, delve in the earth with their sticks for yams and native bread, grope about the rocks for shell-fish, dive beneath the sea-surface for oysters, and fish for the finny tribe. In travelling, the Tasmanian wife is forced to carry her infant, the food and all the worldly goods of the family, while the husband walks in front carrying only his shield and spear. We may add that the wife is freely bought, sold, exchanged, and even borrowed, as any other article of merchandise. The New Caledonians, Sumatrans, and Veddahs pursue similar customs, while in New Guinea the men consent to occupy part of their leisure from the hunt and war in assisting their wives in tilling the soil. Of the women of Fiji, Seeman says: "They are but little better than the beasts of burden; having to do actual field-work, to carry heavy loads, to fish, and besides to attend to all the domestic arrangements devolving upon their sex in other countries." Among the Sandwich Islanders, Samoans, and Tahitans, who belong to more peaceable tribes, only the inferior class of women ever do hard labor. The field-work is done by the men, and that of the women consists chiefly of household duties and of weaving and spinning. The Javans present an extraordinary contradiction of modern ideas. The men are absolutely debarred from all industrial pursuits, and their sole occupation is fighting. It is considered part of the domestic economy that the women clothe the men. In transactions in which money is involved the women are universally considered superior to the men, and from the common laborer to the chief of a province, it is usual for the husband to entrust all his pecuniary affairs to his wife. The women alone attend the markets and conduct all the business of buying and selling. It is proverbial among the Javans that the men are fools in money matters.

The American races will next claim our attention. The women among the Esquimaux are the butchers, cooks, tanners, seamstresses, masons, and shoemakers of every tribe. Of our American Indians, the warlike Snakes, Comanches, and Chippewayans condemn their women to the lowest forms of drudgery. It is said that the more peaceable Chinooks divide the labor equally among the men and women. Of the Creeks, Schoolcraft has written: "A stranger going among them must feel distressed when he sees naked women bringing in huge bundles of wood on their backs, or bent under the scorching sun at hard labor in the fields, while the indolent, robust young men are riding about, or stretched at ease on some scaffold, amusing themselves with a pipe or a whistle." Among the aborigines of South Brazil, and with the Arcanian Mapuches, the men do no work but that involved in war or the chase. The women do all the agricultural work, even to ploughing the fields. When the men are at leisure they eat, sleep, and ride about. "*The women are also the beasts of burden*," one authority tells us.

The Asiatic races present some striking customs. The Arabs require the men to make all their wives' dresses, and the women refuse to do needle-work of any kind. Their duty is to herd the flock and to cook. They also keep all the shops and do the buying and selling. Among the Todas, Karens, and Nages, the women embroider, sing, and cook for their only occupations—the exact ideal of some modern opinions. Among the Kukis, a warlike tribe, all the women are agricultural laborers. This is true of the wife of the chief, which seems to indicate that it is thought both honorable and healthful.

The Mexican races present higher stages of civilization. The women of Nicaragua do the household work, and in addition do the work of trading, buying and selling. All the field-work and other heavy tasks are performed by men. This race is rarely at war. In Yucatan the women are noted for the skill and industry they exhibit in weaving and spinning, which are their only occupations in addition to household duties. A writer says of them: "The women apply themselves very diligently to their labors every day from sunrise to sunset, *without speaking a single word*."

No words can express the hardship which women experience among the African races. With the Hottentots the wife is doomed to all the toil of getting and dressing provisions for her husband, herself, and her children, and to all the care and responsibility and drudgery of the household, and she is given also a large part of the out-of-door work. With the Damarans the women are actually beasts of burden in every sense of the word. They are forced to build and plaster the houses and do all the field-work, and the same is true of the Beuchanas. Among the East Africans, the women till the land, plant the corn, and build the huts. *The men stay at home to spin, weave, talk, and milk the cows.* This extraordinary statement is supported by the observations of Livingstone. The Abyssinians consider it a most infamous thing for a man to go to market to buy anything. He is not allowed to carry water or bake bread, but it is his unassisted duty to wash all the clothing of the family, which is forbidden to the women.

Let us now endeavor hurriedly to trace the progress of the early social positions of women to the beginning of what is called modern history. French civilization offers the most convenient field for this process.

In the Celtic Period the women shared the general fate of all warlike tribes. They were compelled to do all the heavy work, and notably that of cultivating the fields, while the men were engaged in warfare and pillage. The arrival of the Roman Period, and with it a state of comparative peace, found the men assisting in agriculture, and the women excelling as nurses, for which their great fruitfulness gave ample demand. In the Primitive German Period the duties of the women were confined to the house, and there is no trace of their engaging in laborious pursuits. In the Merovingian Period we hear of both men and women exercising all manner of the then known trades, from that of the goldsmith and armorer to that of the weaver and tanner. In the Carlovingian Period men had retired from the more delicate occupations that required no great physical strength, which were largely taken up by women. In the Early Feudal Period, when the warlike state of the country confined women largely within doors, the great bulk of the wonderful tapestry work was done, which is a standing monument to the

skill and patience of women of that day. In the Later Feudal Period it appears, from the rolls of the year 1300, that the following trades were practised by women: brazing, candle-making, trunk-making, shoe-making, rope-making, tin-beating, iron-working, ring-making, gold-drawing, baking, sheath-making, glove-making, milling, and horseshoeing. Women were also grocers, mercers, furriers, jewellers, poulterers, and coopers.

Is it not allowable to draw from this collection of facts the following simple conclusions?—

(1) That women were the only persons who engaged in industrial pursuits in the earliest stages of civilization.

(2) That one cause of this was that women were not suited for warfare or the chase on account of their duties to their children and their inferior physical strength, and that as they remained at home it became the natural division of labor that they should do all the work that lay about the house.

(3) That this menial service, being considered lower than warfare or the chase, tended to degrade women in the eyes of men.

(4) That as soon as a state of peace brought men actively into occupations, and women were brought directly in competition with man's strength, the heavier work at once fell to the men as the fittest to perform it, while the lighter occupations were still open to women and were largely engaged in by them, without any apparent inconvenience or detriment to their health.

(5) That the early tendency of the middle ages was to allow the greatest freedom to women in the pursuit of occupations, until the age of chivalry declared women to be superior to money-making pursuits.

Before concluding this part of our discussion it must not be overlooked that there is the most ample proof that the heavy burdens placed upon women in the earlier stages of civilization were hurtful to their health to an alarming degree. It is said now of the Indian wife and of the toiling wife of the German peasant that they die at an early age, and often pass their maturity and become haggard and worn at as early an age as twenty-five.

In reaching now the beginning of our sketch of the develop-

ment of the social status of women in England, we find ourselves on ground familiar to the careful student of our institutions.

A happy thing it is for the great English-speaking people that their hardy German ancestors were peculiar among all early tribes for the virtue of their social life, the strength of their bodies, and the courage of their fearless minds. Would it not be extraordinary if we could assure ourselves that in every important respect we have fallen behind our progenitors in the treatment of our women? Would it not be significant if it should appear that we wise citizens of the nineteenth century have dragged the being for whom we profess such reverence down to a level far below that which a fierce and ignorant race of barbarians dared to accord them?

Who does not remember the striking testimony of Tacitus? "They even supposed somewhat of prescience and sanctity to be inherent in the female sex; and therefore they neither despised their counsels nor disregarded their responses." What more beautiful words have ever been written of the marriage-service than the historians picture of the German bride? "The marriage-bond is strict and severe among them. Almost singly among barbarians they content themselves with one wife. The wife does not bring a dowry to her husband, but receives one from him. The parents and relations assemble and pass their approbation on the presents—presents not adapted to please a female taste or decorate a bride, but oxen, a caparisoned steed, a shield, a spear, and a sword. By virtue of these the wife is espoused, and she in her turn makes some present of arms to her husband. This they consider as the firmest bond of union; these the sacred mysteries, the conjugal deities. *That the woman may not consider herself excused from exertions of fortitude or exempt from the casualties of war, she is admonished by the very ceremony that she comes to her husband as a partner in toils and dangers, to suffer and to dare equally with him in peace and war.* This is indicated by the yoked oxen, the harnessed steed, the offered arms. She receives what she is to return inviolate and honored to her children."

"Their women, therefore," he continues, "live fenced around with chastity. None but virgins marry. They take one hus-

band, as one body and one life; that no thought, no desire may extend beyond him; that he may be loved not only as their husband but as their marriage."

But yet the women were the agricultural workers of the Germans as of all other warlike tribes. Can any one say that the women were degraded by their life of toil, after this beautiful picture? But what was the effect on their health? Marcellus, a soldier under Julian in his German wars, gives us a characteristic sketch which will help us to answer this question. "A band of strangers," he says, "could not resist one of them in a brawl, assisted by his strong blue-eyed wife, especially when she begins gnashing with her teeth, her neck swollen, brandishing her vast and snowy arms, and kicking with her heels at the same time, to deliver her fisticuffs like bolts from the twisted strings of a catapult."

In the earliest facts which are collected about the customs of the Anglo-Saxons, there is apparent a retrograde movement from the just and simple treatment of women by the early Germans. Whether the Angles and Danes brought in some lower form of civilization, or whether traces of the brutal notions of the early Roman law, which allowed women to be bought and sold as personal chattels, had survived the Roman invasions, or whether the more complicated systems of civilization were responsible for the change, it is impossible to say. But it is plain enough that at once women were lowered in the social scale. The simple statement of a few legal contrasts of the Anglo-Saxon period of our civilization will show beyond all doubt that the idea of *partnership* was in a large degree retained, and that the present attitude of the law is at best only a return to the Saxon provisions. Husband and wife held all the wife's property in common. Neither party could dispose of it without the consent of the other. The wife was the acting, and the husband the consenting, party in its disposition. It was not responsible for the husband's personal debts. The husband had the free disposal of his property, unless he had made no settlement on his wife before marriage, in which case she had an undivided interest in it and appears as a consenting party to his alienations. His property was not liable for his wife's debts. Gifts and conveyances between husband and wife were common.

If the wife survived, she took, in addition to the absolute right in her own property, the marriage-settlement, or, in default of the marriage-settlement, one half of her husband's property. If the husband survived, the wife's property was inherited by her heirs. The husband had no rights as survivor except as the guardian of the children of the marriage. The wife could make all classes of contracts, and personally bind herself in any desired way as tho unmarried. Can it be possible that the eight centuries which have elapsed since the Norman Conquest have only served partly to restore to the wife the rights and dignities which were wrested from her by the quibbles and technical oppressions of the Norman lawyer?

Following close on this state of affairs comes the Norman invasion. Mr. Reeves, the celebrated historian of the Common Law, reminds us that the Conqueror, in the fourth year of his reign, "solemnly swore in the presence of Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, that he would observe the good and approved laws of the kingdom." However true this may be, and however boldly Freeman may declare "that the Normans were absorbed in the race they conquered," it is quite impossible that the process of absorption should take place without a revolution in the domestic relations. "Feudalism," says Kenny, "always assumes its most gigantic proportions in the nations upon which it is imposed by force of arms." To a violent type of feudalism which celebrated the Norman entrance into the laws and customs of England we trace the beginning of the gradual decline of the legal position of woman which at once began. French civilization, from which we might have expected better things, had not reached the justice which opened the arms of industry to her, nor the reverence which enshrined her as a goddess. It was a physical power which laid the foundation of Norman feudalism. Force—this lifting power of which we have spoken—graded the importance and regulated the position of the individual in a society where the protection and force of arms was the only stake of value. Let us bring together now the forces which this new era urges into conflict. The Anglo-Saxon has but one wife. The feudal system declares her sole importance to be as the mother of a man-child. A household in the modern sense of the word is established. Is it to be

wondered at that the power, the unity, the person of that household should be the man?

And now we are ready for the miserable foolishness of the Common Law—that human institution which some men call the mother of justice and the guardian of all that men hold precious of human liberties and joys. Shall we dare to say that to its short-sightedness, to its lack of the simplest dictates of wisdom and virtue, to its wanton disregard of the simplest principles of justice, to its obstinate refusal to alter its dicta when all common-sense cried out in contempt for its position, to the blindness of its interpreters, is chiefly owing the false development of the question of woman's position in England? Is it not a matter of regret that the other influence to which women might well have looked with some degree of hope—the Church—allowed a chain of historical perversions to add their weight to the view of the philosopher of the Common Law? Just at the period when the idea of legal unity in marriage began to claim the support of the Common Law, the power of ecclesiasticism began to make itself felt. The canon law, founded as it was on the civil code of Justinian, had its attention loudly called to the outrageous freedom of divorce under the later days of the Republic, when the separate existence of the wife had been fully recognized. The truth of the matter was that the separate existence of the wife was the outcome of the frequency of divorce, and was a rebellion against the hardship engendered by the husband's appropriation of the family estate upon separation. The Church entirely reversed the historical fact and argued divorce from independence. In the idea of a legal unity she thought she saw a check upon a practice so repulsive to her teachings, and upheld it with might and main. To-day marriage is honored as a sacrament in the Roman Church, and the influence it possesses is bitterly opposed to anything that looks like a legal division of that unity.

But to return to the Common Law. It is settled now beyond all question that the idea of unity must be the substitute for the simple and just plan of the Saxon law. The narrow and dogmatic spirit of the Common Law is fully equal to the occasion. Is it not a shame and disgrace that any system of law, professing to defend the weak and to insure justice, should be

based on the shallow dictum of men like Glanville for instance? "Quia cum mulier," he says, "ipsa plene in potestate viri sui de jure fit." Because the woman is the weaker and entirely at the mercy of her husband, therefore he should be her absolute lord and master, and all her property should vest in him, and her body be his in everything short of death itself; even to the administering of proper chastisement. Compare this, if you please, with the beautiful partnership of the German marriage. But open the solemn nonsense of Bracton, and we will find the cruel sarcasm of the Common Law at its worst. Even the cheap wit of the modern enemy of woman could not surpass this sentence: "Femina majis doli capax quam masculus," he says with playful scorn. His Latin is as bad as his law, but we presume he intended to convey the idea that a woman made a better sneak-thief than a manager of herself and her estate. From this dogma he proceeds to deduce the fatal doctrine of unity. "They are the same body and the same flesh, the man and the wife," he says. And again, "They are like one person, because they have the same body and blood." Alas! for women this argument proved a fateful thing. It swept away at one blow all that the precious heritage of Saxon blood had secured for England. The foundation of every social position has now become that husband and wife are one person in law, and that that one person is the husband. What legal result is astonishing from such an attitude? What is the place of woman in the domestic economy now? She is the mistress, the cook, and the nurse. Keep her out of mischief with spinning and weaving, of course.

In a second paper it is our purpose to review the industrial and educational progress of women in the United States; illustrating it by statistical tables drawn from reliable sources; and, by an analysis of modern tendencies and a comparison of them with those which we have found to be historical, we shall endeavor to arrive at some simple conclusions in regard to the future.

FRANCIS KING CAREY.

## THE LEGAL-TENDER DECISION.

TRUE statesmanship consists in providing for future, while at the same time meeting current, problems. If a measure intended to solve an immediate and pressing question threatens danger when pushed to its logical limits, if it offers an opportunity to commit grave offences against the rights of property, it stands condemned, unless accompanied by other legislation which will counteract its mischievous tendencies, and deprive it of its power to do violence to existing rights. Judged upon this ground, the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the legal-tender case involves a most dangerous and destructive principle, and how great may be the ruin wrought by a future exercise of the power therein recognized as residing in Congress it would be impossible adequately to describe, tho in the past experience of the country there may be found not a little that affords at least some measure of the results that follow abuses of the paper-money function.

With only one dissenting voice (that of Mr. Justice Field) the court ruled:

"Congress as the legislature of a sovereign nation, being expressly empowered by the Constitution 'to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States,' and 'to borrow money on the credit of the United States,' and 'to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin,' and being clearly authorized, as incidental to the exercise of those great powers, to emit bills of credit, to charter national banks, and to provide a national currency for the whole people, in the form of coin, Treasury-notes, and national-bank bills; and the power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in payment of private debts being one of the powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not expressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution, we are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion

that the impressing upon the Treasury-notes of the United States the quality of being a legal tender in payment of private debts is an appropriate means, conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress, consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and therefore, within the meaning of that instrument, necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.

"Such being our conclusion in matter of law, the question whether at any particular time, in war or in peace, the exigency is such, by reason of unusual and pressing demands on the resources of the government or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold and silver coin to furnish the currency needed for the uses of the government and of the people, that it is, as a matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this means, is a political question to be determined by Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question to be afterward passed upon by the courts."

In order fully to realize the scope and importance of this decision it should be remembered that it is given by the highest judicial tribunal of the land, and is final and conclusive upon the subject of controversy. This tribunal was, moreover, specially constituted to correct the error or subdue the oppression of the executive and the legislative branches of the government, and in that capacity it has competent power to interpret, modify, and even declare void acts committed by these branches which it deems contrary to the spirit of, and subversive of the rights under, the Constitution. If, therefore, extreme care in the interpretation of powers is to be looked for anywhere, it is to be sought in the Supreme Court. The decision in this case, however, is so radical and so extreme as to give color to the belief that the court can no longer be regarded as the most important check upon the powers of Congress that exists under our Constitution. It has decided that Congress has the power to issue paper money, and to make the same a legal tender in payment of private debts, at any time and under any circumstances, in peace as well as in war, according as it seems good to it. This is an extreme power.

The question at issue may be regarded from the standpoint of law or of political economy; as a constitutional or as an economic question. The two views, however, are complementary to one another, and it is because the court has confined itself to only one side of the question, and, as we hope to show,

has misinterpreted this, that it has been led to announce a doctrine which is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, contrary to the past experience of the country, and finally contrary to the teachings of political economy.

Congress has power to "coin money and to regulate the value thereof and of foreign coins." It would be a curious interpretation of this sentence to say that it conferred the power of issuing paper money. To constitute money two distinct characters must be united: it must be a medium of exchange and also a measure of value, and it is very likely that a standard of value existed before a medium of exchange. Paper issues, so long as they are well secured, may serve all the uses of money, and would indeed furnish an economical (cheap) circulating medium. Still to make such issues is not "coining money," so the power must be sought elsewhere. Congress is empowered to "borrow money on the credit of the United States," and to "emit bills of credit." The same power was given in the articles of confederation; and altho such bills were issued, the idea of making them a legal tender by Congressional enactment was not seriously entertained, and when proposed created a very reasonable doubt as to the power of Congress to pass such a law. It is true that the State legislatures were asked to pass legal-tender measures; but this extreme caution on the part of the Congress of the Confederation is noteworthy because tender-laws had been generally employed among the colonies, and if there ever was a government in extreme necessity, it was the Confederation at that time. The uselessness of such laws was clearly shown by Gouverneur Morris,[1] their dishonesty by John Witherspoon,[2] and their general economic effect by Pelatiah Webster.[3] A resort to them was almost universally condemned. In 1783 Hamilton pointed out the evils which resulted from the power granted in the Articles of Confederation to emit bills on the credit of the United States without there being joined the power of establishing funds to secure the repayment of the bills emitted, and he asserted that the authority to emit an *unfunded* paper as the sign of value ought not to continue a formal part of the Constitution, so pregnant with abuses was it.[4]

[1] Sparks's Life of Morris, ii. p. 219.
[2] Works, ix. p. 35.
[3] Political Essays, p. 128.
[4] Works, ii. p. 271.

Taught by bitter experience, the framers of the Constitution prohibited the States from emitting bills of credit or from making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. In the draft of the Constitution the authority to "emit bills on the credit of the United States" was given to Congress, but excited much opposition, and was retained only after a struggle. Mr. Madison writes in his Debates that he accepted it only because it cut off the pretext for a *paper currency*, and particularly for making the bills a *tender* either for public or for private debts.[1] Mr. Bancroft says of this opinion of Madison: "This is the interpretation of the clause, made at the time of its adoption alike by its authors and by its opponents, accepted by all the statesmen of that age, not open to dispute because too clear for argument, and never disputed so long as any one man who took part in framing the Constitution remained alive."[2] The number of quotations upon this point might be increased, but they would not lead to any different result. The founders of the Constitution never seem to have had in mind a paper currency except as a last resort for a government in extreme necessity; and the possibility of a legal tender act was not conceived. Both the letter and the spirit of that document were opposed to such an enactment, and in the seventy years that intervened between the adoption of the Constitution and the Rebellion there is not the trace of any legislative act that would even lend color to the belief that paper money was or could be a legal tender in payment of private debts. Whether the country was on a firm basis of a gold and silver currency, or whether it was flooded with the worthless paper issues of State banks, the legal currency was invariably gold and silver or the notes of specie-paying banks.[3] It was not until 1862 that the national government issued a paper

[1] Elliot's Debates, v. pp. 434–5.

[2] Bancroft, History of the Constitution, ii. pp. 132–7.

[3] See act of July 31, 1789; the charter of the first United States Bank, § 10; act of March 2, 1799; and the various acts authorizing the issue of Treasury-notes. The circulars issued from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury also throw much light upon the usage of the government in this matter, and more especially that dated June 15, 1815, Rush's in 1826, Taney's in 1834, and the famous "specie circular" of 1836. The spirit of these various circulars was maintained unchanged until 1862.

currency clothed with a full legal-tender power, and the justice and expediency of that measure were at the time severely criticised, and were only conceded because of the almost unlimited immediate necessities of the government incident to the conduct of a great war, and because this extreme extension of the powers of Congress under the Constitution was confessedly to be but temporary, to be withdrawn when the occasion for its exercise had passed. This was the general understanding at the time, and on no other grounds could the measure have passed, as the dangers were even then fully recognized.

Another circumstance should be noted in this connection as significant. The legal-tender issues as originally made were made convertible into six-per-cent bonds at the pleasure of the holder, and the same provision was made in the issues of 1862 and 1863—$450,000,000 in all. The law which authorized the last issue also limited the time during which these notes might be exchanged for United States bonds, and after July, 1863, this privilege was to cease. The real significance of this provision lies in this: that it marks the final step by which a full legal-tender issue was evolved from the government notes formerly authorized. We have seen that originally the power of Congress to make any issue of paper whatever was questioned, and no exercise of it was made until the War of 1812 gave rise to the Treasury-notes. These notes were issued in small amounts from time to time until 1862 to meet the necessities of the government, and their issues never exceeded $50,000,000 at any one time. They bore interest, were payable at a definite and not distant time, and being always recognized as "debt" were redeemed as rapidly as the revenues of the government allowed. They were not a legal tender, but were made receivable for public dues; they were thus not intended to circulate as money, and in fact did not so circulate. The first issues of the greenback were in reality only a modification of the Treasury-note. They did not bear interest themselves, nor did they specify any date of payment; but they were at any time convertible into long-term bonds which possessed both of these characteristics, and for the final redemption of which a sinking fund was established. It is true these notes were made a full legal tender, but so long as the privilege of convertibility remained there existed a

remedy to the noteholder against being swindled out of what was justly due him. In the face of the continued depreciation of notes this privilege of funding could not be retained, and was indefinitely suspended. The last step was thus taken, and the country had a non-interest-bearing and irredeemable paper money, which possessed a full legal-tender power; and this continued until the resumption of specie payments in 1879.

The Constitutionality of the legal-tender acts was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1871. The history of the cases of that year does not concern us here. While these decisions established the power of Congress to pass a legal-tender act in a time of great emergency, the power to maintain the issues with a full legal-tender quality after the necessity had passed was quite another matter, and it was to decide this question that the decision now under review was delivered. The successive Secretaries of the Treasury had recommended that Congress deprive the "greenbacks" of their legal-tender power as a measure demanded by expediency and by a due regard for the honor of the nation; the financial interests of the country strenuously urged that this be done as a necessary step to place the national finances upon a firm basis. After 1873, when depression and stagnation in trade and industry gave rise to intense suffering among the people, the dangers of allowing such a power to remain in being were clearly seen, as under the pressure of want a wave of fiat-money craze threatened to overturn all that had been done since the war to attain a specie basis, and nearly succeeded in overwhelming the productive capacities of the nation in a flood of worthless paper issues. These dangers were real and imminent; yet in 1878 Congress suspended any further contraction of the currency and provided that "when any of said notes may be redeemed or received into the Treasury under any law from any source whatever and shall belong to the United States, they shall not be retired, cancelled, or destroyed, but they shall be reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation." This was equivalent to a re-enactment of the legal-tender clause of 1862, and it was under this act that the recent case came before the Supreme Court for a final determination.

The court has decided that a bare majority in Congress, or,

at most, two thirds of Congress, if a veto of the President intervenes, may at any and all times "water" the currency of the country to any extent it may see fit. It would hardly be necessary to point out the many dangers of an economic nature that inevitably accompany such a power. There will always be found those who believe that money is solely a creation of law, and that any substance will serve perfectly as money so long as the law recognizes it as a tender in payment of public and private debts. As a corollary to this belief they assert that the more plentiful money is the more will the workingman have and consequently the better will be his condition. Curious as is this blind faith in "cheap" money to the economist, he must recognize its existence, and further he must recognize it as an important political factor. "If there is any experiment," says Wolowski, "which has been seriously made, and as to the results of which there can be no doubt, it is the experiment which demonstrates the chimerical advantages and grave dangers of paper money employed as an instrument of production." Unfortunately the man who suffers most from such experiments, the man who depends upon his daily earnings, is unable to analyze the fictitious prosperity which apparently accompanies an increase in the circulating medium of the country—no matter whether it be in the precious metals or in paper—and is thus easily led astray by the demagogues who promise plenty of currency, which to them is synonymous with plenty of wealth. The evils which attend an excess of gold and silver are of a temporary nature and correct themselves; but those which follow an excessive issue of paper money are lasting and destructive. The distinction, however, is not known to the workingman, and he therefore affords a rich field for the demagogue to plough.

It is idle to say that there is no present danger of any action on the part of Congress; that the dangers are not imminent, and there is no cause for alarm. True, the dangers are in the future, and it is good policy to take measures of prevention at the present time, before the mischief becomes the greater. It is well known that the economic condition of the country is far from good. When judged by the national income it gives every evidence of great prosperity; but unfortunately this is no good test of the real situation. The stock-market was at one

time regarded as a fair gauge; but owing to the questionable operations of tricky and unscrupulous manipulators, it stands by itself and gives no reflections of what is being done in trade and industry. Manufacturers are far from prosperous. Mills have been closed or are running on short time, furnaces have been blown out or their production restricted, and the wages of labor have been reduced to their lowest limit, while large bodies of labor have been thrown out of employment. This process must continue so long as present conditions arising from the fiscal policy of the government remain the same. While there is an immense amount of business transacted with profit, as there always will be, on the whole we are experiencing an industrial depression fully as severe as that which followed 1873. All this points to a revival of the greenback-labor doctrines which assumed such proportions in 1876 and 1877, and which were in a great measure suppressed by the revival of industry in 1879.[1] It is therefore very probable that this question will become involved in politics, instead of being kept one of economics only. It is true, neither party at their recent conventions made any mention direct or indirect of this matter; but already measures have been introduced into Congress so amending the Constitution as to prohibit or restrict the power of declaring other than gold and silver a legal tender.

The opportunities offered to increase the issues of legal-tender notes will not be wanting. The rapid payment of the

[1] Immediately after the court rendered its decision a manifesto was issued by the so-called Greenback Party, which contained the following utterances: The decision of the Supreme Court "declaring that legal-tender notes are constitutional money; that Congress is the supreme and only power authorized to determine the material money may be made of, and to create and issue money in peace or war, is the most important official statement ever yet uttered by man. . . . Under it the American people are offered an opportunity to elect representatives instructed to make money as abundant as God makes the materials money is required to handle." It then goes on to specify the purposes for which notes "based on the life of the government" should be issued: to pay the debt, defend the sea-coast, build a navy, subsidize the mercantile marine, prevent the overflow of rivers, "by constructing reservoirs at their head and thereby providing fish-food for the people and water for navigation when needed," harbor improvements, public buildings, liberal pensions, etc. etc. "The Supreme Court has furnished the rock for us to build on. Are we equal to the duty it imposes? The despised, ridiculed, and abused greenbacker of the past now stands the recognized champion of acknowledged constitutional law."

national debt is causing a contraction in the circulation of the national banks. In the first six months of 1884 this contraction amounted to $18,660,927. This was in a measure compensated for by an issue of gold and silver certificates; while the latter are, through the silver-law of 1878, a positive increase to the circulating medium of the country, the gold certificates merely represent what was already in the hands of the people in the form of coin, and are thus no addition to the currency. Making allowances for these circumstances, the actual contraction in the six months was about $12,000,000. There is every reason to believe that a demand will be made for an issue of greenbacks to make good the contraction of the bank issues. Then, too, when silver becomes so large an element in our currency as to drive out gold,—and this event is impending,—the upholders of paper money will labor for an issue of greenbacks to supply the place of the gold. Since the beginning of the year the exports of gold have exceeded the imports and domestic production by about $20,000,000; so that the total contraction in the currency since January 1 has been about $32,000,000. At the present rate of debt-extinction, in two and one half years $115,848,900 of bonds held by the banks to secure circulation will have been paid, and it is not likely that one fourth of this amount will be re-invested in other bonds for currency purposes. It is estimated that there is about $250,000,000 of gold in the country, and nearly the whole of this will be driven out when the silver-move comes. Is not here an opportunity for a flood of paper issues?

It seems to be thought that to deprive the greenback of its legal-tender quality would compel its retirement. This, however much to be desired, is not the case. Convenience will still cause it to circulate, and so long as the Treasury maintains a sufficient redemption-fund it will not be depreciated, circulating as freely as gold and silver. But it is quite important to keep its true character before the people. It is a debt, and nothing but a debt—not a productive force. The law recognizes it as a debt, but by a strange inconsistency it asserts that having been paid it must again be issued and a new debt created. It is a call-loan to the government, but it is a perpetual loan under the absurd law of 1878. Let this law be repealed and the note be deprived of its legal-tender quality, and it will still form a

part of the circulating medium of the country so long as it is properly secured. Increase the issues and they must depreciate, causing an enormous loss to the country. Good money requires no tender-laws, and the very existence of such laws ought to throw doubt upon the quality of the paper to which they attach.[1] No country has it in its power to have a better circulation than this, and most of the economic ills from which it has suffered have been due to tampering with the natural course of trade and money. The irredeemable paper money of the war and the compulsory coinage of a silver dollar, miscalled a "standard," are dangers which are now upon us.

In 1837 the Supreme Court decided the famous case of Briscoe *v.* The Bank of Kentucky, and defined bills of credit in such a way as to give the wildcat issues of banks a standing under the Constitution. Protected by this decision, these institutions extended their issues and eventually plunged the States into bankruptcy and compelled them in many cases to resort to repudiation. Whether history will repeat itself under the recent legal-tender decision remains to be seen. The opportunity is given, and it will be too much to expect that at least attempts to use it will not be ever present. The remedy is of so simple a character that it will argue gross neglect of the public welfare if it be not applied.

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[1] "The credit or value of money cannot, in the very nature of the thing, be supplied, preserved, or restored by penal laws, or any coercive methods. The subject is incompatible to force; it is out of its reach, and never can be made susceptible of it, or controllable by it. The thing which makes money an object of desire, which gives it strength of motive on the hearts of all men, is the general confidence, the opinion which it gains, as a sovereign means of obtaining everything needful. This confidence, this opinion, exists in the mind only, and is not compellable or assailable by force, but must be grounded on that evidence and reason which the mind can see and believe; and is no more subject to the action of force than any other passion, sentiment, or affection of the mind; any more than faith, love, or esteem."—PELATIAH WEBSTER, 1780.

# THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

THERE are some subjects that lie on the borders of theology and philosophy, on which both of these sciences have a right to speak; and among these is the great and solemn doctrine of the personality of God. Inasmuch as it concerns the Divine Being, it unquestionably pertains to theology, and it is capable of being investigated by purely theological methods. We may study, analyze, and compare the representations of God given in the various parts of Scripture, and from them draw conclusions as to how we ought to conceive of him; we may investigate the works of God, especially in the redemption that is in Christ, and from thence rise to convictions as to what God is; or we may examine the religious consciousness and experience of Christians, and ascertain what it testifies of the Father in heaven, with whom through Christ we have fellowship. In such purely theological ways we may approach the subject and arrive at some knowledge of it. But on the other hand, since personality is peculiarly a philosophical conception, and since we cannot deny the possibility of a natural knowledge of God, we must concede to philosophy the right to inquire whether the conception of personality which she draws from sound psychology can or must be attributed to the Supreme Being whom she recognizes as the Author of nature. Whether and how far either theology or philosophy can establish positive and definite results by their inquiries on this lofty and sacred theme, is another question, which cannot be answered beforehand; but at the outset it should be frankly admitted, that both theology and philosophy have the right to consider and discuss the subject, each starting from its own solid grounds, and using

its own proper methods. These grounds and methods too are independent. Philosophy and theology have each their solid foundation, and while we must believe that there is a harmony between all their true results, we may not always be able to perceive and demonstrate it; and meanwhile we should not attempt to make either bend to the other, as a handmaid to an absolute mistress.

The subject will be regarded in this paper mainly from the theological side, and the conclusions of philosophy considered in their bearing on the doctrine as a part of the system of Christian truth.

All religion presupposes or postulates the idea of the Deity as a person, *i.e.*, a being to whom the human soul can say "Thou," who knows what his worshippers say to him, and who wills either to do or to refuse what they ask. This may be sufficient meanwhile as a definition of personality, and it seems all that is involved in the primary religious affections as such. This however is undoubtedly implied in the exercises of prayer, sacrifice, thanksgiving, that are practised, in however rude forms, by almost all races of mankind. There may be fear, awe, admiration, or satisfaction, joy, delight, directed towards mere blind unintelligent forces or magnitudes; but these feelings can hardly be said to amount to religious worship at all, certainly not to be the whole of it; and man's religious nature ever prompts him to ask benefits from the Being he adores, to offer gifts or service to him, and to render to him not only admiration but gratitude for good things received and enjoyed. It is of no very great consequence whether or not investigation prove the absolute universality among men of such religious feelings: the important point is, that they are natural to man, the result, not of extraneous or accidental circumstances, but of the spontaneous impulses and intrinsic constitution of his soul.

But while the religious instincts of mankind prompt them to words and acts that imply that the Being they worship is a person, in the sense above indicated, it will be hardly safe to take this as affording of itself and directly a proof that this is an objective truth. For it may always be said that possibly this is but an illusion or delusion of the human mind; and that it does not follow that because men are prone to imagine or think

that there is a person Supreme over all, this is really so. It may be pointed out, too, that in almost all cases the primitive beliefs of men about the gods they worship have been most childish and unworthy. They have conceived them after the manner of men; and have not scrupled to ascribe to them not only bodily form and organs, but the lowest and most degrading of human affections and passions. As these notions are certainly unworthy and false, how can we be sure that any idea, merely because it is implied in man's religious tendency, is certainly true? Nowhere can we find the religious instinct in any thing like purity, and it would seem a difficult matter to draw the line between what is a faithful representation of objective truth, and what is a mere subjective tho prevalent delusion. Even the fact that in ourselves a tendency that we feel to be noble and right impels us to acts of religion which imply a personal God, does not afford a perfectly satisfactory assurance of this as a truth. We are not content to be assured on this point merely subjectively, because we are involuntarily constrained to think of God as a person; we farther seek to have satisfactory evidence of this as an objective fact, in order that we may be assured that our religion is a reality and not a delusion.

There is a certain indirect evidence of its reality to be found in the reflection of the understanding on the phenomena of the world; for in so far as these exhibit marks analogous to those that proceed from reason in the works of men, they warrant and require us to infer that the first cause is possessed of reason also; and a being having reason and acting in the exercise of it corresponds to what the exercises of religion postulate as a personal God. The appearances of order, harmony, adaptation of means to ends, in the world; in short, the manifestations of intelligence and reason, underlying the phenomena of the universe around us, seem to indicate that the postulate of the religious feelings, that the Supreme Being is a person, is no mere subjective illusion, but a truth independent of our feelings and conceptions. It is proper also to add here that the entire record of the Hebrew and Christian revelation assumes the personality of God, and represents him as a Being possessing intelligence, affections, and will. Without any dogmatic assertion or definition of the doctrine, the Bible uniformly gives such accounts

of the works and ways of God, and such expressions of the worship and love of his people, as could only be true if he be recognized as a person. Whatever evidence then goes to show that in these books we have a real revelation of God and history of his dealings with mankind for their salvation, serves also to confirm the postulate of all religion, the personality of God.

But that which gives direct and certain evidence of this is the actual experience in our own souls of the reality of communion with God in the true and perfect religion. While every religion, even the most false and degraded, presupposes the personality of the Deity, and professes to bring men into a certain relation to him, in many of them this is a mere delusion and mockery: they do not really lead men to God, and their most earnest votaries, after faithfully observing all their precepts and rites, find the shrine empty, and attain no real communion with a Father in heaven. But it is not so with Christianity. Christ is the Way, and the Truth, and the Life; and by him we really do come to the Father. If we hearken to his words and follow his guidance we shall find that we are really reconciled to God, delivered from the burden of an evil conscience, and made conscious of forgiveness and peace. We are not brought to an empty shrine. We find that when we pray we are not vainly sending up cries to a closed and brazen heaven: we do receive the things that we ask—peace, strength, light, comfort; and so we know experimentally that there is One who hears our requests, who knows our wants, since we find that when we send up our requests there come to us in turn the things that we ask, or, if not these, things that really meet our case far better than those we have asked. In this way the sincere Christian has direct evidence, in his own experience, of the personality of God. It may not, indeed, be always clearly and vividly present to his mind; for even earnest believers in Jesus have not at all times that fervor of devotion and strength of faith that enables them to see Him that is invisible. During many parts of their life the reality and nearness of a personal God may be rather a matter of belief, firm and undoubting indeed, than of direct experimental knowledge. But it is possible through Christ to have such direct communion with God as makes his personality a matter of most certain knowledge; and were our spiritual life

maintained at that elevation that it ought to have, this might be an habitual and constant experience.

It is of the utmost importance to bear in mind that we as Christians have this sure and invincible evidence of the personality of God, and to consider the subject from this point of view. It is not a doubtful problem that we have to solve, whether the Supreme Being be a person or not: we start from the experimental conviction that he is a person, a conviction which must be true unless all religion is a delusion, and which all who have any real religion know to be true; and we proceed to consider how that is related to other truths or deductions.

If the question be looked at as a purely philosophical one, it must be said that tho reason can make the personality of God extremely probable, it can hardly establish it beyond all possibility of doubt. The phenomena of the universe are at least consistent with this belief; nay, more, they seem to point to it as their natural explanation. The order and adaptation of the multitudinous materials and forces of the world certainly indicates intelligence in the first cause of all; and we have no experience and can form no conception of intelligence except in connection with personality. Again, on the principle that the effect cannot surpass the cause, the very existence of human persons would seem to prove that the qualities which make them personal must exist in their Maker. Still it is not altogether impossible to demur to these arguments. It may be contended that for aught we know there may be intelligence without personality, and that while the world exhibits marks of intelligence, yet its uniform order and unbroken laws give no indication of that free will which is another and equally essential element in personality; while, tho it must be admitted that the existence of finite persons proves that their cause cannot be less than personal, it is within the bounds of possibility that there may be a being that is more than personal, not beneath but above the level of personality. Those possible objections to the philosophical argument serve to show the importance of having a more firm foundation for this essential conviction in the direct religious experience.

But such objections would not probably have been deemed of much weight were there not difficulties attaching to the con-

ception of the personality of God arising from other attributes which it is essential to ascribe to him. More especially the recognition of God as absolute, which both religion and reason require, seems hard to reconcile with his personality. The feeling of dependence, which if not the whole is certainly an essential and important element of religion, is one of absolute dependence ; *i.e.*, it implies that the dependence is purely and entirely on one side. There is no sense or aspect in which the relation is reversed or reciprocal ; we are in all things dependent on God, and God is altogether independent of us. Towards the world we have the consciousness of a relative and reciprocal dependence ; we are influenced by it, but on the other hand we have a certain power to resist, and within certain limits to control, its action. But towards the Divine Being we have the feeling of absolute dependence : we must regard God therefore as altogether unlimited and independent of all other beings. This conception of God, while it is of a really religious origin, is also required by intellectual considerations. As the first cause of all that exists, and the greatest and most perfect of beings, the Deity must be conceived as infinite and absolute. This is an element in the scriptural conception of God, both in the Old and New Testament. The heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain him : he is the maker and proprietor of all things : men can neither profit him by their goodness nor injure him by their sin : he is not worshipped by men's hands as tho he needed any thing. This is an essential complement to the idea of God as personal ; for without it that idea would be apt to degenerate, as it did among the heathen, into anthropomorphism, or the notion of God being altogether such a one as ourselves.

But while the highest religious interests seem to require both these elements in the idea of God, there has been felt by many, an intellectual difficulty in combining them, or seeing how they can coexist. The idea of personality that is implied in religion would seem to be that of a being to whom we can say "Thou," and who can say of himself "I." But does not this necessarily imply a relation to other beings? How then can such a conception be united with that of the absolute ; which denotes, not indeed that which is incapable of relation, but that which does not necessarily exist in any relation, that

which is capable of existing apart from all relation whatever? Does not personality imply a relation of "I" to "thou," of subject and object? and does it not follow that an absolute being cannot be necessarily or essentially personal; or conversely, that one who is essentially personal cannot be absolute, since as a person he must be in relation to others?

Again, personality seems as difficult to harmonize with the idea of infinitude. The infinite is that which has no bounds, than which a greater cannot be conceived; but the notion of a person seems rather to be a definite, well-marked being, distinguished from others, and therefore limited by them, since it could conceivably be greater by being what they are. In like manner it is argued by Origen that if we are to regard God as acting consciously, we must say that his power is limited; for if it were absolutely unlimited it could not be known even by himself.

Such are some of the difficulties encompassing this subject that have been felt by all the greatest thinkers who have turned their attention to the matter. They were, however, only incidentally touched upon in ancient times; and were evaded for the most part by one device or another. Some sought a way out of them by resting content with a conception of God short of the truly Infinite and Absolute; others denied the applicability even of the category of existence to the Deity, holding him to be above being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας). But the problem was anew brought into prominence for the modern world by Spinoza, who with his characteristic rigor of logic brought out in a remarkably clear way the difficulty of reconciling the idea of personality with that of the infinite and absolute. His reasonings were treated by most of the theologians of his day with perhaps too great contempt, and regarded as really atheistic in their tendency; but in more recent times they have been held to be of the very highest importance, and his opposition to the Christian conception of God either explained away or regarded as of little moment. In reality the demonstrations of the deep-thinking Jewish recluse should seem to be neither so absurd as they appeared to his orthodox contemporaries, nor so conclusive as his modern admirers deem them. But anyhow they must be taken into consideration in any discussion of the per-

sonality of God. The principle of his system is expressed in the maxim, which has been taken as an axiom by later philosophers, *omnis determinatio est negatio*. The infinite being must be one of whom every thing real can be affirmed ; for if there were any real quality that must be denied, that would be a limitation, and such a being would not be infinite. But every definition or determination of an object, affirming that it is one thing as distinguished from another, implies a negation of that other thing in regard to it. Consequently an infinite being cannot be determined or distinguished in any way ; and if personality implies the distinction of subject and object, of me and thee, how can that be consistent with the absence of all limit ? In place of the idea of a personal God, supposed to be thus disproved, Spinoza put that of an universal substance, of which all phenomenal beings are supposed to be but modifications. But his modern admirers generally admit that in this part of his task he was not quite successful, and that the idea of mere substance is too abstract and negative to meet the requirements of the problem presented by the universe. More recent speculators, agreeing with Spinoza in his polemic against the personality of God, have preferred different ways of positive construction. Thus Fichte held the moral order of the universe to be the only Deity that it is necessary or possible to assume. A third conception, attempted to be substituted for that of a personal God, is Hegel's one of the self-developing idea, that realizes itself in an infinite actuality as nature, and returns into itself as spirit.

I do not however intend to criticise or compare with each other these various substitutes for the belief in a personal God, which, as we have seen, religion imperatively demands ; but simply to consider the ways in which the philosophical objections to this belief which have led to these alternatives may be most validly and satisfactorily met.

Dr. Hodge in his Systematic Theology (vol. i., p. 392) has given a brief but comprehensive summary of the answers that have been made to the objection in question. He first refers to a previous passage where he had impugned the definition of the Absolute and Infinite on which the objection rests. The force and effect of this argument may be more conveniently con-

sidered afterwards. Then he proceeds to make three remarks more directly against the objection: (1) "That it may be admitted as a fact, that the slumbering consciousness of self in the human soul is awakened and developed by contact with what is not only external to itself, but also independent of it. But God is not subject to that law. He is eternally perfect and immutable, having in himself the plenitude of life. There is therefore no analogy between the cases, and no ground for inferring in this case that what is true in us who begin life as an undeveloped germ must be true in relation to God." This is a summary statement of an argument developed at greater length by Julius Müller in his "Christian Doctrine of Sin" (book iii., div. i., ch. 4). He argues that the true idea of God is not that of an absolutely simple essence, but of a being possessing a fulness of attributes; that the infinite is not equivalent to the indefinite; and that the personality of God is absolute, inasmuch as the contents of the divine consciousness are an infinite and absolutely self-sufficient totality. Now this argument seems to be quite conclusive and sufficient against some of the forms in which the objections to the personality of God have been put. No other answer is needed, for example, to the argument of Fichte, quoted with approval by Strauss (Christliche Glaubenslehre, i. p. 504): "You ascribe to God personality and consciousness. What then do you call personality and consciousness? No doubt that which you have found in ourselves, learned to know in yourselves, and designated by this name. But that you absolutely do not and cannot think this without limitation and finitude, the least attention to your construction of this notion will convince you. Thus you make this Being, by the ascription of this predicate, a finite one, a being like yourselves; and you have not, as you wished, thought God, but only multiplied yourselves in thought." If any one seriously bases an objection to the personality of God on the simple fact that we derive our notion of personality from ourselves who are finite, it is sufficient to meet this by saying, that it is at least conceivable that the finitude of our personality may be due to the fact that we are but creatures and imperfect, and that what is true of us does not necessarily hold good of the infinite Being. This possibility cannot be denied, except on an assumption that would destroy

all knowledge of God whatever. When it is argued that personality cannot be attributed to the Infinite, simply because we have learned to know personality from ourselves who are finite, it is enough to meet this by saying that we get all our ideas, even that of existence, ultimately from ourselves. That being so, either we can have no idea of an infinite Being at all, or some of the qualities that we learn to know in ourselves as finite must exist in God, only after a higher and more perfect manner. So far this argument is conclusive.

But we must not conceal from ourselves the fact, that the objection to the idea of an infinite person can and does assume a more formidable shape than that which it presents as simply based on the truth, that the idea of personality is derived from our knowledge of ourselves. It is asserted, not merely that the idea, because it is of human origin, must be inapplicable to the infinite; but that there is something in the nature of the idea itself, as distinct from others, that makes it inconsistent with infinitude and absoluteness; that personality involves distinction, and therefore limitation; relation, and therefore the negation of the absolute. Does the reply of Müller and Hodge sufficiently meet the objection in this form? Does it not seem rather like assuming the main point in question? It is asserted that personality in God is different from what it is in us, and that it consists, not in his being distinguished from other beings, but in his possessing an infinite fulness of perfections in himself. But it may be said, these things ought to be not merely asserted, but proved; and it does not appear that this has been done. The mere assertion, indeed, is sufficient to rebut the general objection, that because we become acquainted with personality first in ourselves who are finite beings, it cannot be ascribed to the infinite. But when it is argued that the special character of the notion of personality implies finitude, it seems to be needful not only to assert, but to show that this is not so. Müller asserts that the fact that personality in man implies other beings, arises from his finitude, and therefore does not apply to God; but in the face of the opposing argument it will not do to assume this as an axiom: we desiderate some proof of it as a truth.

A proof of this position has, however, been undertaken, and is presented by Hermann Lotze and by Ritschl. It consists in

the demonstration that tho our consciousness is in its origin conditioned by other beings, and dependent for its activity on impulses received from them, it yet becomes, as its development advances, independent of these external incitements, and capable of originating from within, out of its own store of memories, thoughts, and imaginations, all that is needed to maintain intellectual and active life. From this the inference is drawn, that personality with us is dependent on other beings, not on account of the inherent and essential nature of personality as such, but on account of the fact that we are created persons, or rather created for full and perfect personality, made to grow up ultimately into a state in which we shall be independent of outward impulses for the exercise and activity of our powers. If human nature tends, even in any degree, to reach such a condition, it seems to follow that the limitation inseparable from our experience of personality arises from the fact that in us personality is only in a state of development, and affords no evidence that personality never can exist without limitation and relation. "Selfhood," as Lotze sums up his argument on this head, "the essence of all personality, does not rest on a past or present opposition of the *I* to the *not I*, but consists in an immediate being-for-one's-self (*Fürsichsein*), which conversely forms the ground of the possibility of that opposition where it appears. Self-consciousness is the interpretation of this being-for-one's-self, which comes to pass by means of recognition ; and even this is in no way necessarily bound to the distinction of the *I* from a *not I* substantially opposed to it" (Microcosmus, vol. iii., pp. 575, 576).

It must be confessed however, that this is not very clear, and it does not seem quite certain that this definition of personality can be applied to the Infinite Being. If "being-for-one's-self" means individuality, being a self-contained whole ; then in the first place it appears difficult to reconcile this idea with that of the Infinite as the unlimited, which must be conceived not as a completed whole, but as transcending all boundaries. Then further, the idea of individuality does not fully represent that of a person : we must have the idea of conscious, intelligent, active individuality ; and in regard to this it seems certain that we can form no conception of consciousness of self, except as

distinguished from what is not self. The question no doubt is, Whence does this inability arise? But whatever be the answer to that—whether it arises, as the Pantheists say, from an essential truth of reason and law of thought, or, as Theists contend, from the limited nature of our minds—the inability itself should be recognized as a fact. If the arguments of Lotze, and the statements of Müller and Ritschl, are designed to make it conceivable that the Infinite and Absolute Being is a person, I do not think they are at all successful; altho, as showing that we are not warranted in affirming the impossibility of this, they are of great value. They seem to have brought the state of the question to this, that our personality is undoubtedly one that has originated and is gradually developed; that in its development it becomes less and less dependent on objects out of ourselves, tho never, as far as we know, entirely independent of them; and that therefore it is possible that personality may exist in an Infinite Being apart from all relation to others, tho this is still inconceivable by us.

This argument of Lotze and Ritschl seems to be in substance what Dr. Hodge indicates in his second answer to the pantheistic objection: "In the second place, we have no right to assume that even with regard to a finite intelligence, created in the perfection of its being, self-consciousness is dependent on what is independent of itself. Such a being would of necessity be conscious of its own thoughts and feelings, for thought is a state of consciousness in an intelligent being. If God therefore can make an intelligent being in the perfection of its limited nature, it would be self-conscious, even were it left alone in the universe" (Syst. Theol., i., p. 392). It is quite true we cannot deny that such a thing is possible; but, on the other hand, the objector might reply that it is altogether inconceivable. We are thus thrown back on the position, that the limits of our power to conceive are not identical with the limits of possibility; and as long as that can be maintained, we may hold it as proved that it is at least not impossible that the attributes of infinitude and personality may both coexist in God. For it cannot be proved that the difficulty of combining these attributes in our thought arises from any logical necessity or demonstrable contradiction between them, or that it may not be sufficiently

accounted for by the fact that all our experience and knowledge of personality is derived from our own self-consciousness as finite persons.

Another reason for hesitation in ascribing to this line of argument the full force that its authors seem to claim for it, is that Müller, Ritschl, and Hodge have all alike been led, apparently by their eagerness to have a complete and positive answer to the pantheistic objections, to give up some of the statements about the Divine Being and attributes that have been held by nearly all the theologians of the Christian Church. Especially is this the case with the doctrine of the simplicity of the divine essence, according to which the attributes of God are not really distinguished from his essence or from one another, but are simply that one indivisible essence as it is contemplated by us through various inadequate conceptions. This noble and lofty view is distinctly abandoned both by Müller and Hodge as a scholastic subtlety, or at least the result of pushing to a needless extreme the dread of conceiving God as in any sense composite in his being. Müller does this in express connection with his argument for the divine personality; and tho Hodge does not bring out this connection so distinctly, but discusses the doctrine of the simplicity of God in a different place, yet he gives indications of the connection of the two points. Now, tho this doctrine is not perhaps of the highest importance, it does not appear to have been disproved, and it is not clear that theologians are wise in being so ready to give it up.

Then Ritschl goes still further, and maintains that the entire conception of God held by the scholastics and Protestant orthodox theologians is a wrong and perverse one, due to the introduction into Christian theology of speculative ideas foreign to it. There was first brought, he says, from the later Platonism the notion of boundless unlimited being, which was made equivalent to the religious idea of God, but which in reality has only the negative sense of not-world. Then, by means of the cosmological and teleological arguments, the notion of the First Cause and that of the Last End of the world were put on a level with the idea of God. These latter, he thinks, were added because the purely negative idea of abstraction from the world

could not possibly explain the existence of the world, and then with this composite notion were combined the attributes that appear in the Christian revelation. But he thinks that all these transcendent ideas are foreign and injurious to Christian theology, and that the middle age theology and Protestant orthodoxy have a positively Christian character, just in the degree in which they do not carry out the scientific conditions of their doctrine of God; while in so far as they are in earnest with them, there spring from this possession of ecclesiastical theology all kinds of rationalism, both the deistic and the pantheistic. In contrast with this he holds that the true and full idea of the personal God is that based upon Kant's moral argument, of the founder of the moral fellowship of mankind as the end of the world; and that when theology starts from this it cannot be rationalistic, because this idea of God is a positively Christian one, and cannot be perverted either into Deism or Pantheism (Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung, vol. iii., pp. 193–4). Now this is a very sweeping demand, and one may well pause and consider before giving in to it. It seems to require the abandonment of all those transcendent elements in the conception of God by which the infinite separation of the Divine Being from all others is expressed and maintained. It may be admitted that these have been sometimes made too prominent, and set forth too exclusively, that the other aspect of the Divine Being, that in respect of which man is the image of God, has been allowed at times to fall into the background, and that when this is done the tendency of theology must be either to Deism or Pantheism. More particularly, since the latter aspect of the Deity is that in which he is revealed, while in the former he is and must be incomprehensible, the neglect of the latter is apt to be specially injurious to the positively Christian character of a theological system. It may be further allowed that the theologians who attempted to combine both did not succeed in showing positively how they were united in one being, or in tracing all that they said of God from one general conception; but that they generally merely placed the two ideas side by side, unable logically to combine them. Still it seems very doubtful if Christian theology can afford to dispense with these attributes of the Infinite Being, the First Cause and the Last End of the uni-

verse, which the profoundest thinkers in all ages have been led to ascribe to God. It should not be forgotten that it was precisely the rationalizing party in the Protestant Church that sought, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to get rid of many of the metaphysical attributes of God, and substitute a new and simpler conception. The Socinians were driven by the peculiar character of their system, impatient of all mysteries, to deny or modify the conceptions of the simplicity, infinity, omnipresence, immutability, eternity, and omniscience of God ; and it was because of the necessity of contending against this that the orthodoxy of the seventeenth century was led to insist so strongly on the metaphysical conceptions of the Divine Being and attributes which had been maintained by the scholastic theology. In fact, the Socinian conception of Deity was a very simple one, being merely that of absolute dominion or lordship ; this conception runs through their system and explains the principal points in it, and they had little or no hesitation in denying or explaining away any attribute ascribed to God, provided only that conception were left intact. This certainly is not an encouraging example of the results of giving up those lofty, tho mysterious conceptions of the Divine Being, and being content with an idea that is more simple and seems to have the advantage of being more directly and positively Christian. The idea that Ritschl puts forward is indeed not so bald and bare as the Socinian one ; it is that of a moral educator of dependent spirits ; but however true it is, so far as it goes, there is no certainty that it is adequate, or can enable theology to dispense with the ideas of infinitude, independence, and eternity as necessarily belonging to the Divine Being.

The theological depreciation of the peculiarly incommunicable attributes of God is perhaps to be traced to the philosophical depreciation of the ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute. Dr. Hodge and some English writers, who have contended for the possibility of a positive knowledge of the Infinite, have generally had recourse to a lowering of the idea of the Infinite, and have argued that there is no difficulty in conceiving the coexistence of other beings with the Infinite, just as an infinite line does not exclude any number of other lines. But that, and all similar instances, are merely cases of things infinite

in certain respects only, and cannot, without a gross fallacy, be applied to a Being infinite in every respect. Nor can it be admitted to be a sufficient view of the perfection of God to assert merely that he is infinite in certain respects, but not in others. We acknowledge the Deity as infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being and in all his attributes, even tho we cannot positively conceive how he is so. No doubt this aspect of the Divine Being is not the only one under which he is to be contemplated, nor that which is of most importance for practical and religious purposes; and Lotze has done well to remark that a mere abstract conception of God lacks one essential characteristic of true reality—the capacity to suffer (Microcosmus, iii., p. 570). But that even this, bold as the expression may seem, can be ascribed to God, even by those who most strongly maintain his metaphysical perfections, may appear from the following words of John Howe: "Among creatures a sense of pain, real grief and sorrow, correspondent to their present true causes, import more perfection than stupidity, insensibleness, and apathy; and if so, tho pain and grief cannot formally agree to the most perfect being of God, to whom their causes cannot agree, the life and percipiency do eminently agree to him, by which he can apprehend an injury, tho not a real hurt, which he can therefore only not apprehend, not because the perceptive principle is wanting, but the object" (Living Temple, part ii., ch. 2).

If then the proof offered of the personality of the Infinite and Absolute requires, as it seems to do, a certain lowering of the conception of the Infinite and Absolute, it ought, I think, to be received with great caution; and it would be well not absolutely to commit ourselves to it, until at least it be seen somewhat more distinctly what the bearing of such a concession would be on the whole circle of Christian doctrine. A perversion of the idea of God, such as might give countenance to a system deviating from Scripture at so many points as Socinianism, would be too great a price to pay, even for the most complete refutation of the philosophical objection that the Infinite and Absolute cannot be a person.

It must be remembered too, that we do not absolutely need any such refutation. It would indeed be very well to have

it if possible, because some might be convinced by it who will not take the means to satisfy themselves, by making trial of Christianity, that there is a personal God, whatever philosophy may say, and whether it can be answered or not. But, as was pointed out at the outset, the personality of God stands fast on its own immovable foundation in the religious convictions and religious experience of mankind. This is as certain as any principle or deductions of reason can be ; and even if these latter may seem to point in an opposite direction, and we should be entirely unable to reconcile what reason dictates about the Most High with what our conscience and heart constrain us to believe ; all that we can legitimately infer from this is that our faculties are limited, not that the two beliefs are really incompatible. Without denying that recent philosophy may have made further progress, I am not ashamed to confess that I have not got beyond the standpoint of Hamilton and Mansel, to whom it appeared that thought on these subjects at its utmost reach is confronted by a problem that is altogether insoluble,—by a choice of alternatives, both of which are utterly inconceivable, but one of which we are constrained on sure grounds to believe to be real. It may be possible to get beyond this, and to come to understand how the apparent contradictions in thought are harmonized in existence ; and I do not mean to express an opinion as to the character or success of attempts in that direction. But it seems at least to be a legitimate inference from a consideration of the way in which the ablest modern theologians and philosophers seek to overthrow the Pantheistic objection to the personality of God, that the explanations on which they rest are neither perfectly clear nor absolutely certain. In the meantime, therefore, it would seem the wiser course for the Christian theologian not to commit himself too unreservedly to them. The armor may be good, like that in which Saul clothed David ; but one cannot help feeling a hesitation in going forth in it, and saying, " I cannot go with these, for I have not proved them." And there is no absolute need of the arms of philosophy to meet the enemies of the living God ; the faith by which the Church must ever live, affords a sure ground of belief in what is incomprehensible to reason.

No doubt this position requires that we frankly confess that

our belief in God contains elements that we cannot combine in thought into one consistent idea. We allow conceptions to stand side by side in our theology which if logically pressed would exclude one another, and we should not attempt to make it appear that we can harmonize them. But we account for this simply and sufficiently by the fact that we have no full or adequate knowledge of God; that, as an old divine puts it, "God as he is in himself can be known by none but by himself, and he is only known by us in so far as he has revealed himself, which is but partially, through a glass darkly, and not face to face." There is no theology that more needs the recognition of this than the Evangelical or so-called Calvinistic system, for in it there are continually arising antinomies, oppositions between different sides of truth, which it is impossible to reconcile logically, *e.g.*, between the divine and human authorship of Scripture, the divine and human nature in Christ, the justice and the mercy of God in the atonement, the universal grace and the sovereign purpose of God, and many others. It is the excellence of this system, not, as is sometimes alleged of it, that it is more logical than others, or gives a solution of more difficulties than they; but that it frankly admits that there are in the being and works of God mysteries that we cannot solve, and that it does not attempt to solve. And if there are such mysteries even in the works of God that come most within our observation, can we wonder that there should be much more baffling and perplexing ones, when we attempt to think of the highest of all possible subjects—the very being of God himself?

There is still another way of meeting the pantheistic objection, indicated by Dr. Hodge in his third answer: "(3) Admitting it to be true that without a Thou there can be no I, we know that, according to the Scriptures and the faith of the Church universal, there are in the unity of the Godhead three distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; so that from eternity the Father can say "I" and the Son "Thou." This is a line of thought that has been adopted by many modern theologians, and is an exceedingly attractive and suggestive one. Delitzsch, in his "Apologetik," points out that mere Deism or Theism, tho it reaches the idea of a God, does not attain to that of a living God, or at most, in the form of so-called

Theism, recognizes a God living in the universe, but not one living in himself; and that to attain to this, we have only the alternative of Pantheism, which identifies the universe with God and finds the divine life in its processes, or of the Christian belief in the Trinity, which recognizes a fellowship of life and love in the Divine Being independent of the universe entirely. So far this is a true and important thought. If there be any validity in the argument that conscious thought and life require an object in some way distinct from the subject, then we seem to be shut up to a choice between an eternal and necessary world, and an eternal and necessary Logos. At least the latter idea affords an outlet from the process of argument by which certain philosophers would force us into the narrow door of Pantheism. The way in which Strauss meets this view seems altogether too abrupt and contemptuous. He merely says that distinct divine persons might explain the possibility of consciousness in God if they are like human persons, exclusive and independent of each other, but that in that case they would be three finite persons, and no absolute. This is to take for granted that there can be no distinction in the Godhead, except of the same sort as that of persons among men, or at least that nothing but such a distinction could be a foundation for conscious life. But what right have we to make any such assumptions? Tho we cannot positively conceive or describe the nature of such distinctions; yet if on other grounds we have reason to believe that there are distinctions in the Godhead, may we not make use of this as indicating how it is that the Divine Being, tho free from all limitations and conditions of space and time, and independent of any necessary relations to any other being, may yet be essentially and eternally personal, having in the Godhead itself full scope for the perfect exercise of thought, feeling, and will? Now the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has a solid foundation, resting not only on the historical facts of the life and work of Christ, but upon the religious consciousness and experience of the believer in him.

This argument, however, must be applied with very great caution, and used rather in the way of repelling objections than of positively establishing truth. In this field very specially an attempt to do too much is sure to lead to failure. If we pro-

fess to explain fully by means of the doctrine of the Trinity the mystery of the divine personality, we should need both to have a more positive and exhaustive conception of that doctrine than the Church has ever been able to attain, and also a proof of it on grounds independent of revelation, such as unbelievers might be expected to accept. In the absence of these it can only be presented to non-Christian minds as a possible hypothesis, tho to Christians it is a certain truth. Indeed, if this doctrine is used at all in the argument against Pantheism, however cautiously, it is necessarily brought somewhat more into the arena of reason and philosophy than some, perhaps even Dr. Hodge himself, consider safe.

If this doctrine forms the way of escape from the meshes of Pantheism, it cannot be so entirely a subject of pure revelation as to have nothing in what can be discovered by unaided reason pointing more or less obscurely towards it. There must be some weight due to those analogies from nature, in which speculative theologians of all ages have sought illustrations of the highest mystery of Christianity. This, however, should not be regarded as an evil or a danger. Rather is it a good and healthful thing for our theology that its doctrines should not merely be received as truths supernaturally revealed, to be accepted simply on authority, but seen and felt to be bound up with essential facts in the nature of things, as well as with our most precious religious experience.

JAMES S. CANDLISH.

## THE TELEGRAPH QUESTION.

WHATEVER diversity of opinion there may be in regard to the policy or constitutionality of the government's going into the telegraph business, the main question in the minds of those who use the telegraph is, "Can we get a more convenient, a cheaper, and a safer service through the government than through private enterprise?" If not, no one would think of proposing that the government should go into the business.

On some points the history and character of the managment of the telegraph in Europe are interesting and suggestive, altho in applying conclusions drawn from them to the problem before us we must be careful to keep in mind the very different character of our country, government, and people. On the continent of Europe the telegraph was from the first under the control of —in most cases constructed and operated by—the governments. Where governments keep large armies and navies in constant readiness for war, and their other functions are numerous and important, they could scarcely exist in these times without their own systems of telegraph lines. A low uniform rate for internal messages gradually became a characteristic of the telegraph in those countries. Belgium and Switzerland were the first to adopt a uniform tariff. France and Germany followed. The increase in the number of telegrams immediately following the reduction of rates was in every instance very great; a reduction from a franc to half a franc in some instances more than doubling the number.

In Great Britain the telegraphic service was developed by private enterprise, and commonly in connection with the railways. The people were not quick to perceive its value, and not

until the cable was laid from Dover to Calais in 1851 did the companies begin to flourish. Some of them became very prosperous and paid excellent dividends. There was a constant tendency toward consolidation and monopoly. Great but fruitless efforts were made to obtain lower rates through competition. The success of the government telegraphs on the Continent with their low uniform rates increased the discontent with the high and variable rates in England; and the general satisfaction with the cheap and convenient mail facilities furnished by the government increased the demand for a government telegraph. The business men were the first to take definite action in regard to the matter. Resolutions were adopted by nearly every Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom strongly condemning the old system and petitioning Parliament to act. The objections urged against the service furnished by the companies were (1) high rates, (2) vexatious delays, (3) inaccurate rendering of messages, and (4) the absence of telegraphic facilities throughout whole districts. It was asserted that for these reasons the telegraph was not available for nor used by the people, or even merchants, generally, but that its use was confined chiefly to brokers, speculators, racing and betting men, and dealers in perishable articles; while on the Continent the low uniform rates and the greater facilities afforded by the governments had brought it within the reach of many other classes of people who used it largely for messages relating to social and family affairs. The general sentiment of the press and of the country was strongly in favor of a government telegraph.

In July, 1869, the Postmaster-General was authorized by Parliament to purchase the properties of the telegraph companies. Instead of following the carefully-prepared estimates of Mr. Scudamore and paying £3,000,000, the government paid more than twice this sum. Prof. Fawcett recently characterized the bargain as a "blunder" committed by the government and sanctioned by Parliament, by which at least £3,500,000 too much had been paid. The government did not at first propose to monopolize the business, but to furnish such excellent service at such low rates that no private company could compete with it. When, however, at the next session of Parliament the bill to provide for the purchase-money was brought in, it was

decided, "in view of the greatly increased facilities which would be afforded and of the possibility of unfair and dangerous competition on the very remunerative lines," to give the government a monopoly. The rates, which had varied from one to four shillings for twenty words, were reduced to a shilling to any part of the United Kingdom. The number of offices was more than doubled, and the wires were brought into the centres of population in the cities and towns for which the offices had formerly been at the railway stations in the suburbs. In consequence of these better and cheaper facilities the business increased enormously. The expense, however, for the first few years was greatly in excess of the estimates, in which the cost of the extensions and improvements had been placed too low and the saving from consolidating the properties too high. In recent years the financial showing has been better. According to the report of the Postmaster-General (pages 66 and 67) the net revenue for the year ending March 31, 1883, exceeded the total cost of the telegraph service by £155,050. It has been decided, in view of the good condition of the finances and also of the belief that the shilling rate is "practically prohibitory for a considerable section of the middle and lower classes," to reduce the minimum rate to a sixpence. The government management of the telegraph in England has on the whole been very satisfactory. Complaints have been much fewer than when the business was done by private enterprise.

In this country the first telegraph line—from Baltimore to Washington—was constructed and operated by the government. It proved quite as unprofitable as the earliest enterprises of the English companies, and after an experiment of three years was sold to private parties. The companies during the first few years did not prosper greatly. The Western Union, however, very early in its history became noted for great energy and skilful management, and began the policy which it has so successfully carried out ever since of absorbing dangerous rivals. New companies have from time to time constructed competing lines, and have sometimes been apparently on the verge of success, but have regularly yielded up their independence and their properties have become a part of the Western Union system. Whether the present strong rival combination will be able to

resist the general tendency and the great inducements to consolidation and centralization of management remains to be seen. Whatever may be said against the monopoly of the business which the Western Union has practically had for several years, it has furnished extensive and in some respects excellent facilities for telegraphing. In 1882 there was in this country a larger proportion of telegraph offices to population than in any of the countries of Europe except Switzerland, and a far greater length of lines in proportion to population than in any of those countries. This is in part accounted for by our having in many instances two or more sets of offices and lines where only one is required, and in part also by the necessities of our extensive railway system. Whatever drawbacks there may be to these telegraphic facilities, the telegraph is used to nearly or quite the same extent in this country as in Europe. The remarkable energy and activity of our people would, however, lead us to expect them to use the telegraph far more freely than the people of most other countries. As a matter of fact we find this to be the case in commercial and business affairs. Of the telegrams sent in this country eighty-four per cent are on business and commercial affairs, eleven per cent press, and five per cent on social and domestic matters. In Europe a somewhat similar state of things formerly prevailed, but since the adoption of low uniform rates the telegrams on social and domestic subjects have increased until they have become nearly seventy per cent of the whole number. While it is believed by the English Government that the reduction to a sixpence will be a great advantage to the commercial community, the greatest benefit will result from its making the telegraph far more available for ordinary social and family matters. If a government telegraph would give us low uniform rates, it would make the telegraph available for a much larger number of people and for messages on a much greater variety of subjects.

The English Government by bringing the lines from the railway stations into the post-offices made it much easier for the people to use the telegraph. Of the 13,000 offices in the Western Union connection 9000 are at railway stations. While these stations are sometimes very near the centres of the smaller towns, in most cases the post-offices are much more

central and accessible. Owing to the necessities of our railway service, telegraph offices are now found at places where the population and business are so small that the government would not be warranted in maintaining telegraphic facilities at the post-offices. At such places and at other stations where the convenience of the public required it the railway-station operator could be made the agent of the government, as is often the case in England, for the collection of messages. On the other hand, there are many places at which there are no railway stations and no telegraph offices, but to which the government could without loss extend the lines by having the same officers and offices do duty in both the telegraphic and postal services. It would of course be utterly impracticable to undertake to extend the wires to every one of our 48,000 post-offices. The use of the letter-boxes in the cities for messages, and of stamps in payment for sending them, both of which would naturally go with a postal telegraph, would be a great convenience to many people.

While in these ways the facilities might be considerably extended and made more available for the people generally, it is doubtful whether a government telegraph could be so easily adapted to meet special emergencies and the wants of new communities and new business enterprises that spring up so quickly in some parts of the country as the telegraph controlled by private individuals or companies. Mr. Herbert Spencer has written in strong language of "the unadaptiveness of officialism." "Unlike private enterprise which quickly modifies its action to meet emergencies, unlike the railway company which doubles its trains to carry a special influx of passengers, the law-made instrumentality lumbers on under all varieties of circumstances through its ordained routine at its habitual rate. By its very nature it is fitted for the average requirements and inevitably fails under unusual requirements." Our Post-Office Department has, however, frequently shown its ability to meet unusual requirements in emergencies. A postal telegraph might prove equally capable, notwithstanding the difference between the postal and the telegraphic services.

The question whether the government would be as ready to stimulate interest in and as quick to adopt new inventions and

new methods in telegraphy as private companies is of much importance in view of the general belief that there is a great field for progress in this direction. A healthy competition, were such a competition possible, would undoubtedly be the best stimulus to progress. A monopoly either in the hands of a company or the government is likely to be slow. It is, however, generally recognized as one of the functions of a civilized government to encourage authors and inventors, and the results of such encouragement have often proved of great value to the public. Our government has sometimes been severely and justly censured for its tardiness in adopting valuable improvements in matters relating to the army and navy. The difficulty usually arises from gross ignorance on the part of influential congressmen or cabinet officers of scientific and technical matters. The excellent work done through many years and uninfluenced by changes of party and administration in connection with the coast and geological surveys and the Smithsonian Institution indicates that it is possible for the government to carry on satisfactorily and successfully scientific researches of great magnitude and importance and requiring scientific and technical talent and skill of a high order. If the government had control of the telegraph, much more might be done than is done at present to bring out new inventions by establishing an institution whose function it would be to test the value of new inventions in telegraphy, and by paying liberally for whatever proved of real value. The expense would be slight compared with the ultimate benefit to the telegraphic service and the public. In Europe, where the governments all have monopolies of the telegraph, there is great activity in reference to new inventions, as the various telegraphic journals published and the proceedings of the electrical congresses show.

Could the government furnish a cheaper service than that which we now have? It is frequently charged that the rates are exorbitant. The rate in France, Belgium, and Switzerland is about nine and one half cents for ten words, in Germany five cents plus half a cent per word on local and one and a fourth cents per word on other messages, while in England it is about to be reduced to twelve cents. The charges on international messages are in most cases considerably higher. By recent

arrangements, nowever, the minimum rate from any part of the United Kingdom to any part of Belgium is eighteen and to any part of France twenty cents. In this country the rates between some important points are now low by reason of competition. The average charge of the Western Union last year is said to have been about thirty-nine cents. The average distance which messages are sent is much greater and the number of messages to each mile of line and each office much smaller here than in Europe. In England, for instance, the average distance is fifty miles, while here it is one hundred and fifty. Maintaining these extensive lines and numerous offices is said to be the chief reason for our higher rates. The expense, however, of sending a telegram does not by any means vary with the distance. The chief items of cost are at the offices from which it is sent and delivered. These would be the same for any distance.

Much has been said in this connection about the enormous profits of the Western Union Company, the cost and present value of its property, and the methods by which its capitalization of $80,000,000 has been reached. Whatever may be said in regard to the transactions by which the volume of stock has been so greatly increased, it is generally admitted that the affairs of the company have been so skilfully managed that it has been able to extend and improve its property until its value is now several times the original cost, and to pay much better dividends on its nominal capital than those commonly paid on money invested in railroads and other similar enterprises. The company claims that its policy of absorbing dangerous rivals, which has enabled it to prosper so greatly and which has been so vigorously denounced, has been beneficial to the public, which has been furnished a better and cheaper service after each important absorption. The large profits of the company, the high rates charged, the great dislike of monopolies, and the apparent impossibility of successful competition by private enterprise have led many people to advocate government competition, and several plans for it have been proposed.

A plan which has been much advocated and which has received the unanimous recommendation of the United States Senate Committee on Post-offices and Post-roads is for the government to contract with telegraph companies for the transmis-

sion of telegrams as it now contracts with railroads for carrying the mails, using the facilities now used for collecting and delivering letters for the collection and delivery of messages, and employing special clerks and messengers when necessary. As this plan involves only a comparatively slight increase in the number of employés of the government, it has been thought by many persons, including President Arthur and Postmaster-General Gresham, less objectionable than any of the other plans. The chief objection that has been urged against its practical working is that while the government would be responsible for the messages sent, it would have no control over the operators employed in sending them. The companies could, however, be held responsible for the acts of their employés. It would be harder for the party in power to use such an arrangement for political purposes than if the managers and operators of the telegraph were employés of the government, holding their positions at the will of the administration.

Another plan that has frequently been strongly advocated is for the government to purchase existing lines or construct new ones and enter into competition with the private companies. At the time of the strike last summer a large number of influential newspapers advocated a government competition of this sort. By using the postal facilities for collecting and delivering messages, supplementing and modifying them so as to meet the demands of the new service, it was held that the government could afford to establish a low uniform rate and could do a large business without destroying the business of the companies. In cities with free delivery the carriers would deliver the messages; at other offices messages would be delivered in the same way as letters. One could send his letter by telegraph and save the entire time now occupied in transmitting it from office to office. A telegraphic letter sent from Austin, Texas, to New York in this way would be delivered as quickly as a letter sent from one part of the city to another. In the larger cities, by a slight increase in the number of carriers, the deliveries could be made more frequent, so that messages would then be delivered almost as quickly as by special messengers. A vast amount of new business would be developed in this way. The more important business, commercial and press dispatches

requiring great promptness in delivery with little regard for expense, would still be sent by the companies. In case of a strike resort could be had to the government telegraph. The constant competition would excite a healthy enterprise in regard to economy and efficiency and the adoption of new and improved methods and instruments. The competition would resemble that now carried on in the express business, where the government competes with the express companies in sending small parcels. The low uniform rate of postage in such cases has created a large amount of business without seriously injuring the express companies, and has to some extent moderated the charges of the latter. Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., has thus summed up the good results of the competition between the government and the private railways in Belgium: "Of late years Belgium has simply presented the spectacle of the state, in the character of the richest and most powerful railroad company of its system, holding in check and regulating other companies, not greatly inferior to it in power, which compete with it for business and with which it deals on terms of equality. The effect of this on the railroad companies has been excellent. At times when the government has attempted certain great measures of reform or bold experiments in transportation, its course has been vehemently criticised by the private companies, who have complained that their property was being unjustly depreciated by tariff reductions made on unsound principles, but which from their position they were compelled to adopt. This was perfectly true; but, on the other hand, the government was so largely interested in railroad property that it felt no disposition to persist in any line of experiment which seemed likely to reduce its value permanently: and in the long-run the private companies have found that the experiments of government were far less to be feared than the wild and ruinous fluctuations of railroad competition as it was carried on in Great Britain. . . . In a word, it was found that while the competition between private roads in Great Britain and America disturbed and disorganized railroad traffic, that between public and private roads in Belgium regulated it. The government meanwhile, in its turn, pressed by the competition of the private lines, found itself compelled to work its road on regular commercial prin-

ciples. . . . Financially the state system was for many years a decided success, netting an annual profit of about six per cent." ("Railroads and their Problems," p. 97.)

It is much to be feared that with a government telegraph competing with private companies some of our legislators in their desire to please the public and gratify the haters of "soulless corporations" would be constantly proposing to greatly reduce the rates and supply the deficiency out of the national treasury. A competition on such terms would be unfair to the companies, ruinous to their property, and entirely unjustifiable. In a competition on equal terms the government, in order to succeed, would be compelled to select its officials and employés because of their experience and skill in the business and not because of their having helped to carry this or that State at the last election. A company managed by politicians who had no special knowledge of or experience in the telegraph business would have no chance of holding its own in competition with one whose officers and employés have spent many years in acquiring skill and experience.

Desirable as a constant and healthy competition would be from many points of view, there is reason to doubt, I think, whether the telegraphic business of the country, even with the new business that would be developed by a competing postal telegraph, would be sufficient to support two entire systems of lines and offices throughout the country with very low rates for messages. The president of the Western Union claims that after the absorption of each important competing line, except one, the rates have been reduced. This has been done in spite of the fact that in some of the States where the laws forbid consolidation it was necessary to operate separately the properties absorbed at an expense of several hundred thousand dollars. Mr. W. H. Smith, who had been a director in one of the companies in England and was familiar with telegraph business, said in the discussion on the acquisition of the telegraphs by the government that he thought forty per cent of the expense of working the telegraphs of the United Kingdom would be saved by uniting them all under one management. While the result showed that his estimate was somewhat too high, the experience in England both before and since the

government took charge of the business has shown that consolidation, leading to unity and economy of management, is a great advantage where low rates are desired. The constant tendency to consolidation and absorption, and the ability of the Western Union to pay large sums for the properties of competing companies and to keep open and operate separately at a large expense some of the lines that are not needed for the business and yet reduce the rates after each important absorption, certainly point unmistakably to the conclusion that the cheapest telegrams can be had with the entire telegraphic system of the country under one management. Justly odious as monopolies are, there are a few things which can be done better and more cheaply by them than under several distinct managements. It is generally agreed that in cities of a certain size one company, even tho it makes large profits and is disobliging, can supply the people with gas or water more cheaply and satisfactorily than two or more competing companies, the additional expense involved in maintaining two or more sets of works and pipes much more than counterbalancing the extortionate charges of the monopoly. Nobody doubts that the government conducts the postal business of the country on the whole a great deal more cheaply and efficiently than several distinct companies could do it, and nobody complains that it is "a grasping, grinding monopoly," oppressing the people. Perhaps there is no great business, affecting great numbers of the people, that is managed so satisfactorily to all concerned as this one of which the government has a monopoly. A government monopoly is more irresistible, and in this respect more to be dreaded, than a private monopoly. The latter, however, tends to high charges, to extortion, as its chief purpose is to earn large profits, while the former, particularly in a business like that of the post-office, in which all the people have a direct personal and pecuniary interest, tends to low charges, having in view only the interests of the people, which are promoted by low charges and good service. The great interest that every one has in good postal facilities and in cheap postage, the constant watchfulness and criticism to which the post-office officials and employés are subjected by the people, and the ceaseless vigilance of the press have produced excellent results in the direction of

efficiency and economy in our postal service. In spite of defects in our civil service, of the large number of our post-offices, and the great length of our mail-routes, often through sparsely settled regions, we have a postal service that in cheapness and general excellence compares very favorably with that of England, where the civil service is on a much better basis, the offices much fewer, and the mail-routes far shorter. This fact certainly suggests the conclusion, altho it by no means establishes it, that, if our government should undertake the telegraphic business of the country, it might, notwithstanding the much longer distances and larger number of offices and miles of wire in proportion to telegrams and population than in England, furnish a service that would be nearly or quite as cheap as that which the English Government now proposes to furnish.

Let us suppose that our government buy out the Western Union Company, paying the present market value of the stock, about $55,000,000, and that all the property and business of the company be transferred to the government, the officers and employés going into the service of the government and conducting the business on the same principles of economy as at present. Could the rates be reduced? The government would not want to make a profit; it might be desirable that it should pay interest on the investment. This at three per cent would be $1,650,000. The difference between this sum and the profits realized by the company would be saved to the service. If, for example, the report for the year ending June 30, 1883, be taken as a basis, we should have revenues $19,454,902.98; expenses, "including rentals of leased lines and taxes," and "the betterments in the account of reconstruction," $11,914,553.40; and profits $7,660,-349.58. These profits less the $1,650,000 interest would be $6,010,349.58, a sum which is more than half the entire expenses and which would of course warrant a reduction at once of more than thirty-three per cent in the rates. Even if it should be desirable to spend a considerable sum out of the earnings in extensions, there would still be a large margin left for the reduction of the tariff. Such a reduction attended by the adoption of uniform rates and telegraphic stamps would lead to a large increase in the business and speedily make a somewhat further reduction possible. Suppose further that the government buy

out the other companies, paying them fair prices for their properties and monopolize the business. It has been very profitable for the Western Union to absorb other companies, paying high prices for their properties, and has enabled the company each time to furnish better and cheaper service than before, notwithstanding expensive litigations growing out of these absorptions, and the expense of operating separately some of the properties in States where the laws forbid consolidation, or in cases where it was desirable to keep open parallel lines at a loss to prevent rivals from getting routes. If the government should absorb all the properties, it could dispense with all superfluous officials, offices, and lines, and the expensive litigations as well, and could save much more than the Western Union, were that company now to absorb all the lines. If, then, this united system were united with the postal service under the direction of some one competent to effect the consolidation on business principles, there might be a still further reduction of expenses. There would be many cases in which with a slight increase on the amounts now spent for salaries, rent, fuel, etc., in the postal service, the same officials, employés, and offices could do duty in both services. In the smaller towns the postmaster could combine with his present duties those of telegrapher or be supplanted by the latter. Considerable saving is now effected by the close connection between the telegraphs and railroads, the railway companies often supplying telegraph offices, paying the operators, and transporting materials and employés of the telegraph companies at very low rates in consideration of the use of the wires for their business. In places where the government would not be warranted in furnishing telegraphic facilities at the post-offices and where it was desirable that the railway telegraph offices should be open for general messages, arrangements similar to those now existing between the telegraph and railway companies could be made. In England about fifteen hundred railway-station telegraph offices are open for the transmission of general messages. Most towns of any importance have telegraph offices separate from those at the railway stations. There would be a considerable sum saved from uniting these with the post-offices; less rent would have to be paid, and less light and fuel and fewer employés would be needed. With

stamps and uniform rates the book-keeping would be simplified and the expense for clerk-hire diminished.

The government would not pay taxes and the sum now paid in taxes by the telegraph companies would be saved to the telegraph service. The people would of course have to pay in some other way the amount thus saved. It would, however, be easy to find a more desirable mode of raising revenue than by taxing the transmission of intelligence. The government would probably not undertake to pay damages for delays or mistakes in the transmission of messages, and would save the sums now paid in damages and the expense of litigations to resist such payments.

Just how much would be saved in each of these ways and in the aggregate it is impossible to say. If all these conditions were fulfilled and the service managed in accordance with strict business principles, we have little doubt that a uniform rate of fifteen cents or less for the whole country could within a short time be maintained without loss to the government. The difficulty would be in fulfilling all these conditions. It would perhaps be impossible for the government to construct and keep the plant in repair quite so cheaply as the companies. In England constructions and repairs are said in some instances to cost more now than when the companies had the telegraphs, because better material is used. On the whole, however, the increase in cost seems to be slight. There appears to be no doubt that in many instances government pays somewhat more than private companies for work done, altho it is not easy to find reliable statistics and estimates on this point. The large sums expended on our navy with the ridiculously insignificant results, the cost of public printing, the eight-hour law, the large sums spent on public buildings, the star-route frauds, the frauds and enormous expenses in work done in cities, all seem to indicate a larger expenditure by government than by private companies. On the other hand it has been said that the large number of suits brought in the Court of Claims by losing contractors to recover the market-price of their work shows that the government often gets work done very cheaply, that private individuals and companies often pay exorbitant prices and are grossly defrauded and swindled, and that no great industry in the country is managed

on the whole more economically than the postal service. The same interest and watchfulness on the part of the people and even greater vigilance on the part of the press than is now brought to bear on the post-office would be directed toward detecting and exposing frauds and abuses in a postal telegraph.

Would a government telegraph service be safer than that furnished by the companies? It would not be interrupted by strikes, and in this respect would be preferable to that of private companies. The loss and inconvenience to business men and the public generally from the strike of the telegraphers last summer is, it is true, not likely to be repeated often. Such a strike might, however, occur at some critical juncture in public affairs, or when the use of the telegraph by the Signal Service was of the greatest importance to commercial and other interests. Apart from the danger from strikes, ordinary social and business messages would probably be about as safe with a private as a government telegraph. The telegraph companies have sometimes been charged with bad faith in regard to messages, but the cases in which messages have been purposely delayed or their contents divulged have not been so numerous as to excite any general feeling of distrust. The fear has often been expressed that with a monopoly of the business in the hands of one company, an unscrupulous man at the head of that company might use his power to manipulate the markets in the interests of himself and his friends, to crush rivals in other kinds of business, to delay the administration of the affairs of the state, and control and manipulate the press of the country. Instances have been given of the rates being raised or the supply of news cut off for papers that criticised the management of the Western Union Company. On the other hand the manager of a government telegraph, too, might be unscrupulous and tyrannical in the use of his power notwithstanding his responsibility to the President and the people.

The greatest danger with a government monopoly of the telegraph would be that the party in power might use it for partisan purposes, tampering with or delaying or divulging the messages of the opposite party. The fear that with the sort of civil service we have in this country a non-partisan government telegraph is an impossibility has led not a few prominent

editors and public men to strongly oppose every measure looking toward a postal telegraph. A gentleman who has an extensive knowledge of political affairs writes to me on this subject what, I have reason to believe, expresses the view of many intelligent men. "I should be utterly opposed to giving the telegraph into the hands of the government, since that means placing it at the disposal of the dominant party, giving them control not only of the vast army of employés but of the messages transmitted. This difficulty under our present system outweighs, in my judgment, all possible advantages of government control; so that, if the prices were twice as high as they are now, I should resist putting the telegraph in the hands of the government." The objection is certainly a very grave one, and, unless some means can be devised to obviate it, the people ought never to give the government a monopoly of the telegraph business.

In an article published in the *North American Review* in 1881 Mr. Springer says: "The legislation that provides for a government system should be so carefully framed that it will not merely secure a telegraph service conducted upon strict business principles, but also free the postal service from the control of politicians and place the whole business of transmitting intelligence under non-partisan management." It is doubtful whether the majority of our congressmen would now be willing to stand on this admirable platform, altho most of the bills recently introduced into Congress to establish a postal telegraph provide for appointments in accordance with the Civil-Service Act and Rules. Mr. Dorman B. Eaton says: "If the present Civil-Service Act shall be accepted as a fixed policy, I think its provisions will be adequate for providing for operating a postal telegraph, and that there is no considerable intrinsic difficulty under the act and proper rules in keeping such a system out of party politics." The technical skill and experience required in telegraphers, the certainty that incompetency would be quickly exposed, and the personal interest that large numbers of people would have in the services being reliable and accurate would no doubt make it less easy for the spoil system to prevail in the appointment of telegraphers than of most other employés, and might give an impetus to civil-service reform.

In England there was, when the government proposed to acquire the telegraphs, much interesting discussion and testimony in regard to the comparative safety of a government telegraph, the possibility of using it for partisan purposes and of employing cipher to insure secrecy. On the transfer of the telegraphs to the government, any violation of secrecy was made a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, and very strict injunctions with regard to secrecy were issued. Experience has shown that the fears entertained at the time were groundless. Complaints of violations of secrecy have been much fewer in England than in this country.

It has been urged as a grave objection to the government's taking charge of the telegraphs that it would involve the employment of a multitude of operators and other employés, and thus greatly increase the already dangerous patronage of the government. There is no doubt that, as a matter of governmental policy, in the present condition of our civil service any increase in the number of civil servants is objectionable. Some of the statements, however, in regard to the increase that would be needed are very extravagant. According to the census reports, in 1880 the total number of persons employed as "general officers, general office-clerks, operators, messengers, and line-repairers" in the sixty-seven telegraph companies of the country was 14,928. This of course did not include the employés of railway companies who sometimes act as operators in sending general messages. If all the lines were consolidated and united with the post-office, a considerable number of general officers, clerks, operators, and other employés could be dispensed with. The number has of course increased since 1880, and the growth of the business would in time require further additions. At present there are about one hundred and ten thousand officials and employés appointed by the government. To increase this number by fifteen or twenty or even thirty thousand would be objectionable, indeed; but if in other respects a great benefit would result to the people, the nation could afford to risk the danger arising from such an increase, especially if civil-service principles prevailed in making the appointments. Of a similar character is the objection that the increased expenditures of the government would greatly increase the oppor-

tunities for fraud and prove generally demoralizing. The increased expenditures would be only a small part of the entire expenditures of the government. The expenditures of the sixty-seven telegraph companies were estimated in 1880 (see census reports) at $10,218,281. They have probably now increased to thirteen millions, which is about one third of the $42,816,700.56 expended by the Post-Office Department, and less than one twentieth of the $265,408,137.54 expended by the government for all purposes last year.

If the government should monopolize the telegraph, it would of course be necessary to buy existing lines. In 1866 an act was passed giving certain rights and privileges to such telegraph companies as accepted its provisions, and providing further "that the United States may at any time after five years from the date of the passage of this act, for postal, military, or other purposes, purchase all the telegraph lines, property, and effects of any or all of said companies, at an appraised value to be ascertained by five competent, disinterested persons, two of whom shall be selected by the Postmaster-General of the United States, two by the company interested, and one by the four so previously selected." This act, which was of the nature of a contract, nearly all of the existing companies accepted. They would therefore be compelled to sell their "lines, property, and effects" should the government desire it. The chief objection made to the purchase of these properties is the difficulty of making a just appraisement of their value, the companies holding that the capacity of the lines to earn money should be the basis of the appraisement, while others contend that by "telegraph lines, property, and effects" are meant "such property and effects as are necessary and convenient for the proper working of telegraph lines without regard to the value of the stock or the price of good-will or monopoly." The privileges granted by the act, including "the forbearance of the government in not exercising for five years its undoubted right to undertake the telegraph business," constituted a valuable consideration for the stipulation on the part of the companies to sell their "lines, property, and effects."

There would doubtless be difficulty in making an appraisement that would be just and equitable and satisfactory to all

parties. It would be unjust for the government to confiscate the property of the companies or any part of it either directly or by indirect means. It has become the fashion with a certain class of speakers and writers to gain capital with the people who have sometimes suffered much from monopolies by denouncing all corporations as tho they were all oppressive and dangerous monopolies. Corporations are, however, often of the greatest value to large numbers of people; sometimes they are absolutely necessary in developing the resources and industries of a country. While from their very nature they must often have unity of management, every man is free to buy their shares in the open market, and to the property which he thus lawfully acquires in a legitimate enterprise he has just as sacred a right as to his private property of any other kind. There are said to be about five thousand owners of stock in the various telegraph companies of the country. While perhaps in every one of the companies a few men own a majority of the shares, in some instances persons have invested their small savings in them, and in others the stock is held by executors, guardians, and trustees for orphans and benevolent institutions. The government would have no right, under any pretext whatever, to take this private property for public use without just compensation. On the other hand, it would be equally unjust to the people for their representatives in Congress to rob them by paying exorbitant prices for the properties and business of these companies. While the general sentiment of the country would justly be opposed to paying extravagantly for "good-will and the business," it is quite obvious that from a financial point of view the government could afford to pay a few millions for the well-established and profitable business of the existing companies rather than construct new lines and run the risk of losing money for several years in a struggle to build up a good business in competition with skilful and powerful rivals.

If the people really desire a telegraph owned and operated by the government, such arbitrators can no doubt be appointed as can be trusted to decide fairly and honestly and see to it that neither the stockholders of the companies nor the public are robbed in the purchase.

There has been much discussion in regard to the power of

Congress under the Constitution to construct or purchase telegraph lines. It seems, however, to be the opinion of the majority of our ablest jurists that Congress has this power. Of those who have recently expressed opinions on the subject no one is entitled to more respect as a constitutional lawyer than Senator Edmunds, who says: "I have considered the subject of the constitutionality of the postal telegraph, and have no difficulty whatever about it. Under the postal, commercial, or army clauses of the Constitution it is clear to my mind that Congress has power to provide for a government telegraph and attach it to any department it pleases." Congress has regularly assumed that it had a right to provide for a government telegraph. Not only was the first telegraph line in the country constructed and operated by the government, but there are now nearly six thousand miles of telegraph lines connected with the War Department. These lines have been constructed chiefly by the army for military purposes and for the use of the Signal Service. By authority of a special act of Congress they may be used for private messages at rates established by the Secretary of War and corresponding with the rates fixed by the Postmaster-General for government communications over commercial lines.

DAVID BENNETT KING.

# THE FIRST LINES OF BIOLOGY.

SINCE the beginning of this century, and more especially of late, scientific art has made, and is, indeed, at the present moment making, wonderful progress in increasing the amenities of this life. Many pages would not suffice to give even the shortest possible description of the increased enjoyment which we derive from the scientific application of steam, in virtue of its elastic power, speeding us along, it may be, right in the wind's eye at sea, or altogether heedless of the weather on land, or spinning for us all the warm or beautiful materials with which we clothe and adorn our persons and our houses. And still more words would be required to tell what we have gained already, and are now gaining, from electricity, in virtue of its conductibility, its velocity, and its light-giving power. It was in this century that illumination by gas was discovered. And in this it was thought that man's triumph over the darkness avoidable in planetary existence might rest, tho it was not forgotten that gas illumination implied the risk of explosion in our houses, and that its products were injurious to health. But to-day electricity, which has neither of these faults, bids fair to supersede gas altogether, nothing more being required for this purpose but that the lightning-stream in which it flows along in its dark metallic conductor be called upon to continue its course for a very short space through the ambient ether or medium of light itself, thereafter to plunge into and recover its strength in its dark conductor again. Meanwhile, gas illumination being now in its glory, practical chemistry, in its unwearied experiments, resolved that the manufacture of gas for illuminating even the largest city should cost

nothing, but be paid by the money-value of the secondary products. And it was found that the liquid which condensed from the gas as it cooled, tho odious to all the senses as it comes directly from the destructive distillation of coal, contains all the beautiful colors of the ancient vegetation of which coal is the remains, and along with many esteemed dyes not elsewhere to be found, those of madder are now obtained from this source in such quantity as almost to supersede the necessity of cultivating the madder plant, which save as a dye-stuff is useless. Nay, it was announced but the other day that indigo, which seems to be the highest achievement of nature at present for the production of colorifics, has proved itself not beyond extraction from coal-tar in the laboratory of the chemist. Nor is this all. Not merely are the most beautiful colors to regale the eye, but the most delicious essences and flavors—raspberry, pine-apple, etc.—to flatter the palate, have been obtained from the refuse of gas illumination. This art will not pass away, therefore, without leaving a bright and a fragrant memory behind it. These are great achievements in the scientific arts, yet they are but a small part of what has been accomplished of late years. Nay, wonderful as they are, they do not equal the magic of the telegraph and the telephone. But upon these inventions we shall not even touch in this place.

It cannot be said, however, that the exercise of thought in unapplied or pure science and philosophy has been equally successful. Little thought has been bestowed in discovering a rational view of the nature of things and the economy of the world. On these great themes only casual remarks are to be met with, introducing limited hypotheses, and that chiefly by individuals who have acquired a good name and position and confidence in themselves in consequence of successful experiments in some one branch of science. It may even be said that published thought in general on this subject, at least among ourselves east of the Atlantic, since Faraday died, has been retrograde. Happily that very thoughtful man fell ultimately into a train of obscure but grand thought, which ancient Greece had also traced, and it is curious to remark how completely, tho probably all unconsciously on his part, he had

adopted the very terminology of Heraclitus. Faraday's anode and cathode, what are they but on a small scale, and in reference to a special mode of agency, the ἄνοδος and κάθοδος of Heraclitus on the scale of nature.

This very undesirable state of things results from the extreme specialization of the studies of men of science. Each has applied himself to only one branch. And in mastering the phenomena, and still more the technical terms, classifications, laws—rational and empirical—and hypotheses refuted and unrefuted which attach to that branch, his life is spent in comparative ignorance of every thing else. Nor can we look for much improvement in this respect until some simple view of things is obtained, at sight of which these artificial props, of which special branches of science mainly consist, will spontaneously fall away when met by the light of true insight, as the leaves of autumn, which, having served their purpose, fall to the ground.

But hence, in the meantime, the absence of a fraternity which plainly ought to exist between the various branches of science, and, indeed, the frequent incompatibilities and contradictions which one meets with in passing from one branch of science to another, and the helplessness of all of them together when called upon to face some great question and solve it in a way satisfactory to reason.

Of such questions one that has received great attention of late years is the origin of life, the rise of living beings. To settle this question, not pure thought, looking all around to all the elements involved in the problem, aided, if possible, by experiment, but experiment alone, as usual, is resorted to. And this has been done to a vast extent, but still with seemingly contradictory results, and, at any rate, with positive contradiction on the part of the experimenters. Some affirm that in experiments where all was undoubtedly dead to begin with, and all life from the outside was undoubtedly excluded, they have seen life manifest itself abundantly. Others affirm that under these same conditions of experiment they have watched and waited long, but no life appeared. Others again, tho belonging to the experimental and eyesight school, set aside experiment and dogmatize in a contrary sense without its support. Thus Haeckel admits that experiments have not proved it, but

that doubtless originally living arose out of dead matter. And Huxley gives it as his opinion that, so far as experiments have been rigidly made and rightly interpreted, there is nothing to contradict the adage *omne vivum ex ovo;* but that for his own part, had he been present at the beginning of life, he would have expected to see protoplasm making its appearance among dead matter.

But differing completely among themselves as to their result in this inquiry, as the different inquirers do, there is one point in which they are all agreed, and that is, to seek the living among the dead. Now considering the very superficial way in which grounds of inquiry are at present assumed, may it not be that there is a radical mistake here which has prevented an unanimous and consistent solution? Simply looking around us, indeed, and thinking of the living and the dead as they present themselves to the naked eye in the terraqueous globe, the living appears in point of amount to be quite insignificant compared with the dead, and as something which has been subsequently attached to the dead or risen out of it. Thus what would the weight of the whole visible animal and vegetable kingdoms be, when placed in the balance against the mineral kingdom, the land and the sea and air, in a word, the world itself? Plainly next to nothing. And in their relation to each other the latter appears also as the mother and nurse and support of all the life that we see upon it. It is very natural, therefore, that all men at first sight should look upon the dead as older than the living, as a prior condition of its existence, and, in a word, seek the living among the dead.

It is very remarkable, however, how this first thought becomes weaker and weaker on more extended observation and reflection and the accurate use of words. Thus nothing can be accurately said to be dead, unless it has once been living. And the recent progress of microscopy, especially when applied to geology, as the world now exists, makes it most difficult to find a region where it is certain that life has not formerly been or is not now. Yet even to indulge as an imagination the thought that the crust of the earth can be to any considerable extent the product of the animated beings which have lived and died in our planet, seems very extravagant.

But when the naked eye is aided by the microscope, and due pains are taken to discover life wherever it may be now, or may have been in some former epoch, considerate and extensive observation leads to quite another view ; and, indeed, makes it difficult to say where life may not have reigned in some former age or may not even still reign.

Into whatever realm of nature we pry with the microscope, if only there be moisture in it, and oxygen have access to it, then what is found is this, that the higher the power of the instrument, just so much the greater its revelations of life, animal or vegetable ; just so much the more numerous the living beings or things that are seen in the field of the instrument.

As to water in general, tho it may be such as to have been hitherto held to be pure, chemists and biologists give it as their opinion that in order to be free from life it must have been recently distilled ; if not, it never fails when analyzed to give indications of ammonia, which as a product of the analysis of a natural medium or substance is generally accepted as an evidence of the present or previous existence of living nature in the medium or mass subjected to analysis. And indeed, without invoking the aid of chemical analysis or other means of discovery than the eye, aided by the microscope, it is not easy to find any drop of water which has stood exposed to the air for any length of time which does not show itself to be teeming with living organisms.

It has also been demonstrated that the air is full of living things, as ova and spores at least, if not as fully developed forms. There is, moreover, good reason for believing in the existence of the latter also in the air. It were strange and contrary to the analogy of nature—for nature is teeming with life wherever life is possible—that a medium should be capable of entertaining in it spores and ova in life for an indefinite time and not be peopled with developing and developed organisms also. That they might be light enough to float in the air, and as fit every way for leading their lives in this medium as in water, there can be no doubt. And that they should be so small as to be invisible to the naked eye of man is only what is to be expected ; while with regard to the use of the microscope in this instance it does not appear how it could be ap-

plied with a chance of success in catching them. Moreover, if caught, such is probably the delicacy of their organization that before they could be subjected to examination they would most likely have been shrunk up so as to be mistaken for spores. In a word, nothing is so difficult as to find any region where man himself can live which is not occupied by other forms of life also. Nay, where man could not live a moment—where, till lately, it was believed that nothing could live, and that naught but eternal darkness and desolation reigned, in fine, the lowest depths of the ocean, like the sunny meadows and hillsides, are now found to be not merely teeming, but carpeted with living beings!

Nor is it only in quantity and diffusion that simple organisms everywhere abound, but also in exquisite symmetry and beauty. In comparison with many of them every thing among large animals seems slow and stolid, and often ugly. They are to large animals what lacework is to matting. To be convinced of this, happily it is not necessary to inspect them in the living state, which would be impossible for all but a few observers. Happily, an indefinite time after they may have died one can study them at his leisure in the cabinet; for many of these beings, tho so minute, have been endowed with the power of secreting, for their own protection while in life, a marbly or quartzy framework, which is very durable, and which under the microscope proves to be of exquisite beauty. And in consequence of this, geology has already made the discovery that not only are many strata, to an almost incredible extent, wholly composed of them—composed of them to such an extent, indeed, as to suggest the inquiry whether those rocks which exhibit no traces of pre-existing animals, and are therefore named azoic, are devoid of such traces, not because there were no living beings at the time of the original deposition of those strata, but because the central heat, the abyssal pressure, and the chemical action to which these rocks have subsequently been subjected, which have obviously changed them much (so much, indeed, as to have gained for them the name of metamorphic rocks), have obliterated all the traces of antecedent organization.

No doubt the existing state of chemical hypothesis, as popu-

larly held at present, implies that all the silicium, all the calcium, etc., which constitute the skeletons of these protesta and protozoa existed before the organisms in which these elements are found ; nay, existed forever, or at least from the commencement of creation, so that instead of having been really secreted in any measure by these organisms they were merely taken up by them into their bodies from without. But if we do not embarrass ourselves with the chemical hypothesis alluded to (which rests on very insufficient evidence, and begins to be very seriously called in question even by chemists), if we fall back on simpler views of the inner structure of material nature, and look to the obvious tendency of geological observation, we shall be led rather to infer that it is not with respect to ourselves merely, not among such animals and plants merely as happen to be visible to our eyes, that life precedes death, but that far more extensively what is now dead is only what has been left behind of what formerly was alive. At any rate, what we actually observe as to the relation of the organic and the inorganic, the living and the dead in nature, is this, that every living thing, either during its life excretes, or after its dissolution leaves behind it, a certain quantity of dead or mineral matter. That all this in every case has been introduced into the living organism in the very forms in which it is given out by it is generally maintained. But it is merely assumed ; it never has been proved. And it has been disputed, and that as the result of experiment, by some of the most accurate and philosophical chemists, as, for instance, Dr. Prout, when interpreting the changes that must have been going on during incubation. But no experiments, especially of late, have been made to test it, because experiment in general is the slave of hypothesis, and experiments which in their issue might possibly damage a favorite belief are generally avoided.

It may be stated, however, and it ought not to be forgotten, that looking simply to nature for information much ashy or mineral matter may have what may be called a meteoric origin, or origin from fire, as well as from vital action. Here, however, we have to consider the latter only.

But it will be truly said that such a theory of the origin of the dead matter which abounds in our planet to such an extent

is contradicted by chemical experiments and chemical analysis in general, which, wheresoever and by whomsoever performed, constantly gives between sixty and seventy different kinds of residuary particles of matter, which can neither be partitioned farther nor resolved into others which are known. And these undecomposable particles, it is said, are therefore legitimately inferred to be true atoms and distinct material elements, and of these only a very few are capable of being animated or of ministering in any way to life. This argument, however, is based upon the supposition that the human chemist, at best but a feeble and short-lived creature, in his actions upon nature, which are possible only at the surface of one small planet, and which are more short-lived than himself, can accomplish all that nature out in the universe with her cosmic forces can accomplish, operating upon matter during numberless ages. Moreover, she does not suffer the elements by which chiefly she works out her own economy to fall into the hands of the chemists at all, till after she has consolidated them by abyssal pressure and tested their stability by the central heat of the globe, the white heat of the sunbeam, and the explosive violence of the volcano.

But already it may have occurred to the reader that he would like to see this view and the whole question of the origin of life tested, or at any rate co-ordinated or viewed in relation to the theory of development, which, tho not without the sincere alarm of many religious men, is adduced by men of science in general as the great step and discovery in science in modern times. It is generally and truly said that there is nothing that is extensively accepted and generally believed, but however erroneous it may be in the body of its statements still has a soul of truth in it. Let us see how the search for the living among the dead may stand with the theory of development. Now to meet this theory at the fountain-head, plainly we must go to the nebular hypothesis of the astronomer.

Well, then, this theory, when not specialized beyond what the astronomer requires, that is, when considering merely a very rare medium composed of material particles actuated by elasticity and gravitation, and therefore subject to known mechanical principles of motion, is a very fair hypothesis. That the

solar system, before it came to consist of sun, planets, and satellites, existed as a nebula, or matter in the aeriform or fully individualized state, is a rational conception. The aeriform is the most completely endowed or perfect state of matter, and, therefore, if we are to conceive an initial state of the material system at all, it is the most rational hypothesis, and it has the advantage of being supported—nay, we may say suggested—by observation, for many nebulæ are to be seen in the remote heavens. But to serve the purposes of particular sciences, and especially to find a place for the theory of development in natural history, it is necessary to look into it more particularly. And here the naturalist might well wish the chemist did not come in between him and the astronomer. For here he must exchange the name nebula (in which, being essentially nebulous, there is little harm) for "cosmic gas" (Haeckel), which while it is a great extension of the hypothesis is very threatening as to its inner composition. For down to the present day modern chemistry, still maintaining its recoil from the absurd doctrine of transmutation as held by the alchemists, showing the fallacies of their experiments and substituting its own with its own interpretation of them, has hitherto maintained, as has been stated, that matter, instead of being ultimately homogeneous in the last analysis of nature, as the word nebula suggests, consists of at least between sixty and seventy different kinds of atoms or elements which are essentially distinct, and which cannot be partitioned farther or transmuted into each other at all. They differ remarkably in weight, some of them being more than a hundred times heavier than others. They differ also in many other respects, which are said to be "chemical." But happily they all agree in those properties with which mechanics in general, and specially astronomy, has to do, and which are named "physical." How they could agree so far and yet be essentially different is not easily conceived. But here, at any rate, looking to the actual state of the chemical theory, is a remarkable complication intruded into the nebular hypothesis, and in these circumstances does it not, let us ask, wonderously fulfil very exactly the ancient conception of a chaos?

But what we have here especially to remark is, that this chemical doctrine of a great variety of aboriginal dissimilar material

elements, is a great disparagement to the theory of evolution, and a great detraction from its intellectual or logical beauty. It is also a great discouragement to philosophy when balancing the claims of theism against pantheism, or rather, let us say, pancosmism ; for neither the nebular theory of the astronomer nor the cosmic gas of the chemist and naturalist look beyond matter and motion—in one word, dynamic force—at the commencement of nature, and therefore any term such as pantheism, involving theism as a part of it, is too much. If, indeed, all the chemical elements were capable of being animated, or of ministering to life, there would be no objection to them in a theological point of view. But this is far from being the case. Of all the sixty-four elements of the chemist found in this world not more than four seem to be essential to life, a few others being borrowed in small quantities from all the rest which go to construct the earth's crust.

This argument against such an amount of dead matter at the commencement of nature stands upon the supposition that a purely ideal universe, such as must present itself in the mind of an infinite, a perfect intelligence, is itself already so perfect that thought can find but one sufficient reason for awarding to it another mode of existence, especially one in some sense external to the perfect mind itself. And that reason is the peculiar condition on which alone enjoyment or happiness is possible. As for enjoyment or happiness itself, it is something so precious compared with all other things that in the last analysis it comes out that all other things owe whatever value they possess simply to their relation to enjoyment or happiness. Now of this affection of mind one of the conditions of existence is individuality in the being who is to be capable of it. Where one only exists no more than one can be happy. While by a creation of beings capable of enjoyment, which is plainly within the power of an Almighty Being who knows what happiness is, and is Himself ever blessed, infinite millions may be happy too. Thus we reach solid ground for standing, while we emancipate ourselves from pantheism with all its intellectual claims and moral faults, and find ourselves in possession of the world-old orthodox belief of a Creator and a creation.

But it may be said that this view does not justify the actual

creation as we see it in existence around us, for there is more suffering in it than enjoyment, and, at any rate, the quantity of matter which is dead and incapable of enjoyment is immensely greater than that which is living and might possibly, therefore, enjoy its existence. Here is an accumulation of objections countenancing pessimism rather than such an economy as theism suggests. As for the first, we must pass over it for the present, remarking only that however much suffering there may be in the actual world, it still holds true that the economy of things is such that every sentient creature tends to its own well-being, and the state of feeling corresponding to a state of well-being is precisely enjoyment. May we not add, in the words of Paley, "Teeth were made to eat and not to ache." And further, with all that is against the world, for which the Author of Nature is not responsible, "it is a happy world after all."

But let us bestow some thought upon the other objection, namely, that there is so much dead matter in the world compared with that which is living or which may be made to minister to life. That it is so we have now seen not merely by ocular observation but by the teaching of modern chemistry, which of sixty-four elements gives only four as truly organic or constitutive in the main of organisms to which life attaches. We have seen how this belief interferes with a theory of evolution, supposing this theory to be pure on its own terms and co-ordinate in its extent with the creation, or at any rate the material system. To be fully in keeping with this theory the cosmic gas should be homogeneous, or consist of one sort of particles only, those which differ from them least, and whose atomic weight is the lightest, being the first-fruits of the theory of evolution in respect of condensation, the κάθοδος of Heraclitus, the cathode of Faraday, or condensation generally. Is there no evidence then in favor of such a working in nature as goes to verify this view? Yes, it cannot be unequivocally detected, indeed, in the downward course, because we have no access to regions where there is intense pressure, and where condensation and the construction of molecules too stable to be decomposed in the laboratory may be going on. But in the heavenly bodies, in virtue of the light along with the heat which they emit, we have access to the upward or rarefying course, to analytic or decompos-

ing agencies of which the analytical apparatus of the laboratory is but a sorry mimicry. The naked eye indeed, which is a synthetic instrument designed to assist in the construction of the unities which the mind is ever seeking, and not an analytical apparatus, gives us the light of the heavenly bodies *en masse*, with only such variations in color as are found to be associated with degrees of heat varying in intensity, such as whiteness, yellowness, redness. But happily light from the stars, the same as that from terrestrial bodies, when made to pass transversely through a transparent wedge or prism, before it enters the eye, is thereby deprived of its synthetic character, and in being rendered useless for natural vision is analyzed. Even the smallest pencil that can awaken the sensation of light is spread out into a spectrum or display of colors. Newton, who first accounted truly for this phenomenon, measuring the beautiful spectrum which he obtained with a sunbeam sent through a glass prism, and comparing the different tints given by the spectrum to the eye with the tones given by the scale of music to the ear, found so much satisfaction in observing the analogy that he did not vary his experiments sufficiently, and the Newtonian conception of seven primitive colors and the ideas of the great philosopher prevailed in science till quite lately. But now it has been found that every particular substance when luminous, emits light, which when analyzed, singled, or spread out by the prism, has a particular spectrum of its own. And thus by simply looking at substances through the prism or spectroscope they may be recognized and discriminated from one another by the astronomer or the naturalist without invoking the chemist first to destroy them and then to say what they are.

Great progress in our knowledge of natural substances has been made within these few years during which the spectroscope has been in use. And what, let us ask, has been its teaching with respect to the chemical elements? Do spectroscopic observations go to support the belief that at the creation or the beginning of nature the cosmic gas or matter in the aeriform state consisted of at least some sixty-four essentially dissimilar undecomposable intransmutable particles, as implied by the limits of chemical analysis and generally maintained in chemical

treatises? No, the teachings of spectrum analysis are very different. This instrument, when directed to the sun, which is believed to be a star of comparatively low temperature, does indeed offer to the eye the spectra or light proper to not a few of the metals familiar in our planet whose ultimate particles are held to be simple and undecomposable, such as magnesium, sodium, calcium, iron, copper, zinc, above all, hydrogen, and about a dozen others. But this is already to be remarked that those whose atomic weight is lightest seem to prevail. When, again, the instrument is directed to stars whose more intense whiteness seems to indicate a more intense heat, fewer of these so called elements are indicated, as if the higher temperature had resolved the others into them. But what is most interesting to us in our present inquiry is the information given by the spectroscope when directed to those heavenly bodies where the analytic power is not the divulsive force of heat but the law of diffusion, where the quantity of matter is very small compared with the space in which it is lodged, and where, consequently, this law itself operating secularly would distribute the matter to the utmost, so that ultimately, if the chemical elements are not real atoms, none but the most stable, if even these, would survive. Bodies of such tenuity as is now referred to are nebulæ and comets. Now, to the amazement of the observer, the spectroscope, when directed to the light of a nebula, gives as its constituents only two chemical elements, namely, hydrogen and nitrogen. And still more wonderful, when directed to the light of a comet it gives only hydrocarbon. Now these are the lightest chemical elements known in the laboratory. The atomic weight of hydrogen, being the lightest of all that are known, is assumed as the unity of the scale. There are none having their atomic weights 2, 3, 4, or 5, on this scale. After hydrogen immediately comes carbon, whose atomic weight in the most classical period of philosophical chemistry was taken at 6 (and now in common with most others is the same doubled). After these comes, in the opinion of one of the most gifted chemists (Laurent), nitrogen, its atomic weight 7 (tho in the aeriform state it is certainly $7 \times 2 = 14$). Besides being so stable or undecomposable these elements are very abundant in nature. And they seem to indicate one of the sim-

plest ways in which less stable and heavier elements under intense heat or under the law of diffusion may be reduced to simpler elements. Thus let us take the atomic weights which were agreed on at that time which I have characterized as the classical period of philosophical chemistry ; they are generally a little heavier than those which are adopted now, since they have been submitted to far more trying ordeals in the laboratory. And this is just what is to be expected if they are really not simple and indivisible, but molecular structures composed of a greater or smaller number of the true units of matter ; for under such ordeals it consists with the analogy of nature to expect that in many cases a certain amount of vaporization or escape of units would take place, and so the atomic weight of the element in hand be proportionally lightened. This granted, many of the surviving and more stable elements could have resulted from heavier ones simply by halving or dedoubling. Thus stellar chemistry does not give potassium at all its full atomic weight 40, but it gives abundantly calcium its atomic weight 20. In like manner, by dedoubling, sodium 24 would give magnesium 12. And in these instances the similarity between the originals and their supposed dedoubles is very confirmatory of such a view. Then again iron, which is intimately associated in nature with silicium, and lithium, which is the metallic basis of the alkalies, is 28, and silicium is 14, as is also nitrogen, which being dedoubled twice give lithium = 7, and so on. But if the view which we are now entertaining as to the greater simplicity and the smaller number of the atoms of nature than those of the chemist is to be inquired into, plainly nature will be found to have many other methods of analysis than that of halving merely. Now this view may claim at last to be favorably entertained by minds of philosophical culture generally. For while the greatest chemists have always looked to it with favor, but were afraid to affirm it for want of an experimental verification, there is no longer this reserve on the subject. Dumas, the most philosophical of chemists, and Perpetual Secretary of the Academy of Sciences, has long favored this view ; but while some experimental members of the same Academy (Despretz, etc.) argued strongly against it, he did not press it. But, at a meeting of that authoritative

body, on the strength or excuse of a communication from Mr. Norman Lockyer, giving the results of his observations with the spectroscope in stellar chemistry, and his own conclusions from them, the great French chemist spoke out upon the subject, and unequivocally, in favor of the ultimate unity and identity of the material elements. And it cannot be long before this view prevails.

Here, then, is the anticipation of a great step in the interest of the theory of development, and of much higher interests, as we shall presently see. The "cosmic gas" is no longer a chaos consisting of a multitude of dissimilar substances. It is, like the medium of light, or the ether itself, a homogeneous medium.

But it shows its relation to an unity as to its cause, according to the belief of the theist, by tending to develop unities in it by the grouping according to the laws of mechanical construction of the single material elements into molecules, the earlier and simpler members of which are indestructible or undecomposable in the laboratory of the chemist. These being the most stable will also be last to survive under any dissociative or analytic force. And what is it that the spectroscope has now informed us? When all others have disappeared, or when molecular synthesis is possibly commencing, as in nebulæ and comets, the elements which are found are hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon. Now this discovery has very important bearings on theodicy. We have found in an early page that the multiplication of living beings and the occupation of space by them, inasmuch as such beings are capable of enjoyment, is an adequate reason for awarding existence to individualized beings, that is, for a creation, in contrast to pantheism or pancosmism. If, then, in these first developed and last surviving elements we find those of all the sixty-three which are best fitted for ministering to life, and which do in reality constitute the quick parts of living beings, there is all the evidence in this field which it admits of that the material creation was designed, and that by a benevolent Being seeking to extend His own ever-blessedness beyond Himself, by sowing life and a capacity for enjoyment broadcast

into space. Now these elements, least and lightest of all, and, strange to say, found and found alone in nebulæ and comets, are the very elements which are found by the chemist when he has decomposed to the utmost the mobile or living parts of any living creature. There is a fourth, no doubt, and one in the absence of which there can be little or no life for the others, namely, oxygen. But it might be shown that we are not to expect this element after extreme analytical agency has been brought to bear upon it, and especially where hydrogen abounds, since both ever tend to unite and to lapse together into common vapor or aqueous matter. In like manner, when instead of existing in a sphere of analytic or separative agency, nitrogen along with hydrogen exists in a sphere of synthetic or unifying agency, there results ammonia, a kind of double vapor having many natural analogies with common vapor. And both of them, by their volatility and easy transformability appearing to be life-preservers in the organism, while the carbon, which enters into the living tissue along with them, from its entirely opposite nature, its fixed and fixing character, prevents that life from being too ephemeral.

With the organic elements, then, as the first products and the last survivors of the molecular or material system, and looking especially to hydrogen, which in stellar astronomy shows itself so conspicuously almost everywhere, what are we led to infer as to the real constitution of the cosmic gas? Shall we infer that it consisted of hydrogen only? This would be a great reduction of the chaos which modern chemistry believes in. And it has been tried again and again whether this element might not be held as the genetic principal of all the rest. But it has been as often found that this will not do, for there are not a few of the atomic weights of the other elements which are not multiples of that of hydrogen, and which, therefore, cannot consist of a unified group of hydrogen atoms and nothing else. Besides, the calling or function of hydrogen, by all that appears in the economy of nature, is to be given off from other molecules, in which it is either included or occluded, not

to be condensed into molecules which are thereafter undecomposable.

Moreover, there is another element which seems the appointed mate of hydrogen, so that they never meet without running together and vanishing both of them in the genesis of a new and wholly dissimilar substance. This other element is oxygen. The fact that it has not been found by observers in general in the chemistry of the heavenly bodies, while it is so abundant in our planet, seems to indicate that, unlike hydrogen, it is easily transformable and decomposable. And it is certain that, unlike hydrogen, which is ever tending to be giving off, oxygen is intensely parasitic, and tends to enter into and remain in union with almost every thing. But its proper mate is, as has been said, hydrogen, and the two, in the intimate state of union which has been referred to, constitute aqueous or common vapor.

Without attempting here to show the primeval, and highly genetic character of oxygen (tho prepared to do so), the cosmic gas of chemists as of Haeckel or the naturalists, consisting of some sixty-four solid elements, thus appears to have been correctly named by the astronomers a nebula or medium, composed in the main of common vapor—nay, we must say composed altogether of common vapor, for the nitrogen, the carbon, and the hydrogen of the nebulæ and comets we must regard as subsequent developments.

This nebula, however, could not always remain wholly in the aeriform state. Unless it were of infinite extent, condensation would take place towards the centre, and an ocean form there ; while on the upper or outer surface all around, in consequence of the cold of further space, there would be a covering of cloud with a true atmosphere or region of transparent vapor between.

Thus in accordance with the most advanced science seeking a beginning of the material system, we must fall back upon old Thales, and on inspired Moses, who with more detail describes a primeval "deep," and the expanse in the midst to divide the waters which were under it from those that were above it. But

the gravitation towards the centre of the superincumbent matter still condensing and pressing more and more severely will generate such a heat as must soon differentiate the homogeneous globe of water, and it belongs to the view of things generally held, to maintain that an atom of oxygen would result from the decomposition of every atom of water. The world was therefore now fitted for the manifestation of life, if suitable organisms were given to entertain it. Now when we consider that the Creator of all is himself ever-living, and life in its very essence, and that He, in all His life and power to impart it wherever He wills, is present, not as a distant spectator, but immanently present, so that the new-born world moves and has its being in His living being, what more rational, what more in accordance with science than to receive with rational and scientific faith such a record as that of the inspired historian, when, with oriental boldness, he represents the Creator as commanding the sea and the land and the expanse over them to "bring forth abundantly the living creature?"—a mode of creation which is finely characterized by the prophet when he says that "the glory of the Lord is the fulness of the whole earth" (inverted in the English version, see Is. 6 : 3). The organic elements are the first that would be developed out of the primeval waters; these waters, then, could not be called dead, and they would soon be teeming with individualized life and its well-being, namely, enjoyment. And thus by the universal institution of water at first two great ends were gained. The iceberg or rock-water is so easily fused and retained in a molten state that it is as fit as any other rock when molten for securing the spherical, the most suitable form of a world, while its temperature in its fused state is so moderate that it is most suitable for organic life and enjoyment.

In the lapse of ages, and (considering that we are now dealing with the works of Him to whom a thousand years are as one day) we must conclude that the heat and pressure on the tender particles of water would hurry their transformation into molecules too dense and stable to be directly fit for ministering to life. But tho not directly they would still be indirectly

available for this purpose ; for matter, that it may be easily transformable and capable of life, must be tender and soft, or easily compressible, and will therefore stand in need of stable and dead matter as a covering or skeleton to preserve its form. The central development of the primeval ocean giving the mineral elements still contribute to the life of the world, and when raised by central fire and vapors afford a platform for a multitude of animated species and for the vegetable kingdom, without which all animals could not subsist but by appropriating each other as food, and consequently destroying life, and in doing so causing much suffering, tho that is not so certain.

I am sorry to think that the views here entertained are very different from those usually advanced. But it must be admitted that they are all in favor of a true theory of development, which under a most defective conception of such a mode of creation is the idol of the day. It must be admitted, also, that we now account for the embarrassment of men of science as to the origin of life while they ignore or deny the omnipresence of the Ever-living One and His immanence in all the heights and depths of created being, as also the end and aim of his creation, and think to find life by seeking the living among the dead.

But the theory of development as a truly logical conception has not yet been justified were it left in the state to which we have brought it. It no longer, indeed, has a most heterogeneous chaos of chemical atoms or miscellaneous elements of matter and blind force for its foundation and first word. In keeping with the older idea and the language of astronomy, instead of a cosmic gas we have found a true nebula. But this, tho matter of the finest kind, is still matter, while the law of continuity, resting itself upon the Creator, who is a spirit, demands some medium that serves to intercede between, if not to unite, the spirit with the material substance. Now that looking to nature we appear to have in ether, the existence of which and that filling all the celestial spaces is now generally conceded by science, and of the relation of which to mind and life the inspired historian informs us, when at the very commencement of the narrative of the creation of the heavens and the earth he

represents the Creator as uttering the sublime fiat, "Let there be light," for light is the action proper to the universal ether.

Now just as the chemical elements of matter result from the grouping of single material elements which are identical, analogy leads us to infer that the material element results from the grouping and unification of ethereal elements. And thus by a reference to the universal ether the theory of development is still further improved and purified, and the discontinuity between spirit-substance and matter is lessened. For such are the properties of ether that it has been well tho awkwardly named "mind-stuff." But one step more and the development theory, viewed as acting in one direction at least, is complete. And that is to assume that inasmuch as the Creator Himself is a spirit, and that of all kinds of existence spirit is the best, and that an immediate effect is to be expected to have a greater resemblance to the producing cause than a remote effect, so the great Creator did first award existence to a world of spirits, providing the realm of light to be their blessed abode.

By this following up of nature to the fountain-head the theory of development has acquired a continuity and an extent which entitles it to be regarded as a logical conception, and in harmony so far with the course both of thought and nature. But only so far. Both thought and nature teach that their economy is not a development or evolution all in one direction, but that it is circular or cyclical; that when the full development and distance from the source has been reached the economy works itself in a parallel stream backward towards the fountain-head. Of this the most interesting phenomenon to us is that just as the grouping together and unifying of the particles of ether in the celestial spaces gave birth to the material element, so weak through attenuation that it has lost the higher energies of the created substance, and can manifest only blind attractions and repulsions, so is it provided that the material economy, in pursuing the same course of unification, called upon to do so by the unity that presides over all and determines the economy, culminates in constructing a molecular scaffolding for a powerful organism of ether—in this planet the myogo-cerebral system—in the focus of whose synthetic action there results a unity of "mind-stuff" which is no longer actuated by merely

blind attractions and repulsions wholly apathetic, but by loves and hatreds, having recovered, along with the quantity of substance or energy of which it consists, the powers of mind, and in virtue of its true unity having this prerogative, that when the material structure, which was its mother and nurse, loses its life, this more than ethereal unity, this soul, this spirit, re-enters the realm of light, and if the design of the Creator has not been frustrated by it, ascends towards Him, and in contemplating Him and His surroundings becomes a partaker of His ever-blessedness.

And thus is the cycle of development completed. Matter, the bugbear of the scientists of the day, proves to be but an episode in the grand scheme of the universe, a beautiful cloud-work in the azure of the spirit-world, unavoidable, perhaps, but utilized by the Author of all for the redemption of the substance of creation from the apathetic state, and for restoring to it the capacity of enjoyment, along with the prospect that that enjoyment shall be forever if the design of the Creator has not been traversed—and even tho it were traversed, as we know it has been in this planet, do we not see even in the process by which existence is awarded to the soul already embodied in the economy of things, a method of redemption?

Let us accept, then, from naturalists and chemists, ever seeking the living among the dead, all that they have to offer us on the head of development, tho but as a likelihood dignified with the name of a theory, and let us merely carry out their idea logically in obedience to the law of continuity and the indefeasible claims of reason, and we find the tables are completely turned. Development in nature, instead of being a blind changefulness among groups of dead particles, evolving forms which were not even dreamt of till they made their apparition in nature, proves to be a method of creation, by the institution of physical forces, so adjusted to the work appointed to them that they shall gradually build up the grand design of the Creator, practically verifying every possible structure, and ever causing the less fit to pass away in favor of the more fit. But instead of stopping where the cerebral cell has been constructed, in connection with which alone it is said that mind is to be found, a view which blinds and desolates the universe all but in

some transient specks on this speck of a world of ours, goes on flowing in a parallel stream upwards towards the fountain-head, the great Creator, leaving matter beneath and behind, and surrounding Him more and more as time moves on with spirits, their bosoms reflecting His love and righteousness, and in the adoration awoke, in meditation, and in looking around tasting His ever-blessedness.

JOHN G. MACVICAR.

## GREEK AND A LIBERAL EDUCATION.

THE Greek language has of late fallen upon "evil times" in this country—we had almost said upon "evil tongues." A little more than a year since, the Hon. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., a leading member of the not very numerous Corporation of Harvard College, was audacious enough to assail "the divine language" as a college fetich and to denounce as fetich-worship the traditionary reverence in which it had been held by generations of not unintelligent scholars. The assault was significantly formal and public. The oration in which it was made was delivered before one of the most intelligent audiences which could possibly be convened in Boston and its vicinity. It was distributed widely through the country by newspaper copyists and critics, and was very generally read by educators and scholars of every description. The pamphlet issue soon passed to a third edition, the appendix to which contains plausible and varied testimony in support of its views from several English and American writers. Some of these comments we had proposed to notice at some length as calling in question the views expressed in this journal. In the mean while, however, President Eliot of Harvard College has reopened the subject, in fact if not in form, by an elaborate essay published in the June number of *The Century Magazine*, entitled "What is a Liberal Education?" in which he takes the ground, impliedly if not avowedly, that the first degree in Arts ought not to be conditioned upon a competent knowledge of Greek, nor indeed upon any knowledge of it, even the most elementary. We also learn that the academic authorities of Harvard College have decided that while Greek shall for the present continue to be required for admission to the university and in so far shall be made in some sort a condition for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts, it shall be made entirely elective after admission. All these movements and conclusions point to the result as inevitable that the time is not far distant when Greek will not be required at all for this degree in Harvard College, altho it will doubtless be studied by very many of its students.[1] These new aspects of the Greek question give additional meaning to the title prefixed to the very brilliant and scholarly address of Mr. Arnold Green of Providence, entitled "Greek and What Next?" They invest the subject with a somewhat graver interest than was excited by the dashing onslaught of Mr. Adams, which seemed to many more amusing for its audacity than solid in its reasoning. Now that the adventurous President of Harvard College has attempted to reason out a conclusion unfavorable to Greek, and the authorities of Harvard have taken more than the fatal "first step," which is not likely to be retraced, it seems necessary that the reasoning argument which is urged in its support should be subject to whatever criticism it merits, and that these somewhat formal appeals to the public judgment should be responded to.

The writer of this paper finds no special satisfaction in repeating arguments which have often been urged, or in reiterating statements which seem to him but truisms and commonplaces. So long, however, as the methods are so distinctly assailed which have been approved by the judgment of scholars who, to say the least, are as broad-minded and as variously cultured as Mr. Adams or President Eliot, and which continue to give character to the higher education of Germany, England, and this country, it seems necessary to interpose a word of fearless criticism and earnest protest.

The title of the essay, "What is a Liberal Education?" is significant and suggestive. It is significant of what the essay ought to be, either in form or fact, and of what it is not, either in form or fact. It would seem to require and to premise that the writer should first define what he means by the term, or at least that his discussion should enable his readers to infer what

[1] The official announcement goes even farther than we had supposed, inasmuch as not only Greek but Latin and Mathematics are remanded to the Electives, while, with a singularly pointed defiance of the old traditions, the only studies which are prescribed are Rhetoric and English Composition, German and French, Physics and Chemistry.

conception he had formed of its signification. But he does neither, and this notwithstanding that in the very first sentence he says, "The general growth of knowledge . . . has made it necessary to *define anew liberal education* and hence to enlarge the signification of the degree of Bachelor of Arts." That he uses the phrase in a special and variable and, in our view, a very questionable meaning is clear enough to our own mind, but none the more so from any effort on his part to state or define its meaning. He will pardon us for the suggestion that this omission is a significant illustration of the importance of the discipline which comes from Greek culture and Greek studies, even in the small measure in which they may be imparted within the college curriculum. The study of two or three of the Socratic dialogues, if kept faithfully in mind with a scholar's reverence for the ancient wisdom which is good for all time, might have suggested to President Eliot, through the unlucky experience of the word-mongers whom Socrates so often drives to the wall, that the meaning of the leading term in any discussion should be clearly understood from the beginning of every argument and strictly adhered to in its progress. President Eliot suggests further on that the Greek civilization was not "adult." We would remind him that in logic, at least, it was by no means "infantile." Certainly one of the most important of the achievements which it wrought for human civilization was the production of this organon of thought which, beginning with Socrates, was so far matured by Aristotle as to have become a necessity for all subsequent generations, including those who shall hereafter aspire to a Bachelor's degree from Harvard College.

Should President Eliot reply that by the "signification" of "liberal education" he only intended the branches of knowledge which such an education includes or requires,—that is, that he concerned himself only with the "extent" of the term and not at all with the "content,"—we reply that this brings to light even more distinctly the assumption which is fatal to the success of his argument. That assumption is that one set of studies are precisely as good as another for the purpose of "liberal education," provided they are taught with equal thoroughness and invested with equal dignity by being made the conditions of an academic prize and honors, and provided they be open to a liberal election, such as may be determined by the

student's prospective work or profession in life. That all these are pure assumptions which require to be proved might have been discovered by President Eliot had he clearly prepared himself to answer the question "What is a Liberal Education?" by a definition of its essential import and purpose. It ought to be no secret to a gentleman who is himself so liberal in his own culture and so well acquainted with the opinions of other cultured men, that a very large number of eminent scholars and teachers hold views which are opposed to his own, in respect to the distinctive and appropriate conception of a liberal education and in respect to the comparative value of different classes of studies in their fitness to promote this end. Whatever his own views upon either of these subjects may be, he ought to bethink himself that if he expects to convince his antagonists, he must be prepared to contest the points in respect to which he and they hold opposite opinions. If he holds in fact, as his argument would seem to imply, that every kind of education is equally liberal, and that there are no common studies which are common in that they tend to cultivate the man as contrasted with the specialist, and if he goes farther, as many of his arguments seem to imply, and holds that the more special they are the more appropriate they are to liberal culture because they are more likely to be pursued with enthusiasm and success, then let him take his ground and defend it. But to seem to be unconscious of this wide difference of opinion exposes him fairly to the charge of voluntary or involuntary ignorance of the real nature of the question which he essays to discuss. The logic which seems somehow to have been matured in "the infantile civilization" of the Greeks might have taught him the importance of a definite knowledge of the question which he attempts to argue. We should not have dwelt so long upon the opening sentence of this essay, did not the defect which we have noticed characterize the entire argument. Whatever be its merits and however valuable the separate considerations which it urges, they are all vitiated by the failure on the part of the writer correctly to conceive and define a liberal education as it is commonly and as we think correctly understood.

Leaving the President's failure to definitely conceive and state what he means by a liberal education, we proceed to his argument, which is directed to three conclusions: first, "that

the number of school and college studies with equal weight and rank for this highly valued degree needs to be much enlarged;" secondly, "that these studies should be liberally elective;" and thirdly, "that the existing order should be changed in important respects." After stating these propositions, he recognizes the strong opposition which they are likely to encounter in conservative minds as a very formidable obstacle in his way. To this he proceeds to lay siege, by a very elaborate and apparently learned review of the history of the progress of "liberal studies" against the conservative prejudices of learned educators for nearly a thousand years. He recites how hard it was to introduce the study of Greek itself into the universities of Paris and Oxford, and contends that Physics and Chemistry are not yet fully admitted into the same. He urges that in the Mathematics which have been long in undisputed possession the analytical has obtained such a victory over the geometrical method as is equivalent to a revolution. He urges next that the way in which Latin is studied at present, as compared with the earlier methods, is another example of a change akin to a revolution; and finally he returns to the slow but revolutionary progress by which Greek fought its way into its present pre-eminence in the universities of England and the Continent. In all this there is the display of imposing details which are fitted to impress the unlearned reader whose prejudices President Eliot now and then condescends to flatter by methods which makes the critic cry out for an half-hour of Socrates, the crude product of "the infantile civilization" of the Greeks. The examples cited in this elaborate induction go to show that universities are slow to accept innovations in the material and methods of education. This conclusion would be accepted without hesitation by all parties, but it by no means justifies the practical application which President Eliot would derive from it. The examples which he cites are of the introduction of new studies, as the new Physics, the new Greek, and the new Mathematics. These new studies are all grouped by the reasoner under the common title of novelties either in method or subject-matter, each of which must necessarily supplant something which held its place. He forgets to observe that in every case in which the new has brought itself into a place of honor it has never thrust out anything that deserved to remain. Greek did not expel

Latin, but took its place by its side. Least of all did it diminish the importance of linguistic study. The new Physics did not displace the study of nature. The new Psychology did not diminish the attention given to psychical phenomena. The new and better Theology did not drive out Theology altogether. The new Physics and the new Psychology simply introduced better methods of studying the same facts and prosecuting the same science. The new Mathematics did not set aside the old Geometry, but superinduced upon its permanent relationships the magic processes of the new analysis. President Eliot overlooks this most important fact in the conclusion to which he leaps—viz.: "This hasty retrospect shows, first, that some of the studies now commonly called liberal have not long held their present pre-eminence; and secondly, that new learning has repeatedly forced its way, in times past, to full academic standing, in spite of the opposition of the conservative, and of the keener resistance of established teachers and learned bodies, whose standing is always supposed to be threatened by the rise of new sciences. History teaches boldness in urging the claims of modern literatures and sciences to full recognition as liberal arts." The argument which could only have force with the half-educated ignorance of superficial readers, tho urged by the head of the oldest and most erudite university in America—viz., that the oldest and most learned of its professors and its graduates must be expected to cherish unreasonable prejudices against the novelties which he would urge upon their acceptance—is certainly not convincing so far as the Greek language is concerned. We are well aware that he introduces other arguments than these. At present we are not concerned with his revolutionary appeals to the ignorance of the populace, and to the shallow half-learning of the rapid generalizers from partial data who are so abundant in the present generation, and who are likely to abound still more if President Eliot's theories are to prevail.

We submit to our readers that the conclusions established by the facts adduced are none other than these: that learning in the form of letters and sciences has been constantly making progress; that the universities have contributed largely tho not exclusively to this progress; that new discoveries, new literatures, new sciences, have been successively systematized and

taught at the universities as rapidly as the convictions of the learned have required. He might have added that to these changed convictions the universities have very largely contributed. That universities are properly cautious and conservative is natural and reasonable, and for this reason when they are reproached for that caution and circumspection which it is their duty to exercise the friends of sound learning have sometimes a right to be offended.

Whether these feelings are reasonable or not, we insist that this elaborate argument *ad invidiam* has not established the conclusion that the conservatism of educated men in respect to so great an innovation as the abandonment of the study of Greek as an essential element of a liberal education is necessarily a bigoted prejudice which must sooner or later give way before modern ideas.

It is possible that we regard the preliminary flourish of President Eliot in too serious a light. We must do credit to its author to observe that he does not regard it as decisive, but proceeds to urge in detail the position which his induction has made probable that "History teaches boldness in urging the claims of modern literatures and sciences to full recognition as liberal arts." The first example which he names is the English language and literature, which he affirms is "of equal academic value or rank with any subject now most honored." That this English language is a most interesting and inspiring study to any one who has gone through a thorough "academic" study of language, and that the English literature is all that President Eliot claims for it to the student who has been thoroughly trained in classic analysis and reading, we are foremost to affirm; but that the English language or literature can be made a substitute for either Latin or Greek to an English or a German student as an "academic" study we do not believe. President Eliot affirms the contrary, but he gives no reasons for his opinion, but simply contents himself with very familiar truisms concerning Shakespeare and the English people, and the abundance of translations in English from "the masterpieces of literature, sacred and profane," and the possibility of learning "much more about the Jews, the Greeks, and the Romans through English than through Hebrew, Greek, or Latin." We do not care to press the inquiry how this last saying is consistent with the

subsequent assertion that the German is indispensable to every scholar as a thesaurus of universal knowledge; but surely President Eliot was more than usually incautious when he says that "Greek literature compares with English as Homer compares with Shakespeare—that is, *as infantile with adult civilization.*"

After these confident but unsupported assertions that as language and literature English is capable of as effective use and deserves the same dignity as Greek, he breaks out with the indignant inquiry why it is not put to this use and honor, and he seeks in vain for an answer, but ringing fifty-fold changes upon this one question, the sole answer to them all being, It ought to be so, therefore it must be so. We do not propose to enter upon these most vexed questions. We are content to accept the facts, attested as they are by the varied experience of many generations, that for the majority of academic students the most efficient method of studying the grammar of the English and of learning to appreciate its literature is found in the analytic and æsthetic study of the classical languages and literature. Why this is so we do not stay to inquire. It is in vain to argue that it ought not to be so, therefore it is not so. It is idle to say that "American youth in large numbers study Latin and Greek, but do not thereby learn English." We do not contend that they gain from their classical studies the half of what they might with more skilful and æsthetical instruction, nor do we hold that "no linguistic discipline can be got out of the study of the native language." We hold, on the contrary, that much discipline can be gained in this way. What we do hold is that the study of the classics is the most efficient means for analysis and æsthetic training in English or in any native language, and that it exacts a discipline which one's mother-tongue with all its endearments, and particularly the English language, cannot furnish so effectively as Greek and Latin.

It is equally in vain to ask, as does President Eliot, "How then was the Greek mind trained in language?" We reply, That is a question which we are not bound to answer. What renders it more puzzling still is that we do know that the Greek mind was *not* trained to the development and mastery of the Greek language by the methods of formal grammar, the elements of which were a late outgrowth of the Aristotelian logic in the hands of the Stoics. Nor was criticism either of art or letters

an early development of the Greek mind. There is no evidence that formal criticism inspired or directed the wondrous verse of Homer or Æschylus, or the matchless prose of Plato and Demosthenes. But the matchless superiority of the Greek language in respect to clearness, flexibility, and comprehensiveness is not for any such reason to be denied or depreciated in its priceless value as an instrument of culture to the human race for all time. The fact is true whether we can explain it or not. It holds true even under every attempt to explain it away. The old Athens on the Ægean Sea is still superior to the new Athens on Boston Harbor; the old Plato, the old Socrates, and the old Diogenes are in many respects superior to the Sage of Concord even when reinforced by the new Socrates and the new Diogenes in the persons of Alcott and Thoreau. The language of Greece, tho it was the product of what President Eliot chooses to call an "infantile civilization," remains with its literature more than a product of mere natural development—a gift of God for all time in spite of our *a priori* theories of what it ought to be in comparison with the English or any other modern tongue, or any attempt to depreciate it as an instrument of culture and education.

President Eliot confesses this inferiority of the English when confronted with a fact which he cannot explain. "For ten years past Harvard University has been trying, first, to stimulate the preparatory schools to give attention to English, and, secondly, to develop and improve its own instruction in that department, but its success has thus far been very moderate." And he adds that "this comparative neglect of the greatest of literatures in American schools and colleges is certainly a remarkable phenomenon." He undertakes to explain it "by the relative newness of this language and literature; it requires two or three hundred years to introduce new intellectual staples; secondly, by the real difficulty of teaching English well, a difficulty which has only of late years been overcome; and thirdly, by the dazzling splendor of the revived Greek and Latin literature." All which are statements in other words that it is by means of classical study, other things being equal, that the English language and literature can be most efficiently studied, especially by a scholar. This is not at all inconsistent with holding that the study of English ought not to receive greater attention in aca-

demic institutions than it has done of late, especially with its new appliances, but it is entirely incompatible with the conclusion which President Eliot persistently urges, that it may properly make a place for itself by the greater disuse or abandonment of Greek and Latin. This, it should be observed, is the only question under discussion. Whatever other whole truths or half truths he has advanced, none of them justify the revolutionary measure which he so confidently urges of the displacement of Greek and Latin by German and English as instruments of academic culture.

In the zeal of his argumentation President Eliot loses sight altogether of the fact that every student who has any literary enterprise or the most moderate desire for self-improvement will undertake private studies in English literature, especially if he is animated by a true classical spirit. He makes no account of the fact that every student who is inspired with any intellectual ambition will give himself to the liberal and independent reading of good English books in this way, and will in some sense supplement any instruction or stimulus which his teacher may fail to furnish. The same will be true to a limited extent of his voluntary reading of classic authors. It argues little for the well working of any curriculum, whether it be enforced or elective, if it makes the chief responsibility for success to depend on the teacher. While the university should furnish every possible appliance by its enforced studies, it ought by no means to be held responsible for the degree or kind of culture which each individual may attain in his own voluntary studies. Every successful student must necessarily have his private and favorite studies; and so far as the elective system prevails he is largely left to his own responsibility for his zeal and success in prosecuting them. Many theorists, and President Eliot among them, reason as tho the entire rounds of one's intellectual activities were determined by what the university provides in its curriculum, whereas the private and individual studies and readings of all ambitious scholars are often the most potent elements in his academic training. It is too often forgotten that even under a system which is rigidly enforced a very wide opportunity must be given for elective studies, especially in all departments of literature.

The next reform which President Eliot would introduce is that of academic equality for French and German with Greek,

Latin, and Mathematics. He urges their claims, "not on utilitarian grounds," but yet on account of their indispensableness to those scholars in every branch of learning who would gain access to the results of modern research and modern genius. He insists very correctly that where it is practicable these languages should be studied in early life, if possible before entrance into college. But he reasons that, as it is not always practicable to find good preparatory instruction, the college should make arrangements to give it in all cases, and to carry it so far that the student may use the results of it freely in the advanced studies of his course. He both assumes and asserts that it is a weakness to contend that the study of French or German may not be as effective a direct discipline of intellectual or linguistic culture as that of Latin or Greek, this opinion being asserted and treated by him as exploded among all illuminated educators of the modern school.

Reserving any further comments upon this position and conclusions for another place, we pass to his disposal of History. This study, he rightly remarks, is a liberal study if any should be regarded as such. Upon this topic he descants in a series of fervid remarks to which no one can take exception. Whether history can or should be taught to candidates for the Bachelor's degree to the extent and on the scale which he conceives possible seems to us very questionable—so questionable that his confident assertions sound like rhetorical declarations. It is obvious that two or three years of exclusive attention must be given to historical studies in order to realize such an ideal of liberal achievement. While it is doubtless true that historic studies are very imperfectly achieved in our best-provided universities, it should be remembered that little or nothing more can be done with the best qualified students and under the most liberal arrangement of electives than to give an outline of the leading topics and the most comprehensive principles, with perhaps a minute discussion of a single theme. Nor would it be desirable, were it practicable, to anticipate and condense those results which only the persistent study of a half-score of subsequent and mature years can achieve. While we confess the inadequate provision for historic study in the most if not all of our colleges, we cannot respond to the extravagant conceptions and representations of what is possible

for the candidate of the first degree. Moreover, we would prefer that the true historic spirit should be awakened by subsequent studies, rather than that the young man of twenty-two to twenty-four should, as the result of the study of a series of so-called philosophies of history or of brilliant sections of the historic panorama, think himself prematurely to be the master of the historic past. He cannot but think that such inflated representations of what is possible for a young man in his teens to learn, and of what the universities ought to impart, as President Eliot furnishes in this essay, are mischievous in the extreme.

Political Economy is treated by him very much as is History: with similar overstatements of what is possible and desirable as a condition for the Bachelor's degree. It may be questioned whether more rather than less presumption were not desirable than usually prevails in the choice between the much-disputed theories of this most vexed science, and whether the youthful graduate would not usually be the wiser if he held his confident and prematurely formed opinions in abeyance for a second revision. Such a revision would attend a fuller acquaintance with its subject-matter and a candid consideration of its conflicting theories. Perhaps it would often be wiser and safer to reserve this revisal of one's studies for the light of practical observation, such as can only be gained in the conflicts of business and public life. It may be safely questioned whether any greater advantage would come from the attempt to finish one's reading in political economy at the university than the ambition to do the same with history.

The last topic which is treated is the physical sciences. Upon this topic the writer expends his usual eloquence and falls into his accustomed exaggerations, as the result of which he contends, as against an imagined antagonist who can nowhere be found, that these studies ought surely to be "admitted" to the magic circle of the liberal arts. The only point which he makes which is worthy our notice is that in this study we have to do with "things." What he means by things is supposed to be facts of matter as contrasted with facts of spirit. Surely he does not mean that science, as science, does not concern itself with the relations of things—viz., their causes and laws—as truly as with facts or phenomena. What he intends is, doubtless,

that the theories and principles of physical science are more readily tested by observation and experiment than those of History, Literature, Psychology, Ethics, and Political Economy, and that for this reason "Physics" is deserving of special prominence in the magic circle of "the Arts." This, we presume, no one will dispute; but it by no means follows that the experimental method in the laboratory or the field can be advantageously applied beyond certain limits by the candidates for the Bachelor's degree, and still less that they can be as effectual instruments of intellectual or philosophical discipline. The same general and special reasons, for and against, which have been considered under other topics here present themselves and need not be repeated. We only add what the author himself has most positively and almost angrily asserted in his essay on "The New Education:" that the time for the scientific study of nature is necessarily somewhat late, and it is in vain to endeavor to hasten it by special studies; that it is only in the form of Natural History that it can be studied with any advantage in the early period of education.[1] Had he referred to this essay he might have spared us the following complaint: "I do not know a single preparatory school in this country in which natural science has an adequate place, or any approach to an adequate place, altho some beginnings have lately been made;" and this also: "The [sic] Science is rarely introduced as early as the Sophomore year; generally it begins only with the Junior year, by which time the mind of the student has become so set in the habits which the study of languages and mathematics engenders that he finds great difficulty in grasping the scientific method." We refer to this earlier essay of the writer as containing a fuller and in many respects a much more rational discussion of many of the topics which are treated of in the more recent paper in respect to both academic and university education, including the special themes of classical and scientific study. The writer of the first paper was not then the President of Harvard College, and did not contemplate it as desirable or possible that special classical and scientific studies should be prosecuted in the same schools. Much less did he dream that it was either possible or desirable, as he now seems

[1] See *Atlantic Monthly*, 1869, pp. 203–220, 358–367.

to dream and argue, that the same academic staff should exercise the functions which in other countries are divided between the *Gymnasium*, the *Real Schule*, and the *University*.

But we may not dwell longer upon this theme. The author has now reached the conclusion of his imagined battle with "the sixteenth century" in the following words: "To the list of studies which the sixteenth century called liberal I would therefore add, as studies of equal rank, English, French, German, History, Political Economy, and Natural Science, not one of which can be said to have existed in mature form when the definition of liberal education which is still in force was laid down. In a large university many other languages and sciences will be objects of study. I confine myself to those studies which in my judgment are most desirable in an ordinary college." Were the discussion to stop here we should infer that the conclusion which had been reached was that some knowledge of all these branches, the new as well as the old, the studies of the nineteenth as truly as of the sixteenth century, should be required in an ordinary college as the conditions of the Bachelor's degree. This conclusion would be accepted by most readers, with perhaps here and there an exception in respect to one or more of the modern languages. No one would deny as against President Eliot that all these studies ought to be contemplated as entering into the ideal of a complete academic education—that is, the education of "an ordinary college" with its Bachelor's degree as contrasted with that of the university with its degree of Ph.D., and the grammar-school as introductory to the college. We say as entering into the ideal of a college curriculum, not surely as mastered in their completeness, but as *mastered in their elements with more or less approach to completeness.*

That President Eliot would not accept this phrasing of his conclusion we are well aware. It would certainly spoil his subsequent argument, which proceeds as follows: These essential nineteenth-century studies cannot all of them be studied in their completeness in the college. There is also very little hope that much help can be found in the preparatory schools; therefore the college must undertake the entire responsibility of teaching them all, and within the term of four years. But this cannot be done for every student, especially if he begins with the

elements. It must therefore allow an election to each individual, and give the degree of Bachelor of Arts to every successful student of some sort of a curriculum. Of this curriculum,—or rather these curricula,—the particulars are not stated. What are to be the conditions of entrance upon this course of chosen studies, or these courses (one or many), we are not informed. How elementary some of these courses may be at the beginning we are left to conjecture. Whether Greek may not be allowed, provided it begins with the alphabet, or whether the study of the English alphabet may not be permitted, especially to a foreigner; how much natural science is to be considered as warranting a Bachelor's degree, or how much Greek or Latin or history or political science or philosophy, provided one or two of these courses are to be accepted, as an equivalent to a greater variety of liberal studies—all these questions, we infer, are matters of detail which are to be left, we suppose, to the *Senatus Academicus*. It is obvious enough that with such an arrangement the special value of a degree will vary with the reputation of the college which confers it. It is equally obvious that its actual general value will be affected somewhat as the best commercial paper or bank-notes must suffer when this class of evidences of value is not definitely fixed. Perhaps the time has come when academic degrees should be altogether dispensed with. If they were, some sort of a testimonial of study and character would be found to be convenient and necessary. Possibly for this and other reasons they had better be retained. But if they are, it would seem that for the present at least their established significance should be adhered to, with such modifications of elective and extra studies as individual colleges may choose to introduce. Hitherto all the colleges and universities of the country have kept faith with one another; and in every case in which they have proposed special courses with a total or partial omission of classical or mathematical study, they have denoted this by a special degree. This has notably been true of Michigan, Cornell, and Brown universities, of Yale, Columbia, and Dartmouth colleges. Moreover the change proposed by President Eliot of giving a varied significance to the Bachelor's degree seems specially uncalled for, in view of the fact that the degree of Ph.D. has already come into general use, and that this degree not only provides for but requires

thorough studies in a wide curriculum of modern science: in that it does *not* require the study of the Greek language, but *does* require a competent knowledge of one modern language as an instrument of research. Consequently it would seem to meet all the demands which are supposed to justify a change in the significance of the Bachelor's degree.

We must be allowed to express our surprise that in this discussion President Eliot has treated so lightly the duties and opportunities of the preparatory schools in the matter of liberal education. He does not fail to notice, indeed, that the modern languages, including the English, can be more advantageously studied and often can be satisfactorily mastered in the earlier portion of the seven to ten years which he assigns to a liberal education. He might have insisted more emphatically that this is the time in which geography, the salient facts and dates of history, are generally learned, if learned at all, and that the same is true of all that knowledge of natural science which even he conceives to be desirable or practicable for the young student to acquire. Upon what might be done and yet is not done in all these particulars in the preparatory schools he might have expended many of those eloquent generalizations which he has so completely at his command and now and then uses so freely. He might also have been just and generous enough to recognize the serious disadvantages under which all our preparatory schools, both the public and the endowed, are forced to do their work, with scanty praises, manifold criticisms, and little sympathy from college men. Instead of the meed of generous justice, he gives them only contemptuous neglect, and not even the meed of that intelligent criticism which might have at least recognized the fact that they have some share in the duties and opportunities of the training for a liberal education. Practically considered—it is not unjust to say—the university, as President Eliot chooses to conceive it, is independent of the fitting school on the one side and the school of graduates on the other. To the university course only as terminated by the Bachelor's degree President Eliot has chosen to limit his discussion, loftily ignoring both the preparatory and graduate schools as having any special opportunities or deserving any special recognition in his theory of liberal education. It would almost seem as tho the final practical outcome of his argument were

the abandonment of Greek by Harvard College as a condition of the bachelor's degree, and as tho this had controlled the discussion of his theme.

We do not overlook the many important truths which this argument includes, nor the favorable and sometimes brilliant eloquence with which these truths are uttered. But we cannot for this reason disguise from ourselves the manifest sophistry of most of his reasonings and the one-sided conclusions to which his reasonings have led him. We take the liberty, in conclusion, to express our own opinions upon the several points which are involved in this discussion, thereby exposing ourselves to the hazard of a counter-criticism.

We begin in the old-fashioned way inherited from "the infantile civilization" of the Greeks of defining the term Liberal Education in its import and application. In its import and idea it means that kind of culture which tends to perfect the man in the variety and symmetry and effectiveness of his powers, by reflection and self-knowledge, by self-control and self-expression, as contrasted with that which brings wealth or skill or fame or power. It includes the most varied knowledge of facts, not as facts, but as illustrations of principles and laws; hence the knowledge of nature, including spirit as well as matter, knowledge recorded and exemplified in history, pre-eminently of man as an interpreter of nature, and therefore as capable of science; of man, also, as a creature of imagination and ideal culture, and therefore as capable of literature, art, and ethics in individual and social life. It involves the study and mastery of language by which science is fixed, transmitted, and preserved, and the aspirations and passions of the human soul are expressed and conveyed for the inspiration and culture of the race.

While all knowledge is liberalizing in its tendency, we call that knowledge liberal by eminence which tends to deepen the reflective and stimulate the imaginative and emotional nature as contrasted with that knowledge which brings profit or power or reputation, or is an art or handicraft or means of gain. Or, if we may define it in another way, whatever knowledge connects man with his race by a common sympathy is liberal as distinguished from that knowledge which exalts or isolates him as an individual. Scientific and professional studies may be pursued in a liberal spirit. Linguistic and literary studies

may be the opposite of liberal in their influence. There ought, however, to be no conflict between these classes of studies, least of all when prosecuted in the generous atmosphere of a college or university. Both, however, may become illiberal when single branches or spheres of knowledge are pursued apart, or are urged by their advocates to the exclusion or disadvantage of others, or are esteemed for their utilitarian or selfish value. They are all, moreover, branches of a common stem and spring from a common root—viz., the manhood whose intellect feeds on common truths and obeys common laws. Hence the possibility and the necessity of common schools and common studies to a larger extent than those which are special. Hence the enormity of the error in principle that elective studies should begin early in the school-life, especially in view of the fact that four or five languages, with science and history and literature, should be known by every well-educated man, and that a good training in what is common is the best preparation for what is special. Hence the folly of the complaint that so much study and acquisition is required which a man can never use: as if every man were not always required to use his mind, and as if the mind did not need to be trained by substantially the same processes.

It is obvious that a course of liberal culture, as thus conceived, must require time. The laws of the body and of the mind forbid that the work of two years should be done in one. Such a course should also begin early in life and be prosecuted according to the laws of the mind's normal development. What is of still greater consequence, these studies should follow a certain order and should be prosecuted with diligence and directed by skill. The study of the forms of language, of geography, of the leading facts of history, and whatever tasks the memory should come first. This is the place for natural history, with its culture of the powers of observation and its awakening and stimulating observation of nature. So soon as school-life begins, and even before, the study of English should begin in the careful training to the exact and elegant use of the mother-tongue with the elements of French and German in order to make familiar the use of grammatical construction, and to prepare as soon as possible for the severer analysis which the Latin and Greek will exact for the discipline of later years. Then should

follow the protracted life of the school, on which so much depends and to which so little importance is attached by many theorizers upon college education. Here we take space to say that the failures of college and university life are to be traced in more than three quarters of instances to failures in the preparatory school. These failures may be moral on the part of the family or teacher or the pupil, involving laziness, neglect, or perverseness—failures which no subsequent hospital of university electives adapted to the genius or taste of *the incurables* will ever reach. Often there is sheer waste of time from dawdling, through weakness on the part of teacher or parent, or because of some stupidity of theory or routine in one or both. Still oftener there is waste from a want of adaptation to the order of mental development such as stupefies the mind by abstractions of grammar beyond the capacity of youth to vivify and apply. Whatever the causes of failure may be, the evidence is abundant that the school-life is long enough when used as it should be to provide not only for the mastery of the elements of the classical languages, but also for that of German and French under favoring circumstances,—with all the knowledge of natural history which is desirable, except for those whom Nature has set apart as her special votaries and gifted with enthusiasm for physics only. Let this school-preparation be adequate and the college course need be a failure to none, altho to expect eminent success for every individual is to dream only to awake to disappointment. It is well to remember that whatever be the system, whether enforced or elective, whether preceded by ample or stinted preparation, all students are not equally capable, nor all equally laborious, nor all equally earnest and upright. To teach or to reason that by a system of electives every student can find a series of studies which he will accept with enthusiasm and prosecute with delight is to reason against nature and experience, and therefore to declaim and argue against common-sense. That there are adaptations in some natures to certain classes of studies and against others is true, but these fittings and "misfits," as they are conceived, often prove just the opposite of the conclusions which are drawn from them, i.e., that the student often most needs the discipline to which he is least inclined.

The leading idea which runs through whatever argument there is in President Eliot's essay is that it is in vain to expect or

attempt to give the modern student any so-called general acquaintance with the cycle of modern literature and science, and that the best liberal education is secured by proposing the mastery of one or two affiliated branches of knowledge. We regret this most sincerely; we hold it to be a sin against modern opportunities and modern light, and urge against it the manifest aspirations and achievements of many ardent and enthusiastic students and the successful achievements of not a few. The related doctrine which is constantly assumed as axiomatically true, that the best advantages of general culture can be gained by mastering a favorite study and giving one's principal force to a chosen or predestined course of limited reading, has just enough plausibility to make it a dangerous error. The limitation of the writer's horizon of discussion to the undergraduate course of what he calls university life, with his contemptuous neglect of the equally if not more important four or six years of school or gymnasial preparation, and the entire absence of any sympathy with a curriculum which extends beyond the Bachelor's degree, indicates that his mind is preoccupied with the defence and enlargement of the special curriculum of Harvard College and its capacities to accommodate a larger number of students by narrowing the qualifications for admission to the Bachelor's degree to limited classes of studies, under the plausible pretext of doing greater justice to the demands of modern science. Consistency would seem to demand that the abandonment of Greek as a part of the required curriculum after admission to Harvard College, which has been already determined on, will soon be followed by abandoning this requirement of it altogether.

We need not say that we have no concern with the special reasons which may favor this conclusion so far as Harvard College is concerned. We confess to the warmest and most wakeful interest in the views or principles which are expressed by its honored president in relation to the studies and discipline of what is generally known as a liberal education, but we find no occasion to apologize for the expression of positive dissent from some of the conclusions which he urges and the reasons by which he would support them. We do not forget, however, as we have already intimated, that Harvard College is connected with the sister-colleges by a common relationship of which the

so-called academic degrees are supposed to be the symbols. These degrees are the passport to a certain kind and measure of public esteem, as having a common signification. They are in a certain sense common property, a kind of trade-mark or certificate, and recognized by common respect and in some cases by civil statute. This respect may often be ill-founded and excessive, and yet it may be of some value and at times have no little practical importance. Any measure which tends to make doubtful their significance or diminish the respect in which these degrees are held affects the interests and rights of all the institutions which give them, and is in a certain sense an offence against the common faith and common understanding which exist among educated men. Neither Harvard College nor any other college has any exclusive property in the degree of Bachelor of Arts, nor any right to dispose of it as it pleases, which is recognized by the court of either common-sense or the common faith of the educated community.

We have already referred to the supplementary matter contained in the third edition of Mr. Adams's address. Some portions of it seem to justify a few words of comment.

The brief address upon the study of Greek by Mr. George S. Merriam, a graduate of Yale, a good student and successful teacher of Greek, is given at length and with evident satisfaction by Mr. Adams, as on the whole sustaining the opinions of his own discourse. We find in the admirable candor and even-handed justice which characterize his remarks, as well as in his lucid and compact statements and the sparkling felicity of his style, abundant evidence that the Greek culture which he enjoyed has produced its legitimate fruits. Indeed, in every word and every sentence that he utters, even when he is most polemic in his onsets, he shows the results of Greek culture in striking contrast to the almost fanatical iconoclasm of such a writer as the editor of the *Popular Science Monthly*, whose unqualified hostility to classical study seems to be tempered by scant courtesy. Mr. Merriam's testimony is also positive proof that his Greek studies not only did him great service, but left valuable memories. His regret respecting them is twofold, being precisely what many scholars feel, that he did not prosecute them far enough to read the best authors with facility and pleasure, and that somehow or other they seemed to him to

have crowded out the knowledge of nature and of history which he now thinks he misses so sadly. His criticism of his Greek studies as pursued by himself is summed up in the query, Are they worth the two years which they cost out of the eight or ten of his student-life? His question is fairly answered by another, and supplemented by one or two more: Is he quite certain that, defective as these results seem to be, any other studies would have left so much good behind? Would he not find, should he seek again, that no quarter or fifth of his school and college life has left similar results in mental agility, in the capacity to think clearly and to express his thoughts with pith and point, in the power to penetrate and dissipate shams, which deserve to be compared with those which were the unquestioned fruits of his Greek training? It is indeed a pity that he did not turn what in a sense was a laborious pleasure, and yet a pleasure, into a positive joy by adding only six months more to those studies. Possibly he would confess that had he exercised a more docile faith in the experience of others and less of the roving impulse that comes from the rush and excitement of modern literature and life, his testimony to the value of Greek would have been qualified by no such misgiving.

We sympathize most cordially with his plaint that he was not made familiar in the golden time of his early life with the knowledge of nature and the modern languages. Doubtless he had time enough in his pre-collegiate studies to learn more than the elements of French and German, and also to become familiar with natural history, had he only been taught those elementary lessons which might perhaps have made him an enthusiastic devotee of the world's present beauty and the wonders of its geologic history. But for this failure of his youth, the college which gave him books in place of "things" and speculations and theories in place of "objects" is not so greatly to blame, as he would have discovered had he attempted himself to teach chemistry or geology or physics or astronomy as he taught Greek. That his college taught him so much of ancient and so little of modern history surprises him at the review, but perhaps he ought to be surprised at himself the more that he had so little sense of his own wants and so little desire in himself to supply those which he felt—so little, in short, of that self-culture which the most complete curriculum always supposes,

and for which it can never be a substitute. The history of every enterprising student will certainly attest to the truth that his self-imposed and self-inspired studies have been his most valuable studies, and that these have not only maintained the keenest delight, but have kindled the most enduring inspiration. Not unfrequently there comes out of the forest or the mountains a student whose youthful opportunities have been the most scanty, who strides before a score of those who have been trained by the wisest of tutors and after the most approved modern methods in the knowledge of "things" as well as of words. This does not prove, indeed, that the best of methods and teachers are not of priceless value, but it ought at least to enforce the truth, which is too often lost sight of in these days of school conventions and university theorists, that, after all that systems and text-books can do, a wide margin of duty and opportunity is left wherein the individual student "must minister to himself," and consequently that neither the school nor the college nor the university can do everything and ought not to be held responsible for results which only the individual can determine. What is true of the individual student is true of the individual teacher. No institution or system will work itself by its own self-moving or self-directing force. Whether it be Greek or physics or history or polity that are taught, whether ancient or modern studies, they must be individualized more or less by the men who impart them in order that they may be assimilated by the man who receives them. The assumption that a curriculum, if it only be scientific in its theory, will grind out a perfect and symmetrical scholar, or that the teacher has heavier responsibilities than the individual pupil, is unsound in its theory and misleading in a thousand ways in its influence. The experience of every teacher and every school of learning has hitherto taught the lesson that man has not yet become in fact an intellectual machine, however generally he may be regarded as such by many of the current philosophies; that environment may do much, but the individual man can do much more.

We have less occasion to notice the very labored efforts of Professor James to weaken the force of opinion and testimony which are expressed in the papers of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Berlin in the years 1869 and '80. It may certainly be conceded to the critic that the "practical trial" of the two

systems of study, the classical and the non or less classical, was not in all respects fair or decisive, while yet its results may be taken as on the whole as decisive as could be looked for, unless the testimony of these eminent professors is challenged as hopelessly biased by prejudice. No fair-minded man would certainly contend that some of the considerations advanced by Professor James are not entitled to respect, and yet it would seem that the experiment was as fair and as decisive as could ever be.

The long extracts from Professor E. L. Youmans taken from the *Popular Science Monthly* are significant as urging the point made by President Eliot that classical is essentially inferior to scientific culture because "it trains the verbal memory and the reason so far as it is exercised in transposing thought from one form of expression to another," "while the new method cultivates the powers of observation and the faculty of reasoning upon the objects of experience so as to educate the judgment upon the problems of life." "The problems of life," as we understand them, are to a very large extent those which concern human relations, and these are quite as important as those which are commonly called facts or phenomena. To a large extent they are not material relations and are not subjects of sensible experiment or verification. The facts and the reasoning must also be stated in language clearly, forcibly, and convincingly, in order to convince the reason and affect the conduct. To interpret and employ language, even with those who think themselves employed about facts, is consequently one of the chief occupations of all those who have power with their fellow-men, whether their sphere of thought is material or spiritual "things." The pretended contrast between thought and words is not valid, especially when used for so sweeping an induction as that made by Professors Cooke and Youmans or President Eliot. Were it worth so much as they would make of it, neither Mr. Adams's address nor the articles in the *Popular Science Monthly* and the *Century* by these gentlemen would have been written, nor would they have been deemed of so much importance as to call forth this paper which the writer is glad to have completed.

NOAH PORTER.

## SOME DESULTORY THOUGHTS ON MAN IN NATURE.

FEW words are used among us more loosely than "nature." Sometimes it stands for the material universe as a whole. Sometimes it is personified as a sort of goddess, working her own sweet will with material things. Sometimes it expresses the forces which act on matter, and again it stands for material things themselves. It is spoken of as subject to law, but just as often natural law is referred to in terms which imply that nature itself is the lawgiver. It is supposed to be opposed to the equally vague term "supernatural;" but this term is used not merely to denote things above and beyond nature, if there are such, but certain opinions held respecting natural things. On the other hand, the natural is contrasted with the artificial, tho this is always the outcome of natural powers and is certainly not supernatural. Again it is applied to the inherent properties of beings for which we are unable to account, and which we are content to say constitute their nature. We cannot look into the works of any of the more speculative writers of the day without meeting with all these uses of the word, and have to be constantly on our guard lest by a change of its meaning we shall be led to assent to some proposition altogether unfounded.

For illustrations of this convenient tho dangerous ambiguity, I may turn at random to almost any page in Darwin's celebrated work on the "Origin of Species." In the beginning of Chapter III. he speaks of animals "in a state of nature," that is, not in a domesticated or artificial condition, so that here nature is opposed to the devices of man. Then he speaks of

species as "arising in nature," that is, spontaneously produced in the midst of certain external conditions or environment outside of the organic world. A little farther on he speaks of useful varieties as given to man by "the hand of Nature," which here becomes an imaginary person; and it is worthy of notice that in this place the printer or proof-reader has given the word an initial capital, as if a proper name. In the next section he speaks of the "works of Nature" as superior to those of art. Here the word is not only opposed to the artificial, but seems to imply some power above material things and comparable with or excelling the contriving intelligence of man. I do not mean by these examples to imply that Darwin is in this respect more inaccurate than other writers. On the contrary, he is greatly surpassed by many of his contemporaries in the varied and fantastic uses of this versatile word. An illustration which occurs to me here, as at once amusing and instructive, is an expression used by Romanes, one of the cleverest of the followers of the great evolutionist, and which appears to him to give a satisfactory explanation of the mystery of elevation in nature. He says, "Nature selects the best individuals out of each generation to live." Here nature must be an intelligent agent or the statement is simply nonsensical. The same alternative applies to much of the use of the favorite term "natural selection." In short, those who use such modes of expression would be more consistent if they were at once to come back to the definition of Seneca, that nature is "a certain divine purpose manifested in the world."

The derivation of the word gives us the idea of something produced or becoming, and it is curious that the Greek *physis*, tho etymologically distinct, conveys the same meaning—a coincidence which may perhaps lead us to a safe and serviceable definition. Nature rightly understood is, in short, an orderly system of things in time and space, and this not invariable, but in a state of constant movement and progress, whereby it is always becoming something different from what it was. Now man is placed in the midst of this orderly, law-regulated yet ever progressive system, and is himself a part of it; and if we can understand his real relations to its other parts, we shall have made some approximation to a true philosophy. The

subject has been often discussed, but is perhaps not yet quite exhausted.[1]

Regarding man as a part of nature, we must hold to his entering into the grand unity of the natural system, and must not set up imaginary antagonisms between man and nature as if he were outside of it. An instance of this appears in Tyn dall's celebrated Belfast address, where he says, in explanation of the errors of certain of the older philosophers, that "the experiences which formed the weft and woof of their theories were chosen not from the study of nature, but from that which lay much nearer to them—the observation of Man:" a statement this which would make man a supernatural or at least a preternatural being. Again, it does not follow because man is a part of nature that he must be precisely on a level with its other parts. There are in nature many planes of existence, and man is no doubt on one of its higher planes and possesses distinguishing powers and properties of his own. Nature, like a perfect organism, is not all eye or all hand, but includes various organs, and so far as we see it in our planet, man is its head, tho we can easily conceive that there may be higher beings in other parts of the universe beyond our ken.

The view which we may take of man's position relatively to the beings which are nearest to him, namely, the lower animals, will depend on our point of sight—whether that of mere anatomy and physiology, or that of psychology and pneumatology as well. This distinction is the more important, since, under the somewhat delusive term "biology," it has been customary to mix up all these considerations, while on the other hand those anatomists who regard all the functions of organic beings as merely mechanical and physical, do not scruple to employ this term biology for their science, tho on their hypothesis there can be no such thing as life, and consequently the use of the word by them must be either superstitious or hypocritical.

Anatomically considered, man is an animal of the class *Mammalia*. In that class, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of some modern detractors from his dignity to place him with the

1 "Man's Place in Nature," PRINCETON REVIEW, November, 1878. "The Unity of Nature," by the Duke of Argyle, 1884, may be considered as suggestive of the thoughts of this article.

monkeys in the order *Primates*, he undoubtedly belongs to a distinct order. I have elsewhere argued that if he were an extinct animal the study of the bones of his hand or of his head would suffice to convince any competent palæontologist that he represents a distinct order, as far apart from the highest apes as they are from the carnivora. That he belongs to a distinct family no anatomist denies, and the same unanimity of course obtains as to his generic and specific distinctness. On the other hand, no zoological systematist now doubts that all the races of men are specifically identical. Thus we have the anatomical position of man firmly fixed in the system of nature, and he must be content to acknowledge his kinship not only with the higher animals nearest to him, but with the humblest animalcule. With all he shares a common material and many common features of structure.

When we ascend to the somewhat higher plane of physiology we find in a general way the same relationship to animals. Of the four grand leading functions of the animal, nutrition, reproduction, voluntary motion, and sensation, all are performed by man as by other animals. Here, however, there are some marked divergences connected with special anatomical structures on the one hand and with his higher endowments on the other. With regard to food, for example, man might be supposed to be limited by his masticatory and digestive apparatus to succulent vegetable substances. But by virtue of his inventive faculties he is practically unlimited, being able by artificial processes to adapt the whole range of vegetable and animal food substances to his use. He is very poorly furnished with natural tools to aid in procuring food, as claws, tusks, etc., but by invented implements he can practically surpass all other creatures. The long time of helplessness in infancy, while it is necessary for the development of his powers, is a practical disadvantage which leads to many social arrangements and contrivances specially characteristic of man. Man's sensory powers, while inferior in range to those of many other animals, are remarkable for balance and completeness, leading to perceptions of differences in colors, sounds, etc., which lie at the foundation of art. The specialization of the hand again connects itself with contrivances which render an animal naturally de-

fenceless the most formidable of all, and an animal naturally gifted with indifferent locomotive powers able to outstrip all others in speed and range of locomotion. Thus the physiological endowments of man, while common to him with other animals, and in some respects inferior to theirs, present in combination with his higher powers points of difference which lead to the most special and unexpected results.

In his psychical relations, using this term in its narrower sense, we may see still greater divergences from the line of the lower animals. These may no doubt be connected with his greater volume of brain; but recent researches seem to show that brain has more to do with motory and sensory powers than with those that are intellectual, and thus that a larger brain is only indirectly connected with higher mental manifestations. Even in the lower animals it is clear that the ferocity of the tiger, the constructive instinct of the beaver, and the sagacity of the elephant depend on psychical powers which are beyond the reach of the anatomist's knife, and this is still more markedly the case in man. Following in part the ingenious analysis of Mivart, we may regard the psychical powers of man as reflex, instinctive, emotional, and intellectual; and in each of these aspects we shall find points of resemblance to other animals, and of divergence from them. In regard to reflex actions, or those which are merely automatic, inasmuch as they are intended to provide for certain important functions without thought or volition, their development is naturally in the inverse ratio of psychical elevation, and man is consequently in this respect in no way superior to lower animals. The same may be said with reference to instinctive powers, which provide often for complex actions in a spontaneous and unreasoning manner. In these also man is rather deficient than otherwise; and since from their nature they limit their possessors to narrow ranges of activity, and fix them within a definite scope of experience and efficiency, they would be incompatible with those higher and more versatile inventive powers which man possesses. The comb-building instinct of the bee, the nest-weaving instinct of the bird, are fixed and invariable things, obviously incompatible with the varied contrivance of man, and while instinct is perfect within its narrow range it cannot rise

beyond this into the sphere of unlimited thought and contrivance. Higher than mere instinct are the powers of imagination, memory, and association, and here man at once steps beyond his animal associates, and develops these in such a variety of ways that even the rudest tribes of men, who often appear to trust more to these endowments than to higher powers, rise into a plane immeasurably above that of the highest and most intelligent brutes, and toward which they are unable, except to a very limited degree, to raise those of the more domesticable animals which they endeavor to train into companionship with themselves. It is, however, in these domesticated animals that we find the highest degree of approximation to ourselves in emotional development, and this is perhaps one of the points that fits them for such human association. In approaching the higher psychical endowments the affinity of man and the brute appears to diminish and at length to cease, and it is left to him alone to rise into the domain of the rational and ethical.

Those supreme endowments of man we may, following the nomenclature of ancient philosophy and of our Sacred Scriptures, call "pneumatical" or spiritual. They consist of consciousness, reason, and moral volition. That man possesses these powers every one knows; that they exist or can be developed in lower animals no one has succeeded in proving. Here at length we have a severance between man and material nature. Yet it does not divorce him from the unity of nature, except on the principles of atheism. For if it separates him from animals it allies him with the Power who made and planned the animals. To the naturalist the fact that such capacities exist in a being who in his anatomical structure so closely resembles the lower animals, constitutes an evidence of the independent existence of those powers and of their spiritual character and relation to a higher power which, I think, no metaphysical reasoning or materialistic scepticism will suffice to invalidate. It would be presumption, however, from the standpoint of the naturalist to discuss at length the powers of man's spiritual being. I may refer merely to a few points which illustrate at once his connection with other creatures, and his superiority to them as a higher member of nature.

And first we may notice those axiomatic beliefs which lie at the foundation of human reasoning, and which, while apparently in harmony with nature, do not admit of verification except by an experience impossible to finite beings. Whether these are ultimate truths or merely results of the constitution bestowed on us or effects of the direct action of the creative mind on ours, they are to us like the instincts of animals—infallible and unchanging. Yet just as the instincts of animals unfailingly connect them with their surroundings, our intuitive beliefs fit us for understanding nature and for existing in it as our environment. These beliefs also serve to connect man with his fellow man, and in this aspect we may associate with them those universal ideas of right and wrong, of immortality, and of powers above ourselves, which pervade humanity.

Another phase of this spiritual constitution is illustrated by the ways in which man, starting from powers and contrivances common to him and animals, develops them into new and higher uses and results. This is markedly seen in the gift of speech. Man, like other animals, has certain natural utterances expressive of emotions or feelings. He can also, like some of them, imitate the sounds produced by animate or inanimate objects. But when he develops these gifts into a system of speech expressing not mere sounds occurring in nature, but by association and analogy with these, properties and relations of objects and general and abstract ideas, he rises into the higher sphere of the spiritual. He thus elevates a power of utterance common to him with animals to a higher plane, and connecting it with his capacity for understanding nature and arriving at general truths, asserts his kinship to the great creative mind and furnishes a link of connection between the material universe and the spiritual creator.

The manner of existence of man in nature is as well illustrated by his arts and inventions as by anything else; and these serve also to enlighten us as to the distinction between the natural and the artificial. Naturalists often represent man as dependent on nature for the first hints of his useful arts. There are in animal nature tailors, weavers, masons, potters, carpenters, miners, and sailors independently of man, and many of the tools, implements, and machines which he is said

to have invented were perfected in the structures of lower animals long before he came into existence. In all these things man has been an assiduous learner from nature, tho in some of them, as for example in the art of aërial navigation, he has striven in vain to imitate the powers possessed by other animals. But it may well be doubted whether man is in this respect so much an imitator as has been supposed, and whether the resemblance of his plans to those previously realized in nature does not depend on that general fitness of things which suggests to rational minds similar means to secure similar ends. But in saying this we in effect say that man is not only a part of nature, but that his mind is in harmony with the plans of nature, or, in other words, with the methods of the creative mind. Man is also curiously in harmony with external nature in the combination in his works of the ideas of plan and adaptation, of ornament and use. In architecture, for example, devising certain styles or orders, and these for the most part based on imitations of natural things; he adapts these to his ends just as in nature types of structure are adapted to a great variety of uses, and he strives to combine, as in nature, perfect adaptation to use with conformity to type or style. So in his attempts at ornament he copies natural forms, and uses these forms to decorate or conceal parts intended to serve essential purposes in the structure. This is at least the case in the purer styles of construction. It is in the more debased styles that arches, columns, triglyphs, or buttresses are placed where they can serve no useful purpose, and become mere excrescences. But in this case the abnormality resulting breeds in the beholder an unpleasing mental confusion, and causes him, even when he is unable to trace his feelings to their source, to be dissatisfied with the result. Thus man is in harmony with that arrangement of nature which causes every ornamental part to serve some use, and which unites adaptation with plan.

The following of nature must also form the basis of those fine arts which are not necessarily connected with any utility, and in man's pursuit of art of this kind we see one of the most recondite and at first sight inexplicable of his correspondences with the other parts of nature, for there is no other creature

that pursues art for its own sake. Modern archæological discovery has shown that the art of sculpture began with the oldest known races of man, and that they succeeded in producing very accurate imitations of natural objects. But from this primitive starting-point two ways diverge. One leads to the conventional and the grotesque, and this course has been followed by many semi-civilized nations. Another leads to accurate imitation of nature, along with new combinations arising from the play of intellect and imagination. Let us look for a moment at the actual result of the development of these diverse styles of art, and at their effect on the culture of humanity as existing in nature. We may imagine a people who have wholly discarded nature in their art and have devoted themselves to the monstrous and the grotesque. Such a people, so far as art is concerned, separates itself widely from nature and from the mind of the Creator, and its taste and possibly its morals sink to the level of the monsters it produces. Again, we may imagine a people in all respects following nature in a literal and servile manner. Such a people would probably attain to but a very moderate amount of culture, but having a good foundation, it might ultimately build up higher things. Lastly, we may fancy a people who, like the old Greeks, strove to add to the copying of nature a higher and ideal beauty by combining in one the best features of many natural objects, or devising new combinations not found in nature itself. In the first of these conditions of art we have a falling away from or caricaturing of the beauty of nature. In the second we have merely a pupilage to nature. In the third we find man aiming to be himself a creator, but basing his creations on what nature has given him. Thus all art worthy of the name is really a development of nature. It is true the eccentricities of art and fashion are so erratic that they may often seem to have no law. Yet they are all under the rule of nature; and hence even uninstructed common-sense, unless dulled by long familiarity, detects in some degree their incongruity, and tho it may be amused for a time, at length becomes wearied with the mental irritation and nervous disquiet which they produce.

I may be permitted to add that all this applies with still greater force to systems of science and philosophy. Ultimately

these must all be tested by the verities of nature to which man necessarily submits his intellect, and he who builds for aye must build on the solid ground of nature. The natural environment presents itself in this connection as an educator of man. From the moment when infancy begins to exercise its senses on the objects around, this education begins—training the powers of observation and comparison, cultivating the conception of the grand and beautiful, leading to analysis and abstract and general ideas. Left to itself it is true this natural education extends but a little way, and ordinarily it becomes obscured or crushed by the demands of a hard utility, or by an artificial literary culture, or by the habitude of monstrosity and unfitness in art. Yet when rightly directed it is capable of becoming an instrument of the highest culture, intellectual, æsthetic, and even moral. I have in a previous article on evolution in education insisted on the importance of following nature in the education of the young, and of dropping much that is arbitrary and artificial. Here I would merely remark, that when we find that the accurate and systematic study of nature trains most effectually some of the more practical powers of mind, and leads to the highest development of taste for beauty in art, we see in this relation the unity of man and nature, and the unity of both with something higher than either.

It may, however, occur to us here that when we consider man as an improver and innovator in the world, there is much that suggests a contrariety between him and nature, and that instead of being the pupil of his environment he becomes its tyrant. In this aspect man and especially civilized man appears as the enemy of wild nature, so that in those districts which he has most fully subdued many animals and plants have been exterminated, and nearly the whole surface has come under his processes of culture, and has lost the characteristics which belonged to it in its primitive state. Nay more, we find that by certain kinds of so-called culture man tends to exhaust and impoverish the soil, so that it ceases to minister to his comfortable support and becomes a desert. Vast regions of the earth are in this impoverished condition, and the westward march of exhaustion warns us that the time may come when even in comparatively new countries like America the land will

cease to be able to sustain its inhabitants. Behind this stands a still farther and portentous possibility. The resources of chemistry are now being taxed to the utmost to discover methods by which the materials of human food may be produced synthetically, and we may possibly at some future time find that albumen and starch may be manufactured cheaply from their elements by artificial processes. Such a discovery might render man independent of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Agriculture might become an unnecessary and unprofitable art. A time might come when it would no longer be possible to find on earth a green field, a forest, or a wild animal; and when the whole earth would be one great factory, in which toiling millions were producing all the materials of food, clothing, and shelter. Such a world may never exist, but its possible existence may be imagined, and its contemplation brings vividly before us the vast powers inherent in man as a subverter of the ordinary course of nature. Yet even this ultimate annulling of wild nature would be brought about not by anything preternatural in man, but simply by his placing himself in alliance with certain natural powers and agencies, and by their means attaining dominion over the rest.

Here there rises before us a spectre which science and philosophy appear afraid to face, and which asks the dread question, What is the cause of the apparent abnormality in the relations of man and nature? In attempting to solve this question, we must admit that the position of man even here is not without natural analogies. The stronger preys upon the weaker, the lower form gives place to the higher, and in the progress of geological time old species have died out in favor of newer, and old forms of life have been exterminated by later successors. Man, as the newest and highest of all, has thus the natural right to subdue and rule the world. Yet there can be little doubt that he uses this right unwisely and cruelly, and these terms themselves explain why he does so, because they imply freedom of will. Given a system of nature destitute of any being higher than the instinctive animal, and introduce into it a free rational agent, and you have at once an element of instability. So long as his free thought and purpose continue in harmony with the arrangements of his environment, so long all

will be harmonious, but the very hypothesis of freedom implies that he can act otherwise, and so perfect is the equilibrium of existing things that one wrong or unwise action may unsettle the nice balance, and set in operation trains of causes and effects producing continued and ever-increasing disturbance. This "fall of man" we know as a matter of observation and experience has actually occurred, and it can be retrieved only by casting man back again into the circle of merely instinctive action, or by carrying him forward until by growth in wisdom and knowledge he becomes fitted to be the lord of creation. The first method has been proved unsuccessful by the rebound of humanity against all the attempts to curb and suppress its liberty. The second has been the effort of all reformers and philanthropists since the world began, and its imperfect success affords a strong ground for clinging to the theistic view of nature, for soliciting the intervention of a Power higher than man, and for hoping for a final restitution of all things through the intervention of that Power. Mere materialistic evolution must ever and necessarily fail to account for the higher nature of man and also for his moral aberrations. These only come rationally into the system of nature under the supposition of a Higher Intelligence from whom man emanates and whose nature he shares.

But on this theistic view we are introduced to a kind of unity and of evolution for a future age, which is the great topic of revelation, and is not unknown to science and philosophy, in connection with the law of progress and development deducible from the geological history, in which an ascending series of lower animals culminates in man himself. Why should there not be a new and higher plane of existence to be attained to by humanity — a new geological period, so to speak, in which present anomalies shall be corrected, and the grand unity of the universe and its harmony with its Maker fully restored. This is what Paul anticipates when he tells us of a "pneumatical" or spiritual body to succeed to the present natural or "psychical" one, or what Jesus himself tells us when he says that in the future state we shall be like to the angels. Angels are not known to us as objects of scientific observation, but such an order of beings is quite conceivable, and this not as superna-

tural, but as part of the order of nature. They are created beings like ourselves, subject to the laws of the universe, yet free and intelligent and liable to error, in bodily constitution freed from many of the limitations imposed on us, mentally having higher range and grasp, and consequently masters of natural powers not under our control. In short, we have here pictured to us an order of beings forming a part of nature, yet in their powers as miraculous to us as we might be supposed to be to lower animals could they think of such things. This idea of angels bridges over the otherwise impassable gulf between humanity and deity, and illustrates a higher plane than that of man in his present state but attainable in the future. Dim perceptions of this would seem to constitute the substratum of the ideas of the so-called polytheistic religions. Christianity itself is in this aspect not so much a revelation of the supernatural as the highest bond of the great unity of nature. It reveals to us the perfect man who is also one with God, and the mission of this divine man to restore the harmonies of God and humanity, and consequently also of man with his natural environment in this world and with his spiritual environment in the higher world of the future. If it is true that nature now groans because of man's depravity, and that man himself shares in the evils of this disharmony with nature around him, it is clear that if man could be restored to his true place in nature he would be restored to happiness and to harmony with God, and if on the other hand he can be restored to harmony with God, he will then be restored also to harmony with his natural environment, and so to life and happiness and immortality. It is here that the old story of Eden, and the teaching of Christ, and the prophecy of the New Jerusalem strike the same note which all material nature gives forth when we interrogate it respecting its relations to man. The profound manner in which these truths appear in the teaching of Christ has perhaps not been appreciated as it should, because we have not sought in that teaching the philosophy of nature which it contains. When he points to the common weeds of the fields, and asks us to consider the garments more gorgeous than those of kings in which God has clothed them, and when he says of these same wild-flowers, so daintily made by the Supreme Artificer, that to-day

they are and to-morrow are cast into the oven, he gives us not merely a lesson of faith, but a deep insight into that want of unison which, centring in humanity, reaches all the way from the wild-flower to the God who made it, and requires for its rectification nothing less than the breathing of that Divine Spirit which first evoked order and life out of primeval chaos. When he points out to us the growth of these flowers without any labor of their own, he opens up one of the most profound analogies between the growth of the humblest living thing and that of the new spiritual nature which may be planted in man by that same Divine Spirit.

J. WILLIAM DAWSON.

## EMERSON AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTION.

EMERSON is named a Transcendentalist. It is simply another word for Idealist. "What is popularly called Transcendentalism among us," he said himself, in the midst of the Transcendental movement in New England, "is Idealism—Idealism as it appears in 1842." "The Idealism of the present day," he said, "acquired the name of Transcendental from the use of that term by Immanuel Kant, of Königsberg, who replied to the sceptical philosophy of Locke, which insisted that there was nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the experience of the senses, by showing that there was a very important class of ideas, or imperative forms, which did not come by experience, but through which experience was acquired; that these were intuitions of the mind itself; and he denominated them *Transcendental* forms. The extraordinary profoundness and precision of that man's thinking have given vogue to his nomenclature, in Europe and America, to that extent, that whatever belongs to the class of intuitive thought is popularly called at the present day *Transcendental*."

"As thinkers," says Emerson, "mankind have ever divided into two sects, Materialists and Idealists; the first class founded on experience, the second on consciousness; they perceive that the senses are not final; they give us representations of things, but what are the things themselves they cannot tell. The materialist insists on facts, on history, on the force of circumstances, and the animal wants of man; the idealist, on the power of Thought and of Will, on inspiration, on miracle, on individual culture. The idealist concedes all that the other affirms, . . . and then asks him for his grounds of assurance that things are as his senses represent them. But I, he says,

affirm facts not affected by the illusions of sense, facts which are of the same nature as the faculty which reports them. . . . He does not deny the sensuous fact: by no means; but he will not see that alone. . . . Even the materialist Condillac, perhaps the most logical expounder of materialism, was constrained to say: 'Tho we should soar into the heavens, tho we should sink into the abyss, we never go out of ourselves; it is always our own thought that we perceive.' What more could an idealist say?"

In speaking here of Emerson and the philosophy of evolution, and more particularly, as there will be occasion, of Emerson and Darwinism, there is, of course, no intention to imply that we have here an instance of this old antithesis between Idealism and Materialism. Emerson and Darwin represent no such opposition — represent no opposition whatever. It is, indeed, scarcely legitimate to speak of Darwin as having to do directly with philosophy or the problem of the universe at all. He was not a philosopher, but a wise, logical student of the processes of nature, whose results make neither for nor against the principles either of Idealism or Materialism, and were urged for and against neither. Certainly do not make against Idealism--as it is not extravagant to say that Darwin's truth lies in Emerson's philosophy as a natural and essential moment of it. Emerson is precisely a philosopher — ever approaching the problem of the universe both from the soul-side and the nature-side, ever standing, confident and patient, in the presence of the sphinx. Much more than philosopher, but essentially that philosopher, and our greatest, perhaps our only great, philosopher. "The poet," he says, "differs from the philosopher only herein, that the one proposes Beauty as his main end, the other Truth. But the philosopher, not less than the poet, postpones the apparent order and relations of things to the empire of thought. 'The problem of philosophy,' according to Plato, 'is, for all that exists conditionally, to find a ground unconditioned and absolute.'" And it is worthy of noting here, when we speak of Emerson as approaching the world-problem from the side of mind and of Darwin as a student of the principles of nature, that Emerson's own most energetic and systematic attempt to find and formulate the absolute ground of things is the essay on—not the Soul, but *Nature.*

"All that is separate from us, all which philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME,—that is, both nature and art, all other men and my own body,—must be ranked under this name, NATURE."

The little book on "Nature" was Emerson's first authentic utterance. It came a year before the address on the American Scholar, two years before the address to the Harvard Divinity School. It came the year after the publication of Strauss's "Life of Jesus." Yet who divined, in the hubbub of that tumbling of old sanctions, that inspiration even then was speaking at the door, fresh, faithful, positive and jubilant, pausing not so much as to note the collapse of images, but simply speaking the word of the soul under the soul's eternal forms, with the soul's self-vouching and inimitable accent? "The foregoing generations beheld God and nature face to face; we, through their eyes. Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe? Why should not we have a poetry and philosophy of insight and not of tradition, and a religion by revelation to us, and not the history of theirs? Why should we grope among the dry bones of the past, or put the living generation into masquerade out of its faded wardrobe? The sun shines to-day also. There is more wool and flax in the fields."

It was a still, small voice, this little book, which came without its author's name,—still as the coming of the green in May-time,—and few heard it (five hundred copies of the book were disposed of, we are told, only after twelve years); tho as many as heard and received it, to them it gave power to become the sons of God. Its accent was almost drowned by the thunder of Carlyle's "Sartor Resartus," which Emerson gave to America at the same time, to preach, in a way so different, the same Everlasting Yea.

Emerson's first authentic utterance, "Nature" is also, as I have said, the most systematic and sufficient expression of his general philosophy, and the noblest possible expression of a pure idealism—to my thinking, the profoundest philosophical word yet spoken in our New World. It could almost be wished that there might be professorships of this book, "Nature," in our colleges—a not extravagant suggestion, when we remember in how many professor of philosophy means professor of some book so infinitely smaller and poorer, by William Hamilton or

another Scotchman. I think that any young man going out into life with his mind well opened to the real intension and extension of those views of Nature as Commodity, Beauty, Language and Discipline would have more to be grateful for and wherewith to turn his chaos into cosmos than all chapters on the classes of the faculties can possibly be made to yield. What invitations everywhere, and provocations, to excursions into the history of speculation and of every science! Where should we find a more fruitful text for a *Kritik* of Language, which Max Müller tells us is the *Kritik* which our philosophy most needs next? For here we have no mere formal and punctilious thinking,—improved metric scheme of classing roots, Sanscrit or other,—but are borne directly to that primary question why and how it is that spirit symbolizes and bodies itself in nature and in words, and what is the significance and scope of that speech which man has evoked from himself and which remains, firmly conserving his thought, while the generations pass. Where better or more natural ground from which to consider Darwinism itself and the modern statement of self-development? The very motto of "Nature" might well be adopted as the tersest and most pregnant text for our evolution-philosophy:

> "A subtle chain of countless rings
> The next unto the farthest brings;
> The eye reads omens where it goes,
> And speaks all languages the rose;
> And, striving to be man, the worm
> Mounts through all the spires of form."

We are brought by "Nature" into contact with the apostolic succession of the lords of thought, from the Egyptians and the Brahmins to Bacon and Swedenborg. Brought into contact especially with the great modern Germans. They are not cited,—but "Nature," written fresh from the reading of the Germans, of Coleridge and Carlyle, is so instinct with the spirit and purpose of the Transcendental Philosophy, that it were well enough to direct the mind unsatisfied with the book's own fresh and simple word, and craving statement in syllogistic *a*, *b*. *c*, and corollaries of the manner of Emerson's approach to the world-problem, to the pages of Kant and Hegel and Fichte. He takes

us, in the very beginning, to where Kant leaves us in that last page of his Ethics: "If a man would be alone, let him look at the stars. . . . One might think the atmosphere was made transparent with this design, to give man, in the heavenly bodies, the perpetual presence of the sublime." "Undoubtedly," he says, "we have no questions to ask which are unanswerable. We must trust the perfection of the creation so far as to believe that whatever curiosity the order of things has awakened in our minds, the order of things can satisfy." "I maintain," Kant had said, in his great *Kritik*, "that no question, referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble for the same human reason; and that no excuse of inevitable ignorance on our side, or of unfathomable depth on the side of the problem, can release us from the obligation to answer it thoroughly and completely; because the same concept which enables us to ask the question must qualify us to answer it, considering that the object itself does not exist except in the concept." "Beauty," says Emerson in "Nature," "in its largest and profoundest sense, is one expression for the universe. God is the All-fair. Truth and goodness and beauty are but different faces of the same All." This is but another utterance of that central principle of Hegel's Logic—that the Absolute is all and every, and whether we conceive it now as this or that is not a question of false or true, but of completer or less complete definition, a question of the gradation of circles and of the circumference of the present circle.

At the beginning of the chapter on Idealism, Emerson speaks with kindness and with warmth of the extreme subjective theory, for which Fichte stood in the first period of his thought,—or, indeed, for the very illusionism of Berkeley,—and condemns the frivolous who make merry with the theory, as if its consequences were burlesque and as if it affected the stability of nature. "A noble doubt," he says, "perpetually suggests itself, whether the end of Discipline be not the Final Cause of the Universe,—and whether nature outwardly exists. It is a sufficient account of that Appearance we call the World, that God will teach a human mind, and so makes it the receiver of a certain number of congruent sensations, which we call sun and moon, man and woman, house and trade. What difference does it make whether Orion is up there in heaven, or some god paints

the image in the firmament of the soul?" "To the senses and the unrenewed understanding," he says, "belongs a sort of instinctive belief in the absolute existence of nature. Things are ultimates. But the presence of Reason mars this faith. Time and space relations vanish as laws are known. The first effort of thought tends to relax the despotism of the senses, and shows us nature aloof and, as it were, afloat." Turgot said: "He that has never doubted the existence of matter may be assured he has no aptitude for metaphysical inquiries." "It is the uniform effect of culture on the human mind," says Emerson, "not to shake our faith in the stability of particular phenomena," —any distrust of the permanence of laws, he says, would paralyze the faculties of man,—"but to lead us to regard nature as a phenomenon, not a substance." Ideas, he says,—speaking in Platonic phrase,—immortal, necessary, uncreated natures, are accessible to few men, as objects of science, altho all men are capable of being raised by piety or by passion into their region; and in their presence "we think of nature as an appendix to the soul." "Both religion and ethics," he says, "put nature under foot. The first and last lesson of religion is, 'The things that are seen are temporal; the things that are unseen are eternal.'"

To a pure Subjective Idealism, however, Emerson does not commit himself, either in "Nature" or anywhere else. At the very beginning he saw clearly the full circle which it took Fichte his whole lifetime to describe, and the Universal Spirit, constituting and informing all individuals, as all nature, is as distinctly recognized and fundamental in this first utterance as in "Worship" and "The Over-Soul," or as in Fichte's "Way to the Blessed Life." "Idealism," he says,—Subjective Idealism,— "acquaints us with the total disparity between the evidence of our own being and the evidence of the world's being. The one is perfect; the other, incapable of any assurance. . . . Yet, if Idealism only deny the existence of matter, it does not satisfy the demands of the spirit. It leaves God out of me. Then the heart resists it, because it balks the affections in denying substantive being to men and women. Nature is so pervaded with human life, that there is something of humanity in all, and in every particular. But this theory makes nature foreign to me, and does not

account for that consanguinity which we acknowledge in it." Its significance and value, therefore, for Emerson, are simply this: that it serves "to apprise us of the eternal distinction between the soul and the world," vouching the mind to be of the fundamental nature of things. But a complete philosophy demands much more. Emerson's own philosophy goes much beyond. Would we have a just statement, in one word, of that philosophy, we have it in this same "Nature." I know of no other passage where so much of his fundamental thought is so well balanced and compacted as in this following:

"Man is conscious of an universal soul within or behind his individual life, wherein, as in a firmament, the natures of Justice, Truth, Love, Freedom, arise and shine. This universal soul he calls Reason: it is not mine or thine, or his, but we are its; we are its property and men. And the blue sky in which the private earth is buried, the sky with its eternal calm, and full of everlasting orbs, is the type of Reason. That which, intellectually considered, we call Reason, considered in relation to nature, we call Spirit. Spirit is the creator. Spirit hath life in itself. And man in all ages and countries embodies it in his language, as the FATHER."

Nature, to Emerson, "always speaks of Spirit. . . . It is a great shadow pointing always to the sun behind us." "The aspect of nature is devout. Like the figure of Jesus, she stands with bended head, and hands folded upon the breast. . . . The noblest ministry of nature is to stand as the apparition of God. It is the organ through which the universal spirit speaks to the individual, and strives to lead back the individual to it." "The world proceeds from the same spirit as the body of man. It is a remoter and inferior incarnation of God, a projection of God in the unconscious. But it is not, like the body, now subjected to the human will. Its serene order is inviolable by us. It is therefore, to us, a fixed point whereby we may measure our departure. We are as much strangers in nature as we are aliens from God."

This last thought Emerson returns to more than once. "Man is fallen," he says, in a later essay; "nature is erect and serves as a differential thermometer, detecting the presence or absence of the divine sentiment in man. By fault of our dulness

and selfishness we are looking up to nature, but when we are convalescent nature will look up to us. We see the foaming brook with compunction: if our own life flowed with the right energy, we should shame the brook."

An incarnation of God—this, then, is what the universe is to Emerson. "There seems to be a necessity in spirit," he says, "to manifest itself in material forms; and day and night, river and storm, beast and bird, acid and alkali, pre-exist in necessary Ideas in the mind of God, and are what they are by virtue of preceding affections, in the world of spirit." "In the divine order," he says, in the address on "The Method of Nature," "intellect is primary; nature, secondary; it is the memory of the mind. That which once existed in intellect as pure law has now taken body as Nature. It existed already in the mind in solution; now, it has been precipitated, and the bright sediment is the world." Nature he views purely as the projection and symbol of spirit. "Every natural fact is a symbol of some spiritual fact." "Every object rightly seen unlocks a new faculty of the soul." If you wish to understand intellectual philosophy, he said, study natural science. Every time you discover a law of things you discover a principle of mind. Every law of nature, he said, in his lectures on the Natural History of the Intellect, is a law of mind; and it is quite indifferent, he said boldly, in a connection where he would not be misunderstood, whether we say "all is matter" or "all is spirit." For to him matter is all spiritualized, is spirit's other. Carlyle, it will be remembered, had a certain kindness, as opposed to the old dualism, to "your frightful theory of materialism, of man's being but a body, and therefore at least once more a unity." This, he said, may be the paroxysm which was critical, and the beginning of cure.

This thought, that everything in the phenomenal world takes place at once mechanically and metaphysically,—the *source* of the mechanical, however, being in the metaphysical,—was a very constant and fundamental thought with Emerson. "A perfect parallelism," he says, almost in the words of Leibnitz, "exists between nature and the laws of thought." The whole of nature agrees with the whole of thought." Precisely herein,

indeed, is Emerson's key to the interpretation of nature, as we shall have occasion to consider more carefully. "Things are knowable," he says, in the essay on Plato, "because being from one, things correspond. There is a scale; and the correspondence of heaven to earth, of matter to mind, of the part to the whole, is our guide."

The source of Nature in Universal Spirit, says Emerson, is betrayed by that intimate unity which so pervades all its forms as to make each particle a microcosm, which faithfully renders the likeness of the world. In "The Sphinx," the first poem of his first collection, thirty years before Tennyson made his most compact expression of the central truth,—

> "Flower in the crannied wall, . . .
> Little flower—but if I could understand
> What you are, root and all, and all in all,
> I should know what God and man is."

Emerson, as Mr. Stedman has observed, had put it in this wise:

> "Through a thousand voices
> Spoke the universal dame:
> Who telleth one of my meanings
> Is master of all I am."

"A leaf, a drop, a crystal, a moment of time," says Emerson in "Nature," "is related to the whole, and partakes of the perfection of the whole." "The granite is differenced in its laws only by the more or less of heat from the river that wears it away. The river, as it flows, resembles the air that flows over it; the air resembles the light which traverses it with more subtile currents; the light resembles the heat which rides with it through space. Each creature is only a modification of the other." To this great fact of the correlation and the transmutation of forces he returns ever—and to the truth beyond, that all force is quickly driven where it must be spoken of ideally, in terms of thought, of will and intellect. He observes how the law of harmonic sounds reappears in the harmonic colors. He dwells with interest on the fact that that picture which we have of outer nature is no more conditioned by the landscape than by the eye itself. The structure of this it is which determines out-

line, color, motion and grouping. Nature, too, "always wears the colors of the spirit." "The same scene which yesterday breathed perfume and glittered as for the frolic of the nymphs, is overspread with melancholy to-day. To a man laboring under calamity, the heat of his own fire hath sadness in it. There is a kind of contempt of the landscape felt by him who has just lost by death a dear friend. The sky is less grand as it shuts down over less worth in the population."

"There is nothing lucky or capricious in these analogies," says Emerson. "This relation between the mind and matter is not fancied by some poet, but stands in the will of God, and so is free to be known by all men. It appears to men, or it does not appear. A ray of relation passes from all other being to man; and neither can man be understood without these objects, nor these objects without man."

As with the intellectual, so too with the moral. "The laws of moral nature," says Emerson, "answer to those of matter as face to face in a glass." This thought was fundamental in his ethics, and he lost no good occasion to emphasize and urge it.[1] It was part of that grand creed which he spoke from the platform of the Free Religious Association, fifteen years ago: "The moral sentiment speaks to every man the law after which the universe was made." It was the last word of the famous Harvard address of 1838: "I look for the new Teacher, that shall follow so far those shining laws, that he shall see them come full circle; shall see the world to be the mirror of the soul; shall see the identity of the law of gravitation with purity of heart; and shall show that the Ought, that Duty, is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy." It is hinted in "The Preacher"—which, read to the Harvard students of religion forty years after the first address, somehow echoes

[1] This thought of Emerson's, which appears constantly in his writings in most striking forms, and which seems to me of fundamental importance in ethics, I have presented with some fullness in a lecture on "Emerson's Ethics," read at the Concord School of Philosophy and intended to appear in the volume of Concord lectures on Emerson. I would respectfully ask attention to this study from those for whom the present paper may have interest, not only for the sake of the thought here referred to, but for the sake of a clearer exhibition of the relation of evolution to morals, as conceived by Emerson, than is here possible.

every sentiment of that:—"The next age will recognize the true eternity of the law, its presence to you and me, its equal energy in what is called brute nature as in what is called sacred history." But the whole thought was already firmly grasped and clearly formulated in "Nature." "All things are moral," he said here, "and in their boundless changes have an unceasing reference to spiritual nature." "Every natural process is a version of a moral sentence. The moral law lies at the centre of nature and radiates to the circumference." Every chemical change, every change of vegetation, every animal function "shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong and echo the Ten Commandments." He cannot doubt that the moral sentiment which thus scents the air, grows in the grain, and impregnates the waters of the world, is caught from them by man. "Who can guess," he says, "how much firmness the sea-beaten rock has taught the fisherman? how much tranquillity has been reflected to man from the azure sky, over whose unspotted deeps the winds for evermore drive flocks of stormy clouds, and leave no wrinkle or stain? how much industry and providence and affection we have caught from the pantomime of brutes?" Read again the whole of that chapter upon Discipline. Nature is a discipline, he says,—school alike for the understanding and for morals. As Fichte said: Nature is the objectified material of duty.

A notion is abroad—reports itself, upon occasion, in the newspapers—that Idealism is unpractical, careless of fact, even inimical to exact science. Renan has said—I think it is he—that every position has so much to say for itself and is so plausible from some point, that, could a man live long enough, with his mind fresh and virile, he would doubtless champion successively every doctrine and belong to every sect. And thus for each one of us may be reserved the mumps-and-measles period of a believed antinomy between thought and fact. "To a sound judgment," says Emerson, "the most abstract truth is the most practical." But the word of your rigorous and vigorous henchman of "fact" is, Come down from the barren heights of speculation and out of the clouds, to the firm ground of the physical and positive. Shut your *Kritik* of Reason and open your Palæontology, that so we may have some reliable and useful knowl-

edge. In like manner we hear sincere and earnest men counsel, Give up belief in God, that you may economize your forces for humanity; give up believing in the immortal nature of you, that so you may concentrate on a new earth. They think the law of parsimony rules the soul, instead of that other, that to him that hath shall be given, and that giving is getting and qualifying for giving more. Stop this sending of gospel and schoolmaster to Africa and the isles of the sea, they say, and attend to the ignorance and squalor round the corner,—and they ridicule the missionary society. Yet they have to blush more than this other when asked for the census of their own neighborhood activities and self-sacrifices, and for the page of their cash-book which chronicles their dealings with the local vice.

The positivist's appeal to the idealist to leave his Idealism, to strengthen the ranks of reform and regenerate society, is irony's *ne plus ultra*. Its answer is Moses and the prophets; its answer is Christ and the Church; its answer is Luther and Channing and Parker; its answer is Milton and Vane, Plymouth Rock, Samuel Adams and Bunker Hill; its answer is Rousseau and Turgot, the voice of Fichte amidst Napoleon's drums, Cobden and the Corn-law Rhymer, Mazzini and Castelar; its answer is Garrison, the Emancipation Proclamation, and the scaffold of John Brown; its answer is the Transcendental Movement in New England. Never in New England, it seems, was such a turn-out of men to regenerate society as in those two decades. Each man inoculated with the "new views" straightway appears with a recipe for the divine commonwealth in his pocket. It shall come by Brook Farm, by eating potatoes, by temperance, by conventions,—a perennial Anniversary Week,—but it shall come somehow. The labor of those men and women for a new earth was as energetic as their faith in its coming was indefectible and buoyant. But for their labor and their faith, the cause of reform among us would be infinitely behind where it is to-day. On the whole it seems to me, in the light of our own history and thought, that, if our social reformers desiderate in the people a zeal according to knowledge, they had better pray for a new influx of Transcendentalism rather than seek to minimize what we have. For if the time ever should come

when Transcendentalism should be "at bay" in America, then Reform would simply find that it had killed its goose.

The same answer which is given him who seeks to antagonize Idealism and philanthropy stands for him who seeks to show a conflict between speculation and science. The answer is Aristotle and Bacon, Descartes and Leibnitz, Kant, Goethe and Emerson. Kant, and not Laplace, was the true author of the nebular hypothesis, and his name will be identified with it as completely as Newton's with the law of gravitation. He, too, distinctly enunciated the doctrine—altho he called it "a daring adventure of reason"—of the descent of all organic beings from a common original mother, as an hypothesis which "alone is in harmony with the principle of the mechanism of nature, without which a science of nature is altogether impossible." Goethe said, "Nothing could hinder me from boldly maintaining this 'adventure of reason,' as the sage of Königsberg calls it;" and Goethe's own "Metamorphosis of Plants," his "Metamorphosis of Animals," and the whole body of his valuable works in morphology, biology and geology are clear anticipations, and much more than anticipations, of Darwinism and our evolution-theory. "What kind of God," said Goethe, "were he who impelled things only from outside, and let the universe twirl round his finger? God moves the world inwardly, cherishes nature in himself, himself in nature, so that whatever lives and works and exists in him never misses his power nor his spirit." And again: "All members form themselves according to eternal laws, and the rarest form preserves in secret the primitive type. The form determines the animal's mode of life, while, reciprocally, the mode of life reacts powerfully on all form."

Some have raised the objection that these and similar passages of Goethe are "no 'scientific truths,' but only poetical or rhetorical flourishes and images: the type he meant was only an 'ideal pro-type,' no real genealogical form." "This objection," says Professor Haeckel,—and the answer serves for similar objections to Emerson,—"betrays little understanding of the greatest German genius. He who is acquainted with Goethe's thoroughly objective mode of thought, who appreciates his thoroughly living and realistic view of nature, will entertain no doubt that under that 'type' was intended a perfectly real

descent of kindred organisms from common genealogical form."

This truth, that the great pioneering and revolutionizing work in science and the study of nature has so commonly been done by those who have approached the problem of the universe on the thought-side, is certainly interesting and significant. To the man who thinks, it seems to me, not at all a strange thing; yet something surely worth making a note of by the stickler for "facts." "Man," says Emerson, "carries the world in his head, the whole astronomy and chemistry suspended in a thought. Because the history of nature is charactered in his brain, therefore is he the prophet and discoverer of her secrets. Every known fact in natural science was divined by the presentiment of somebody, before it was actually verified." He quotes with pleasure George Herbert's quaint and pregnant lines upon man's "private amity" with the herbs and the stars. He might have quoted those lines of Milton, which Channing quotes:

> "One Almighty is, from whom
> All things proceed, and up to him return,
> If not depraved from good, created all
> Such to perfection, *one first matter all*
> Indued with various forms, various degrees
> Of substance, and, in things that live, of life:
> But more refined, more spirituous and pure,
> As nearer to him placed or nearer tending,
> Each in their several active spheres assigned,
> *Till body up to spirit work*, in bounds
> Proportioned to each kind. So from the root
> Springs lighter the green stalk, from thence the leaves
> More aery, last the bright consummate flower
> Spirits odorous breathes; flowers and their fruit,
> Man's nourishment, by gradual scale sublimed,
> To vital spirits aspire, to animal,
> To intellectual."—*Paradise Lost*, Book V., lines 469–485.

But nothing could illustrate so strikingly the truth that the method of thought is the method of nature as what is called "the Darwinism of Emerson himself—the anticipations and clear expression everywhere of that view of development which our science has adopted and made so cardinal. Of this Darwinism in Emerson much has been made, yet not too much. Darwinism, as we have already noticed, was made the very

motto of "Nature," twenty years before "The Origin of Species" was written. "Nature" is full of Darwinism. "It is essential to a true theory of nature and of man," Emerson said, "that it should contain somewhat progressive." And in the essay on "Fate" he says, "No statement of the universe can have any soundness which does not admit its ascending effort." His quick interest in the questions of natural science declares itself in "Nature" as genuinely as his interest in the soul and life. "Open any recent journal of science," he said, "and weigh the problems suggested concerning Light, Heat, Electricity, Magnetism, Physiology, Geology." But he has slight regard for that physiology or physics which merely concerns itself with particulars and heaps up facts, with no curiosity or thought concerning relations, tendency, and end. "Empirical science," he says, "is apt to cloud the sight, and, by the very knowledge of functions and processes, to bereave the student of the manly contemplation of the whole." "There are far more excellent qualities in the student," he says, "than preciseness and infallibility. It is not so pertinent to man to know all the individuals of the animal kingdom as it is to know whence and whereto is this tyrannizing unity in his constitution, which evermore separates and classifies things, endeavoring to reduce the most diverse to one form. When I behold a rich landscape, it is less to my purpose to recite correctly the order and superposition of the strata, than to know why all thought of multitude is lost in a tranquil sense of unity. I cannot greatly honor minuteness in details so long as there is no hint to explain the relation between things and thoughts; no ray upon the *metaphysics* of conchology, of botany, of the arts, to show the relation of the forms of flowers, shells, animals, architecture, to the mind, and build science upon ideas."

Emerson remarks upon "that wonderful congruity which subsists between man and the world—of which he is the lord, not because he is the most subtile inhabitant, but because he is its head and heart, and finds something of himself in every great and small thing." And this view, thus clear and explicit at the very beginning, in the pages of "Nature," becomes ever more pronounced and prominent in his maturer thought. Half a dozen years later he says, "We can point nowhere to anything final, but tendency appears on all hands; planet, system, constella-

tion, total nature is growing like a field of maize in July, is becoming somewhat else. The embryo does not more strive to be man than yonder burr of light we call a nebula tends to be a ring, a comet, a globe, and a parent of new suns." This process of evolution, he says, "publishes itself in creatures, reaching from particles to spicula, through transformation on transformation to the highest symmetries, arriving at consummate results without a shock or a leap. . . . How far off is the trilobite, how far the quadruped! How inconceivably remote is man! All duly arrive, and then race after race of men. It is a long way from granite to oyster; farther yet to Plato, and the preaching of the immortality of the soul. Yet all must come, as surely as the first atom has two sides." This, note, twenty years before men heard of "Darwinism." "In ignorant ages," says Emerson, "it was common to vaunt the human superiority by underrating the instinct of other animals. Better discernment finds that the only difference is of less and more." Again: "'Tis a long scale from the gorilla to the gentleman,—from the Gorilla to Plato, Newton, Shakespeare,—to the sanctities of religion, to the refinements of legislation, the summits of science, art, and poetry. The beginnings are slow and infirm, but 'tis an always accelerated march."

Passages of this sort could of course be multiplied indefinitely. The reference in "Bacchus" to the ascent of life from form to form still remains incomparable, as Mr. Stedman has observed, for terseness and poetic illumination:

> "I, drinking this,
> Shall hear far Chaos talk with me;
> Kings unborn shall walk with me;
> And the poor grass shall plot and plan
> What it will do when it is man."

Lines in "Wood-notes" put the same in different phrase. Perhaps the most definite and sufficient statement of the doctrine by Emerson is that in the second essay on Plato. "Modern science," he said here,—this was ten years before Darwin,—"by the extent of its generalizations has learned to indemnify the student of man for the defects of individuals, by tracing growth and ascent in races, and, by the simple expedient of lighting up the vast background, generates a feeling of complacency and

hope. The human being has the saurian and the plant in his rear. His arts and sciences, the easy issue of his brain, look glorious when prospectively beheld from the distant brain of ox, crocodile, and fish. It seems as if nature, in regarding the geologic night behind her, when, in five or six millenniums, she has turned out five or six men, as Homer, Phidias, Menu, and Columbus, was nowise discontented with the result. These samples attested the virtue of the tree. These were a clear amelioration of trilobite and saurus, and a good basis for further proceeding. With this artist, time and space are cheap, and she is insensible to what you say of tedious preparation. She waited tranquilly the flowing periods of palæontology for the hour to be struck when man should arrive."

If Idealism be a true philosophy, then it was but natural and regular that Emerson should see and say this betimes. If Darwinism be a true theory of the origin of species and the descent of man, then this insight and conclusion bear notable witness to the primary virtue and validity of Emerson's method. Indeed, if we consider, upon what presupposition are this insight and conclusion, if they be true, so likely and so clear as upon his?

"The possibility of interpretation," he says, "lies in the identity of the observer with the observed. Each material thing has its celestial side; has its translation, through humanity, into the spiritual and necessary sphere." "The reason why man knows about them is that he is of them; he has just come out of nature, or from being a part of that thing. Man, made of the dust of the world, does not forget his origin; and all that is yet inanimate will one day speak and reason." "I announce the good of being interpenetrated by the mind that made nature; this benefit, namely, that it can understand nature, which it made and maketh. Nature is good, but intellect is better: as the law-giver is before the law-receiver."

Intellect is the supernatural, the creator and the sap of nature. Intellect is God, it is the mind in man. "Man must look at nature with a supernatural eye," says Emerson. "Every natural fact is an emanation. Not the cause, but an ever novel effect, nature descends always from above. The beauty of these fair objects is imparted into them from a metaphysical and eternal spring. In all animal and vegetable forms no chemistry,

no mechanics, can account for the facts; but a mysterious principle of life must be assumed, which not only inhabits the organ, but makes the organ." This is the metaphysics of evolution, its philosophy, with Emerson.

And what of man in nature—what of the mind? We are brought by this word to Emerson's point of view. Man is the projection of God in the self-conscious. "The foundations of man," says Emerson, "are not in matter, but in spirit"—and "the element of spirit is eternity." "Man pretends to give account of himself to himself, but at last what has he to recite but the fact that there is a Life not to be described or known otherwise than by possession? What account can he give of his essence more than *so it was to be?* The *royal* reason, the Grace of God, seems the only description of our multiform but ever identical fact."

"I praise with wonder," he says, "this great reality, this Supreme Presence, which seems to drown all things in the deluge of its light. What man, seeing this, can lose it from his thoughts, or entertain a meaner subject? The entrance of this into his mind seems to be the birth of man. We cannot describe the natural history of the soul, but we know that it is divine. I cannot tell if these wonderful qualities which house to-day in this mortal frame shall ever reassemble in equal activity in a similar frame, or whether they have before had a natural history like that of this body; but this one thing I know, that these qualities did not now begin to exist, cannot be sick with my sickness, nor buried in any grave; but that they circulate through the Universe: before the world was, they were. Nothing can bar them out, or shut them in; they penetrate the ocean and land, space and time, form and essence, and hold the key to universal nature. I draw from this faith courage and hope. All things are known to the soul. It is not to be surprised by any communication. Nothing can be greater than it."

"Every scripture is to be interpreted by the same spirit which gave it forth,"—this, observes Emerson, is the fundamental law of criticism. And is it not apparent that all man's efforts to interpret the universe are at once vain and inexplicable, unless it be that he himself is of the same spirit which

gave forth the universe and eternally gives forth? The fact that man doth philosophize and must is the blazing evidence of his oneness with the Mind by which the worlds are and were created.

And that which is implied by speculation is also vouched by freedom and the infinite transformation wrought by Will. "The world," says Emerson, "yields itself passive to the educated Will. It is not fixed, but fluid and obedient." "From the child's successive possession of his several senses up to the hour when he saith, 'Thy will be done!' he is learning the secret, that he can reduce under his will, not only particular events, but great classes, nay, the whole series of events, and so conform all facts to his character." Every jet of chaos which threatens to exterminate us, he says in the essay on "Fate," is convertible by intellect into wholesome force. Fate is unpenetrated cause. The water drowns ship and sailor, like a grain of dust; but learn to swim, trim your bark, and the wave which drowned it will be cloven by it and carry it. Right drainage destroys typhus. Steam, till the other day, was the devil which we dreaded; but Worcester, Watt, and Fulton bethought themselves that, where was power, was not devil, but was God. Could he lift pots and roofs so handily? he was the workman they were in search of. The opinion of the million was the terror of the world, and it was attempted to hold it down with a layer of soldiers, over that a layer of lords, and a king on the top. But the Fultons and Watts of politics, by satisfying the million, have made of this terror the most harmless and energetic form of a State. "Every solid in the universe is ready to become fluid on the approach of the mind, and the power to flux it is the measure of the mind. . . . One after another, man's victorious thought comes up with and reduces all things, until the world becomes, at last, only a realized will—the double of the man."

"Intellect annuls Fate," says Emerson. "So far as a man thinks, he is free." I see not how one can well see this doctrine of freedom challenged without jealousy, so fundamental does it appear to me. I read of late an article by one of our thoughtful men, in opposition to the principle that the freedom of the will is the corner-stone of ethics; and I marvelled at the argument,

—to which Grote, Voltaire, and Mr. John Fiske were made to contribute. "The *free* agent" was grotesquely defined, in the language of Grote, as "one who can neither feel himself accountable nor be rendered accountable." "If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives," it was said,—certainly no one would ever dream of denying so trivial a truism,—"the whole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless infliction of pain." "If, when a robber is executed," says Voltaire, in strange idiom, "his accomplice, who *sees* him suffer, has the liberty of not being frightened at the punishment, he will go from the foot of the scaffold to assassinate on the high-road; if, struck with horror, he experiences an insurmountable terror, the punishment of his companion will become useful to him, and moreover prove to society that his will is not free." "Substitute for the unmeaning phrase, 'freedom of the will,'" says Mr. Fiske, according to this writer, "the accurate phrase, 'lawlessness of volition,' and the theory already looks less plausible." "To write history,"—so Mr. Fiske is also quoted here,—"on any method furnished by the free-will doctrine would be utterly impossible."

I know not in what connection and with what saving explanations Mr. Fiske may have said this.[1] I think he could never have said it at all, save in his propadeutic period. I certainly commend to whoever is inclined to look upon the reasoning of Buckle as "equally legitimate and conclusive with that of Darwin," Mr. Fiske's own essays upon Buckle's fallacies; and very sure I am that the history of America which he promises can be based on no other doctrine than that of freedom. "Does the reading of history make us fatalists?" says Emerson. "What courage does not the opposite opinion show! A little whim of will to be free gallantly contending against the universe of chemistry."

Substitute the accurate term *lawlessness* for *freedom*, it is urged, and the theory already looks less plausible. Substitute *lawlessness* for *freedom*! Substitute Preston Brooks for

[1] The expression, which seems to me an unfortunate one, occurs, as I learn since the above was in type, in Mr. Fiske's "Cosmic Philosophy," vol. ii. chap. xvii. But the expression gives no adequate idea of the purpose of the chapter, which is to show the lawful power of motives.

Sumner, substitute Alcibiades for Plato, and Judas for St. John! The confusion is a monstrous one. Is the lawless State the free State,—or the State where law is perfect and supreme? Who is the free citizen? Is it Gladstone, whose speech on each month's problem we confidently prophesy, by knowledge of the self-determined law of his mind,—or is it the Jingo of the music-hall, whose whim next week or the week after is quite incalculable? Is it the obedient citizen, or the capricious and he who does not feel himself accountable? As I understand it, this is the one who finds himself in jail.

Voltaire's identification of freedom with caprice, with insulation from influences, from motives and causality, is a foolish and trivial thinking. People may think as they will of Carlyle's judgment, that "there is not one great thought in all Voltaire's six-and-thirty quartos;" but few who will not own that he was "positively shallow" upon occasion, when they find him adducing the fact that the sight of a hanging frightens a would-be murderer, as a proof that the will is not free! "Will, pure and perceiving," says Emerson, "is not wilfulness. When a man, through stubborness, insists to do this or that, something absurd or whimsical, only because he will, he is weak; he blows with his lips against the tempest." "If we thought men were free in the sense that in a single exception one fantastical will could prevail over the law of things, it were all one as if a child's hand could pull down the sun." "Let us build altars," he said, "to the Beautiful Necessity, which rudely or softly educates man to the perception that there are no contingencies—that Law rules throughout existence." "If we give it the high sense in which the poets use it, even thought itself is not above Fate: that, too, must act according to eternal laws, and all that is wilful and fantastic in it is in opposition to its fundamental essence."

Man may choose as he will, but he chooses the wrong at his peril, his error or his sin in no wise earning deference from the moral nature of things; and the problem set to man is to gladly will the universal, not to do somehow that which gravitation and the Ought command,—that he must do somehow, or be ground up,—but to do it voluntarily, in the perceiving of its infallible excellence and oneness with the deep base of the

life. "Thank God," said Lessing—he who said, in its place, that deep correlative word, "*Kein Mensch muss müssen*"—"that I *must*, *must do the right*." Herein only is freedom—in obedience, in harmony with right. "The law of liberty," says St. Paul. "Our wills are ours," says Tennyson, in his line, "*to make them thine*." "The last lesson in life," says Emerson, in "Worship," using almost Spinoza's word, "is a voluntary obedience, a necessitated freedom." "Morals," he says, "is the direction of the will on universal ends." But "morals implies freedom and will. The will constitutes the man."

Morals implies freedom, he says,—as the immediate consciousness and common-sense of men have said from the beginning, and the profoundest philosophy from Plato and Aristotle on to Emerson. We need no Kant to prove it by formulas of metaphysics. What else mean the words *responsible*, *blame*, *retribution*, *indignation*? Why else this difference in kind between my feeling toward this stinging viper and that toward this selfish coward or false friend? Aristotle's simple old argument, in his "Ethics," for the free will and consequent responsibility of man, by appeal (1) to our own consciousness, and (2) to the fact that in society we treat one another as free agents, and must do it, whatever our theory, has never been laid nor transcended yet, and is not likely to be in a hurry.

But I know of no profounder word upon this old knot of freedom and necessity than that of Emerson, in the essay on "Fate." I think of no word so profound as this, no system of ethics so great,—for system of ethics it is *in posse*,—save, in somewhat, that of Kant's great *Kritik*.

Nature is no sentimentalist, to Emerson. He believes in no "pistareen Providence, which, whenever the good man wants a dinner, makes that somebody shall knock at his door and leave a half-dollar." It is of no use, he says, to "dress up that terrific benefactor in the clean shirt and white neckcloth of a student in divinity." The world "will not mind drowning a man or woman."

Nor is there any underrating of external influence or circumstance by Emerson. "Every spirit makes its house," he says; "but afterwards the house confines the spirit." "How

shall a man escape from his ancestors?" "At the corner of the street, you read the possibility of each passenger, in the facial angle." "A crudity in the blood will appear in the argument; a hump in the shoulder will appear in the speech and handiwork." You cannot make a poet of "that little fatty face, pig-eye, and squat form." "The election often goes, probably, by avoirdupois weight—and it might be speedier to take the parties to the hayscales than to the ballot-box." Circumstance, nature, the thick skull, is half. "The book of Nature is the book of Fate." Whatever limits us we call Fate—and limitation runs through entire nature. Fate is organization tyrannizing over character.

"But if Fate is so prevailing, man also," says Emerson, "is part of it, and can confront fate with fate. History is the action and reaction of these two—Nature and Thought. Man cannot blink the free will. To hazard the contradiction, freedom is necessary. If you please to plant yourself on the side of Fate, and say, Fate is all; then we say, a part of Fate is the freedom of man. Intellect annuls Fate. So far as a man thinks he is free. He who sees through the design, presides over it, and must will that which must be. If the wall remain adamant, it accuses the want of thought. The one serious and formidable thing in nature is a will." "'Tis written on the gate of heaven," he quotes from Persian Hafiz, "'Woe unto him who suffers himself to be betrayed by Fate!'"

"It is wholesome to man to look not at Fate," Emerson says, "but the other way: the practical view is the other." This takes us back to that place in "Nature" where he declared the advantage of the ideal theory to be that it presents the world in precisely that view which is most desirable to the mind —the view approved alike by philosophy and by virtue. And it indicates the primary principle of his method of reform,—whether dealing with appetite or crime. We have seen how fully he recognizes the power of environment and circumstance. Environment itself is the creation of thought, and it is ultimately and essentially in the control of thought. It is right and signally important that we should direct our efforts to the amelioration of circumstance, that so those results which conform to the results of virtue may be facilitated and more constant.

Indeed, if we consider, this fact, that the melioration of circumstance is also in man's power, and is his prescribed task, bears the same witness to his freedom as his triumph over circumstance. It is the triumph over circumstance—only in broader circle, and vicarious in somewhat. But this triumph over circumstance in every circle is the command of virtue, and the teaching of its necessity and possibility is the cardinal ethical truth of the ideal theory. Above and below and within those seven ancestors wrapped up in thy skin is that new thing which thou art,—and this, and not chiefly those, is responsible for thy depravity and fall. Thou art the doer of this wrong, and not thy father rather,—and deviltry is not all one with dyspepsia. It were not possible for Emerson to write Carlyle's essay on the Model Prison,—but in his vocabulary also *scamp* was not yet an obsolete word nor synonym of invalid.

Amidst many rash and mischievous "philosophies of evolution," it is wholesome to recur to these first principles,—profitable and very necessary at any rate, to consider seriously what is first and what circumferential second. No man in this time, to my thinking, has approached the problem of the world and the soul with mind so capacious and so veracious as our own great thinker—none has spoken a word so proportionate, so rational, and so commanding. The American, at least, has not excuse who, possessed of Emerson's inspired and sacred page, hastens to hang up his logic on psychology and choke intellect and freedom in mechanism, lawlessness, or fate.

EDWIN D. MEAD.

## LORD LYTTON.

THE publication of a biography of Lord Lytton by his son arouses new interest in a man of letters whose career is intimately interwoven with the literary history of the nineteenth century, but whose life and character, until the present time, have never been placed adequately before the world. Beginning his work when the novels of Jane Austen and Fenimore Cooper were still new, when Sir Walter Scott and Lord Byron stood at the head of living English writers, when Miss Edgeworth had not published "Helen," nor Miss Ferrier "Destiny," he survived Charlotte Brontë, Hawthorne, Dickens, and Thackeray, and at his death left in the field Trollope, Charles Reade, Lord Beaconsfield, and George Eliot, all of whom had been his competitors for popular favor. In his time the taste of the public went through many changes; but so versatile were his powers that he was able to satisfy the new demands as they arose and to leave behind him a list of novels so widely differing in subject and style that critics refused to believe that all had come from the same hand. Nor is it wholly on works of fiction that his fame must rest. As a dramatist he has no equal in the nineteenth century; he was an accomplished historian and essayist; while in no sense a remarkable poet, he had in a high degree the poetic temperament. Possessing none of the physical requirements of an orator—his voice harsh, his manner hesitating and awkward—he yet succeeded in holding the attention of the House of Commons and in influencing the course of legislation by clear and brilliant argument. He was, moreover, an excellent man of business both in public and private affairs. Of the many paths of activity on which Lytton entered, he met triumph in several and

failure in none. His works are read with delight wherever the English language is spoken, and translations have made them known in Italy, Germany, and France for fifty years. Of this man much has been written in praise and even more in detraction, but the time has come when a just estimate may be made of the degree in which either was deserved, and of the place posterity may accord him in the particular department of literature where his labors were greatest and most successful.

Edward Bulwer was born in 1803 at Knebworth, a country-seat which his mother had inherited as the heiress of the Lytton family. His father was General Bulwer, a distinguished officer, who married late in life and died while Edward and his two elder brothers were still in their boyhood. The future Lord Lytton was exceedingly precocious, and, being left to the care of an admiring, indulgent mother, he developed early a self-conceit which became responsible for most of the enmity which afterwards accompanied him. His boyish letters from school, where he was found very difficult to manage, were a strange mixture of childishness and affected maturity. At the age of fifteen he had written a number of poems, among them an Ode to a Poker in imitation of Milton's "Allegro," which were published in a volume in 1820. About this time the venerable Dr. Parr wrote the boy a number of letters containing flattery enough to have turned a much older head, and Edward Bulwer had not gone to college before he had acquired a very high idea of his own genius, and had passed through an affair of the heart from which he never fully recovered. At the age of sixteen an abscess appeared in his ear which afflicted him throughout his life and at intervals brought on attacks of excruciating pain. His university career was not distinguished otherwise than by the attainment of a prize for a poem on "Sculpture;" but at this period he applied himself to the study of general literature with a devotion which has left plainly marked traces on his own works. At the age of twenty-one he had made an elaborate plan for a "History of the British Public;" he had acquired laboriously a good prose style, he had studied novel-writing as an art, and had made a good reputation at the Cambridge debating club, where both Praed and Macaulay were among his applauding audience. With his love of books and of self-culti-

vation was combined a spirit of adventure which led him to undertake the solitary pedestrian tours of which so many reminiscences are to be found in his novels. On leaving the university Lytton went abroad, and like his hero, Henry Pelham, plunged into the whirl of Parisian gayety. He returned to England in 1822, full of ambition and confidence. At that time Europe was still full of the martial ardor kindled by the downfall of Napoleon; the greatest reputations of public men were made as soldiers or as statesmen in time of war; the poets and novelists were writing of martial heroes. Under such influences Lytton determined to enter the army. But before he could carry out this intention he met Rosina Wheeler, his future wife, and the opposition of Mrs. Bulwer Lytton to the match made it necessary for him to seek in literature the means of subsistence which he had hitherto received from his mother. With his marriage in 1827 his allowance came to an end, and his professional labors were begun, as they generally are, from necessity. Under the pressure of pecuniary needs, Lytton produced in the ten years following his marriage twelve novels, including "Pelham," "Disowned," "Paul Clifford," "Eugene Aram," and "The Last Days of Pompeii," the work entitled "England and the English," three volumes of the "History of Athens," a number of poems and reviews, besides attending to political duties of various kinds. From 1831 to 1841 he was a member of Parliament, and yet worked so assiduously as to produce several more novels in addition to plays and speeches. His political career, without being brilliant, was highly creditable. Always the advocate of reforms, he was among the first to urge the emancipation of West Indian slaves and the principle of international copyright. In 1838 Bulwer was made a baronet, and in 1843, when he had published about fourteen novels and several plays, he succeeded to the Lytton estates of Knebworth and was relieved of all necessity for money-making. But the industry of his life suffered no abatement. About this time the celebrated plays "Money" and "Richelieu" increased his fame as a dramatist already made by "The Lady of Lyons." After succeeding to his estates he wrote no less than nine novels, including the famous "Caxton" series and "Kenelm Chillingly." In 1856 he was made Lord

Rector of the University of Glasgow. Ten years later he was raised to the peerage as Baron Lytton. He received in addition to his other honors the degree of LL.D. from Cambridge and that of D.C.L. from Oxford; and he retained sufficient vitality up to the time of his death in 1873 to make an entirely new and anonymous reputation with the "Coming Race."

The most prominent feature of Lord Lytton's character was his industry. It was shown before pecuniary wants made it imperative, and it continued long after the necessity had disappeared. Its fruits are shown not only in the literary and political work known to the public, but in the great number of unpublished manuscripts and commonplace-books which he left behind him. This untiring industry, together with great mental fertility and brilliancy, made up the elements of Lytton's genius. A well-known historian has thought it conclusively proved that Lord Lytton was not a man of genius by the fact that he was able to change his style so entirely to suit the taste of the day. But this is paramount to saying that versatility is incompatible with genius; that when a man of genius excels in more than one line of action, he ceases to be such. We are much more inclined to accept the definition of genius as a capacity for taking pains. Lord Lytton has expressed himself on this point very convincingly: "I have an intense belief in the generative virtue of labor; and I look upon genius as concentration of thought upon one point at a time. I do not believe that true genius is confined in its sphere of operation. It is only because few men of genius concentrate as much labor of thought on one point as on another that they are not equally successful in every intellectual effort." Lytton's industry was inspired by a deep affection for books and by an overpowering love of fame. The position of an unknown scholar like his grandfather could never have satisfied him. He longed to be before the world, *monstrari digito*, to have his name on other men's lips. Desire for fame, added to his intense self-consciousness, was the cause of that affectation which made him pose before the world in a character foreign to his own. He believed that the public liked to think of him, not as an ordinary man, but as high-flown and romantic as his fictitious heroes. It was such a feeling as this that made him, in middle life, write thus ab-

surdly of his childhood: "But at least I resembled Homer in one respect. I did not find it necessary to write in order to compose; for before the gross materialism of pot-hooks, mine airy soul had hovered over Hippocrene, strayed through Corycian caverns, and inhaled the fragrance of the blossoms that fell from the garlands of the vine." The same affectation made him always conceal his true age and induced him, in his autobiography, where he carefully chronicled the day of the month and the hour of the day in which he was born, to stigmatize as "curious impertinents" any persons who might desire to know the year of his birth. This unfortunate characteristic was at the bottom of the prolonged and concerted attempt to write Lytton down and at the same time made him extremely sensitive to criticism at a period when the critic's art was at the lowest ebb. He suffered acutely from such ribald and brutal attacks as appeared in *Fraser's Magazine;* but he was generous enough not only to forgive the wretched malice of his enemies, but to extend pecuniary assistance to such of them as applied for it in later years. Among his detractors was the young Thackeray, who afterwards placed his repentance on record. Lytton was afflicted all his life with a constitutional irritability. During his early married life this was so aggravated by the pressure of work under which he struggled and by the conduct of his wife in leaving the petty, domestic cares of the household to be attended to by her overburdened husband, that he was described by a friend as resembling a man who had been flayed and was sore all over. Lytton's affection for his mother, his patience and respect under her displeasure, are qualities not to be overlooked. The story of his unhappy marriage need not here be reviewed. Rosina Wheeler was beautiful and clever, but she abhorred and neglected her household duties, impeding instead of assisting her husband. The separation of the unhappy couple resulted from absolute incompatibility of character. There only remains to be said that while Lord Lytton preserved in regard to his wife a dignified silence, she acted toward him after the separation in an outrageous manner: writing a wretched novel called "Cheveley" in which she maligned him most venomously, appearing in person at the polls to obstruct his return to Parliament, and pursuing him always

with unwomanly violence. Lord Lytton's character presents many admirable traits. His faults were chiefly such as only injure a man's self. None was less jealous of others' fame nor more ready to applaud a rival. He was great in his untiring labor, great in the loftiness of his aims, in the purity of his motives, and in the amount of his accomplishment.

The most striking impression received by a glance over the list of Lytton's works relates to the variety of their character. Novels of Life and Manners, of Criminal Tragedy, of Philosophy, of Supernatural Fancy, of History, succeed each other as the whim of the author or the demand of the public seems to have required. Lytton grew up with the nineteenth century, himself a most characteristic production of it, sharing in its ever-changing tastes and catering to them. In this capacity to vary the theme and to apply the art of fictitious composition to very different objects consists Lord Lytton's chief claim to a foremost place among the great English novelists. Jane Austen, Scott, Thackeray, Dickens, George Eliot, however any of these may excel him in certain respects, none of them has shown the same versatility. They all chose a well-defined field of action within the limits of which they were contented to be master. But Lytton invaded, successfully, every field. His novels succeeded each other indiscriminately, but it will be most convenient to examine them in groups.

The world in which Edward Bulwer grew up to manhood was greatly occupied with romantic ideas. The supernatural glare of the Radcliffe school had been dimmed, if not extinguished, by the practical common-sense of Miss Austen; but Scott and Byron were the ruling literary influences of the day, and society was penetrated by an affectation of sentiment and expression which left deep traces on what may be called Lytton's first series of novels of life and manners. This includes "Falkland," "Pelham," "The Disowned," "Godolphin," "Ernest Maltravers," and "Night and Morning," and differs from the later Caxton series as the product of two separate authors. "Falkland" may be dismissed as the work of a man of twenty-two, condemned by his maturer judgment and withdrawn from circulation. With "Henry Pelham," Lytton at once attained fame. Unnoticed at first, the book soon made a genuine

sensation in London and became an authority in Paris on the customs of English society. It had, indeed, many qualifications for popularity. The plot was extremely interesting and unfolded with uncommon art, the characters lifelike and various, the dialogue brilliant. But the quality which made the most potent factor of its success, and which is most important to Lytton's reputation, was originality. No trace is to be found of the influence of Scott. The book shared far less in the prevailing literary characteristics of the time than the works which immediately followed it. Into this volume the young Bulwer compressed all the impressions of life, the brilliancy, the aspirations which had accumulated in his own mind. It was the portrait of a young man possessing the character and qualities which would fit him for future greatness, but which, as yet, in the heydey of youth, under the fascination of the first view of a life seeming all rose-colored, were lavished on the frivolities of fashion. The affectations of Pelham did away with those of his opposite, the gloomy, guilty Byronic hero who then predominated in imaginative writing. Before Pelham conquered the world by genius, by exertion, he wished to charm it by brilliant eccentricity; to be the darling of fashion before he became the admiration of the Senate. While in the character of Pelham, Lytton was thinking perhaps not exactly of himself but of what he liked to imagine himself, many other characters, as Vincent, Guloseton, Clutterbuck, and even Job Jonson were taken in part from originals known to the author. The habit of weaving in personal experiences was constant with Lytton. Many passages in his novels are autobiographical. But while this method added intensity to his conceptions, it did not greatly increase their reality. Some of the Bulwerian spirit was infused into every character; Guloseton or Job Jonson spoke, not exactly as they would really have spoken, but as the author himself would have done in their place with their characters to keep up. It was as a novel of fashionable life that "Pelham" became famous, but one of its chief merits was that it gave an equally striking view of the extreme end of the social scale. The vulgar villain Thornton is as good in his way as the polished Vincent; the Parisian *salon* is not more vividly described than the London slums.

With the publication of "The Disowned," Lytton, already burdened with cares, his faculties strained by compulsory production, acknowledged that the spirit of creation within him was not what it had been. The novels that immediately followed "Pelham" show a lack of the freshness so charming in that book; the author had evidently lost some of his originality and had succumbed to the influence of the romantic tendencies of the time. In exceptional cases an improvement is manifest. Savile in "Godolphin," who has become a type of the social philosopher as Henry Pelham has of the dandy, is a distinct advance on Guloseton. But the faults of the earlier novels of life and manners come out strongly in "The Disowned," which, even more than the others, was an experiment in the art of fictitious composition while the author was not yet conscious of where his best powers lay. At the time of the composition of this book Lytton had been studying metaphysics, and with his mind full of the subject he resolved to write a novel of which the "development of the abstract" should be the principal object. Thus the characters of "The Disowned" are abstractions rather than real persons: Talbot, representing Vanity; Lord Borodaile, Pride; Warner, Ambition; King Cole, the love of liberty from the point of view of the poet; Wolff, the love of liberty from that of the politician. And the whole book shares in the unreal impression of the characters. In these earlier novels the conversations are full of carefully-prepared philosophizing and flowing phrases. People speak polished essays. A theatrical glare is over everything. When dealing with common people, and especially when seeking to be humorous, Lytton fell into what had been Scott's fault of making one stock phrase answer for the conversation of a character, as in the case of the wearisome Morris Brown. His wealth of imagination tempted him into introducing characters having a doubtful connection with the story in order to get an opportunity to bring in descriptions of a roving gypsy life, or enthusiastic comments on scenery, or quotations from the ancients and moderns. His invention was let loose and allowed to elaborate wherever it chose instead of being confined to the main points. Many incidents shocked probability; estates were won and lost too easily; the changes from wealth

to poverty were too sudden. Notwithstanding their evident faults, these productions contained a great deal to interest the generation to which they were first introduced. They were romantic, unreal, and high-flown, but such characteristics were rather to the public taste fifty years ago. The fulness of their matter and the practical skill of their literary workmanship contained the promise of better things to come.

The extraordinary success of Sir Walter Scott called Lytton's attention to the historical romance. But while the great body of writers who attempted to follow in Scott's footsteps were capable only of imitation, Lord Lytton entered the field with original ideas and produced some specimens of historical fiction which deserve to rank among the very best of their kind in English literature. Scott looked upon history as a rich fund from which to draw the materials for romantic composition. Historical accuracy was of small consequence to him compared with romantic interest. But Lytton adopted the contrary method of using romance to illumine history. Accuracy was his first aim, and fiction was employed to give life and interest to the authentic tale. Thus we naturally find Scott the better romancer, Lytton the better historian. Immediately after the publication of "The Disowned" the first essay in this department was made with "Devereux." The pressure of necessity under which the author was then working, and the false theatrical manner which then marred his composition, told fatally against the book. Neither plot nor incidents were successfully managed. Such characters as Steele, Addison, Pope, Swift, and Bolingbroke were unnatural; the phrases manufactured for them were affected. It was left for Thackeray, more than twenty years later, to do justice to the time of Queen Anne. But when Lytton was travelling in Italy to recuperate from the effects of overwork, he became interested in the history of Pompeii and in the career of the great Rienzi. From his studies in these subjects resulted the two splendid works which established his reputation as an historical novelist. A grander and a more difficult theme could hardly have been chosen than the last days of the fated city. To rebuild these ruins, to re-people them with human beings, was a task from which the most confident might have recoiled. But Lytton brought vividly to

mind the houses and streets as they had been; the gay luxury of the inhabitants, the mysterious rites of the priesthood, and the bloody scenes of the amphitheatre. In the loves and occupations of Arbaces, of Glaucus, of Ione and Nydia, he reproduced the brilliant life of the city. And the final catastrophe, with its awful combination of horrors, is more completely portrayed in his account than in any other. It has been objected to this work that any attempt thus to reconstruct a long-forgotten state of society must have at best a cold and lifeless result. The criticism is by no means devoid of force, but only heightens the author's triumph in the great popularity of the work. It has become a sort of text-book on Pompeii, and has diffused information among many thousands who otherwise would have remained totally ignorant of the subject. At the present time, fifty years after its publication, every town library has its well-thumbed copy of the "Last Days of Pompeii."

Lytton's labors in the department of historical fiction reached their culmination in "Rienzi." This work is not only delightful as a romance, as a fascinating tale of ambition and love placed amid scenes deeply stirring to the imagination; it is, besides, a contribution to history of uncommon value. Previously to the publication of "Rienzi," justice had never been done to the memory of the great Tribune, and even the Italians found in this romance the first correct view of their countryman. A legitimate criticism may be made concerning "Rienzi" to the effect that it contains too much historical material: that the fortunes of persons are deserted too often for the teachings and philosophy of history. But it is easy to forgive this artistic defect in view of the importance of the lessons to be learned from the Tribune's career and the wisdom with which the causes of great political events are traced. The main incidents of Rienzi's life were supplied ready made, but Lytton's invention appears admirably in the management of the minor characters. The adventures of Walter de Montreal are very skilfully interwoven; the loves of Adrian and Irene keep up an undercurrent of tender romance which relieves the more sombre features of the narrative. Over all is cast the glow and warmth of an Italian atmosphere. Lytton's choice of historical subjects was always made with great regard to dramatic in-

terest. He wisely preferred such periods as contained a definite conclusion of some celebrated series of events. With "The Last Days of Pompeii" and "The Last of the Tribunes" he was pre-eminently successful. In "The Last of the Barons" he gave a good view of the time when feudalism was succumbing under the successive blows of knowledge and civilization. But "Harold, the Last of the Saxon Kings," written to describe the causes which made the Norman conquest possible, is entirely lacking in any sort of truth to nature. It contains many beautiful passages, but its dialogue is stilted to a degree sometimes bordering on absurdity.

There are always many persons interested in supernatural topics, and the number of these has been largely increased of late years by the progress of spiritualism, mesmerism, and kindred investigations. Lord Lytton's mind was strongly attracted to such studies; his imagination seized upon them as choice food; his thirst for knowledge was only whetted by their mystery. With the supernatural tales of "Zanoni," "A Strange Story," and "The Coming Race," he entered an entirely new field of labor and added to his already large literary constituency yet another new element. There have been an abundance of fictions, ancient and modern, dealing with the prolongation of life. All of these, however, have represented a compact with powers of evil for the purpose of worldly pleasure. But Lytton's heroes, Zanoni and Mejnour, attain immortality by renouncing the flesh and the devil and by purifying themselves up to the point of etherealization. In "Zanoni" it is represented that there are certain properties of plants and metals which give perpetual life. But these secrets are known only to denizens of the air, and the initiation to their brotherhood is difficult and painful. Only Zanoni and Mejnour have passed through it successfully. Of these two characters, Mejnour has become immortal in old age, his passions and affections dead; he lives on, the incarnation of intellect, a thinking, calm, benevolent, stainless being. But with Zanoni the case is very different. Beginning his immortality in early life, he enjoys immortal youth with the capacity of youth for affection. He falls in love with a mortal, thus alloying his ethereal condition, and he gives up his life for the woman because he cannot survive love. The

obvious moral is that the mind can attain perpetual life, but the passions cannot. In the very beautiful romance of "Zanoni" the immortality attained by purity and self-denial is employed for objects entirely pure. But in "The Strange Story" immortality is sought from low motives and seized by treachery and murder. Hence the hero, Margrave, has a brilliant and captivating appearance, but his nature is cruel and sordid, his enjoyment merely sensual.

Lytton's desire to investigate life and character under as many aspects as possible naturally led him to study the morbid workings of the mind in what may be called his novels of Crime and Tragedy. Of these, "Paul Clifford" and "Eugene Aram" belong to the early period of his literary life, and are marked by the faults prominent at that time. "Lucretia" was published some years afterward, but before the author's genius had attained its best development. "Paul Clifford," published in 1830, was written to advocate much-needed reforms in the treatment of criminals. Lytton's favorite object, to trace the effect of education on character, is the basis of the book. To readers of the present day there is little interest in "Eugene Aram." The aim is to display the defect, in an otherwise noble and enlightened mind, which could permit the great scholar to be seduced into the commission of a murder. But the book is too long in proportion to the amount of material involved; the chief character is so full of contradictions as to become vague; the faults of Lytton's early productions, their straining after effect and theatrical unreality, are always prominent. "Lucretia," the most important of this series, published in 1846, is a horrible study of crime. The mind of Lucretia, first corrupted by treachery, becomes more and more degraded by the desire of revenge, until it reaches total moral perversion under the influence of the diabolical Dalibard and Varney. The number and the horror of the crimes described are so great, the callousness of the criminals so revolting, that the public received the work with unqualified disapproval. This feeling was founded on grounds of both taste and morality. Against crimes connected with passion the reader feels himself least secure, and hence such crimes are not without interest to him. But no one thinks that homicide, especially for purposes of gain, can possibly be among

his temptations. Lytton took up these subjects with a desire to study crime in the abstract in connection with tragedy. But, much to his astonishment, his readers declined to go with him. In "Lucretia" they saw, not a legitimate and careful study of the morbid workings of the mind, but a revolting association with criminals. They missed the author's point, but they had a right to be uninterested in discovering it. On the ground of taste the reading public was correct enough in denouncing "Lucretia," but on that of morality it was entirely wrong. In judging the moral effect and responsibility of an author we must follow certain obvious rules. So long as crime exists it may be written of. But it must be written of truthfully, as crime, never excused, never palliated, never raised to the dignity of heroism. It must never be of a nature to allure. If unattractive it will instil repugnance, not cause imitation. But to this end only some kinds of evil-doing can be legitimately treated. Murder, robbery, treachery, when shown in their true colors, will teach moral lessons only. But licentiousness, even when stamped as guilt and followed by punishment, still finds an ally in the nature of men, and may corrupt when the intention is to reform. Thus Richardson's "Pamela," presenting the most virtuous views and written with a confessedly moral object, contains many scenes which inflame the passions and tend to familiarize the reader with the very vice which the book sought to uproot. But Lytton's novels deal with crimes naturally repulsive to humanity, and leave upon the mind a yet stronger detestation of evil. Lytton was indignant at the charges of immorality directed against "Lucretia," and made no further efforts in the department of fiction to which that novel belonged.

It is singular that while the critics and a great part of the reading public were assailing Lytton so violently for his choice of criminal characters, he was preparing for the press a novel so entirely different both as to matter and manner. "The Caxtons" followed "Lucretia," and was intended as a pendant to that work. Both books had for their object Lytton's favorite theme, the effect of education on character. "Lucretia," of course, depicted the evil effect of early associations and waywardness; "The Caxtons" contrasted with that dark picture

the purity and rectitude of a family life in which affection and unselfishness are the leading characteristics. "The Caxtons" was published anonymously in 1850, exciting a great deal of curiosity and interest. The announcement of its authorship was received with surprise and incredulity. Surprise was natural, for the book not only contrasted so strongly with "Lucretia," but also it differed radically from anything the public expected from its author. There was no trace of the unreal, theatrical manner of his earlier novels of life and manners. While a slightly romantic atmosphere hung about the volume, there was no straining after effect, no stilted conversation, no affectations of sentiment or diction. "The Caxtons" had an out-of-door freshness about it, an abundance of sunshine, a simple chivalry and natural, domestic tone which inclined the world to believe that a wholly new hand was at work. It was with this book that Lytton began his last and by all means his best series of fictions. It is not the least remarkable feature of his career that at the age of forty-seven, when he had already been actively producing for twenty-four years, he should have preserved enough power and freshness to make a new, anonymous reputation. These qualities were not only retained; they were considerably increased. "The Caxtons" is a family picture, showing no more than the domestic relations of a few simple people, but showing them so delicately and sympathetically that the reader is charmed. Austin Caxton, the amiable bookworm, and his brother Roland, the soldierly gentleman, are better than anything the author had yet done except Henry Pelham. Lytton was indebted to "Tristram Shandy" for the main plan of the book. The characters correspond exactly: Austin Caxton to Walter Shandy; Uncle Roland to Uncle Toby; Mr. Squills to Dr. Slap; Bolt to Trim. Both works open in the same way with the birth of the narrator, and in both there is the same absurd accident about naming the child. Many points of resemblance may be enumerated, but still it is untrue to say that "The Caxtons" is a plagiarism on the masterpiece of that most unblushing of all plagiarists, Laurence Sterne. That the work was suggested by "Tristram Shandy" there can be no doubt, but there the obligation rests. "My Novel" was still a step in advance. It seemed as if Lytton had always

something good in reserve. The book is perhaps too long, much longer than the public taste now requires, and its length is largely caused by the conversations of the Caxton family which are sandwiched in here and there, somewhat impeding the progress of the story. "My Novel" has the advantage over "The Caxtons" of a very interesting plot, and it contains the characters of Dr. Riccabocca, Parson Dale, Audley Egerton, and Squire Hazeldean, who retain a strong hold on popular affection. The villain, Randal Leslie, like so many of this writer's villains, is after too ready-made a pattern. There is no hope for him; the author has made up his mind, and the young man has no alternative but to abandon the paths of virtue for ever in the interest of the narrative. All of Lytton's works have a serious object. That of "My Novel" is the discussion of the question whether knowledge is power. This work alone would entitle its author to a place among the first of English novelists. Lytton here touched his highest point; but there was no falling off in "What will he Do with it?" and "Kenelm Chillingly." All the information concerning men and things which had been accumulated during a life uncommonly full was here moulded into form by a hand which long experience and careful training had made consummately skilful. In these novels life was treated in its broadest sense. The reader's attention was no longer occupied with the accidental circumstances affecting one individual, but with those broad tendencies which influence a whole people. Man was studied, not isolated beings. We have said that an air of romance hung about these later works. It is not that single characters or incidents were romantic, but rather that the material realism to which we are now accustomed in literature was wholly absent. Love was not yet calculating the dollars and cents. The weak and erring were not hurried by the inexorable fate of their unchangeable natures to an ignominious end. Virtue was still triumphant, vice still punished. The novelist was a creator, not yet merely an analyst. The author of "Kenelm Chillingly" was a poet, studying life and its problems, but mindful of heaven while walking on earth. There is no better way to appreciate the great mental progress made by Lord Lytton than to compare the two extremes of his work, "Henry Pelham" and "Kenelm

Chillingly." The young, exuberant Pelham saw in the world but a series of obstacles which his strength and wit could easily overcome. It was but a shallow world, to be charmed into favor at first by the graces and to be reduced at last, when folly wearied, by the exertion of will and intelligence. To him, as to all Lytton's early heroes, "there is no such word as fail." Success was a god. But to Kenelm Chillingly life was an inexplicable, an awful problem before which human intelligence stood in doubt. There was a consciousness of duties and responsibilities, but a terrible ignorance of their nature. What had been facts and articles of faith to Pelham, on which he could form a theory of life, were now uncertain or denied. Amidst the growing materialism of the time what place had religion, art, or poetry? These things were of no use. The young man entering life, who had not bread to earn, was without a reason for existence. What should he do? Why should he do anything? Why, like Pelham, should he seek success when success meant the attainment of an object of doubtful value? The times had changed indeed; old standards had been swept away and the new were yet indistinct. Kenelm Chillingly might look longingly out on the world for some worthy aim, for some career in which his own material interest was not the only end. But after all nothing remained but to acknowledge lofty aspiration to be vain, and the commonplace treadmill of life the only pursuit in which disappointment was not the sure result.

Versatility was the distinctive quality pervading the literary career of Lord Lytton. And his versatility was never the result of caprice; he cultivated each department of literature with all the care of which he was capable, aiming at perfection in everything. In far greater degree than is commonly the case with novelists he studied fictitious composition as an art. The plots and construction of his novels were elaborated with the utmost pains. "Pelham," "Night and Morning," and "My Novel" were the most successful in this respect. The unity of aim which he generally attained resulted from the distinctness with which his subjects and objects were outlined in his mind. His were essentially novels of purpose; each one had its well-defined principle to urge, commonly stated at

length in the preface. His favorite subject was the influence of early education and associations on subsequent conduct. It was perhaps on account of the prominence of purpose in Lytton's novels that the characters were often indistinct, if not unreal. Too frequently they represented principles rather than individuals. The author had not the capacity for losing his own identity in that of an imaginary person. Some trace of himself remained on nearly every character he described. He saw his men and women plainly enough, but he looked at them through a veil of fancy. For this reason only a limited number of personages, such as Henry Pelham, Job Jonson, Dr. Riccabocca, Waife, and Kenelm Chillingly, retain a strong hold on the reader's memory. Villains like Crawford, Leslie, Dalibard, and Varney are drawn too much on the theory of total depravity. There is no difficulty in realizing the extent of their wickedness, but we are not sufficiently informed as to how they came to be so bad. With women Lytton was fairly successful: Jemima, Arabella Crane, Nydia, Nina, Irene, Fairy, and Miss Travers are natural and human. Guloseton, the epicure, and Savile, the social philosopher, are typical characters. It was a skilful stroke to have made Kenelm Chillingly so muscular and pugnacious, for otherwise he must have run the risk of being considered a prig. Lytton loved vagabond characters, and sketched them exceedingly well. He shared the pleasure of their wandering life and arranged the effect of their spasmodic appearances in the story with great art. The minstrel in "Kenelm Chillingly," who forms the medium for the introduction of the poetic element, is the individual of this description most delightful to the reader and most beloved of the author. But Morris Brown, intended to relieve the sombre features of "The Disowned" by amusing eccentricities, is merely tedious. It is indeed with serious, meditative, or tragic subjects that Lytton was most at home; his humor was usually forced. He had a clear, flexible style which adapted itself to the varying requirements of his different forms of composition. In his speeches it is measured and stately, in the earlier novels somewhat florid and over-ornamented, in the Caxton series easy and familiar. His early romantic manner was modified toward the end of his career into a poetic idealism. He never became real-

istic, as the word is now understood, nor was he at any time a thoroughly national writer. In his literary work he depended less on invention than on his store of reading and observation. His career was very remarkable, and his position among contemporary authors unique. He forms a link between the time of Scott and that of George Eliot. For almost fifty years he was prominently before the world as an active, progressive, and brilliant writer. He stands unchallenged at the head of the dramatists of the time, and among the famous group of novelists which the nineteenth century has produced the name of Lord Lytton must always be included.

BAYARD TUCKERMAN.

# OUR EXPERIENCE IN TAXING DISTILLED SPIRITS.

## THIRD ARTICLE.

WE come next to a consideration of the most interesting and novel phase of this history; namely, the financial results and moral influences which have followed the attempt of the United States to obtain a large revenue through the imposition of high taxes on distilled spirits.

The first tax imposed by Congress after the outbreak of the war, namely, under the act of July 1, 1862, was 20 cents per proof-gallon, or at the rate of fully 100 per cent on the then cost of the article taxed. The revenue derived from the same for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1863, exclusive of the revenue derived from licenses for the manufacture, rectification, and sale of spirits,[1] was $3,229,941, indicating a production of 16,149,950 gallons, as compared with a production returned under the census of 1860, three years previous, of 90,000,000 gallons.

The tax of 20 cents continued in force until March 7, 1864, when the rate was advanced to 60 cents per gallon. The rev-

[1] In addition to the tax directly imposed on the distilled spirit, the United States from the first imposed a number of other collateral taxes, i.e., license-fees, permits, etc., on the business of producing, refining, and vending of spirits, all of which, altho assessed and collected independently, are included under a general return of aggregate revenue from distilled spirits. Thus the total revenue returned as collected in any one year is always considerably greater than the receipts from the direct tax on the spirit itself. These annual aggregates since the first imposition of the tax have been as follows: 1863, $5,176,520; 1864, $30,329,149; 1865, $18,731,422; 1866, $33,268,171; 1867, $33,542,695; 1868, $18,655,630; 1869, $45,071,230; 1870, $55,606,094; 1871, $46,281,848; 1872, $49,475,516; 1873, $82,099,371; 1874, $49,444,089; 1875, $52,081,991; 1876, $56,426,000; 1877, $57,469,000; 1878, $50,420,815; 1879, $52,570,284; 1880, $61,185,508; 1881, $67,153,974; 1882, $69,873,408; 1883, $74,368,775.

enue derived under these two rates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864, was $28,431,798, and the number of gallons returned as having been assessed was 85,295,391.

On the 1st of July, 1864, the tax on distilled spirits was further raised to $1.50 per proof-gallon, and by the same act it was further provided that the tax on and after February 1, 1865, should be $2 per gallon. When Congress reassembled, however, on the succeeding December, the time when the $2 rate was made to take effect was changed from the 1st of February, 1865, to the preceding 1st of January. The revenue which was collected under these two rates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1865, was only $15,995,000. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1866,—the first full year under the $2 tax,—the receipts were $29,198,578 (exclusive of $283,409 derived from spirits distilled from fruits), the assessment being on 14,599,000 gallons.

With these curious figures before us, let us next inquire somewhat more in detail into the course of events of which they are the exponents. From the very commencement of the war, until its issues became certain, and indeed for a considerable period thereafter, the attention of the Government was so engrossed with current military events, foreign relations, the operations of the Treasury in respect to the most complicated and gigantic system of finance and taxation that the world has ever known, and later with the problems of the reconstruction of the Union, that the efforts made to prevent, detect, and punish frauds in respect to the revenues were almost absolutely of no account. Indeed it may be further alleged with truth that the spirit and working of the revenue statutes were to a very great degree in the direction of the encouragement of fraud and speculation. And while there was also during all these times an immense amount of patriotism on the surface, it rarely with the producing and commercial part of the community struck in so deep as to prevent them from taking prompt advantage of any necessities or neglect of the Government, to benefit their individual and material interests. Thus, going back to the rates of taxation on domestic distilled spirits, it will be found that, after the imposition of the first tax of 20 cents per gallon in July, 1862, the rates were three times changed and largely advanced within the short space of

ten months—namely, March, 1864, from 20 to 60 cents; July, 1864, from 60 cents to $1.50; and January, 1865, from $1.50 to $2 per gallon. There was, moreover, in each case—dating back to the imposition of the first tax—ample premonition to all interested that the tax would be imposed or largely advanced; and, after the enactment of the first tax, a feeling of almost absolute certainty, which experience afterwards confirmed, that Congress, under the influences to which it was subjected, would never make the advance applicable to stocks on hand. The first and general result of such legislation was to render the great business of distilling in all parts of the country almost altogether speculative and extremely irregular. A more special and immediate result of the first three and succeeding tax enactments was to cause an almost entire suspension of distilling, which was resumed again with great activity as soon as an advance in the rate of tax in each instance became probable. The stock of spirits which accumulated in the country under this course of procedure was without precedent; and as Congress, as already stated, refused to make the advance in taxation in any instance retroactive, it thereby virtually legislated for the benefit of the distillers and the speculators rather than for the Treasury and the country.

Under the first tax of 20 cents per gallon, imposed July 1, 1862, there was probably no very great fraud perpetrated. The idea of systematically cheating the Government was new; the persons concerned in the business of distilling did not fully know how to do it, and there was in addition an entire absence of that record and tradition of illicit practices in respect to matters of revenue that forms a part of the history and romance of almost every government of Europe, and entails an hereditary disposition to smuggle under the customs, to evade under the excise, and to socially ostracize every official charged with the execution of the laws and the detection of offenders. But there was nevertheless sufficient whiskey manufactured in anticipation of this low tax, or which evaded the tax after its enactment, to bring down the legitimate production of the country from ninety millions of gallons in 1860 to sixteen millions in 1862–3.

But early in the commencement of the new fiscal year, 1863–4, when it became evident that the great fiscal necessities

of the Government would soon compel an increase of all taxes, and that distilled spirits would be one of the first subjects upon which the rate would be raised, the situation speedily altered; and with this anticipation all the distilleries of the country gradually got into full operation. The advance anticipated was made on the 7th of March, 1864, and was from 20 to 60 cents per gallon. The Internal Revenue Bureau assessed and collected the spirit-tax for that year upon 85,295,391 gallons. Of this great product—sixty-nine millions of gallons in excess of the product of the preceding year—at least seventy million gallons were manufactured prior to the 7th of March, and were released from Government control by the payment of the 20-cent tax only; and as after the 7th March, 1864, the market-price of the greater part of this increased product, which had not been allowed to pass into consumption, was advanced in accordance with the advance in the tax,—i.e., 40 cents per gallon,—it is clear that twenty-five millions of dollars at least were thus at once legislated into the pockets of the distillers and speculators.

Again, immediately after the imposition of the 60-cent rate in March, 1864, nearly all the distilleries once more suspended operation; the country was acknowledged to be overstocked with tax-paid whiskey, and the Government almost ceased to collect taxes upon its manufacture. In May, however, the project for a further increase in the rates began to be again agitated in Congress; and as soon as its realization became probable all the distilleries speedily resumed operations. How great at that time was the capacity of the loyal States for production, and how actively the distilleries temporarily worked under the stimulus of a prospective increase in the tax, may be inferred from the circumstance that in the month of June, 1864, the number of gallons distilled and on which the Government collected the 60-cent tax was 10,468,976, or at the rate of 125,000,000 gallons per annum; while the number of distilleries in the country, which according to the census of 1860 was 1138, or in the ratio of 27,540 persons to each distillery, had increased in 1864 to 2415, or in the ratio of 17,242 persons to each distillery; and how this increase in distilleries further continued will be hereafter noted.

On the 1st of July, 1864 (or of the succeeding month), the tax was again advanced from 60 cents to $1.50 per gallon; and during that month the entire product of the country of which the revenue officials could take cognizance was only 697,099 gallons. How great a "stock on hand," the result of manufacturing under the 20- and 60-cent rates of tax, was carried over the 1st of July and experienced the advance of 90 cents per gallon in market-price in consequence of the advance in the tax from 60 cents to $1.50, cannot be accurately known; but sixty millions of gallons would certainly be a low estimate; and on this amount the profit that accrued to private interests was at least $50,000,000. With the further advance in the tax on the succeeding 1st of January to $2, the operations above described were again repeated, with all the benefit derived from former experience, and with a very large extension of the sphere of participants in the resulting profits. What was the resulting profit from this last transaction was estimated, by those who had opportunities for forming an opinion, at from twenty to thirty million dollars.

In short, all the available evidence indicates that the profits realized by distillers, dealers, speculators, through Congressional legislation having reference to the taxation of distilled spirits from July 1, 1862, to January 1, 1865,—a period of two and a half years,—and exclusive of any gains accruing from evasions of taxes, and with every allowance for overestimates, must have approximated one hundred million dollars.

Such, then, is a brief but probably as exact a narration as it is possible to now give of what may be regarded as the first of a long series of subsequent and successful operations in the United States which have had for their object the spoliation of the general public for the benefit of the comparatively few through legislative enactments or the abuse of corporate privileges, and which was almost unnoticed at the time of its occurrence by reason of the far greater importance of other and contemporaneous events. The transactions under consideration, nevertheless, mark an era in the history of the United States almost as important as the war itself; for before that time frauds, in this country, against the Government, and trafficking in the interests

of the community, were always comparatively small, and were never systematized on a large scale. The moral sense of the community previous to that time seems to have been also more impressible and less inclined to tolerate and overlook the prostitution of influence and position on the part of men prominent in public office or trusts for the sake of private gain. It was, moreover, the first occasion when the outside influences—subsequently termed the "lobby"—gathered round the halls of Congress in notable numbers, and with acknowledged influence and organization, for the purpose of influencing legislation in behalf of private and selfish interests. It was the opening of the flood-gates for an issue of corruption which has since then almost seemed to pervade the whole land, and which the press and the pulpit have not been able to roll back. Since then, also, nothing in this direction has been too audacious to venture, and there has been little in the way of attempt which the public has not tolerated, condoned, or speedily forgotten, more especially if the attempt has been accompanied by success.

One question, however, which naturally suggests itself at this point is, "What explanation can be given of the action of Congress in relation to this whole matter?" "How happened it that with the lesson of experience repeatedly before it and made a subject of discussion, Congress in successive instances, and always, refused to make the advanced rates on distilled spirits, enacted solely on account of the public necessity for greater revenues, applicable to stocks on hand, the greater part of which it was acknowledged had been manufactured solely for the purpose of profiting by the great advance in price certain to result from the advance in the tax?"

In reply it is to be said that it is not easy to satisfactorily answer these questions. It is certainly impossible to charge wholesale corruption or improper motives against the men in the two branches of Congress *who in the main* controlled and led the fiscal legislation of this period. Thus among those prominent in favoring exemption were Senators Fessenden, of Maine, and Trumbull, of Illinois—men against whom the voice of scandal never was and never could be raised; while on the other side were Mr. John Sherman, of the Senate, and Elihu Washburn,

of the House. The arguments brought forward in opposition to making the whiskey taxes retroactive were mainly that it was contrary to sound policy for the Government, after having assessed and collected the taxes on an article of manufacture and released it for sale or use, to again reassess the same property before it had been subjected to use; and also that it would be a matter of no little difficulty and expense for the revenue officials to find and assess a product of spirits after it had once become an article of commerce and passed from the supervision and custody of the Government. On the other hand, it was urged in reply that it was the custom of the Government, Federal and State, to tax the same articles, while awaiting consumption and use, at successive periods—as stocks on hand, animals, and agencies of production and transportation; and that much of the whiskey which it was proposed to subject to the surcharge was held in warehouses in quantity (as was afterwards proved to be the fact), and so was not difficult of ascertainment and assessment.

In the case of the first two acts of legislation by which the tax was originally imposed and then advanced, there was probably not much speculation or participation of interest on the part of members of Congress and revenue officials. But in the case of the last two acts, speculation and participation in the results of legislation were very extensive. The answer to a question put by the writer, some twelve years subsequent to the period of the events related, to a somewhat prominent member of Congress during the war, "To what extent his associates participated in the speculation contingent upon their legislation respecting the whiskey tax?" substantially was, "that his personal and certain knowledge of such transactions was very limited, but that he inferred, from the interest displayed by members in the current market rates and prices of highwines, the participation to have been very extensive." A personal interest was confessed in a hundred barrels, purchased under the 60-cent tax and carried until disposed of under the $2 tax; and regret was also expressed that, inasmuch as the legislation in question was inevitable, he had not been bolder and profited more largely by his opportunities. From conferences with persons who were formerly and at the time officially employed under the internal

revenue, and spoke from personal knowledge, the writer also feels warranted in asserting that there was not a revenue district in the loyal States in which distilled spirits were manufactured or largely dealt in at wholesale, in which the officials of the revenue, collectors, assessors, inspectors, gaugers, clerks, and detectives, were not to a greater or less extent engaged in speculating in whiskey, and consequently personally interested in favor of Congressional legislation looking to an advancement of the rates; and that the transactions in question were not only no secret, but were regarded as perfectly legitimate. And as a single illustration of the profits accruing to private parties and in particular instances, a case made known to the Revenue Commissioners may be referred to, in which one firm manufactured or received under contract, for a period of several weeks prior to the assessment of the $1.50 tax, an average quantity of thirty thousand gallons of proof-spirits per day: the major part of which was held and sold after the advance in the tax in January, 1865, to $2 per gallon.

After the establishment of the $2 rate on the 1st of January, 1865, there was again a period of inactivity on the part of those interested in the manufacture of distilled spirits. The stocks on hand, manufactured in anticipation of the advances in rates, were very large, and, the markets being oversupplied, there was little legitimate inducement for activity on the part of distillers. The profits realized, or made prospectively certain, had been, moreover, enormous, and no further advance in the rate of tax could be anticipated. Under such circumstances there was an apparent disposition on the part of manufacturers and speculators to wait and see what developments in legislation and business would follow the now certain termination of the war.

It was just at this period that the writer was appointed chairman of the "Revenue Commission," created by Congress under an act of March 5, 1865, for the purpose of inquiring into the best methods "of raising by taxation such revenue as may be necessary in order to supply the wants of the Government," and also concerning "the sources from which such revenue should be drawn;" and without any previous adequate preparation, and without any fund of experience available for guidance, other than what could be personally collected under the large powers

for investigation granted to the Commission, he entered upon his duties. The task at the outset seemed as hopeless as to attempt to tunnel a mountain with nothing but a crowbar; and one of the chief sources of embarrassment was to determine, from the immense number of points of detail, how and where to begin; for the United States revenue system at this time actually touched directly every art, trade, profession, and occupation of the country, and drew from them, and largely by direct taxation, in a single year (1865), the enormous sum of $559,000,000. After considerable deliberation it was determined to commence the investigations with that one article or department of this great tax system which furnished the greatest specific revenue, which proved to be "distilled spirits." The theory which he entertained at the outset respecting the situation was the common and popular one, so far as there was any such, namely, that distilled spirits was a product upon which it was expedient to impose the heaviest burden of taxation; that if the annual consumption of the country averaged ninety million gallons, as it probably did before the war, a tax of $2 per gallon would suffice to pay all the burden of interest on the immense public debt, and provide for its ultimate extinguishment through a sinking fund; and finally, that if the high tax resulted in restricting consumption, the gain to temperance and morality would far more than counterbalance any reduction of revenue. The method of investigation adopted was as follows: A typical distillery was *first* visited, and a study made of its machinery and system of operations, including the assessment and collection of taxes; *second*, the leading distillers of the country were brought to a conference, and their views and wishes obtained, and in conjunction a large amount of testimony from rectifiers, wholesale and retail dealers, was also taken; *third*, the leading officials of the Internal Revenue Office—assessors, collectors, inspectors, and detectives—were called together at Washington, and their opinions and experiences noted. Finally, books were consulted: and in this particular the situation in the United States was like that of the snakes in Ireland—there were none; while, apart from the British blue-books, the literature of all other countries in respect to the taxation of spirits was exceedingly meagre. The result of a long and careful inquiry, how-

ever, abundantly satisfied the writer that all his preconceived ideas on the subject, and which were also very generally the ideas of Congress and the great body of the people, were entirely erroneous; that under the influence of a high tax and a resulting high cost the production and consumption of spirits, exclusive of the demand for drink, was greatly restricted; and that under the conditions of a sparse population scattered over a vast extent of territory, and a form of government that would not admit of the use of a despotic, inquisitorial, and numerous police, the attempt to collect a tax of a thousand per cent on the first cost of any article was utterly impracticable. In a report made to Congress in January, 1866, it was accordingly recommended that the $2 tax be abandoned and a tax of 50 cents per proof-gallon, conjointly with a license system for rectifiers and dealers, be adopted as the rate most likely to be productive of revenue and most efficient for the prevention of illicit distillation and other revenue evasions.

The report, altho attracting much attention by reason of the singular experiences of the preceding four years which it detailed, obtained no favor in respect to its recommendation of tax abatement; only two members of Congress of any prominence, namely, General Garfield and Hon. W. B. Allison, of Iowa, both then members of the House and of its Committee of Ways and Means, cordially accepting its conclusions. The result was no legislation, and a new chapter of experience; for when it became certain that the opportunity for realizing profits from manufacturing in anticipation of an increase in the tax had come to an end by the prospective maintenance of rate, the opportunity for profit offered by the imperfections of the law was at once eagerly embraced and improved. Thus, testimony subsequently brought to light repeated instances where individual distillers manufactured, conveyed to market, and fraudulently sold spirits, varying in quantities from 20,000 to 30,000 gallons and upward, without a suspicion on the part of local officials that the business was not in all respects conducted legally and honestly. It was sworn to before the writer that the determination of the strength of spirits, preparatory to assessment, was often made by mere physical inspection or taste, and that the use of instruments (for which no uniform

standard was provided) was regarded as something wholly unnecessary. It was also not unfrequently the case that barrels were inspected and branded some days in advance of their being filled, and their future regulation—filling and removal—left entirely with the manufacturer. Distillers and their workmen were sometimes constituted inspectors of their own product; and in one instance an assessor was appointed who did not possess sufficient intelligence to understand and correctly use either a gauging-rod or an hydrometer. Thus it was at the commencement of the period of high taxation; but subsequently, when the administration of the laws became somewhat more intelligent and vigorous, and some degree of concealment to the projectors of fraud became necessary, the expedients successfully adopted for the evasion of the tax were in the highest degree characteristic of the people. One of the most fertile of these was made available through a provision of law which allowed spirits to be made and stored in bond, or exported in bond, without prepayment of the taxes. Thus, for example, spirits deposited in bond were, through the connivance and corruption of ill-paid officials acting as guardians, secretly withdrawn from bond, the barrels filled with water or very weak spirits, and subsequently exported. On receipt of a "landing certificate," obtained through a consul of an inferior grade at some foreign port, the bonds given by the manufacturer for the payment of the taxes were cancelled, and the profits derived from the sale of the untaxed spirits in the domestic market, at the tax-paid rate, were divided among all concerned. Warehouses from which spirits deposited in bond had been fraudulently withdrawn were also frequently burned, and the bonds cancelled on evidence of loss, wholly fraudulent, but so strongly supported by perjury as to be difficult of disproof. Large losses were also sustained by the Government by the acceptance, as the basis of large transactions, of bonds which subsequent investigations, contingent on the exposure of more open frauds, showed were purposely made and given by persons of no responsibility, who in some instances by prearrangement agreed to accept the risk of persecution and trial, with an almost certainty of non-conviction by a jury, for a stipulated compensation or a share in the anticipated fraudulent profits.

It is to be also noted that the number of licensed distilleries, which in 1864 was 2415, or in the ratio of one to every 17,242 persons, had increased in 1868 to 4721, or in the ratio of one to every 8058 of the population. In short, the tax of $2 (amounting to 1000 per cent advance on the average cost of manufacture) and the enormous profits contingent upon the evasion of the law, coupled with the abundant opportunity which the law through its imperfections, and the vast territorial area of the country, offered for evasion, created a temptation which it seemed impossible for human nature as ordinarily constituted to resist; and the longer the tax remained at a high figure, the less became the revenue and the greater the corruption. Thus during the year 1866–7 the revenue directly collected in the United States from spirits distilled from other materials than fruits was $29,198,000, and in 1857 $28,296,000, indicating an annual product respectively of 14,599,000 and 14,148,000 gallons. But during the succeeding year, 1868, with no apparent reason for any diminution in the national production and consumption of spirits, and with no increase, but rather a diminution, in the volume of imported spirits, the total direct revenue from the same source was but $13,419,092, indicating a production of only 6,709,546 gallons; proof-spirits at the same time being openly sold in the market, and even quoted in price-currents, at from five to ten cents less per gallon than the amount of the tax and the average cost of manufacture. We have also in these figures the materials for approximately estimating the measure and strength of the temptation to evade the law, and the amount of profit that must have accrued in the single year 1868 from the results of such evasion. For as the consumption of distilled spirits in the country during that year was probably not less than 50,000,000 gallons, and as out of this the Government collected a tax upon less than 7,000,000, the sale of the difference at the current market-rates of the year, less the average cost of production (even if estimated as high as 30 cents), must have returned to the credit of corruption a sum approximating $80,000,000. To this must be added a further unknown but undoubted loss of revenue, growing out of the circumstance that the influence of successful fraud in the matter of spirits seemed to infect and

demoralize almost every other department of the internal revenue.

But notwithstanding all these facts were for three years annually reported upon and in detail by officials of the Treasury, and were also generally recognized and commented on by the press, it was with the greatest difficulty that Congress could be induced to take any action looking to remedies by the enactment of more perfect laws, by providing for more efficient administration, or for diminishing the temptations to fraud by diminishing the tax; and it was not until the revenue from distilled spirits bade fare to disappear altogether, and the popular manifestations of discontent became very apparent, that anything really was accomplished; a report from the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, in favor of a new law and a reduction of the tax, having been actually prevented in 1867, and action delayed thereby a whole year, by an appeal of a leading member of the Committee—who has since posed as a great statesman—for postponement of action, on the ground that it would be derogatory to the honor of a great nation to confess, "after having put down a great rebellion, that it could not collect a tax of $2 per gallon on whiskey." There may have been instances in history where one single speech of an individual has led a nation into war and into consequent great losses and expenditures, but there probably never was a speech in reference to the civil polity of a government which can be proved to have been as expensive as the silly utterances above quoted. For reform being thus delayed, the *direct* revenues from *all* distilled spirits fell off in the fiscal and succeeding year, 1868, to the extent of $14,874,000 as compared with the receipts from the same sources for the previous year, 1867, or from $29,164,000 to $14,290,000; while on the other hand, when by the act of July, 1868, the direct tax was reduced to 50 cents per proof-gallon, the receipts for the ensuing and incomplete fiscal year increased at once to the extent of nearly $20,000,000, or from $14,290,000 in 1868 to $34,245,000 in 1869; or, including all taxes on the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits, licenses, etc., from $18,655,000 in 1868, to $45,071,000 in 1869. And as there is no question that this advance might have been realized through legislation in

the previous year but for the influence of the speech of the "statesman" in retarding action, the direct cost of his words may be fairly estimated at over twenty-six millions of dollars, to say nothing of indirect losses to the Treasury contingent on the continuance for another year of a system which magnified temptations and made frauds easy.

It is to be here noted that in preparing the law of July, 1868, by which the direct tax was reduced from $2 to 50 cents per gallon, the intent of the writer, which was realized, was to make the total aggregate tax 70 cents per gallon, but to impose only 50 cents as a maximum tax on the spirit as an article of manufacture, and to distribute the balance (20 cents) in the way of licenses, fees, etc., at points intermediate between the manufacture of the spirits and their final sale to consumers, but so remote from and so disconnected with the process of manufacture as to render collusion between producers and distributors with a view to gain by evading the law almost wholly impracticable. Another leading object was to fix the direct tax at such a sum as would diminish the temptation to fraud to the greatest possible extent consistent with the procurement of such an amount of revenue as was demanded by the necessities of the Government. The rate of 50 cents per proof-gallon, recommended by the writer, who was then "Special Commissioner of the Revenue," and subsequently adopted by Congress, was fixed upon, because investigations showed that on the average the product of illicit distillation costs, through deficient returns, the necessary bribery of attendants, and the expense of secret and unusual methods of storage and transportation, from two to three times as much as the product of legitimate or legal distillation. So that, assuming the average cost of spirits at that time in the United States to have been 20 cents per gallon, the product of the illicit distiller under the most favorable circumstances would cost from 40 to 60 cents, leaving but 10 cents per gallon as the maximum profits to be realized from fraud under the most favorable conditions—an amount not sufficient to offset the possibility of severe penalties of fine, imprisonment, and confiscation of property, which were made essential features of the new enactment. Another feature of the new law, never before attempted, was

a requirement that the original taxes on the spirit, as well as the license taxes on its subsequent manipulation and sale by rectifiers and wholesale dealers, should be paid by means of various stamps affixed to the packages containing the spirits,—which stamps, through their numbers, devices, and record, established the identity of the spirits wherever found, and their relations to the various tax requirements. This system, originally proposed and worked out by the writer, was at first violently opposed as wholly impracticable; but was finally adopted, and, after some modifications suggested by experience, has proved in the highest degree practicable and successful. A similar stamp system for collecting the internal-revenue taxes on fermented liquors and smoking tobacco was also, on the recommendation of the writer, adopted by Congress, and has also proved successful.

In answer now to a question which those who have followed this narrative may naturally put, "What was the sequel to this radical change in this department of the revenue laws of the United States as it existed in 1868?" it may be said, without the possibility of challenge or contradiction, that in the whole history of political economy, finance, and jurisprudence there never was a result that so completely demonstrated the value of careful scientific investigation in connection with legislation. Illicit distillation practically ceased the very hour the new law came into operation; and evasions of the law were confined to occasional false returns, and a re-use, on a very limited scale, of the stamps with which the tax was for the first time made payable by purchase and cancellation. Industry and the arts experienced a large measure of benefit from the reduction in the cost of spirits, more especially in the form of alcohol; while the Government collected during the second year of the continuance of the new rate and system, with comparatively little friction, *three* dollars for every one that was obtained during the last year of the two-dollar tax.

The great economic and moral lesson to be deduced from this curious record of experience is, that whenever a government imposes a tax on any product of industry sufficiently great to sufficiently indemnify and reward an illicit or illegal production of the same, then such product will be illicitly or illegally manufactured; and when that point is reached, the losses and penal-

ties consequent upon detection and conviction—no matter how great may be the one, or how severe the other—will be counted in by the offenders as a part of the necessary expenses of their business; and the business, if forcibly suppressed in one locality, will inevitably be renewed and continued in some other. It is the part of a civilized government, therefore, in framing laws for the assessment and collection of taxes, to know when the maximum revenue point in the case of each tax is reached, and to recognize that in going beyond that limit the government "over-reaches" itself.

The history of the experience of the United States in taxing distilled spirits subsequent to the time when this narrative now terminates, embracing renewal of frauds when the 50-cent tax was abandoned, the curious invention, use, and abandonment of the "Tice meter," and the no less curious experience of the State of Virginia in endeavoring to register and collect a State tax on the retail sale and consumption of spirits through the agency of the so-called "Bell-Punch Law," can only properly be detailed in another chapter.

DAVID A. WELLS.

# THE TWO SCHOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

EVERY careful observer of current opinion knows that the system of Political Economy which we have imported from England, and which we generally teach in our colleges, does not command that universal assent to which its scientific character and the eminence and influence of its expounders would seem to entitle it. That these expounders are to be counted among the great men of our time none will deny; and when we find the opinion of the masses diverging from the principles held by such men, it is natural in the first place to attribute it to defective education. But in the present case it cannot be claimed that distrust of the teachings of political economy is confined to the less educated classes. As a matter of fact, it will be found difficult to name any one class of men who mingle with the world among whom at least a large minority, possibly a majority, will not be found to share the distrust in question. Farmers, men of business, college graduates, eminent philosophers, students fresh from the seats of learning in Germany, are all imbued with the same feeling.

There are yet other considerations which give seeming weight to the dissent in question. The general rule is that when a sound body of doctrine is assailed from fallacious standpoints, the views of the assailing parties are so confused and contradictory that they can be easily disposed of by pointing out their inconsistency. But in the present case a careful examination will show that these widely different classes of men assign substantially the same reasons for their dissent. Can views which are shared by such widely separated classes be other than sound? This is the question which it is the object of the present article to consider. It will assist the reader in following us if we begin

by indicating our conclusion. It is in brief that the objections raised against the economic system alluded to, which is commonly called the English Political Economy, are founded on a misapprehension of what that system professes, or ought to profess, to do and to teach. It does not follow from what we say that there is anything erroneous in the general current of the views held by the objectors themselves. They are simply men who, in applying their views to the case in question, forget the limitations which are placed upon human knowledge in every department of inquiry, and the necessary imperfections of all scientific statement. We shall prove this conclusion by showing that the very same objections which they raise against the current system of economy can be raised against almost every branch of human knowledge with equal force and conclusiveness.

We must begin with a precise statement of what the objections are. This we can do by quoting, almost verbatim, propositions which may be found in the writings of such a logician as Wundt, in a brochure by Dr. Ely, recently issued by the Johns Hopkins University, and in the daily conversation of almost every man of business. These different men and classes all agree in framing an indictment of which the substance is the following:

The political economy of the schools is a deductive science founded on a-priori hypotheses respecting human nature, which are too wide of the actual facts of the world to form a sound basis for any practical conclusion. It assumes to subject all economic phenomena to a few formal laws, and fails to consider how these laws are modified or even reversed in practice. It takes no account of the very different circumstances in which different nations and communities are placed, but assumes all to be under the same system. It assumes universal self-interest and universal selfishness as the preponderating causes of economic phenomena. Some of its great expounders attempt to establish far-reaching principles without adducing one single illustration from actual life, without bringing forward a single historical fact, and without citing any event which ever occurred. It assumes an absolute lack of friction in all economic movements. Not only do capital and labor move with perfect ease from place to place, and from employment to employment, but

this, it is implicitly maintained, is accomplished without the slightest loss. The silk-manufacturer diverts his capital into another employment, like the construction of locomotives, with precisely the same facility with which he turns his family carriage-horse from an avenue into a cross street. From such assumptions equality of profits and equality of wages are readily deduced, while the fact that inequality is the universal rule is entirely ignored. The result of thus substituting ideal for actual conditions is a body of doctrine which, however logically it may be reasoned out, does not agree with the state of things which actually exists around us.

Formidable as this indictment looks, we can easily show that it applies with equal force to every branch of pure science, when we consider the science in its relation to practical applications. It is in fact a most valuable illustration of a truth which every logical student should know, but which hardly any one always bears in mind—that all scientific propositions are in their very nature hypothetical. Let us take examples of the most familiar sort.

If we begin by examining any school arithmetic, we shall hardly find an illustration adduced from the actual history of mankind, and only here and there will we find any mention of a single event which ever occurred, or a single transaction which ever took place. The problems in arithmetical operations are all made up by the author out of his own head, or borrowed from others who made them up in the same way. When a boy is set to compute interest on a note, it will be found that no such note was ever drawn, and that the parties whose names are signed to it never existed. The same remark applies to the numerous grocers, laborers, custom-house officers, and merchants who are quoted in the book. Not one is an actual man, but all are hypothetical and imaginary products of the author's brain.

When the pupil gets into Algebra the case is intensified. He is set to work on quantities called $x$ and $y$ without a shadow of proof that any such quantities ever existed. It is yet worse when he reaches Geometry. He is taught that lines have no thickness, when, as a matter of fact, every line that anybody ever saw or conceived of had thickness. He is set to work on purely imaginary triangles, quadrilaterals, and circles; and throughout the whole treatise there is not one allusion to a geo-

metrical figure which ever had a visible existence outside the book.

But is not the matter improved when he gets to Physics? Is he not now confronted with the actual facts of nature? No: on the contrary, all natural phenomena are positively contradicted by the propositions he is taught. Not satisfied with talking about things which never did exist, he is introduced to things of which we cannot define the existence without a contradiction in terms—such absurdities as a material point, for example. He is told how a body acted upon by no force will move, when, as a matter of fact, no one ever saw in the universe a body which was not acted on by some force. He learns the law of falling bodies, which tells him that a body falls sixteen feet in the first second, three times that distance in the next, five times in the third, and so on, without end. As a matter of fact no body ever did or ever could fall according to this law. It rests upon two perfectly unattainable hypotheses: (1) that there is no atmosphere to resist the motion of the body, and (2) that the force of gravity is the same at all heights. The fact is that not only did no body ever fall according to this law, but no body was ever known to move in accordance with the law for any considerable period. When the mechanical powers are taught, no allowance is made for friction, altho this agent modifies the effect in all cases, and is sometimes the most potent factor in producing it. Thus all the laws of power in machines which the student learns are not applicable to any actual machine, but only to ideal conditions, which never existed on earth and could rarely be produced if men tried to. In fine, the whole of physics as taught in our schools and colleges is a purely ideal science, which is concerned with a kind of matter and a state of things which never existed in the world, and which would lead any firm of machinists into pecuniary ruin should they apply its principles unmodified in their calculations.

We have made it quite clear, we trust, that the indictment under consideration lies with as much force against all the exact sciences as it does against Political Economy as taught by the English school. As a matter of fact, every one who has studied the views of the class of so-called "practical men" who undervalue what they term "theory" knows that this class

really does bring against the practical value of scientific training objections substantially identical with those under consideration. The question which now meets us is whether it is possible to construct a system of Political Economy which shall be free from such objections. Our object is to answer this question in the negative, by showing that the imperfections alluded to are inseparable from all exact knowledge. Paradoxical tho it may appear, the fact that the phenomena of nature cannot be reduced to simple formal laws does not render less necessary the consideration and study of such laws. Most of the effects which we observe either in nature or in human society are the products of a complex combination of causes, acting and interacting in such a way that it is impossible to trace their combined action by any direct process. If we expect to study their action by any rational method, only one mode of proceeding is open to us—that of analysis. We begin by isolating each separate cause, and considering what would be its action were all the others absent. But, since the causes act only in combination, the separate study of each is necessarily the study of a state of things which as a matter of fact does not exist. Thus the introduction of ideal conditions instead of the real conditions is a necessary first step in any rational system of exact knowledge.

We are now in a condition to illustrate more fully the proposition already alluded to—that all science is from its very nature founded on hypothesis. The expression of a law of nature is merely an assertion that under certain circumstances a certain result will be produced. So far as the law is concerned the circumstances may or may not exist; they may even be such as never did exist without at all impairing the validity of the law. Let us take a proposition so simple as that gunpowder explodes. It presupposes as an hypothesis the existence of gunpowder. There may be large regions of country where there is no powder, and there the law is entirely without application. Again, the powder will not explode unless it is touched by fire. Here we have again another hypothesis—fire. Thus, so familiar a proposition as that under consideration is only hypothetically true. But this is not all. We must always assume not only some positive hypothesis, but the negative

hypothesis that all causes which might influence the result are absent. In other words, the enunciation of all natural laws is to be understood with some such limitations as "other conditions being equal," or "if no other cause intervenes to modify or prevent the effect." These same qualifications must be understood in all applications of the principles of political economy. The writer does not for a moment pretend that economists always remember this qualification. But they are perfectly excusable for not always expressing it, because they must leave something to be supplied by the reader. Gunpowder will not explode if it is wet, nor if it is treated in any one of many other ways. Is it therefore necessary in every chemical treatise where the properties of gunpowder are described, that an exhaustive statement of the conditions under which it will not explode must be made? Is chemistry a delusion and a snare because a hunter may have considered the law that gunpowder explodes true, whatever the condition of his powder-flask, and may have missed a shot in consequence? The person who expects either economic or physical phenomena to occur according to formal laws, regardless of circumstances, is justly stigmatized as a doctrinaire, and one who interprets these laws in accordance with the doctrinaire method should be relegated to the same place of perdition to which we assign the doctrinaire himself.

The great mistake made by the objectors is that of supposing that the economist considers all his hypotheses as susceptible of universal application without any restriction or modification whatever. We avoid this error by remembering that the correctness and applicability of the hypothesis are always open to challenge, but that the fact of its incorrectness or inapplicability no more invalidates the general law founded upon it than the fact that there may be no gunpowder within a thousand miles of the north pole invalidates the truth of the theorem that gunpowder explodes. A careful study of human nature would perhaps show that the power of always distinguishing between the truth of the hypothesis and the truth of the connection between the hypothesis and conclusion is rarely acquired by the large majority of men. We may define a wise man as one equipped with a large and well-selected stock of hypotheses,

properly arranged for use, each with its conclusion attached. To foresee what will occur to-morrow he selects from his hypotheses such as correspond most nearly to the state of things to-day, and then forms his conclusions accordingly. If he applies an hypothesis which is not valid to-day, and thus reaches an erroneous conclusion, that is his fault, and not the fault of the law. So also if the hypothesis is itself true, but other causes come in to modify its action, we have a case of defective knowledge which may lead to a mistaken conclusion. But no science that ever existed professes to give formal rules by which conclusions can be worked out without any exercise of judgment on the part of the individual.

In the light of these considerations, let us inquire how we must proceed to establish a sound system. The causes with which the economist has to deal differ from those which appear to us to operate in nature in this important point—that final causes or the ends which men have in view come into play. This fact makes it necessary to follow quite different methods in physical and in economic investigations. But in both classes of inquiry we have this in common, that to reach a really satisfactory conclusion we must analyze the causes which act into their component elements. The first step of the economist must be to discover and define the most general and widely diffused tendencies of human nature, just as the physicist commences by teaching the most general laws of force. Now, if we study civilized men, we shall find that notwithstanding the wide diversity between the motives which actuate different men, and the conditions in which they are placed, they have this in common: that when they want to reach an end, they adopt the easiest and shortest way to it which they can find, unless they have some special reason for preferring another way. This is as sound and comprehensive a law as that a stone will fall directly downwards unless it is turned aside by some intervening force. Not an objection can be made to the one that may not also be made to the other.

Again, a large majority of the intended acts of every man are executed for gaining some end which he, the man, has in view. The good he seeks is his own, and not that of anybody else, except so far as he may make the good of others an object to

himself. Economically and scientifically there is no difference between the acts of the man working to get a loaf of bread for himself, and of the man working to get a loaf of bread for his neighbor, except that the former are more common. Thus the actuating motives of men in general may be called "selfish" in a scientific sense, however disinterested they may be in a popular sense.

Again, nearly all human acts with which the economist is concerned are those directed towards the acquisition of wealth. These acts have this common feature, that the man so directs his exertions as to obtain from them the maximum amount of wealth, unless his course is modified by some other cause than the desire of wealth. The objection that the latter is not the sole and universal motive among men has no more force than the objection that the tendency to fall is not the sole and universal force which acts upon bodies upon the surface of the earth.

Again, economics can concern itself only with average results as they arise in the general action of great bodies of men. It takes no account of the individual bargaining in a desert between John, who owns the only camel within reach, and William, who has the only bucket of water within reach. It is not concerned with the fact that Smith gives double wages to his coachman out of pure sentiment, except so far as this sentiment may be common to all men. Now, however capricious may be the acts of the individual, it is certain that when we consider only average results common to the whole, these results have a certainty, permanence, and freedom from caprice which individuals do not exhibit. Where the individual may be travelling or residing at any moment no man can predict. But the centre of gravitation of the whole population of the United States has during the past thirty years moved past Cincinnati and along the neighborhood of the Ohio River with a slow and regular motion, which statistics show to be as exact and definite as the change in the pointing of the magnetic needle.

It is also to be admitted that unknown causes play a very important part in Political Economy, more important, perhaps, than they do in the applications of Physical Science. The result of this partial ignorance is that economic phenomena cannot

be predicted as physical phenomena can; and thus one proof of the soundness of scientific conclusions, which appeals so strongly to the human mind in the work of the astronomer, is not at the command of the economist. But this defect again is less of a drawback in Political Economy than it might appear at first sight. The unknown causes which we cannot predict are generally such as men cannot influence. When we come to those which men can influence there is not the slightest doubt that scientific prediction can be applied. In other words, the unknown quantity is the cause itself, and not the relation of the cause and its effect.

Hence confining economic science within certain necessary bounds—that is, regarding it firstly as concerned only with general averages, and secondly as concerned only with the relation of cause and effect, and not merely with known causes—its applications are not subject to any greater limitations than are those of Physical Science. Upon the widely diffused tendencies of human nature, which we have described, we can build up a system bearing the same relation to the transactions of the commercial world that theoretical physics bears to the working of machinery. Such a system is that commonly known as the "school economy," and taught by Ricardo and Mill. The objections to the deductive features in this school can arise only from a misapprehension. Its deductions being only hypothetically true, are not to be applied in practice unless the actual case is shown to apply to the hypothesis. But it does not follow that the method is useless because it needs modification when applied to particular cases, because this is true of all science.

Deduction is an essential process in every rational explanation of human affairs. To say that we are not to apply it to any subject is equivalent to saying that we can have no rational conception of the relation of cause and effect. A subject of which this is true would be quite unworthy of the study of men. It is a familiar fact to those who have studied human nature, that the so-called "practical men" who proclaim most loudly their distrust of what they call "theories" are extremely liable to become the victim of the most unfounded theories and injurious superstitions. Any one pretending to have a system of

economics must be able to say that some assigned cause will produce definite effects, which he can foresee, upon the interests of society. If he cannot foresee what effect would be produced by any cause whatever, he has nothing worth talking about in his system. Now, the prediction of any effect of this kind is in its very nature an operation of deduction, and subject to the same limitations which have to be imposed on the deduced consequences of the purely theoretical economy. The conclusion of the protectionist, that the free competition of low-priced labor will diminish the wages of high-priced labor, is reached by a purely deductive process. Even if such a conclusion could be reached by induction,—that is to say, if we actually found by the collection of statistics that wages had been lowered by such competition,—the conclusion that they would be lowered in future would be a deductive one. It would in the first place presuppose that the competition had in times past been the true cause of the lowering of wages. And the conclusion would rest on the hypothesis that no cause would come into play to modify the effect. The conclusion would therefore be subject to all the limitations imposed on deductions generally.

Let us now look at what the objectors have to offer us in exchange for our system. Some of the more intelligent and distinguished of them profess to be disciples of a new school known as the German, statistical, or historical school. The one fundamental principle of this school is, that instead of beginning with certain hypothetical principles of human nature it professes to start from the great facts of history and statistics. Starting in such a way would be as bad as commencing the study of geometry by instructing the pupil in land-surveying, or commencing physics by taking the student around to see all the machinery in a city at work. Moreover, the new school has not really put any new system into practice. When we examine its writings we find them divisible into three classes. First, we have works like those of Roscher, which, whatever merit they may possess, do not, in their mode of development, differ radically from the system to which we are accustomed, and which therefore cannot be considered as forming a separate school unless we ascribe an extraordinary importance to differences of detail, and regard the works of every different writer as forming a different school.

We have, secondly, a large mass of statistical investigation and social studies affecting the well-being of nations. But this is applied, not pure, political economy, and is at best only an application of principles of political economy to be otherwise learned. Finally, we have a very large mass of mere nonsense, of no interest or value to anybody except the student of psychology, who may use it to illustrate the aberrations of the human intellect.

Our judgment of the new-school economist must therefore depend upon his position. In so far as he is one who points out that the old system, however consistent and logical it may be, cannot be safely applied without due consideration of all the modifying causes which may act in each particular case, he is a sound teacher, how little soever common-sense people may need his teaching.

When he tells us that he has found out a better way of developing the subject,—a method by which the incompleteness inherent in all scientific systems is avoided,—he takes a position which he lamentably fails in making good. There is not a stone in his foundation capable of bearing any weight at all which is not taken from the English system. He can and does make valuable additions to the superstructure, but has added nothing better than platitudes to the foundation.

When he denounces and professes to reject the commonly received propositions which lie at the base of the subject because they are not absolute and universal, he is guilty of a proceeding so irrational that only the number and strength of his following entitle him to serious refutation.

SIMON NEWCOMB.

## DESCARTES AND THEOLOGY.

IN a little book recently published on the life of Descartes, I endeavored to put from a new point of view the main facts of this great philosopher's life. The book was without preface, and it was left to the critics to find out for themselves what was new and what was old. As they have failed to do so, it may not be out of place to say a word on the subject here; it will fitly introduce the main inquiry of this paper. For, as they rightly observed, it was impossible within so limited a space to discuss the whole of so important a system, and it is therefore my present intention to follow out the new indications on the relations of Descartes to the theologians, which I had already briefly set forth.

The first point on which previous biographers appear to have erred is the date of Descartes' discovery of the application of algebra to geometry. It was heretofore ascribed to a chance inspiration in the class-room at La Flèche. This oft-repeated opinion, to which even Kuno Fischer subscribes, rests on no reliable evidence, and is clearly inconsistent with subsequent facts. The discovery was indeed impossible till Descartes had read the newer developments of algebra by Vieta, and this he did not do until he settled down to scientific work in Paris.

The second point hitherto misunderstood was the nature of the extreme mental crisis he underwent on 10th November, 1619, when he was affected with visions and dreams, and could not contain his excitement. This was no mere general revival in the direction of scientific study, nor was it the excitement consequent on a mere mathematical discovery; for Descartes never rated mathematics in themselves very highly, and thought the solution of speculative problems mere waste of time. The

real cause of his excitement was his first glimpse of the great discovery of his life—not the application of algebra to geometry, not the *cogito ergo sum*, not the essential distinction of mind and matter, but—the application of algebraic reasoning to physical phenomena. It was this reducing of the science of nature to purely mathematical calculations which he always set forth as his prime discovery. He reduced the qualities of matter—heat, color, flavor—to the figure and the motion of its particles. All these particles were extended and therefore figured, or geometrical quantities. Their motion could be computed mathematically. Hence all which was required was the general application of the calculus to figures too minute or too complicated for geometrical reasoning. This being provided by his analytical geometry, he had bridged over the chasm between algebra and nature, and provided the means of calculating *a priori* the laws of nature and the myriad modifications of matter. "Give me extension and motion," he boldly exclaimed, "and I will construct you the world." This it was which occupied the whole of his mature life. He was ever making experiments and observations to corroborate this doctrine. He was ever seeking to show that the *mechanical* explanation of nature is all-sufficing, and that there is no effect in nature so apparently disconnected with mere motion and figure that it cannot be really derived from them.

The only guarantee which Descartes originally proposed for all these conclusions was their deduction from simple notions which he perceived *clearly and distinctly*. They must be clear in themselves and distinct from all around them. This was his inheritance of the spirit of the age, which breathes through the early religious reformers, and through Bacon, and more obscurely through the Italian philosopher of the Renaissance, whose names have survived, tho their works are buried and forgotten in our dustiest libraries' most dusty shelves. The age had broken with Aristotle and with the authority of the schools, even where the authority of the church in matters of faith was still acknowledged. Men were throwing aside all the old guides and the old methods, and seeking a new and independent point of departure. Thus we find Descartes and his earlier correspondents speaking of Bacon not as a novel theorist, a pioneer into untrodden paths, but as an exponent of the world's want, and a thinker

who was only required to build up a positive edifice on the ground which by common consent was now to be cleared of its older tenements.

There was not, therefore, any so striking originality in Descartes' *proclamation of doubt* as regards older science or popular knowledge. Such proclamations were common in those days, and amounted in fashionable French society to actual Pyrrhonism. What was really remarkable about Descartes's doubt is this, that while he specially exempts morals from his attack, while he says he must live in a temporary house while he is pulling down and rebuilding his mansion, and while he afterwards rebuilds its moral wing by a mere selection of the old materials—while he is thus express about morals, he says not one word about theology. Or rather here and there, when he feels himself urged, he says, "Of course the doctrines of the Catholic Church are absolutely true; they are derived from direct revelation; I should be the last to question them; if anything I say conflicts with them in the smallest degree, I hereby retract it." But he never did retract any single proposition he put forward; he may have delayed its publication; he doubtless suppressed many things he would gladly have said; but to retract mentally, to abandon honestly, for the sake of the church, any conclusion he had attained clearly and distinctly, never once entered his mind. He lets us see a little further than usual into his real convictions when he says: "Of course we know by revelation that the world was made in six days, and by the direct creation of the Deity; but it *peculiarly satisfies the mind* to comprehend how these things could take place by natural and gradual means." He goes on to explain the genesis of the universe on the supposition that an Eternal Creator, starting with nothing but homogeneous extended matter, variously figured, and with motion, could cause the whole world to be gradually developed from them by natural and necessary results. In one other place, probably in an unguarded moment, he identifies this Deity with *the order of the world;* and as he distinctly suggests that miracles are only the action of known laws in unusual combinations, as he even suggests the possibility of a *science of miracles*, which could produce them when required, he evidently admitted no direct or personal interference of the

Deity beyond the creation and conservation of the material world.

In the moral world, his practical advices show the same turn of mind. He never, in his addresses of consolation to various friends, alludes to the comforts of religion, to its promises of future bliss, and the happiness of reunion in heaven. He never recommends the suffering and the bereaved to fly for succor to their priests and embrace the promises held out to the faithful. He builds his own moral system on a syncretism of Stoic, Epicurean, and Peripatetic doctrines. He exhorts to tranquillity of mind, to firmness of purpose, to a contempt of fortune and her freaks. Never does he speak of trust in God, of resignation to his will, of future rewards or future punishments. Once, I think, in all his works (cf. p. 12) he expresses a *philosophical* belief in future existence of the soul and its happiness. Whenever his doctrines were attacked as being in conflict with those of the church, he did not modify his philosophy in deference to the church, but sought means of accommodating the church doctrine to his philosophy. Never was there a more thoroughly secular spirit, never was there a mind more averse to dogmatic theology, to the claims of faith, or to the demands of authority. His studied politeness to the church meant no more than the extravagant compliments he thought it right, as a French *gentilhomme*, to pay those royal ladies who honored him with their correspondence. His title of orthodox Roman Catholic, dying with the rite of extreme unction, meant no more than his title du Perron, which he retained to please his family, tho he had sold his inheritance and abandoned its privileges.

How was it, then, that in spite of all his efforts to avoid religious controversy, in spite of his careful submission to sacerdotal authority, in spite of his strict conservatism in what appertained unto faith, he was perpetually involved in this kind of conflict, and that his name was a watchword in the quarrels of religious sects? How is it that even now the theological elements of his system do not cease to occupy metaphysicians, and to count justly as prominent features in his doctrine?

This question is easy to answer for those who regard Descartes as originally and fundamentally a religious philosopher,

anxious to supply a metaphysical groundwork for the doctrines of the church. And Descartes himself never objected to this interpretation of his philosophy. But if we adopt the view just set forth as to his thoroughly secular and non-religious spirit, the problem becomes more complex and more interesting, as we must solve it from inferences suggested by his works in their historical development.

We know that while still in Paris, long before he published his famous first work (the Essays) in 1637, he had occupied himself with a treatise "On the Existence of God." This was during the period (1625–29) when he was thinking out his system, and fortifying it by discussion in the literary and scientific atmosphere of Paris. He tells us that the distractions of the city made continued thought impossible, and that he at that time abandoned his task. It is easy to see why he felt himself driven in this direction. The society of Paris was profoundly sceptical, and when he announced his rejection of all received systems, and of all scholastic pedantry, they cheered him to the echo. But when he advanced to the positive part of his system, and proposed to base his new science on the mere assurance of clear and distinct conviction, the sceptics joined issue with him. How can you know, said they, that your clear and distinct ideas have any objective certainty—objective, we mean, in the modern sense? Were not the schoolmen as convinced as you are that they saw *clearly and distinctly* the truth of Aristotle's philosophy? Where is your guarantee that what you believe to have demonstrated is not equally idle?

To answer this difficulty Descartes must have been sorely exercised at one time. He could not fall back on the authority of the church, which he would not concede anywhere save in theology. And yet he must find some basis to satisfy at least his theological friends, who were suspicious of the consequences of his universal doubt. His escape from the difficulty, tho by no means logical, was one of the most remarkable features in his system. His earliest work on method, the "Règles pour la direction de l'esprit," contains hardly a word on the subject; his Essays are its first and complete pronouncement.

Among the ideas which he perceived clearly and distinctly so that he could not doubt them was that of a perfect and om-

nipotent Being, the counterpart of the defective and imperfect being which he felt himself to be. And here the shadow of scholasticism touched him, and he proceeded to an analysis of this idea more in the style of Augustin or Anselm than we should have expected from the seventeenth-century sceptic. He perceived clearly that among the perfections of this Being existence must be included *ex hypothesi* as it were, and so he asserted that the *existence* of God was a necessary datum of his own thinking. Here we have that remarkable passage from thought to existence which we find again in his philosophy—an argument which Hegel has resuscitated in our own century. All his other proofs or modifications of proof that the Deity must exist are based, as Kant clearly saw, and as indeed he himself admits, on this passage from the clear *idea* of an infinite and perfect Being to his necessary *existence*. This Deity once established, it followed that he must be the creator of the world and of man, that he could not possibly make man's convictions a mere system of delusion, and therefore our clear ideas, and our strict deductions from them, obtained a new and adequate guarantee.

Of course his adversaries were far too well trained in logic not to attack this argument as moving in a vicious circle. "You prove the existence of the Deity," they objected, "on the evidence of your clear and distinct idea; you guarantee the truth of the idea by the authority of the Deity you have thus established." His reiterated reply to this objection grants that no *other possible guarantee can be found for an idea present to the mind except its clearness and distinctness.* But in the case of past conclusions, in the case of the knowledge once acquired and now stored up in the memory—habitual knowledge, as Locke called it—the veracity of a Deity who created us is necessary to secure us from scepticism. Of course he ought to have argued that this habitual knowledge is either recoverable, step by step, in the way it was once acquired, thus showing the clear and distinct ideas it contains and their necessary connection, or that it is not scientific knowledge at all. But this he never did. His friends were so delighted at his reconciliation with natural theology that they urged him to fortify this point; they called it the stronghold of his doctrine. When Descartes had

once adopted an argument he never abandoned it, and he reiterated over and over again this demonstration, and often spoke of the "Meditations," in which it was most fully expounded, as the most perfect and valuable of his works.

Thus we find our philosopher in the field which he had carefully excluded from his original research. He might indeed have guessed that theology would invade his studies somewhere, however careful the separation from its sphere, however wide a berth he was desirous of giving to the theologians. He might indeed also have guessed, and perhaps knew well enough, that he too must invade theology, and that his philosophy would lend arms to the religious Reformation already begun and progressing.

But altho he sought the support of natural religion for his science, tho he set up the certainty of the existence of God as the first condition of real science, which accordingly an atheist could not attain, he never expanded this idea beyond the strictest bounds of metaphysics, and never called in for one moment the aid of revelation or of the inspired words of Holy Writ. He defines the Deity as "a substance infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent, by which I, and all other things that are, have been created and produced." He does not insist upon personality as one of these attributes, nor does he discuss any moral attributes save the absence of deception and ill-will, which are marks of imperfection. As for special mercy, particular providence, successive dispensations of dogma, they are unknown in his philosophy. Moreover, since he regards the conservation of the earth from moment to moment an act of omnipotence of the same kind as a perpetually new creation, it is evident that he did not necessarily consider the first creation as a personal act of will. Nor is it inconsistent with his other views that matter should be eternal, eternally ordered and preserved by the infinite Substance.

Once only, at the close of his third Meditation, we find him in a moment of religious contemplation: "Here I think it the right place to pause and devote some time to the contemplation of this all-perfect God, to weigh at leisure all his marvellous attributes, to consider, to admire, and to adore the incomparable beauty of this Divine Light, at least as far as the strength of my spirit, which is in some sort dazzled by it, can allow me to

do so. For as faith teaches us that the sovereign felicity of another life consists simply in this contemplation of the Divine Majesty, so let us now experience that a similar meditation, tho incomparably less perfect, makes us enjoy the greatest satisfaction which we are capable of feeling in this life." This is a fine passage, and in another author might be interpreted in a deep and devout sense; in Descartes it means little more than the intellectual admiration of perfection.

Years afterwards the Queen of Sweden asked him, through Chanut, whether the light of nature teaches us to love God, and whether we can love him by reason of this light. His reply is very interesting (vol. x. p. 10, ed. Cousin): "I see two strong reasons to doubt it. The first is that the attributes of God usually taken into account are so far above us that we cannot conceive them in any way suitable to us, for which reason we exert in their case no act of will [as is the case in loving ordinary objects].

"Secondly, there is nothing in God which we can imagine [in the sense of *image*]; so that even if we had for him some intellectual love, it does not appear that it could be sensitive, because it must pass through the imagination to reach sense. Hence I do not wonder that some philosophers are persuaded that nothing but the Christian religion, in teaching us the mystery of the incarnation, by which God humbled himself to become like unto us, makes us capable of loving him; also that those who, without knowledge of this mystery, seem to have a passion for some Deity, have it not therefore for the true God, but for some idol called by his name, embracing, like the Ixion of the poets, a cloud instead of the queen of the gods.

"And yet I have no doubt but that we *can* love God by the mere force of our nature. I will not assert that this love has any merit without grace; this I leave to theologians; but I venture to say that, as regards this life, it is the most absorbing and useful passion which we can have, and it may even be the strongest, altho for this is required a very attentive meditation, because we are continually diverted by the presence of other objects. Now the way which I think should be pursued to arrive at the love of God is to consider that he is a Spirit or thinking Being, in which our nature having some resemblance with his, we come to persuade ourselves that this nature

is an emanation from his sovereign intelligence, *et divinæ quasi particula auræ*. Also, since our knowledge seems to be capable of increasing by degrees to infinity, that of the Deity, being infinite, is the goal to which our own tends; if we consider nothing else, we may arrive at the extravagance of wishing to be gods, and so, by a great error, of loving mere Divinity instead of loving God. But if we also attend to the infinity of his power, by which he has created so many things of which we are the smallest part; if we attend to the extent of his providence, which makes him embrace at a single thought all that was, and is, and is to come; to the infallibility of his decrees, which, tho they disturb not our free will, cannot by it in any wise be changed; and in fine on the one hand to our littleness, on the other to the grandeur of all created things,—observing how they depend on God, and how they are related to his omnipotence, without enclosing them in a sphere, like those who believe the world to be finite,—the meditation on all these things fills the man who clearly understands them with such extreme joy, that, far from being so insolent and ungrateful to God as to covet his place, he thinks that he has already lived enough in that God has favored him in arriving at such knowledge; and so, joining himself willingly to him, he loves him so perfectly as to desire nothing in the world but that God's will be done; hence he no longer fears death, or pain, or misfortune, because he knows that nothing can happen to him but what God has decreed; and he so loves this divine decree, he esteems it so just and necessary, he knows that he depends so entirely upon it, that even when it brings him death or some other ill, if it were conceivable that he could change it, he would not choose to do so. But if he refuses not ills and afflictions because they are sent by divine providence, still less does he refuse all the good or lawful pleasures which he can enjoy in this life, because they likewise are so sent, and receiving them with joy, without fearing any ill, his love renders him perfectly happy."

This exposition, tho accommodated to the pious Catholic Church, and the queen whose interest he sought to arouse, is anything but the Christian love of God. It might have been written by any Stoic philosopher, and indeed we often find some such trains of thought in what remains of their writings. The

only point which here really interests him is whether this intellectual wonder and inspiration can be called *love*, which is a passion, and is accompanied by a warmth and excitement of the heart. How different the mystic piety of Fénelon; how different the equally calm but more intense devotion of Bishop Butler in his "Sermons on the Love of God"!

On the nature of God Descartes speculates no further. He never touches any distinctively Christian problem. The case is not different when he comes to the second principal point where his system touches theology—the relation of God to man. He has a distinct theory of man's creation and daily preservation to propound, and nothing more. But this is so closely connected with the problem of the nature of the soul and its future destiny that we may consider them together.

It is more than probable that when Descartes commenced to philosophize, he started purely as a mathematician and physical inquirer. His deductive turn of mind led him to define and limit his data, and so he came to isolate them from the data of other sciences. I conceive him first of all eliminating theology, as a disturbing element, and then mental and spiritual data, as of no service in the field of mathematics and physics. It was doubtless his early and brilliant successes in this domain of knowledge which tempted him to approach the other side and speculate on metaphysic, on spiritual phenomena and their scientific treatment. Here he thought himself most of all successful, tho posterity has not endorsed his judgment. But we must not digress further from the matter in hand.

As regards the nature of the soul, Descartes insisted upon its essence being nothing more than we can clearly and distinctly perceive. We are conscious of the act of thinking, and this is not only our only and highest guarantee of the existence of ourselves as thinking beings, but also determines for us the nature of those thinking beings. He will allow no occult powers, no latent modifications, nothing but clear thinking and definite ideas. Any such distinction as mind and soul, or soul and spirit, he rejected absolutely. On the other hand, all approach to a material origin of the soul was equally precluded. The essences of mind and matter were diametrically opposed, and they were only combined into one human being by a special act

of the creating Deity, who attached a "divine particle" to each mortal body at the first moment of its existence, making up what Le Roy (Descartes' once favorite pupil) called *an accidental unity*, tho this phrase was disowned by Descartes on account of the theological storm it produced. This foreign soul was in some peculiar and inexplicable way—for mind and matter have no natural meeting-ground or possibility of mutual influence—more closely present to the body in the pineal gland, and through it all sensations passed to and from the mind, but *how* was to Descartes inexplicable. It was the mere arrangement of the Deity, a perpetual miracle, which his followers developed into the theory that the mutual influence was imaginary, and that the supposed action of each on the other was only the pre-established harmony in the parallel life of two independent creations made to act in correspondence by the Divine Artificer.

We can see already what must have been the position he took up as regards immortality. He stoutly defended and demonstrated the soul's *immateriality*, and in the proposed title of his "Meditations" professed to demonstrate its immortality also. But he failed to fulfil his promise; and when his friends, who read and criticised the first private copies, commented on this, he changed the title, and omitted this development of his argument. He says, in apology, that it would require so complete a knowledge of all his metaphysical system that it was premature to discuss it. But the ripe moment never came. We have indeed in one or two letters a clear statement of his private belief. In answer to Mersenne's query why he had not discussed the soul's immortality in the "Meditations," he replies (viii. 431) that this need not cause astonishment; "for I could not demonstrate that God cannot annihilate the soul, but only that it is of a nature totally distinct from the body, and therefore not naturally subject to death with it, which is all that is necessary to establish religion." We see here the key to the whole of Bishop Butler's first chapter in his "Analogy." Again (ix. 369): "As regards the state of the soul after this life, I know far less about it than [Sir Kenelm] Digby; for, leaving aside what faith teaches us, we may make many favorable conjectures and have many fine hopes, but no possible

assurance." This second letter is six years later (1646), and is written to his intimate friend Madame Elizabeth.

He seems, therefore, to have gone back to doubt as he grew older; for in 1642 he writes to Zuytlichem to console him for the loss of his wife: "I cannot abstain from offering you a remedy for your grief which I find very potent, not only to enable me to support the death of those I most loved, but also to prevent me from fearing my own, tho I think well of life. It consists in considering the nature of our souls, which I think I know so clearly will last after this life, and are born for pleasures and felicities much greater than those we here enjoy, provided that by our misconduct we do not make ourselves unworthy, and expose ourselves to the punishments prepared for the wicked; that I cannot conceive any other state for the most of those who die than that they pass into a life more sweet and tranquil than ours, where we shall meet them some day, even with a recollection of the past. For I find within us an intellectual memory which is certainly independent of the body; and tho religion teaches us many things on this head, yet I confess to an infirmity which is, I think, common to me with the majority of men. It is this, that tho we wish to believe and even tho we think we believe very firmly all that is taught us by religion, we are not wont to be so nearly touched by things which faith alone teaches us, and to which our reason cannot reach, as by those to which we are in addition persuaded by very evident natural reasons."

This interesting passage goes further than any other in all Descartes' remains. But it is quite plain why he never ventured to argue the immortality of the soul in his official works. Confining himself to the natural arguments derived from its immateriality, he was probably unable to explain, or perhaps to believe, the doctrine of the immortality of the body. And this is the fundamental point in the Christian faith. For tho in consoling Zuytlichem he speaks of rejoining the dead, with a recollection of the past, it is not likely that he was convinced of the *personality* of the immaterial souls in a future state. His expression *particula divinæ auræ* points rather to pantheism, tho he was far too cautious to leave us any statement favoring so damnable a heresy.

These were the chief points, indeed all the points, in which Descartes' essentially secular and almost heathen system came naturally in contact with the dogmas of Christian theology. His ethics were purely heathen, and a syncretism of the better points in the chief ancient systems. It remains for us to consider the points which the theologians of his day thought of special importance or of special danger, and the manner in which he met their attacks.

We may, of course, separate these theologians into two great classes, the Catholic and the Protestant. The former were chiefly French, the latter Dutch. But among the Catholic theologians we must again distinguish two distinct classes: first, those many learned men of the Jesuit order, of the Oratory, etc., whose chief interest was in science, who had adopted the frock and the tonsure rather to seek leisure for general study than to pursue the special object of theology. Descartes spent his time in Paris with these people; there is every evidence that they were very secular in spirit; they ridiculed privately the pretensions of the Roman Congregation to decide questions of philosophy; in all the correspondence of Mersenne and others there is hardly a word which smacks of the priest. These letters are intensely and thoroughly secular; indeed, Descartes' voluminous correspondence, supported by that of Gassendi and others of the same date, is a curious and little-cited demonstration of the large and liberal spirit which reigned in the higher portion of the Gallican church, tho the policy of the court was at times influenced by the vulgar side of the Jesuit order, and presently the day came when this order regularly persecuted Cartesianism. But during Descartes' life things were not so, and among these liberal and secular priests he found his best disciples and advocates.

Among those, on the contrary, whose proper business was theology, from the most serious and enlightened, like Arnauld, to the most flippant and vulgar defenders of scholasticism, like Bourdin, we find the same kind of objections urged, and urged with reason. First and most vital is their objection to the spirit of universal doubt, the determined scepticism which Descartes had so eloquently inculcated at the opening of his "Method." He had protested, indeed, that it was applicable neither to religion nor to morals, and he satisfied Arnauld of his honesty of purpose in

this particular. But who could fail to see the intense danger of such a temper of mind, who could prevent any eager spirit from applying such a method universally, and proceeding to reconstruct by means of initial doubt the truths of religion? This was, in fact, precisely what Spinoza did in his "Tractatus Theologico-politicus"—the first note of modern destructive criticism, the legitimate outcome of Descartes' "Method." Descartes, indeed, always intended his doubt as the mere introduction to the founding of a more certain knowledge; he was anything but a sceptic in philosophy. But in theology he was silently an agnostic, and the spirit which he preached, to test all things, to hold fast that which was clear only, was so manifestly allied to the reformation of religion, in fact to Protestantism, that we wonder this particular charge was not oftener brought against him during his life. His taking refuge in Holland, among Protestants, and for the special purpose of being theologically free, was too suspicious not to cause many hostile surmises. In Holland not only were his chief friends Protestants, but he actually apologizes, in a letter of recommendation written for two Catholic priests, who entertained him with good music near Egmond, for being intimate with men of this class—a society which he usually avoided. This principle, then, of substituting clear ideas and individual certainty for authority and dogma, tho only applied in philosophy, was fraught with momentous consequences to the Roman Church.

Apart from this general objection, we find certain special Cartesian doctrines questioned as inconsistent with the Catholic faith, and these especially by Arnauld, his fairest and most profound critic.

But first of all came the assertion of the earth's motion, which Descartes was unable to abandon, or to hide by means of subterfuges, even tho he was terrified by the fate of Galileo, and was almost deterred from ever publishing anything by the fear of similar consequences. In this particular case, tho he submitted formally to the church, he plainly evaded the heresy by a subterfuge, asserting that the circumambient ether in which the earth was situate moved in a great vortex, carrying the earth with it, as the sailor is carried in his ship over the sea, and is nevertheless considered at rest if he does not move in the ship.

To his intimates among the Catholic clergy he did not conceal that he thought the Roman Congregation of the Inquisition were no authorities in science, and ought not to shackle private opinion till confirmed by a General Council. And in spite of Galileo's condemnation, the doctrine of the earth's motion was believed and taught by many orthodox Catholics in France, not even the Jesuits showing any bigotry in the matter. The Protestant divines in Holland, on the contrary, were often vehement in opposing this novelty. In France the Reformed had openly rejoiced at the blunder made in condemning Galileo; in Holland, where the authority of Holy Writ, and of the synods in interpreting it, were substituted for the authority of the church, people were just as ready to condemn a dissenter of heresy as they were at Rome. "God had made the round world so fast that it could not be moved." How was this text reconcilable with Descartes' physics? Here, as often since, Protestantism was not so much the assertion of a spirit of free inquiry as the substitution of modern authority, or individual authority, for the consent of past ages, interpreted by the Roman Church. The Protestant divines believed fully as much in their own infallibility as the Roman Church did in hers, but without formally asserting it. If Descartes opposed the Council of Trent, he violated the dogmas of his church; if he differed from the Synod of Dort, he was said to reject the truth of Holy Writ. In both cases his crime was exactly the same; he differed from the opinions set up by two various societies, and called sacred and infallible by them.

We come to the more serious and well-meant objections of Arnauld. Some of them are so truly scholastic that they now only excite a smile. In what sense could God be called the cause of himself, and was not this an improper expression? How could the infinity of the world be compatible with the belief of the church about its creation? These were, however, mere speculative difficulties, of little import when compared with the difficulty concerning the Eucharist.

Protestant theologians are so fond of regarding the doctrine of transubstantiation as an absurd violation of common-sense, that it is well to remind the reader of its origin and meaning. The Peripatetic philosophy established the distinction between

substance and accident, and taught that the *substance*, or real essence of a thing, was something quite different from all its *qualities*, and *could never be perceived*, tho it held together and produced the qualities. This is the sphere ascribed to the idea of substance even in Locke's Protestant and Reformed philosophy. It is the unknown and unperceivable something which binds together the sensible qualities and unites them into definite and separated objects. Hence Catholic theologians saw a way of escape from this capital difficulty, that Christ himself had expressly taught (St. John, cap. vi.) the sacrament to consist in eating his flesh and drinking his blood, while our senses taught as expressly that no change was perceptible in the bread and wine used in the sacrament. On the Peripatetic theory there was no difficulty. Let us imagine the *substance* of Christ's body made to underlie the *qualities* of bread and wine, and the elements, while offering no change to the senses, will be in the more real sense his body and blood. For the substance was more thoroughly the essence of things than any transient or changeable quality. Hence the change in the elements was not for the senses; they could not perceive *transubstantiation*, and the invisible miracle of the Eucharist was one consistent with the ordinary nature of things.

Here, however, the philosophy of Descartes joins issue. One of its cardinal points is the denial of any essence, or substance, or anything else, in bodies, which we cannot distinctly perceive. The whole rubbish of sensible forms, second intentions, substantial forms, he cast to the winds. The essence of matter was its *extension* and nothing else, and this extension, instead of being something imperceptible, like substance, is of all attributes the most clearly and distinctly perceived. What then becomes of the doctrine of transubstantiation? Here was truly a capital difficulty, and one upon which the church could tolerate no wavering. If Descartes could not reconcile his theory with this cardinal dogma, it could not be declared sound in faith and pure in morals. The Protestants were boasting openly that he had destroyed the doctrine and even demonstrated its impossibility. Hence his Catholic opponents were ready to identify him with Luther and Calvin, while his Protestant foes charged him with sympathy for Bruno and Vanini, who had preached atheism under the guise of a vague pantheism.

Descartes felt himself obliged to reply to this objection in answering Arnauld, and this is the official answer to which his followers would have been wise to adhere. He urges that when we are said to touch the elements or perceive them by sense, we are only really in contact with their external superficies, and that the peculiar quality which their surface affords us is merely made up of the position and shape of the various minute particles of which it is composed. But the surface itself is only a mean term between us and the substance we touch; it does not form part of the essence of either the organ or the object. Hence if bread and wine are only so modified in transubstantiation that the new substance is made to occupy exactly the same minute places as were occupied by the particles of the old, then the new substance would affect our senses with its surface exactly as the bread and wine did. Descartes took care to add that he was only bound to show his doctrine *compatible* with that of the church, and that he had done so, even avoiding an additional and unnecessary miracle. For the Council of Trent had expressly declined to define the exact process of the miracle of transubstantiation, making the belief in the mere fact an article of faith.

Nevertheless, tho Arnauld expressed himself satisfied, it is plain that the above subtle explanation, which assumes the Cartesian (and Lockian) doctrine that all the secondary qualities of bodies are mere consequences of minute figure and motion, implies this heresy, that the body of Christ *did not remain itself in the Eucharist, but was changed into bread.* For with Descartes the assuming of the qualities of bread must mean becoming bread, and nothing else. And in later but anonymous letters Arnauld pressed this difficulty, and Descartes screened himself under the words of the Council of Trent to which I have just referred.

It gradually transpired, however, after Descartes' death, that he had ventured another explanation to the Jesuit father Mesland, a missionary to the North American Indians. This Descartes had done under promise of secrecy, or at least that the doctrine should in no wise be attributed to him if it did not conform with the decisions of the church. Fortunately for us, his ardent admirers could not keep it secret. It circulated, however, only in MS., and Bossuet, a warm but prudent follower of Descartes, so strongly advised its suppression, that the letter to Mesland was not published till 1811, in Emery's "Pensées sur

Descartes," afterwards in Garnier's edition, but unfortunately not in Cousin's. The document is very interesting.[1] Its substance is as follows: The word *body* is equivocal, and means either a mere fixed quantity of matter, or that portion of matter which is animated by a soul. In the Eucharist we must take it in the second sense. Whatever changes there are in the quantity or figure of our bodies, we still count them our bodies in this sense, or the bodies of individual men. Hence in digestion and assimilation we have every day a natural instance of transubstantiation. The particles of foreign matter which we assimilate could even be pursued and discovered in our substance, if our senses were sufficiently acute. Let us imagine the elements standing in exactly the same relation to the soul of Christ, as if they had been *naturally* assimilated, and they would, while remaining in one sense bread and wine, be in another, with equal truth, his body and blood. This relation is produced *miraculously* by the words of consecration, so that the separate particles of the elements which would naturally be combined in Christ's body to form his substance become so without this combination.

But if the former explanation changed Christ's body into bread, this changed the bread into his body, merely animating it by his soul, and so in either case transubstantiation was simply evaded. Hence no orthodox Catholic theologian could be satisfied with such subtleties, and in the century following Descartes' death the Jesuits made this heretical tendency, tho not openly professed, one of their main grounds for the persecution of Cartesianism.

Such disputes have now merely a historical interest, but are worth restating in order to show, in the first place, how thoroughly the problem in Descartes' mind was not to reconcile his philosophy with the dogma of the infallible church, but rather to explain the dogma of the church so as to agree with his own infallible philosophy—his clear and distinct perceptions. Secondly, this discussion is necessary to explain what now seems strange—the fury of the controversy as to *extension being the essence of matter;* since this theory, if adopted, led to serious

[1] The full text, which is little known, I have appended at the end of this paper,

consequences in faith as well as in philosophy. The Protestant divines were never weary in urging that both sides had proved their case; that Descartes had proved the essential extension of matter, and the theologians its inconsistency with the Council of Trent. Of course it suited them well to set reason and Catholic dogma at variance. But had they chosen to adopt Cartesianism more thoroughly, they would have found it equally dangerous to the safety of Protestant principles. For Spinoza was its real outcome, and the rejection of all miracles its logical development. Pascal, himself imbued with its principles, and in some sense a follower of Descartes—Pascal's evidence on this point is not known as it deserves to be, and yet it sums up the controversy in a few words. He used constantly to say: "I cannot forgive Descartes; he would have wished in all his philosophy to get rid of the Deity, but he was unable to keep from making him give a nudge to set the world in motion."

And this is really true. In spite of all the demonstrations for the existence of the Deity, in spite of all the assertions of this Deity as the prime Mover of matter, he was to Descartes no more than the *Noûs* to Anaxagoras, required for a starting-point and then dispensed with absolutely.

This curious chapter in the history of philosophy was at first obscured by those who would not see it; then by those who could not see it, for they studied Descartes at second hand. Last of all he was traduced by the Scotch common-sense school into an advocate of empirical psychology, the forerunner of Reid and Stewart. It is time that a return to the original documents should reduce all this misrepresentation to its proper value; but we must read the original documents not in the exoteric but in the esoteric sense. We must not accept the certificate of the renegade Queen Christina as a voucher for the orthodoxy of the philosopher. We must not accept his formal declarations—formal in every sense. We must judge him by the spirit of his doctrine, and by the general effect which his works produce not only in their statements, but also in their studied silence.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

The following is the letter referred to on page 319:

Quand, à l'occasion du Saint-Sacrement je parle de la superficie qui est moyenne entre deux corps, à savoir entre le pain (ou bien le corps de Jésus-Christ après la transsubstantation) et l'air qui l'environne, par ce mot de superficie je n'entends point quelque substance ou nature réelle, qui puisse être détruite par le toute-puissance de Dieu; mais seulement un mode ou une façon d'être, laquelle ne peut être changée sans le changement de ce en quoi ou par quoi elle existe; comme il implique contradiction que la figure carrée d'un morceau de cire lui soit ôtée, et que néanmoins aucune des parties de cette cire ne change pas. Or, cette superficie moyenne entre l'air et le pain ne diffère pas réellement de la superficie du pain, ni aussi de celle de l'air qui touche le pain, mais ces trois superficies ne sont en effet qu'une même chose, et diffèrent seulement au regard de notre pensée; c'est à savoir, quand nous la nommons la superficie du pain, nous entendons que, bien que l'air qui environne ce pain soit changé, elle demeure toujours *eadem numero*, pendant que le pain ne change point, mais que s'il change, elle change aussi; et quand nous la nommons la superficie de l'air qui environne le pain, nous entendons qu'elle change avec l'air et non avec le pain. Enfin, quand nous la nommons la superficie moyenne entre l'air et le pain, nous entendons qu'elle ne change ni avec l'un ni avec l'autre, mais seulement avec la figure des dimensions qui séparent l'un de l'autre; si bien qu'en ce sens-là, c'est par cette seule figure qu'elle existe; car le corps de Jésus-Christ étant mis en la place du pain, et venant d'autre air en la place de celui qui environnait ce pain, la superficie qui est entre cet air et le corps de Jésus-Christ demeure *eadem numero* qui était auparavant entre d'autre air et le pain, parce qu'elle ne prend pas son identité numérique de l'identité des corps dans lesquels elle existe, mais seulement de l'identité ou ressemblance des dimensions; comme nous pouvons dire que la Loire est la même rivière qui était, il y a dix ans, bien que ce ne soit plus la même eau, et peut-être aussi qu'il n'y ait plus aucune partie de la même terre qui environne cette eau.

Pour la façon dont on peut concevoir que le corps de Jésus-Christ est au Saint-Sacrement, je crois que ce n'est pas à moi à l'expliquer, après avoir appris du Concile de Trente qu'il y est, *ea existendi ratione quam verbis exprimere vix possumus;* lesquels mots j'ai cités à dessein à la fin de ma réponse aux quatrièmes objections, afin de m'exempter d'en dire davantage. Et aussi, parce que n'étant point théologien de profession, j'avais peur que les choses que j'en pourrais écrire fussent moins bien reçues de moi que d'un autre. Toutefois, puisque le Concile ne détermine pas que *verbis exprimere non possumus* mais seulement que vix possumus, je me hasarderai ici de vous dire en confidence une façon qui me semble assez commode et très-utile pour éviter la calomnie des hérétiques qui nous objectent que nous croyons en cela une chose qui est entièrement incompréhensible, et qui implique contradiction; mais c'est, s'il vous plaît, à condition que, si vous la communiquez à d'autres, ce

sera sans m'en attribuer l'invention, et même que vous ne la communiquerez à personne, si vous jugez qu'elle ne soit pas entièrement conformé à ce qui a été déterminé par l'Eglise. 1° Je considère ce que c'est que le corps d'un homme, et je trouve que ce mot de corps est fort équivoque, car quand nous parlons d'un corps en général, nous entendons une partie déterminée de la nature, et ensemble de la quantité dont l'univers est composé, en sorte qu'on ne saurait ôter tant soit peu de cette quantité que nous ne jugions incontinent que le corps est moindre et qu'il n'est plus entier; ni changer aucune particule de cette matière, que nous ne pensions que le corps n'est plus par après totalement le même ou *idem numero*. Mais quand nous parlons du corps d'un homme, nous n'entendons point une partie déterminée de matière, ni qui ait une grandeur déterminée, mais nous entendons seulement la matière qui est ensemble unie avec l'âme de cet homme, en sorte que bien que cette matière change et sa quantité augmente ou diminue, nous croyons toujours que c'est le même corps *idem numero*, pendant qu'il demeure joint et uni substantiellement à la même âme, et nous croyons que ce corps est tout entier pendant qu'il a en soi toutes les dispositions requises pour conserver cette union; car il n'y a personne qui ne croie que nous avons le même corps que nous avons su dès notre enfance, bien que leur quantité soit beaucoup augmentée, et que, selon l'opinion commune des médecins, et sans doute, selon la vérité, il n'y ait plus en eux aucune partie de la matière qui y était alors, et même qu'ils n'aient plus la même figure, en sorte qu'ils ne sont *eadem numero* qu'à cause qu'ils sont informés de la même âme. Pour moi qui ai examiné la circulation du sang, et qui crois que la nutrition ne se fait que par une continuelle expulsion des particules de notre corps qui sont chassées de leur place par d'autres qui y entrent, je ne pense pas qu'il y ait aucune particule de nos membres qui demeure le même *numero* un seul moment; encore que notre corps en tant que corps humain soit toujours le même *numero* pendant qu'il est uni avec la même âme; et même en ce sens, il est indivisible; car si l'on coupe un bras ou une jambe à un homme, nous pensons bien que son corps est divisé en prenant le mot de corps en la première signification, mais non en le prenant en la seconde; et nous ne pensons pas que celui qui a un bras ou une jambe coupée soit moins homme qu'un autre. Enfin quelque matière que ce soit, et de quelque quantité ou figure qu'elle puisse être, pourvu qu'elle soit unie avec la même âme raisonnable, nous la prenons toujours pour le corps du même homme et pour son corps tout entier, si elle n'a pas besoin d'être accompagnée d'autre matière pour demeurer jointe à cette âme. De plus, je considère que lorsque nous mangeons du pain et buvons du vin, les petites parties de ce pain et ce vin se dissolvant dans notre estomac, coulent incontinent de là dans nos veines, et par cela seul qu'elles s'y mêlent avec le sang, elles se transsubstantient naturellement et deviennent partie de notre corps, bien que si nous avions le vue assez subtile pour les distinguer d'avec les autres particules du sang, nous verrions qu'elles sont encore les mêmes *uumero* qui composaient auparavant le pain et le vin; en sorte que si nous n'avions point de garde

à l'union qu'elles ont avec l'âme, nous les pourrions nommer pain et vin comme devant. Or, cette transsubstantiation se fait sans miracle. Mais, à son exemple, je ne vois point de difficulté à penser que tout le miracle de la transsubstantiation, qui se fait au Saint-Sacrement, consiste en ce qu'au lieu que les particules du pain et du vin auraient dû se mêler avec le sang de Jésus-Christ et s'y disposer en certaines façons particulières, afin que son âme les informât naturellement, elle les informe sans cela par la force des paroles de la consécration; et au lieu que cette âme de Jésus-Christ ne pourrait demeurer naturellement jointe avec chacune de ces particules de pain et de vin, si ce n'est qu'elles fussent assemblées avec plusieurs autres qui composassent tous les organes du corps humain nécessaires à la vie, elle demeure jointe surnaturellement à chacune d'elles, encore qu'on les sépare. De cette façon, il est aisé à entendre comment le corps de Jésus-Christ n'est qu'une fois en toute l'hostie quand elle n'est point divisée; et neanmoins qu'il est tout entier en chacune de ses parties quand elle l'est; parce que toute la matière tant grande ou petite qu'elle soit, qui est ensemble informée de la même âme humaine, est prise pour un corps humain tout entier. Cette explication choquera sans doute d'abord ceux qui sont accoutomés à croire qu'afin que le corps de Jésus-Christ soit en l'eucharistie, il faut que tous ses membres y soient avec la même quantité et figure, et la même matière *numero* dont ils ont été composés quand il est monté au ciel. Mais ils se délivreront aisément de ces difficultés, s'ils considèrent qu'il n'y a rien de cela qui soit déterminé par l'Eglise, et que tous les membres extérieurs et leur quantité et matière, ne sont point nécessaires à l'intégrité du corps humain, et ne sont en rien utiles et convenables à ce sacrement, où l'âme de Jésus-Christ informe la matière de l'eucharistie, afin d'être reçue par les hommes et de s'unir plus étroitement à eux; et même cela ne diminue en rien la vénération de ce sacrement. Et enfin, l'on doit considérer qu'il est impossible, et qu'il semble manifestement impliquer contradiction que ses membres y soient; car ce que nous nommons, par exemple, le bras ou la main d'un homme, est ce qui en a la figure extérieure, et la grandeur et l'usage, en sorte que quoi que ce soit que l'on puisse imaginer en l'hostie, pour la main on le bras de Jésus-Christ, c'est faire outrage à tous les dictionnaires, et changer entièrement l'usage des mots que de le nommer bras ou main, puisqu'il n'en a ni l'extension, ni la figure, ni l'usage. Je vous aurai obligation si vous m'apprenez votre sentiment touchant cette explication; et je souhaiterais bien aussi d'avoir celui du Révérend Père Vatier; mais le temps ne me permet pas de lui écrire.

# WOMEN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A PROPHECY FROM HISTORY.

## SECOND ARTICLE.

"Look around us where we will, we find nothing but a confused scene of contradiction, hardship, uncertainty, and arbitrary power. Thence arises our desire to render more perfect the laws upon which our lives and fortunes depend."—VOLTAIRE.

"In rebus quibuscunque difficilioribus, non expectandum, ut qui simul, et serat et metat, sed præparatione opus est, et per gradus maturescant."—BACON.

AT the conclusion of our first article we had reached that point in our historical examination where the technical fallacy of "unity in marriage" had become firmly imbedded in the law of England, and had begun to establish or direct all the important tendencies in the development of the relations of women to the social body. It would be an examination of extraordinary interest, if the limits of our paper made it feasible, to trace that evolution through the succeeding centuries to the present day. We could note the establishment of the tenancy by entireties, so carefully elaborated by Littleton and his learned commentator, Lord Coke. We could deprecate the exclusion of married women, by express provision, from the benefits of the Statute of Wills, passed in the reign of Henry the Eighth. We could analyze the growing sense of justice which found expression in the development of the wife's "sole and separate estate," which the system of uses and trusts made possible—a device which quite abrogated the doctrine of unity without denying it. We could follow the intense conservatism of the English law into the modified conservatism of the early American law, which thought it wise upon this subject alone to allow the voice of precedent to drown the cry of justice. We could

describe the wave of legislative reform which swept over the States between 1840 and 1850, which completely wrecked the principle of unity in marriage on many points, but retaining in others introduced a system of marriage-laws which was neither consistent nor intelligible. And finally we could chronicle the steady progress of modern legislation towards the establishment of simple forms of simple justice, which promises shortly to sweep from the threshold of the home every vestige of the tangled web which mediæval ignorance and injustice began eight centuries ago to weave across it. But we must turn now to the facts from which our conclusions are to be drawn.

In reviewing the present status of the questions relating to the social position of women, let us first address ourselves to their part in industrial pursuits, which we have suggested as so important a consideration in determining their relative value and importance.

We must now direct our attention to the arguments of statistics, which, however dry and tedious, will be more apt to convince than any lighter or more fanciful process. It is believed that a few figures will enable us to get at once at the root of the matter.

The Census Report for 1880 takes notice of two hundred and sixty-five different occupations. Of this number it appears that women pursue, to a smaller or greater degree, two hundred and twenty-two. The foundation for all our calculations must be the relative number of women engaged in occupations compared with men. The census gives: males, 14,744,942; females, 2,647,157. These figures must in their turn be compared with the statistics of population, viz.: males, 25,518,820; females, 24,636,963. These comparisons give a general outline of the actual connection of women with industry throughout the Union.

A closer analysis of the occupations of women will furnish the following table:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Women | engaged | in Agriculture | 594,510 |
| " | " | Professional and Personal Services | 1,361,295 |
| " | " | Trade and Transportation | 59,364 |
| " | " | Manufactures and Mechanics | 631,988 |

We will find, moreover, that of the whole number of women engaged in occupations, all but about three hundred thousand may be included under twelve forms of labor, viz.:

| | |
|---|---|
| Domestic Servants | 938,910 |
| Agricultural Laborers (chiefly negro cotton-pickers) | 534,900 |
| Milliners and Dressmakers | 281,928 |
| Teachers and Scientists | 154,375 |
| Laundresses | 108,198 |
| Cotton-mill Operatives | 91,479 |
| Farmers | 56,809 |
| Tailoresses | 52,098 |
| Employees of Hotels and Restaurants | 31,065 |
| Boot and Shoe Makers | 21,007 |
| Woollen-mill Operatives | 35,506 |
| Clerks in Stores | 23,722 |
| In Other Occupations | 317,160 |

Women almost monopolize the offices of domestic servants there being about nine times as many women as men engaged in them. The same is true of millinery and dress-making. There are nearly twice as many women as men who are classed as teachers and scientists. Cotton-mills employ about thirteen thousand more women than men. The class of professional nurses has over twelve thousand women and about fifteen hundred men.

In the following occupations there appear to be no females employed:

Stock-drovers.
Hunters and Guides.
Draymen and Hackmen.
Insurance Officers.
Blacksmiths.
Butchers.
Charcoal and Lime Burners.
Firemen.
Machinists.
Pattern-makers.
Pump-makers.
Railroad-builders.
Scale-makers.
Stove-makers.
Civil Engineers.
Soldiers and Marines.
Teamsters.
Railway Officers.
Sash-makers.
Car-makers.
Lead and Zinc Workers.
Marble and Stone Cutters.
Plasterers.
Masons.
Quarrymen.
Roofers and Slaters.
Ship-carpenters.
Wheelwrights.
Hostlers.
Veterinary Surgeons.
Bank Officers.
Pilots.
Steam-boiler Makers.
Boat-makers.
Carpenters.
Engineers and Firemen.
Lumbermen.
Oil-well Operators.
Plumbers.
Quartz-workers.
Saw-mill Operatives.
Sawyers.
Stave and Shook Makers.
Wood-choppers.

With the exception of two or three of these occupations, it is clear that the reason for the exclusion of women is the single

one that they do not possess the necessary physical strength—this lifting power of which we have spoken. We will consider hereafter whether this is likely to be a permanent bar.

There seems no sufficient reason why women should not freely enter any of the following occupations, nor why it is that they have apparently neglected them. The figures are taken from the last Census Report, and opposite each occupation the number of women engaged in it throughout the Union is given:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Apiarists (17). | Florists (230). | Architects (17). |
| Gardeners, etc. (1309). | Chemists (48). | Designers, etc. (56). |
| Journalists (288). | Physicians (2432). | Brokers (68). |
| Telegraphers (1131). | Telephoners (147). | Real-Estate Agents (39). |
| Bakers (1063). | Basket-makers (596). | Bone and Ivory Workers (171). |
| Bookbinders (5491). | Engravers (103). | |
| Lawyers (76). | Coopers (1). | Gold-workers (1967). |

With the exception of the restrictions upon the practice of law by women in some States, and the difficulties women have in acquiring technical training, there seem to be no hindrances placed in their way in these occupations either by law or nature.

Now we are ready for an important inquiry. Do statistics show that the relative number of women engaged in occupations is steadily increasing? An examination of the following table taken from the census figures of 1870 and 1880 will give an affirmative answer:

| | |
|---|---|
| Number of Females in Gainful Occupations in 1870..... | 1,836,288 |
| Increased by ratio of increase of population (29.03 per cent). | 2,369,362 |
| Actual number returned by Census of 1880..... | 2,647,157 |
| Excess over increase in population..... | 277,795 |

We will next take up the question of women's wages. How do they at present compare with those of men for the same work, and are matters improving in this respect?

We will first direct our attention to a familiar illustration to which the community has recently had its attention called. Telegraphy requires no great physical strength, and in its pursuit women are brought directly in conflict with men. They are under no peculiar disadvantages of which we can learn, altho we understand from a Baltimore and Ohio official that they do not allow women to use their duplex machines on

account of the strain involved: but this is not the experience of other companies. After some difficulty, we have obtained the following figures in regard to the actual monthly wages paid women and men by the Western Union Company. We have taken the Wheatstone operators in order to insure uniformity. The operators are divided into three distinct classes, and the following table compares the average monthly wages of male and female operators:

| | Beginners. | Medium. | Extra. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Women | $15 00 | $25 00 | $30 00 |
| Men | 40 00 | 50 00 | 60 00 |

It is quite impossible to convince any person who has had an opportunity to observe the marvellous nimbleness of hand, lightness of touch, and quickness of comprehension of which women are capable, that these figures in any way represent the relative intrinsic value of the labor performed by the men and women respectively.

Another illustration, quite as forcible, is at hand in the report of the Commissioner of Education for 1881. The following statistics show the salaries of the men and women in the public schools. The public schools have been chosen in order to avoid the unfair effect which the large salaries of college professors would have upon the averages. The average monthly salary is given in each case:

| State. | Men. | Women. |
|---|---|---|
| Massachusetts | $85 54 | $38 49 |
| Rhode Island | 76 00 | 41 89 |
| Nevada | 99 50 | 74 76 |
| Florida | 40 00 | 40 00 |

Great significance is to be attached to this table. It will be noticed at once that in Florida, where there are about four thousand more men than women, the average salaries are the same, and in Nevada, where the men largely predominate, they are nearly equal, while in Massachusetts, where the women exceed the men by some seventy-six thousand, the women

receive about one half of the salary of the men. It is plain enough that the laws of supply and demand are at work.

But is it true that as women are admitted into additional employments and the pressure on certain points are removed their average wages are rising? With a view to answering this inquiry we have prepared the following table from the census statistics of manufactures; it is based on the manufacturing reports of the State of Massachusetts, and compares the weekly wages of male and female operatives:

| Occupation. | 1840. | 1850. | 1860. | 1870. | 1875. | 1880. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Weavers (women) | $2 42 | $3 52 | $3 73 | $5 90 | $5 35 | $5 33 |
| Others (women) | 2 84 | 3 22 | 3 26 | 5 42 | 5 05 | 4 88 |
| Mechanics (men) | 7 88 | 8 52 | 9 00 | 13 50 | 12 12 | 10 62 |
| Carders (men) | 4 50 | 4 50 | 4 56 | 8 26 | 7 26 | 6 30 |

It will be seen that in the past forty years the wages of women in the departments given above have more than doubled, while the wages of men in the same classes of occupations have increased by only one third.

Before concluding our examination of women's relation to industry, let us direct our attention to two important opinions which have recently been rendered from high authorities. The first was in the case of Mrs. Mary G. Miller, who applied for a license to act as captain of a steamboat on the Mississippi River. Her application was refused by the local authorities, and she appealed to the Treasury Department. Secretary Folger, in reversing the decision below, made use of the following language: "There is no need of talk pro or con on the social status of woman's rights. Mistress Miller having been put on God's footstool by him, she has the right to win her bread in any moral, decent way which is open to any of his toiling creatures. If she chooses to do so as the master of a steam-vessel, it is an honest calling; and if she is fitted for it, tho clothed in skirts rather than breeches, she has a right to follow it, and no man should say her nay."

The second case was that arising lately in Philadelphia on the application of Mrs. Kilgore to be admitted to practise law in the law-courts of the city. Three separate courts in that

city took the ground that special legislation would be required before the privilege could be extended to women. In the third proceeding Justice Pierce delivered a dissenting opinion. "There are inherent reasons," he said, "why women should be admitted to practise law, growing out of the necessities of her fellow-women." And after expressing his indignation at the unjust and brutal rules of the common law respecting the property rights of married women, he proceeds: "And if this were not enough, denying them the right of earning their own livelihood by their talents which God has conferred upon them! How long are these relics of barbarism to be perpetuated? I am in favor of admitting Mrs. Kilgore to practise law as an attorney of this court."

Mrs. Kilgore's fourth application met with success. Judge Thayer, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "If there is any longer any such thing as what old-fashioned philosophers and essayists used to call the sphere of a woman, it must now be admitted to be a sphere with an infinite and indeterminable radius." And again: "It would not be the part of a wise judicial discretion to turn backward the wheel of time to convince history that it is all wrong and to say at this time of day that woman shall not be permitted to pursue the vocation that suits her taste and for which her studies have qualified her."

"It may be," says the Editor of the *Albany Law Journal*, in commenting upon the case, "that a woman under the existing laws is not competent as an attorney; but if so, the sooner such ridiculous laws are repealed the better."

It is unnecessary to remark upon the extraordinary advance in public opinion which is represented by these official views.

There is, perhaps, no better way of introducing a sketch of the present educational status of women than by mentioning some of the sources of information which have been put at our disposal. We have by us the circulars of information issued by the Cambridge Society for the Collegiate Instruction of Women (familiarly known as the Harvard Annex), the circular issued by Columbia College relating to its department for women; the report of the Massachusetts Society for the University Education of Women; notes from Smith College for Women, Wellesley College, the University of Michigan, and Vassar and Rutgers female colleges; the prospectus of the

Bryn Mawr College for Women, recently endowed with nearly a million dollars; and a great number of valuable reports and circulars from the National Bureau of Education relating to the subject, which Commissioner Eaton, with great kindness, has forwarded to us together with an exhaustive letter replying to some inquiries made of him, which were not answered in any printed matter. No words will speak so emphatically of the educational interests of women as the fact that there are at present in full operation in the United States two hundred and twenty-six institutions for the superior instruction of women.

With a view to proving the steady advance of public opinion in the matter of the higher education of women, we have copied the following table from the last Report of the Bureau of Education on this subject. It compares the numbers of institutions for the superior instruction of women during the past ten years:

| Superior Instruction. | 1871. | 1874. | 1876. | 1878. | 1879. | 1880. | 1881. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutions | 136 | 209 | 225 | 225 | 227 | 227 | 226 |
| Instructors | 1,163 | 2,285 | 2,404 | 2,478 | 2,323 | 2,340 | 2,211 |
| Students | 12,841 | 23,445 | 23,856 | 23,639 | 24,605 | 25,780 | 26,041 |

It appears from this table that within the past ten years the number of institutions for the superior instruction of women has nearly doubled; that the number of instructors engaged in them is doubled, and that the number of students attending them is very considerably more than doubled.

The same report from which this table is taken uses the following strong language: "All that the advocates of higher education for women claim upon the ground of their capacity for development has been conceded in the United States." The official opinion of the Commissioner only follows in the wake of a strong public sentiment. The question of woman's intellectual capacity is no longer an open one. The public-school systems of the great majority of States recognize no sex in education so far as the opportunities are concerned, and the following figures will demonstrate the fact that the great mass of the community raise no question as to the importance of

at least a common-school education for girls as well as boys:

| | |
|---|---|
| Total enrolment at Public Schools | 9,946,160 |
| Number of Females | 4,825,301 |
| Number of Males | 5,120,859 |

The number of males exceeds the number of females by less than three hundred thousand. There is no occasion for any further demonstration in regard to primary instruction.

But are there any great number of women who are actually receiving full college training, or do these institutions of superior instruction include only intermediate, normal, and preparatory instruction? It is impossible to give exact figures in answer to this inquiry, but Mr. Eaton has kindly prepared for us the following approximate table which will not be found far out of the way:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *Intermediate.* | | |
| City High Schools | 24,833 | |
| Normal Schools | 23,525 | |
| Academies and Seminaries | 60,448 | |
| | | 108,856 |
| Preparatory Departments for Women in Colleges and Universities: | | |
| Universities and Colleges | 7,009 | |
| Colleges for Women | 7,016 | |
| Schools of Science | 290 | |
| | | 14,325 |
| Total Intermediate | | 123,171 |
| *Collegiate.* | | |
| In Universities and Colleges | | 3,122 |
| In Colleges for Women | | 13,661 |
| In Schools of Science | | 1,278 |
| Total number in Collegiate Courses | | 18,061 |

It is fair to argue from these statistics very important conclusions. If it be true that the question of woman's capacity for the highest forms of intellectual training is really settled beyond dispute, and if great educational advantages are being offered her, which are yearly increasing in number and improving in character, and if she is actually making use of these advantages and the world is gradually becoming equipped with strong, carefully trained female minds, full of independence

of character and of strong natural force and individuality, can any of us measure the completeness of the reaction from social views in regard to the intellectual value and importance of woman, both to herself and to the community which is inevitable. Give the savage the knowledge of the use of the Martini rifle, and how soon will he discard his boomerang! Let our women once feel their intellectual power, and hold them back if you can. Give to women the power of letters and you have given up the contest. The army of educated women is growing to vast proportions. It will become irresistible, if it is not already so.

Hereafter women will mould their own future.

It is unnecessary to offer any detailed statement of the present legal and political rights of women. We have already alluded to the gradual removal of all restraint upon their entrance into any decent mode of livelihood. It remains to say a word upon their rights in a court of law. It may be news to some that there is no difference of any kind between the legal rights of the single woman and the man. The spinster has all the rights of property and contract that are possessed by the freest man. The general tendency of modern law is to give even the married woman, whose hardships at the common law were so grievous, the same rights as her husband. In no one of the advanced States of the Union does the husband's arbitrary right in his wife's estate remain, and it is no longer responsible for his debts. Conservatism still places restrictions upon her power to contract, but there is a strong tendency to do away with this absurd relic of the thirteenth century, and there is scarcely a State which does not allow the married woman to trade in her own name and right. She has in some States the absolute power of disposition of her property by deed or sale, and in almost all the absolute power of testamentary disposition. She retains most of her interests in her husband's estate as at common law, which he is not allowed to deprive her of by alienation. This is a manifest injustice, and is so considered by recent provisions of some of our States.

Women are to a certain extent quite without political power, and are regarded by the State in the same light as children,

idiots, and drunkards. The test of freedom in republican government, if the individual be of age and *compos*, is the suffrage. No taxation without representation. It is well known that women are denied this right. It is to be doubted whether the time has come for the extension of suffrage to women, but the tendency is undoubtedly in this direction. The denial of the right was based on the merger of the wife's person and property in her husband, and with the disappearance of both of those theories the franchise can no longer be refused her with justice or safety.

In conclusion, we must in so far assume the rôle of prophecy, in order to give any meaning to our title, as to gather up the threads of our argument, and to give to the historical and modern tendencies we have been studying what we believe to be their true value and significance. Are these tendencies temporary or permanent in character? And if we say permanent, what is the probable state of affairs to which they will have led the community within another century?

But first let us dispose of what appear to us to be two dangerous and misleading fallacies. We may remember the figures we have quoted in regard to the relative number of men and women in the United States. The males predominate by about one million (881,857). It is endeavored by many to argue that these figures prove beyond doubt that marriage is the inevitable future of women under the law of nature, and that no theory is worth anything which does not acknowledge this law as supreme. This argument would have held in the Garden of Eden before the Fall. It will doubtless be unassailable when the millennium comes. But examine the figures in regard to the older States in the Union. The following table shows the unequal distribution of the sexes in five States:

| States. | Males. | Females. | Surplus. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pennsylvania..... | 2,136,665 | 2,146,236 | F. 9,581 |
| New York..... | 2,505,322 | 2,577,549 | F. 72,227 |
| Massachusetts..... | 858,440 | 924,465 | F. 76,025 |
| Indiana..... | 1,010,361 | 967,940 | M. 42,421 |
| Territories..... | 443,201 | 341,242 | M. 101,959 |

It will be seen from this table that in the three States of Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts alone nearly one hundred and sixty thousand women are absolutely debarred from matrimony, and this without taking into consideration the state of bachelorhood. In almost all of the older States the women predominate by about ten thousand. To say that emigration will cure this evil, and serve to restore the special averages, is simply to add another piece of cheap sarcasm to the arguments with which some men meet the issue. To ask any intelligent man to believe that in the face of the modern developments this vast number of human beings will not advance in the direction of material independence is to require a position which is at once absurd and unjust.

Another mistake which is common and should be avoided at all hazards is that of confusing health with physical strength.

Insurance companies have hitherto refused to insure the lives of females, but we notice in the last Report of the Provident Life and Trust Company of Philadelphia a complete disallowance of any special risk thereby incurred. The report quotes with approval the following extract from a pamphlet written on the subject by a Dr. Schenck:

"From forty-five years and upwards women die at a decidedly lower rate than men, and the mean result over the whole life is in favor of female life. The English mortality rates for twenty-five years prove that there is not only less mortality among females, but there is also less disease, especially those diseases which are not nervous in character; not only so, but when any year is especially healthful the fact tells most in favor of female life."

It is to be remembered in the first place that these results are partly due to the less exposed occupations to which women direct their attention, and to the fact that they are greatly protected from all but one class of sudden deaths. But at best they have only a partial bearing upon the industrial problem. They possess great importance in serving as complete defences to the position that women are physically capable of great endurance for education or other objects, but they do not add to their physical strength in lifting a definite number of pounds a definite number of feet, nor are they any reply to the position

that in all occupations where brute force is the element of value women will suffer by comparison with men.

In exactly the same manner men will suffer when brought into competition with the mule or the steam-engine. Who will argue, therefore, that men are inferior to mules? Is it not plain now how important it is to measure similar values with each other and not with those to which they bear no relation?

May we not hope that some of our readers have anticipated us in our postulation of the following conclusions in regard to our "Women of the Twentieth Century"?—

It seems to be clear beyond all argument that women are by nature of lighter frame than men, and that they are subject to certain constitutional limitations (the most important being child-bearing) from which men are wholly free, and that this fact imposes upon them certain restrictions in competition with men in the most laborious pursuits. Therefore the average wages of women, or their average industrial value, is *ex necessitate* less than that of men. These limitations may be hereafter modified by a healthier mode of life, more rational modes of dress, and generous provisions of society; but it is impossible to suppose that they will ever be entirely removed.

But the multiplication of labor-saving machinery, the education of woman in industrial pursuits, the opening of new avenues of trade to her, will greatly enlarge the sphere of her industrial activity, while there are even at present a large number of lucrative occupations perfectly suited to her, and to which she will doubtless address herself very shortly.

The present low rate of wages paid to woman in pursuits to which she is adapted results not from her competition with men but from her competition with her own sex. She engages in a small number of occupations and overcrowds them. As she takes up new pursuits and the pressure is relieved at certain points her average wages in these occupations will certainly rise. For reasons already stated, the lower class of women will still continue to be domestic servants, and this pursuit will always occupy the same position for women that the lowest and most laborious pursuits do for men.

It being admitted that women are fully capable of the

highest forms of intellectual culture, and the tendency being to afford them equal opportunities with men, another century will find them on an equality in every respect with men, so far as intellectual acquisitions and technical knowledge are concerned.

The tendency of modern law being to sweep away all distinctions of sex as regard the legal status of women and to return to the just position of the Saxon law, it is probable that the next century will bear no traces of the present obstructions that are placed upon married women.

As women increase in intellectual and industrial importance and gain intellectual and material independence, their individuality of character will be too distinct to be merged in that of their husbands by marriage, and a similar revolt which has newly defined the property rights of husband and wife will divide the parties to the contract into their separate unities and hear them both as members of the State. The woman's ideas will become strong, sound, and valuable, and she will be allowed to express them through the suffrage.

In general terms, the present harassing difficulties which a false and half-reformed conservatism places as a bar to woman's progress will, before another hundred years are gone, be entirely removed, and the sole limitations upon her advancing and taking her place by the side of man will be those imposed by nature, to which the wisest women will always give the closest heed.

Instead of being forced to struggle, with her limited strength and peculiar disadvantages, in the face of hindrances and discouragements which would dishearten the bravest men, society will cheerfully allow her to do her best under every possible and helpful convenience. The modern mill-stones which society, in its selfishness, blindness, and obstinacy, loves to hang around her neck will be lifted from her much-enduring shoulders by the hands of a gallantry more unselfish and a reverence more genuine than the shallow pretensions of modern society have ever known.

That all these advancements are in accordance with the natural and proper development of the social status of women seems to us to be clear. We cannot but think that altho the laws of social evolution will never, theoretically, permit the

return of social events to their original forms, none the less history lays at the doors of our boasted modern civilization a load of falseness and unfaithfulness to the trust of womanhood which no circumstances can palliate, and that society will find, when at last women shall force from it the common decency and fairness of treatment which one human being owes to another, that it has only retraced its steps to that almost prehistoric time when our ancestors were not too proud, too selfish, or too cruel to deal with a weaker and unprotected ward with honor and justice.

Who will care to say, who indeed will dare to say, that the future will not be to the greater glory of woman; to the greater strength and moral welfare of society; and to the achievement of an ideal of womanhood more beautiful, more noble, because less helpless, less pitiful than the sophistry of a century ago could possibly have dreamed of or imagined as the richest jewel in the crown of a century in whose shadow we stand?

FRANCIS KING CAREY.